Recurring concern

Unreliable medication dosage verification and communication

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 30 Jul 2013•Latest report 16 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of dosage verification, clarification, read-back, discussion or communication when they directly concern medication dosage safety across prescribing, dispensing, administration or transitions of care.

Not included

  • Excludes medication safety concerns unrelated to dosage verification or communication, such as failures to refer for non-medication care.
  • Excludes generic staffing, documentation or communication deficiencies that are not directly tied to medication dosage safety.
  • Excludes failures concerning medication choice, monitoring or adherence where dosage verification or communication is not the unsafe condition.
Reports
16

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
20

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
26

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England4
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Boehringer Ingelheim Limited1
Brace Street Health Centre1
Brook Medical Centre1
BTCM Limited1
Care Quality Commission1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Department of Health and Social Care1
Doncaster Royal Infirmary1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
Godfrey Care1
Inmind Healthcare Group1
Manor Field Surgery1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    DARREN ROBERT DICKSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren Robert Dickson was found unresponsive at home after last being seen on 5 February 2025 and died in hospital on 6 February 2025. Toxicology found benzodiazepine and alcohol, and concerns were raised about incomplete records of information and signposting provided by Recovery Steps, and possible confusion or insufficient communication between Recovery Steps and GP services about benzodiazepine use and doses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure clear communication with GP services about ongoing drug use and doses

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) At the appointment on 27 January 2025, Mr Dickson was given advice to prepare a ‘drugs diary’. This was required so that, at his follow up appointment, it could be ascertained what his usage of benzodiazepine he was, so that a better-informed treatment plan could be prepared. I was conscious of the need your staff have for accurate information as to the extent of the drug use so that a well informed and coherent plan could be put in place. The concern I had was that Mr Dickson had seen his GP prior to the appointment on 27 January 2025 and had been told that if he was to take any benzodiazepine, it should be less than what he had previously taken. I was concerned that there was scope for confusion as to the information being given to Mr Dickson, and the level of communication that Recovery Steps has with the GP services in relation to the issue of ongoing use and doses of drugs. ”

    Source location

    DARREN ROBERT DICKSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to scrutinise prescribed medication and medication-system information

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate networks for Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers and Medication Safety Officers to receive and spread learning from medication errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide guidance and tools to NHS Trusts for learning from patient safety incidents and improving controlled-drug safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the option to modify existing prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system, requiring cancellation or discontinuation and reordering with clinical warnings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9th June on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify morphine product names and predefine twice-daily frequency for modified-release morphine prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have recognised there is a huge variation in morphine formulation and type and have made the naming of products clearer. For example, MST is noted as ‘Morphine MODIFIED RELEASE 12 HOURLY tablets’ on the system. We have also pre-defined the frequency as twice a day.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Education and training alone would not sufficiently mitigate recurrence; systems improvements and mechanisms are also required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NICE medicines optimisation guidance NG 5 (2015) referenced above recommends that organisations support healthcare professionals through training and education to ensure safe prescribing, dispensing and administration. In this specific case, education and training alone would not prevent these types of safety system issues and would not be sufficient to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence. Systems improvements and mechanisms will need to be implemented to ensure lessons are learnt and that the current organisational and systems factors and processes highlighted in this case are addressed, to ensure the safe and effective checking and administration of medications. This has been substantiated by safety research and incident analysis.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj, also known as Merita Brahimi, died on 30 June 2024 from a traumatic head injury after falling from a height at a multi-storey car park while suffering an exacerbation of psychosis. The report identifies concerns about subtherapeutic antipsychotic medication levels not being acted on, communication and escalation within the mental health team, incomplete record-keeping, medication prescribing confusion, and safety mitigation on the car park’s penultimate floor.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to verify antidepressant prescription doses

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was confusion about the mental health Trust prescribing dose for Ms Ahmetaj antidepressant medication and an overreliance on discussions with her rather than checking the prescription dose and communication with the GP was delayed. ”

