Recurring concern

Unreliable safety risk assessments for prisoners

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First reported 11 Mar 2014•Latest report 15 Dec 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in prisoner safety-risk assessment processes, including incomplete or omitted assessments, reliance on a prisoner's presentation or interview instead of relevant collateral information, failure to consider known risk factors, and assessment practices that depart from appropriate prisoner-safety standards.

Not included

  • Excludes mental-health-specific risk assessments where mental health risk assessment is the more specific supported concern.
  • Excludes named systems or pathways such as ACCT, multidisciplinary high-risk-prisoner reviews or custody observation where those systems provide the more specific boundary.
  • Excludes generic prison staffing, training, documentation or communication deficiencies unless they directly make a prisoner safety-risk assessment unreliable.
  • Excludes non-prison risk assessments and assessments concerning only physical equipment, premises or public-road hazards.
Reports
10

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
10

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
11

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service3
Ministry of Justice2
Belmarsh Prison1
Cardiff Prison1
Care UK1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Featherstone Prison1
Glen Parva Young Offender Institution1
High Down Prison1
Home Office1
Lancashire & South Cumbria NHS Foundation Trust1
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust1
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust1
Pentonville Prison1
Sodexo1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Sundeep Ghuman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sundeep Ghuman was a prisoner at HMP Belmarsh who was placed in a triple cell with a prisoner known to have racist and violent behaviour. On 18 February 2020, that prisoner violently assaulted Mr Ghuman with a table leg, and Mr Ghuman died in hospital on 19 February 2020 from a head injury. The principal concerns included failures in the CSRA process and training, inadequate treatment of racism alerts and other risk information, insufficient consideration of risks when allocating cellmates, and wider concerns about violence and drug use at HMP Belmarsh.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of assessment of Spice-related risks in cell-sharing decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “There appears to be no consideration in HMPPS of the risks to prisoners from inhalation of Spice when a cellmate is a user or supplier, or of the risks of more easily exploited prisoners being led into Spice use by cellmates who use the drug, and no assessment of whether it is safe to place a prisoner in a cell with a user or supplier of Spice. I am aware that deaths have been directly linked to Spice use. In the absence of any assessment of the risks in individual cases, there appears to be a risk of death of a prisoner through being placed into a cell with a known user or supplier of Spice. ”

    Source location

    Sundeep Ghuman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require prisons to quality-assure CSRA assessments and cell allocations through sampling, escalation, rechecks, and management oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Another improvement in the new framework will be to require all prisons to put in place a quality assurance process. This will involve checking samples of initial assessments to see that all available evidence has been taken into account, and that the results are based on that evidence. It will also cover how CSRA is used in practice, to check whether prisoners’ cell allocations match their risk level. In addition, independent audits of the CSRA process by our Performance, Assurance and Risk Group will continue.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate CSRA checks into LTHSE safety assurance visits, including sample reviews, escalation, rechecks, and targeted support for assurance gaps.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As well as improving training, quality assurance measures have been formally embedded within HMP Belmarsh’s internal audit processes. These arrangements ensure that decisions and practice remain compliant with national policy and are subject to regular review. Additionally, the LTHSE Safety Team will incorporate CSRA checks during safety assurance visits to provide the Prison Group Directors (PGDs) with assurance that prisons are policy compliant in CSRA application. This will include reviewing a sample of 10% of CSRAs completed in the last 60 days (on reception, transfer, and following incidents) for process compliance and quality. CSRA forms will be checked to ensure there is a clear rationale for”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen First Night Centre assessments to identify and promptly share current risks for people entering custody.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “First Night Centre processes have also been strengthened and a robust assessment procedure is now in place for all individuals entering custody, whether via court or transfer. These assessments ensure that information is current and accurate, that any risks to others are clearly identified, and that critical information is promptly shared with all relevant stakeholders. The First Night Centre now works closely with the local Safety team, which further improves the flow of information and early risk identification.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 5 · response
    Published 18 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Available evidence indicates secondary exposure to psychoactive substances is highly unlikely to cause adverse effects or currently pose a risk to cellmates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have raised also the risk associated with secondary exposure to psychoactive substances. This is a matter that we have also considered and based on the evidence available, we do not believe this currently presents a significant risk.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 4 · response
    Published 18 December 2025

