Recurring concern

Failure to identify and address recurring safety issues through organisational learning

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First reported 3 Dec 2013•Latest report 20 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of reporting, review, investigation or organisational-learning processes to recognise substantive safety issues, retain learning from prior concerns, or ensure that identified recurring issues are addressed across the organisation.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to implementing a specific already-defined safety action where no broader failure of organisational learning or issue recognition is identified.
  • Excludes failures of a named clinical, operational or safeguarding system where that system itself supplies the more specific parent boundary.
  • Excludes deficiencies limited to the quality of an individual incident investigation without evidence that safety issues or learning were not identified or addressed more broadly.
  • Excludes generic governance, culture or management concerns without a direct failure to identify, retain or address substantive safety issues.
Reports
62

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
68

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
163

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care14
NHS England10
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB4
Care Quality Commission4
Home Office3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
HM Prison and Probation Service2
Ministry of Defence2
Ministry of Justice2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust2
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust2
Office of the Chief Coroner2
The Children's Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Victor William Knowles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Victor William Knowles was admitted to a nursing home for short-term care planning while at high risk of dehydration and malnutrition. He lost 5kg, had very low fluid intake, and later required hospital treatment for severe dehydration and malnutrition, acute kidney injury, hypernatremia and osmotic demyelination syndrome before dying on 20 January 2024. Concerns included inaccurate or incomplete information being shared with healthcare professionals, failures to obtain timely medical treatment, and limited investigation, reflection and learning from his care and death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Internal care reviews failing to identify learning and improvements in individual care

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Although an internal review of the care arrangements in place for Victor took place alongside the internal investigation, the purpose of this was to identify any further opportunities to strengthen existing procedures, rather than to identify any areas of learning and improvements that could have been made in respect of Victor’s care. ”

    Source location

    Victor William Knowles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing investigation and learning arrangements are appropriate; no further changes are required beyond measures already discussed at the inquest.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Home has at all times had in place a comprehensive policy for undertaking internal investigations including guidance on when these are required. As you will appreciate, given the setting in which the Home operates, it would not be reasonably practicable nor proportionate to commence an investigation following all deaths or admissions to hospital. Rather, this requires the review of all incidents whereby a sudden death occurs or any unexpected hospital admission. Furthermore, a monthly review of deaths and hospital admissions considers any themes or trends. This is consistent with the protocols observed by care homes throughout the industry. We are also obliged to notify the Care Quality Commission of deaths in our home without delay under our provider and manager registration.”

    Source location

    Response from Springcare Care Homes Ltd
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 January 2025

    Open published response
  2. Coventry and Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    Darren Joseph Hope · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren Joseph Hope died on 3 July 2023 after falling from the 10th-floor building where he lived while on unescorted Section 17 leave. The report identifies concerns about verifying leave conditions, ensuring people on leave can contact the facility, and the ability of the reporting system to identify and address patient-safety issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reporting system failing to identify substantive patient safety issues

    Wider context from the report

    “Concern 3: There may be limitations in the reporting system’s ability to identify and address substantive issues that directly impact patient safety. If critical concerns are overlooked, there is a risk that valuable insights for preventing future incidents may be missed, reducing the system's effectiveness in promoting long-term safety improvements. ”

    Source location

    Darren Joseph Hope · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reporting system failing to address substantive patient safety issues

    Wider context from the report

    “Concern 3: There may be limitations in the reporting system’s ability to identify and address substantive issues that directly impact patient safety. If critical concerns are overlooked, there is a risk that valuable insights for preventing future incidents may be missed, reducing the system's effectiveness in promoting long-term safety improvements. ”

    Source location

    Darren Joseph Hope · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and embed Patient Safety Incident Response Framework arrangements with external consultancy, local-system collaboration, staff training, a PSIRF Plan and Policy, and senior-leader assurance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The statement on the final day of the inquest prepared by ████████, Associate Director of Nursing and Quality (MH Directorate) set out the details of the improvement work already in place, as well our investigation approach. It also explained our transition from the Serious Incident Framework (NHSE, 2015), which focuses on ‘root cause’, towards adopting the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) (NHSE, 2022), which moves away from a root cause (blame), and focusses on learning and understanding of the work system, acknowledging that staff and patients are part of the ‘work system’ and that it is the system that will support good or poor outcomes.”