    Source location

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce with medical staff the need to communicate medication-dose inconsistencies clearly and promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this discrepancy was not causative of the sad outcome in this matter, reliance on the patient’s report was made in good faith as part of the therapeutic process. I can assure the Court that, moving forward, the importance of clearly communicating and communicating any inconsistencies between a patient’s reported medication dosage and the dosage prescribed by the GP will be reinforced with the medical team, in order to ensure safe and effective prescribing and to minimise the risk of confusion.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The maximum licensed sertraline dose meant no dose increase was possible, so no additional prescribing action was considered necessary before the planned review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this case, during the consultation with the doctor on the 22nd May 2024 the patient reported that she was taking sertraline ████████ and this was documented in the clinical notes on the day by the doctor. A brief letter was sent to the GP on the same day requesting an increase in dose of Sertraline (████████). The GP responded on the 24th May 2024 advising that the patient was in fact prescribed and reporting use of sertraline 200 mg. This is the maximum licensed dose. This meant there was no role for recommending a further increase, and the appropriate course of action was to review the patient at her next planned appointment which would be on 1st July 2024 to consider alternative treatment options. At this time there were no indications to suggest a need to bring the appointment forward.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2025

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Amanda Richardson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amanda Richardson, aged 40, was transferred from prison to a low secure mental health hospital and was found dead in her bedroom on 29 April 2023. Toxicology found a very high level of a prescribed drug, which had been prescribed at double the stipulated maximum dose, alongside evidence of illicit drug use. The concerns included inadequate medication review and monitoring, failures to record and investigate searches, and the adequacy of hospital security arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of hospital systems to review and safeguard medication prescribing and administration

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was admitted that the prescription of ████████ at the rate of ████████mg/day was double the ████████mg/day stipulated maximum (without additional monitoring being undertaken) and was made in error. This situation went unnoticed for some six months, until her death. There was no effective system of review in the hospital in this period. The pharmacist appears to have dispensed the drug without querying the high dose. The nurses who administered the drugs did not question it. The MDT meetings which took place did not check the dose, or reflect upon its potential interaction with the several other medications prescribed. Overall, there was no effective resilience in the hospital’s systems to safeguard against drugs bring prescribed or administered in error. ”

    Source location

    Amanda Richardson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Actions taken following the Serious Incident Report are considered sufficient to address identified issues and prevent similar future deaths.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Inmind Healthcare remain committed to learning and improving service but given the assurances given to the Coroner at the Inquest, Inmind Healthcare consider that actions have been taken to fully address the issues identified by the Serious Incident Report and to prevent future deaths in similar circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from InMind
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 September 2024

    Open published response
  5. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Ethan Burgess, who had epilepsy and Lennox-Gastaut syndrome, died at home on 19 November 2022 after vomiting and aspirating during an epileptic seizure. The report identifies concerns about communication and prescribing processes for Brivaracetam, including failures to update the prescription, medication being withheld for several days, and a subsequent increase to 10ml twice daily despite information that 4ml twice daily was appropriate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer dosage-clarification correspondence to a clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer medication-change correspondence to a clinician for consideration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to give the prescribing GP express instructions to amend Brivaracetam prescriptions after dosage changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain a reliable written basis for Brivaracetam dosage administration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review internal policies and procedures against the coroner’s concerns and identify necessary changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Godfrey Care Response We intend to review our internal policies and procedures considering the coroners concerns and identify where changes need to be made. Below, we respond to the coroner’s areas of concern, setting out what we have already done, what we are doing now, and what we intend to do in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a local medication policy covering medication receipt, transcription, altered labels, missed doses, written prescribing confirmation and triangulation between prescribers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reviewed Policies and Procedures The following actions will be implemented by 1st April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update staff medication competency assessments to test clarification of unclear directions, MAR-label discrepancies and verbal medication changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3 The Staff Medication Competency Assessment has been reviewed and now includes the following questions.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require GP review and triage of all neurology correspondence received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have a GP review and triage all neurology correspondence and clinic letters received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised Medisec clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear prescribing actions for primary care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust setting which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update weekly and monthly managers’ medication audits to verify written authorisation, dosage changes and timely receipt of replacement prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Run through the reviewed managers monthly medication audit to ensure expectations are clear.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear actions for prescribing GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust settings which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A standardised clinic-letter template cannot be created immediately because implementation across the Trust requires substantial timeframes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The delay in administering medication did not contribute to the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Whilst this concern is not directly addressed to the acute Trust (UHNM) or Brook medical Centre, it has been considered as part of the wider learning following Joshua’s death. Medications for epilepsy is considered across the healthcare economy to be ‘critical’. The National Patient Safety Agency (2010) defined critical medicines as ‘medicines which can result in patient death or serious harm if there are delays in their administration’. Whist the Coroner found that the delay in administering medications on this occasion did not contribute to Joshua’s death, we believe that further education within the care home setting is required. With this in mind, we will work together with the local authority to ensure that up to date communications are shared across the Stoke on Trent and North Staffordshire health and social care economy to reiterate this message.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response
  6. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Juanita Boate Nti had complex congenital diseases and was receiving palliative care at home. She received twenty times the intended morphine dose after the prescription and symptom control plan failed to clearly specify the volume, and the prescription contained two different concentrations. She suffered respiratory arrest and died following an accidental morphine overdose, with concerns also identified about the EMIS prescribing system not offering the relevant morphine strength.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify conflicting medication concentration and specify administration volume before dispensing