    Open published response
  2. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Patrick Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew Patrick Jones, a 37-year-old male prisoner, died after being transferred from a vulnerable-prisoner wing, unlawfully segregated and deprived of healthcare assessment, basic amenities and prescribed medication. The report identified concerns about inadequate risk assessment and communication, the absence of effective personal-officer support and transfer protocols, inconsistent medication systems, unlawful segregation, and failures relating to adjudication and monitoring. The expert psychiatric evidence stated that these factors created the “perfect storm”, and the jury concluded that the prison regime contributed to the death and added a rider of Neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess risk on reception and after transfer

    Wider context from the report

    “b. Deselection of prisoners from the Residential Support Unit with no multidisciplinary assessment of past ACCT/self-harm, mental health, psychology input into the decision along with risk factors for an RSU prisoner in the wider jail c. Misapplication by all senior officers and custody managers of wing segregation rules resulting in mass segregation of prisoners with no safety algorithm completion, enhanced checks, involvement of healthcare et cetera; d. No risk assessment by the CM prior to transfer or the transferring wing Senior Officer prior to transfer; e. No prison records of any discussions regarding transfer or the decision to transfer a prisoner between wings or of any checks undertaken prior to transfer f. No risk assessment by the receiving wing senior officer either on reception of the prisoner or at any time in the next 36 hours before his death; g. Inconsistent medication regimes without explanation; h. Closure of ACCT forms when either medical treatments were impossible to deliver or had not been undertaken although the reduction in analgesics had occurred; i. Records of post closure interviews been entered in the records when it was obvious that the risk profile had changed substantially since the post closure interview took place; j. No personal officer involvement to ascertain why a prisoner may be defaulting from the prison regime. ”

    Source location

    Andrew Patrick Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 8 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Robert John Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert John Richards died by suicide after being found hanging by a sheet in his cell at HMP Wandsworth on 29 July 2014. The report identified concerns about bullying, extortion, inadequate risk management and communication, unsuitable cell allocation, staffing and training, and failings in resuscitation equipment and procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake risk assessments of prisoners before sentencing

    Wider context from the report

    “8. That there is a risk assessment undertaken of prisoners in the approach to sentencing so that any increase in risk may be appropriately managed. ”

    Source location

    Robert John Richards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Russell was a serving prisoner who was found hanging by a ligature from his cell door and died in hospital the following day. The jury concluded that multiple failures in the management and application of the ACCT plan procedure materially contributed to his death, including concerns about medication monitoring, care planning, multidisciplinary reviews, staff training, risk assessment and communication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct risk assessments for individual prisoners

    Wider context from the report

    “HM Prison High Down a. Ensuring that all staff have received adequate foundation and on-going training in the ACCT procedure, with particular emphasis on: • Requiring ACCT Case Reviews to be multidisciplinary and thereby ensuring that all relevant medical practitioners are aware of the date and time of any such review and have been invited to attend. • Risk Assessments in relation to individual prisoners. ”

    Source location

    Matthew RUSSELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review SystmOne use with partner agencies and develop a multi-agency protocol for risk communication and medicines optimisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CNWL has been appointed as the Lead provider for Primary Care Services in HMP Highdown and across the Surrey prisons cluster. As part of the mobilization and transfer process, CNWL will undertake a full review of the system in conjunction with partner agencies to optimise system usage and risk assessment and management processes across prescribing and pharmacy services. This will include the development of a multi-agency protocol on the use of SystmOne that includes communication of risk and medicines optimisation.”

    Source location

    2016-0430-Response-by-Central-and-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use a daily Open ACCT Log and morning briefing to identify open ACCTs, arrange assessments and ensure mental-health attendance at reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Safer custody at HMP Highdown now provide CNWL with a Daily Open ACCT Log, which is sent to three managers within the team. This is then circulated to all staff on duty that day and a daily copy posted on the Inreach Staff Office Notice Board.”