    Source location

    Response from Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Grace Holder · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Grace Holder, an 88-year-old woman recovering in hospital after surgery for a broken hip, fell while using a commode without supervision and died from a fatal intracerebral bleed. The concerns identified were that the Trust failed to prevent a predictable and avoidable fall and that its governance systems failed to identify care failings or act on factors contributing to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of governance systems to identify and reflect upon failings in care

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Despite this incident activating the PSIRF process which resulted in the completion of an After Action Review (“AAR”), the Trust did not identify any sub-optimal aspects to Mrs Holder’s care. Accordingly, I have a concern regarding the failure of the Trust’s governance systems to; a. Identify and reflect upon failings in care, b. Consequently, the failure of the trust to act in a way to remediate the factors that contributed to Mrs Holder’s death. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Grace Holder · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is responsible for responding to concerns about its failures and explaining what went wrong.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The report raises concerns over the Barts Health NHS Foundation Trust’s failure to prevent a predictable and therefore avoidable fall which resulted in death. Despite this incident activating the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) at the Trust, no sub-optimal aspects to Mrs Holder’s care were identified. Thus, there are concerns around the failure of the Trust’s governance systems to:”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 1 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The CQC will determine whether further regulatory action concerning the Trust’s PSIRF and governance is appropriate or necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have been informed that the CQC will be discussing the PSIRF in upcoming meetings with the Trust. The CQC also continue to monitor the Trust and will consider whether further action is appropriate or necessary. I look forward to any developments which could provide a deeper understanding of the underlying issues at the Trust and help preventing future deaths such as Mrs Holder’s.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2024

    Open published response
  4. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Nancy ROGERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Nancy ROGERS collapsed on 18 November 2023, attended the emergency department, and was discharged home before being found unresponsive the following morning. The inquest recorded bilateral haemothorax due to a ruptured dissecting aortic aneurysm. Concerns were raised about her discharge after emergency attendance and the reported absence of learning or teaching following a similar death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake learning or teaching following comparable deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) At the inquest into Shirley Potter's death the hospital report indicated no learning was required as her presentation was not typical. The circumstances in both these cases are remarkably similar in that both ladies attended the emergency department at Furness General and were allowed home only to die within a day of the same cause and as far as the attending clinician at today's hearing knew no learning or teaching has taken place since Nancy's death. ”

    Source location

    Nancy ROGERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write an action plan addressing the causes and prevention of missed aortic dissection diagnoses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A meeting was held between the Clinical Lead - Emergency Medicine (FGH), the Clinical Lead - Emergency Medicine (RLI), the Clinical Lead - Urgent Treatment Centre WGH and the Deputy Medical Director (Education, Research, Workforce and Innovation) to discuss the causes of Shirley Potter and Nancy Rogers and another case that we had noted in the jurisdiction of the Senior Coroner Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen. The discussion at the meeting centred on the best way to disseminate information regarding aortic dissection, in order to reduce the risk of this diagnosis being missed in the future. An action plan was written and since the meeting, the following actions have been put in place:”

    Source location

    Response from Morecambe Bay NHSFT
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Display an aortic dissection poster with a linked educational video in emergency department clinical and triage areas.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• An A4 poster has been created (copy attached) and is displayed in the Emergency Department (ED) clinical areas and triage, for quick reference. The QR code links to a video on the Aortic Dissection Charitable Trust's website.”

    Source location

    Response from Morecambe Bay NHSFT
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate the aortic dissection video to medical and nursing staff across emergency, urgent treatment, same-day emergency care and acute medical units, tracking viewings and adding new starters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• The video on the Aortic Dissection Charitable Trust website is being drawn to the attention of senior and junior medical staff at ED meetings at both of the Trust’s main hospitals, between July and the end of September. A list of the”

    Source location

    Response from Morecambe Bay NHSFT
    Page 1 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include aortic dissection in the August induction programme for new doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Aortic dissection is now included in the new doctor induction in August.”