    Wider context from the report

    “The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

    Source location

    Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly record prescribed medication strength and administration volume

    Wider context from the report

    “The hospital originally prescribed 120 micrograms of morphine sulphate 6 hourly and dispensed 100 micrograms per ml solution, but the strength and volume to be administered were not clearly recorded on the plan sent to the GP. The mother requested her GP by telephone to continue the prescription. The GP found only one strength of morphine on the EMIS prescription system, 10mg/5ml, confirmed to be the lowest strength available in the British National Formulary. He wrote this in the first line of the prescription and then confusingly further added “100 micrograms per ml solution, 120 micrograms 6hrly”. The pharmacist did not notice that the second line contained a different concentration and dispensed the higher dose without stipulating the volume to be administered. The baby received 3mg instead of the intended 150 micrograms. Whilst both GP and pharmacist made errors in clinical practice and did not contact each other, the error would not have occurred had another strength of morphine been a choice on EMIS. EMIS have been notified and placed the special prescription on its drug data base. The local commissioning group is conducting a project to identify other special prescriptions that are not on EMIS that may pose a similar risk to safety. ”

    Source location

    Juanita Boate Nti · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake further actions and discussions after receiving the paediatric medicines review’s statement on next steps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The national Patient Safety Team at NHS England are aware of the issues and the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) and the Neonatal and Paediatric Pharmacy Group (NPPG) Joint Medicines Committee is currently undertaking a ‘Review of the Management of the Supply of Unlicensed Liquid Medicines to Children’, which includes the workstreams referenced above. NHS England awaits a statement from the Group as to next steps later in November 2023, and further actions and discussions will then take place. We can update the Coroner once we have an update.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss liquid morphine safety with London ICB medication-safety representatives and provide regional oversight of action-plan implementation, including communications to GPs and community pharmacists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The London region Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer will also be discussing this issue with all London ICB medications safety representatives and ensure regional oversight of implementation of action plans which will include communications to GPs and community pharmacists.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2023

    Open published response
  7. Hertfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    John Paul SKINNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Paul SKINNER was admitted to Watford Hospital on 15 May 2020 after suffering tonic clonic seizures and was given phenytoin. A verbal communication failure led to 15 mg/kg being heard as 50 mg/kg, resulting in an overdose; he arrested and died. The principal concern was that unclear communication of dosage could lead to foreseeable medication errors in hospitals.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use clear and non-confusable communication and expression of numbers for medication dosages

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Junior doctor instructed to administer phenytoin did not know the required dosage and asked his more senior colleague for advice. The senior doctor's reply 15mk/kg was heard by the junior doctor as 50mg/kg resulting in administration of a significant overdose. This is a readily foreseeable confusion which could apply in any hospital and could be avoided by use of clearer and less confusable means of communication and expression of number ”