    Source location

    2016-0430-Response-by-Central-and-North-West-London-NHS-Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 26 February 2017

    Open published response
  5. Preston and West Lancashire

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew Gus PEEBLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    The circumstances of Andrew Gus Peebles’s death are said to be set out in the attached summing up, jury findings and conclusion; the inquest concluded on 18 May 2016. The substantive concerns included failures to record or undertake mental-health assessments and referrals, inadequate review of relevant documentation, and insufficient evidence of supervision or retraining after the concerns were identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake assessments in the way recommended for prisoner safety

    Wider context from the report

    “(9) the attendance at inquest by the healthcare manager without sufficient information to demonstrate that matters had improved, been resolved etcetera and having heard the suggestions to minimise future deaths by the expert ████████ consultant forensic psychiatrist who advises at a national level on matters of prisoner safety, effectively responded that that wasn't the way the Trust undertook its assessments ”

    Source location

    Andrew Gus PEEBLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Rodney Darren BLAIR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rodney Blair, who had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol dependency, multiple drug use and depression, was remanded in custody at HM Prison Pentonville and was found hanging in his cell on 2 August 2015. The inquest concluded that his death was suicide, with several contributing factors. Concerns included gaps in assessment and management of his mental health and antidepressant treatment, and delays and procedural issues in the prison emergency response.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess drug use during prison triage

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Although the assistant psychologist who triaged Mr Blair in prison on 2 July 2015 asked him about his alcohol dependency, she did not ask him about drug use, nor did she record asking him about his mood or any suicidal thoughts. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Rodney Darren BLAIR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns 2, 3 and 4 relate to BEH-MHT services rather than the services addressed by this response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: We refer you to the response provided by BEH-MHT as these concerns are relating to their services rather than the services of Care UK.”

    Source location

    2016-0196-Response-by-Care-Uk
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2016

    Open published response
  7. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Greg Revell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Greg Revell was found hanging in his cell at HM YOI Glen Parva, and resuscitation was unsuccessful. The concerns included that a previous ligature self-harm attempt did not lead to an ACCT, uncertainty among prison officers about when to open an ACCT, insufficient consideration of recorded risk factors, and weaknesses in capturing healthcare information and obtaining a GP summary.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Over-reliance on prisoners’ accounts instead of previous recorded risk factors

    Wider context from the report

    “4. There was over reliance upon what the Prison Officers were told by Greg, and insufficient emphasis on previous recorded risk factors in documentation available to them. ”

    Source location

    Greg Revell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a robust clinical-information process with documented responsibilities, follow-up, escalation and senior risk-system scrutiny for obtaining prisoners’ clinical notes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We now have a robust system in regard how clinical information is sought and there is a flow chart (Attachment 1) identifying team member's responsibilities to ensure consistency and follow up if required. This flowchart details the responsibility of each discipline within the team to ensure that there is a robust mechanism in place to ensure that Prisoners Clinical Notes are requested and followed up.”

    Source location

    2015-0165-Response-by-Leicestershire-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Safer Prisons recording procedure and train reception and healthcare staff to document risk information and decisions in O-Nomis and SystmOne.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A new Safer Prisons strategy was launched in October 2014. This includes a new procedure for recording decisions made in response to the risk information on the self-harm warning form. The new procedure has been disseminated through training and briefings with reception and health care staff, who have been informed that they must refer to all relevant information about newly arrived prisoners, including the Person Escort Record, and make an entry on O-Nomis to record what they have observed and decided. Healthcare staff have also been reminded to record this information on SystmOne (the electronic medical records system).”

    Source location

    2015-0165-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff to open an ACCT whenever information indicates suicide or self-harm risk, even when the prisoner does not appear at risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the local policy which states that an ACCT must be opened whenever information is received to indicate that a prisoner is at risk, even if the prisoner himself does not present as being at risk. Case managers have also been reminded to take account of all the relevant information and to have regard to the dynamic and static risk factors for the individual when carrying out case reviews, and not simply to rely on their assessment of the prisoner’s presentation. This ensures that the level of risk is assessed on the basis of comprehensive information.”

    Source location

    2015-0165-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind case managers to consider comprehensive dynamic and static risk information during individual case reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff have been reminded of the local policy which states that an ACCT must be opened whenever information is received to indicate that a prisoner is at risk, even if the prisoner himself does not present as being at risk. Case managers have also been reminded to take account of all the relevant information and to have regard to the dynamic and static risk factors for the individual when carrying out case reviews, and not simply to rely on their assessment of the prisoner’s presentation. This ensures that the level of risk is assessed on the basis of comprehensive information.”