    Source location

    Response from Morecambe Bay NHSFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response
  5. Warwickshire

    AI-generated summary

    David RILEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Riley developed a pericardial effusion after atrial fibrillation ablation and later suffered a stroke before dying on 10 June 2023. Concerns included inconsistent decisions about pausing Apixaban, delays in restarting it, inadequate communication and continuity of care, and difficulties using computerised clinical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to specify and disseminate learning from the DOAC pausing incident

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Warwick hospital conducted a Root Cause Analysis Investigation Report (RCAIR) of 6 July 2023 which indicated that the pausing of the DOAC was a lesson learned, it did not indicate what was learned. The only further action was limited to the incident being presented at the Grand Round, but this had not taken place at the time of the inquest, some 9 months after publication of the RCAIR. There are remaining outstanding matters of concern. ”

    Source location

    David RILEY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Report and consider whether learning should be shared across Midlands integrated care boards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Regional Chief Pharmacist in the Midlands has also been asked to review your Report and consider whether any learnings need to be shared across the ICBs within the Midlands region.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss received Prevention of Future Deaths reports through the Regulation 28 Working Group and share their learning nationally and regionally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of David, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the report with Agilio Software for awareness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will share your report with Agilio Software for their awareness.”

    Source location

    Response from NICE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present the incident and related learning at the cardiology Grand Round.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can only apologise that, over a year after his death, Mr Riley’s case has still not been presented at the Trust’s Grand Round. His case will be presented by one of our Cardiology consultants to Grand Round on 19 July – and will incorporate the learning from the concerns you have raised in your Regulation 28 report.”

    Source location

    Response from S. Warwickshire NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prioritise Grand Round slots for cases whose formal investigations recommend presentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Grand Round is an “open to all staff” learning forum – held weekly both in person and online – and there are always a large number topics vying for attention. This, combined with staff availability, means that there can sometimes be a significant time lag between an incident occurring and the learning being shared. That said, the delay in this particular instance is unacceptable, and we have asked our Medical Education Co-ordinator (who manages the programme) to ensure that priority slots are given to those cases where a formal investigation recommends that a case be discussed at Grand Round.”

    Source location

    Response from S. Warwickshire NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational responsibility for delivering health services and responding to related concerns lies with NHS England.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is operationally responsible for delivering health services across the country and will be responding directly to your concerns at length. NHS England is an executive non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Department of Health and Social Care.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response
  6. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Ash BANNISTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ash Bannister, a 16-year-old who was gender neutral, died in a residential care home on 7 August 2021 after being found hanging. Principal concerns included the removal of Ash’s personal Ligature Risk Assessment without documented reasons, inadequate documentation and communication, inconsistent waking-night cover, failure to follow the support plan, staff training gaps, and an investigation process described as not fit for purpose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigation process failing to identify all learning from deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “It was accepted by United Children’s Services that their investigation policy and process was not fit for purpose because it failed to identify all of the learning arising from Ash’s death. If an investigation was undertaken by United Children’s Services after Ash’s death it: (1) Was not documented; (2) Failed to identify all of the learning uncovered at the inquest; (3) Failed to trigger any changes at United Children’s Services. The investigation process in place at United Children’s Services is therefore not fit for purpose. ”

    Source location

    Ash BANNISTER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require an independent third party to conduct investigations under the Death and Serious Incidents Policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We carried out our internal investigation in accordance with the organisation's Death and Serious Incidents Policy. This sets out the procedure that must be followed in the event of a death or serious incident concerning one of our young people. We initiated the investigation a few weeks after Ash died. A key part of that process is considering lessons that we can learn as an organisation. We regret that we did not document the investigation and our conclusions. The senior management team, who are responsible for such investigations, have been reminded that the full and proper procedure as set out in the Death and Serious Incidents Policy must be followed. We have also made a change to the Policy which now requires that an independent third-party conduct the investigation in line with the procedure set out in the Policy.”