    Source location

    John Paul SKINNER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark fell at home on 3 November 2018 and remained on the floor for around six hours before being taken to hospital with a suspected fractured neck of femur. She received multiple doses of morphine, including an intravenous dose that was not titrated, and was not monitored in accordance with Trust policy; concerns included inconsistent use of millilitres and milligrams between pre-hospital and hospital services when recording opiate medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of different units for opiate medication between pre-hospital services and hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “The doctor who prescribed the morphine at Queens Hospital had not appreciated that the London Ambulance Service paramedics had administered 20 milligrams of morphine. If he had been aware of this he would have administered a further 10 milligrams. The doctor did not note that the paramedics had referred to mls as opposed to mgs in the medication section of the Patient Report Form. The doctor confirmed that the units used in hospital are mgs. It was agreed by all witnesses that great care needs to be taken in the administration of opiate medication. It was agreed that the use of different units by the pre-hospital service and the hospitals themselves creates risk and creates concern as to the risk of future deaths. It is requested that the Trust liaise with the London Ambulance Service to determine whether the units for administration of opiate medication can be standardised between the hospitals and pre-hospital services. ”

    Source location

    Doris Daisy Laura Clark · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Annie Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Annie Lloyd was taking warfarin and appears to have taken a higher-than-intended dose for around two weeks. She was found unconscious on 6 April 2019 with a large subdural haematoma and raised intracranial pressure, and died the same day. Concerns identified during the inquest included inadequate checking of her warfarin dosage and reliance on family members to confirm the required dose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to independently verify warfarin dosage before prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that there was an inadequate process in place for checking the patient’s warfarin level dosage. It appears that a “yellow book” confirming the dosage was being copied and the GP issued the prescription without checking this. 2. The GP practice claim to have placed reliance on the family to confirm the dosage required. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Annie Lloyd · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require Warfarin patients to present yellow books, record and verify INR results and doses, and confirm prescriptions before issuing them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. All of our patients (who take Warfarin) have been told that they must bring in their yellow Warfarin book every time they go to have their INR checked at the hospital. The Warfarin book will be scanned and then given to the practice manager who will code the latest INR. She will then enter on to their consultation the date the INR was taken, the result, what dose of medication they should be taking and when their next INR is due. She will then request the correct strength as per the yellow Warfarin book. The General Practitioner will also check the details before issuing the prescription.”

    Source location

    2019-0493-Response-by-Brace-Street-Health-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a written procedure for prescribing Warfarin, checking INR results, and changing doses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. The Practice now has a written Procedure for the process of prescribing Warfarin, checking INR results and altering doses. Please find this document attached.”

    Source location

    2019-0493-Response-by-Brace-Street-Health-Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign the assistant practice manager to check Warfarin requests during the practice manager’s leave.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) The assistant practice manager will check Warfarin requests when the practice manager is on leave.”

    Source location

    2019-0493-Response-by-Brace-Street-Health-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Warfarin prescribing, monitoring and auditing systems are considered robust and sufficient to prevent further recurrences.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The receptionist will photocopy and scan the yellow book immediately and then give it to the practice manager who will code the latest INR and check the correct dose. The GP will then check it again. Our pharmacist is doing a quarterly audit to make sure we are not missing any patients.”

    Source location

    2019-0493-Response-by-Brace-Street-Health-Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 October 2019

    Open published response
  10. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    George Benjamin Rimmer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Benjamin Rimmer was found deceased at home on 25 October 2018 after being prescribed Oramorph for pain following decompression surgery. The concerns included taking the medicine directly from the bottle rather than measuring doses, possible lack of counselling about exceeding the prescribed dose, and insufficient warnings about excess or cumulative dosing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to counsel medication users on the use and risks of exceeding the prescribed dose

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Mr Rimmer was known to swig out of the bottle rather than take a measured dose as many patient do; (2) Mr Rimmer self medicated as required; (3) Mr Rimmer’s GP did not recall advising him of the possible consequences of exceeding the prescribed dose. (4) There was no evidence to show that anyone had counselled Mr Rimmer with regards to the use of this drug. (5) The leaflet that comes with the bottle does not provide a sufficient warning of the dangers of taking an excess dose. (6) There is no mention of the dangers of drinking from the bottle and not measuring the dose. (7) There is no warning on the bottle to act as a reminder of the dangers of taking an excess dose or of the cumulative effect of taking more than the prescribed amount. ”

    Source location

    George Benjamin Rimmer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prescribing clinicians and other healthcare professionals are responsible for explaining dosing, risks, and consequences of exceeding prescribed doses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We view this matter of concern as more pertinent to Mr Rimmer’s prescribing clinician and other healthcare professionals.”

    Source location

    2019-0269-Response-by-Boehringer-Ingelheim
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 October 2019

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026