    Source location

    2015-0165-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 April 2015

    Open published response
  8. Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Stuart Megginson BAUMBER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Megginson BAUMBER died by hanging in his cell at HMP Peterborough between 22:30 on 14 November 2013 and 04:10 on 15 November 2013, after being remanded in custody for arson. The jury found that occasions existed when the ACCT process should have been initiated and that inadequate understanding and training contributed to this not happening. The report also raised concerns about ligature points on cell doors, healthcare screening that did not mention section 136 detentions, and items available to prisoners that could facilitate suicide.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use trigger-date information to prompt risk reassessment for prisoners outside the ACCT process

    Wider context from the report

    “9. It is known that a prisoners risk of self-harm and/or suicide may increase in certain circumstances. This applied to the deceased in this inquest. HMP Gartree have identified measures to identify potential triggers and there has been developed a database on trigger dates but only for those who are or have been subject to an ACCT. This could be refined to deal with re assessment of risk for many prisoners if key factors exist. (See Equality and Human Rights Commission paper in 2015 on Preventing Deaths in detention of adults with Mental Health Conditions). Again, the PPO bulletin of March 2015 highlighted increased vulnerability where a restraining order was made and this could be input into a database to prompt a review of risk. ”

    Source location

    Stuart Megginson BAUMBER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    Adam Amos Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adam Amos Williams, a serving prisoner aged 29, collapsed at HMP Featherstone on 5 March 2013 and died at New Cross Hospital on 6 March 2013 from a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage. The concerns raised related to communication between prison healthcare staff during emergencies, whether dynamic assessments considered the need for restraint, and the possible benefit of additional CCTV in prison common areas.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of dynamic assessments to account for the need for prisoner restraint

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Picking up on recommendation 3 in the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s report I wonder if the “dynamic assessment” referred to does specifically take into account the need for a prisoner to be restrained at all. ”

    Source location

    Adam Amos Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Apply an individual, audit-compliant escort risk assessment to determine restraint use, including reassessment following medical advice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At HMP Featherstone a standard risk assessment proforma is in place for all external escorts, which is audit compliant. This is completed on an individual basis for each prisoner which considers various risk factors, such as criminal history, behaviour in prison, risk to the public, risk to the victim and escape potential. Where it is confirmed”

    Source location

    2014-0324-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide escort and duty managers with emergency-escort advice and guidance, and review restraint decisions at operational meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “that a prisoner is in a life threatening condition then cuffs will not routinely be applied. Where medical professionals or our staff are in doubt about the physical condition of the prisoner, a risk assessment will be completed to ascertain whether cuffs will be applied. This can be reviewed at any point following advice from medical professionals. Since the escort and duty managers have received advice and guidance on emergency escorts, and this issue is regularly reviewed at morning operational meetings by the Senior Management Team (SMT) to discuss whether the level of restraint applied at recent hospital visits was appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0324-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 July 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing individual escort risk assessments, guidance and operational reviews are considered sufficient to determine whether prisoners require restraints.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At HMP Featherstone a standard risk assessment proforma is in place for all external escorts, which is audit compliant. This is completed on an individual basis for each prisoner which considers various risk factors, such as criminal history, behaviour in prison, risk to the public, risk to the victim and escape potential. Where it is confirmed”

    Source location

    2014-0324-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2014

    Open published response
  10. Cardiff & the Vale of Glamorgan

    AI-generated summary

    Christopher Shapley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Christopher Shapley was arrested on 17 September 2013, remanded in custody, and taken to HMP Cardiff after treatment at hospital for alcohol withdrawal symptoms and fitting. He was placed alone in a cell and found hanged during morning checks on 20 September 2013. Concerns included incomplete transfer of information about his hospital treatment and self-harm risks, insufficient assessment of risk factors, inadequate efforts to arrange a shared cell, and inadequate handover and night-time observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reliance on prisoner interview instead of balanced assessment of all known risk factors

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The reception prison officer was aware of the self-harm form and the alcohol withdrawal risk factor but relied heavily on the interview with Christopher Shapley in determining his care. Reliance on interview by prison staff, rather than undertaking a balanced assessment of all the known risk factors, was a feature of the evidence before the jury. The jury did however find that it was appropriate not to have raised an ACCT. ”

    Source location

    Christopher Shapley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026