    Source location

    Response from United Childrens Services
    Page 6 · response
    Published 30 April 2024

    Open published response
  7. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Grenville Hammersley Ithell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Ithell, aged 77, died in hospital on 20 November 2022 after prostate cancer progressed and caused his death. He had become lost to follow-up, with PSA monitoring and clinical review not occurring for about 10 months after November 2021. Concerns included the absence of a Datix report and Health Board investigation, lack of assurance about learning or changes, and staff time constraints affecting incident reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of assurance regarding changes and learning from identified matters

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the evidence it was identified that:- 1. There was no Datix raised by anyone when the error (Mr Ithell being lost to follow up) was identified, either at the time of the appointment on 22 October 2022 when the error was identified or at any point thereafter; 2. There has been no investigation by the Health Board into how Mr Ithell came lost for follow up after his appointment on 5 November 2021; 3. There have been no assurances as to what, if any, changes and learning have been identified other than a tracking system for PSA monitoring; 4. Evidence was heard at the Inquest that time restraints on hospital staff had meant that Datix was not completed and that the system was not user-friendly. I have raised a number of Prevention of Future Death reports with the Health Board previously around investigation processes. I remain incredibly concerned that where matters are not raised in accordance with internal Health Board processes that assurances given to me previously in Prevention of Future Death Reports cannot be supported. Furthermore, I am concerned that Datix reports will not be raised if time constraints prevent such, where the Health Board themselves often identified the Datix reporting system as the initiation of governance / investigation processes. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Grenville Hammersley Ithell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a detailed action plan responding to the investigation findings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that an Incident Report has now been raised in regards to the error identified and a Make it Safe Rapid Review was undertaken. This review was completed on 05 March 2023. A decision was made to conduct a full investigation and this is underway at present. The incident has been confirmed as a Nationally Reportable Incident (NRI). The investigation report is due to be completed by 09 May 2024 and will include a full action plan to address any areas of learning.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Form the Quality Systems Group to provide integrated oversight of quality systems and user feedback.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within the Health Board, in November 2023, we formed a new Quality Systems Group to provide greater oversight of our quality systems in a more integrated approach. This group’s remit includes collecting, assessing and acting upon user feedback. Over the coming months we will be conducting a survey of our staff experiences in using the Datix system and we will use these findings to make recommendations nationally on improvements or enhancements to the system (recognising any changes we suggest will be subject to all-Wales agreement).”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 25 January 2024

    Open published response
  8. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ruth Carla Perry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ruth Carla Perry’s mental health deteriorated significantly during and after an Ofsted inspection of Caversham Primary School in November 2022. She displayed suicidal ideation and planning a few days later, and took her own life on 8 January 2023; the inquest concluded that her suicide was contributed to by the inspection. The principal concerns included the conduct and fairness of the inspection, limited Ofsted training and policy for managing school leader distress, confidentiality requirements, report publication timescales, and aspects of the inspection system affecting school leader welfare.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct or require learning reviews of inspection-related concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “6. No learning review of these matters was conducted by Ofsted. There is no policy requiring this to be done. ”

    Source location

    Ruth Carla Perry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Appoint an independent expert to lead and publish recommendations from a learning review of the response to Ruth Perry’s death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will appoint an independent expert to lead a learning review of Ofsted’s response to the tragic death of Ruth Perry. We will respond to the recommendations of this review as part of our response to the Big Listen.”

    Source location

    Response from Ofsted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Define when future learning reviews will be commissioned, who will conduct them, how they will operate, and how lessons will be disseminated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the same time, we will define clearly the circumstances in which a learning review will be commissioned in future and the procedures to be followed.”

    Source location

    Response from Ofsted
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2023

    Open published response
  9. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Lauren Page Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lauren Page Smith died at home on 6 January 2023 after paramedics attended to reported vomiting, chest pain and arm pain. An abnormal ECG, including an automated report of an anterior infarct, was interpreted as normal, and she declined hospital attendance after being given that incorrect information. The report raises concerns about ECG interpretation, training and assessment, and the absence of further action or safeguards addressing identified competency and patient-safety risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the ambulance service to implement collective learning from identified ECG training gaps

    Wider context from the report

    “Some of the concerns I have identified are directed at multiple organisations and some are specific. During the course of the inquest I heard live evidence from Paramedic ████████, Technician ████████ and patient Safety Lead ████████ 1. An ecg reading was taken at 08:56 am when both the paramedic and technician were in attendance on Miss Smith. That ecg was abnormal. The ecg identified pathological Q waves in V1, V2 and V3, an isolated ST elevation in V2 and a positive AVR deflection. Although the rhythm was sinus rhythm, 3 abnormal indicators were clearly present on the ecg. In addition, the auto diagnostic monitor clearly recorded the ecg as abnormal and reported an anterior infarct which was available for attending paramedics. 2. Interpretation of a 12 lead ecg is fundamental part of the job of a paramedic and the ecg was not interpreted correctly by either the paramedic technician or the attending paramedic with over 8 years’ experience. 3. Paramedic ████████ gave evidence at inquest that she’d never heard of Q waves before and didn’t see the ST elevation on the ecg. She’d never heard of the term pathological Q waves nor an AVR positive deflection. 4. Technician ████████ told me she had never heard of pathological Q waves and that she wouldn’t know what they were. She told me she didn’t recognise the ST elevation on the ecg. 5. The ecg print out clearly indicated a cardiac event in progress at the time the ecg was taken. Lauren Smith died from an acute MI. 6. I am concerned that neither the paramedic nor the technician was able to interpret the ecg correctly and that neither paramedic appears to have noted or acted upon the auto diagnostic monitor report. 7. Lauren Smith was informed that her observations and ecg were normal. This information was not correct, and it is likely that Lauren Smith based her decision not to attend hospital on this incorrect information. 8. I was told in evidence that paramedic training includes identifying Q waves and ST elevations and any abnormal rhythms. I was told that a positive AVR deflection (which was a view) was not ‘normal’ and should have been identified as abnormal. I was told that the diagnostic monitor display reported what was seen on the ecg. 9. I heard in evidence that ecg interpretation forms part of a paramedics initial training and mandatory annual training, but I am concerned that there was no evidence at inquest of any qualitative assessment of the ecg aspect of their training. I was informed that Technician ████████ was undertaking a Paramedic BSc at Wolverhampton University. The training provider and/or regulator must ensure that training is effective. I am concerned the absence of such assessment presents a risk to patient safety at this time. 10. I heard in evidence that neither paramedic nor technician had received any further training from WMAS following the death of Lauren Smith and the internal SI investigation which specifically identified the incorrect interpretation of the ecg. I am concerned this presents a risk to patient safety at this time. 11. I am concerned that whilst ████████ and ████████ may’ve undertaken their own additional learning/self-reflection NO qualitative assessment of this learning has been undertaken and no action has been taken by their employer WMAS and no restrictions or sanctions placed on their practice nor further individual training provided by WMAS and they continue in their respective roles. I am concerned this presents a clear existing risk to patients which remained unaddressed at the time of inquest. 12. I was told in evidence that neither paramedic nor technician had been referred to the HCPC. I have reported my concern about the fitness to practice of both ████████ and ████████ to the HCPC however there appears to be a lacuna in respect of ████████. ████████ is a technician and not a fully qualified paramedic and as such is not yet registered with the HCPC. Therefore, the HCPC can take no action at the present time. I am informed the report I have made will be considered at such time as ████████ applies for full registration. I am concerned this presents a risk to patient safety at this time. 13. I am informed that as ████████ is a Student Paramedic (qualified/trained to technician level), WMAS as her employer are responsible for her professional competency. I am concerned that the lacuna I have identified in relation to her technician status has not been addressed and that despite WMAS applying the same HCPC standards to trainees as fully qualified paramedics, WMAS have taken no action in relation to ████████ fitness to practice and provided no further training. I am concerned this presents a risk to patient safety at this time. 14. I am concerned that there has been no collective learning by West Midlands Ambulance Service following the death of ████████. There has been no action to address the learning gaps identified by WMAS own internal investigation in respect of both the paramedic and technician. Therefore, I have addressed this aspect of my PFD to the CQC/Chief Inspector of Hospitals/HSIB as part of their regulation as to the safety of the West Midlands Ambulance Service considering the risk I have identified in relation to patient safety due to inaction by WMAS. ”

    Source location

    Lauren Page Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver CPD education on STEMI care, ECGs, ACS guidance and ambulance quality indicators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There was a CPD day at Erdington hub alongside the Research team to provide presentation on STEMI clinical times article on ACS and the new JRCALC update, including the ambulance quality indicators and time from 999 call to inflation of a balloon in a specialist coronary catheter”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 6 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver ECG recognition and advanced life support sessions with Zoll Medical.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “February 2023”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 6 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver evening ECG and resuscitation-skills education sessions, including sessions alongside Zoll Medical.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Evening training session on ECGs and Resus skills delivered”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver an in-person CPD event covering ECG signs and recognition.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “June 2023”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish ACS discharge-on-scene case learning and link staff to ACS educational resources.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “August 2023”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review ECG cases and disseminate the resulting learning through staff briefings and clinical communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “September 2023”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a Microsoft Teams channel for publishing ECG case studies and facilitating clinical discussion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Microsoft teams channel set up for regular publication of ECG case studies and to allow for discussion”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 7 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide remedial ECG and acute coronary syndrome training to both clinicians through training school.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both the clinicians are booked to attend training school for remedial training on the 1 December 2023. In addition to this ████████ will be meeting with the Trust’s Consultant Paramedic who is the Head of Clinical Care, ████████ to review and reflect on the ECG abnormalities as part of an additional self reflection request.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Ambulance Service
    Page 8 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring improvements to serious incident management and learning from deaths through ongoing monitoring and engagement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to monitor WMAS’s progress in making improvements to their serious incident management and learning from deaths through our ongoing monitoring activities and engagement.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    At the time of the incident, the individual was employed by WMAS as an associate ambulance practitioner, not acting as a university student.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It should also be noted that on the 6 January 2023, ████████ was working as an employee of WMAS and was not there in her student capacity. ████████ was working within the remit of an associate ambulance practitioner.”

    Source location

    Response from University of Wolverhampton
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2023

    Open published response
  10. Somerset

    AI-generated summary

    Irene Joy White · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Irene Joy White, who had dementia and became immobile after a fall and hip-fracture surgery, was discharged to a nursing home without further thromboprophylaxis and was not mobilised beyond regular repositioning. She died of a pulmonary embolism, and concerns were raised about the nursing home's failure to identify and manage her DVT risk, including the absence of a DVT policy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to learn from and reflect on DVT-related care to change practice

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned following the evidence presented to the Inquest that: (i) Frome Nursing Home employs clinically trained staff who would have been well aware (or should have been well aware) of the risk of developing DVT in an immobile patient and yet: (a) Did not make any enquiries with the discharging hospital as to her care needs and lack of thromboprophylaxis. Despite appropriate medical/clinical knowledge the Home did not question this and/or take any active steps whatsoever to ascertain Mrs White’s needs or treatment plan; (b) Did not take any steps to acquire any TED stockings, or similar, to minimise the risk of a DVT; (c) Did not take any steps to mobilise Mrs White, over and above repositioning her in bed every four hours, to minimise the risk of a DVT (ii) Frome Nursing Home did not have a DVT Policy in place at the time of Mrs White’s death, and no such active policy was in place at the time of the Inquest and so I am concerned that there has been no active learning and/or meaningful reflection since Mrs White’s death; meaning that practices have not changed and vulnerable residents remain at risk. I am concerned that the Home did not take appropriate and reasonable steps to identify her risk and then take such steps to minimise it. The overwhelming thrust of the evidence presented indicated a poor attitude to a joined-up and cohesive response from the management and clinical teams and this resulted in a lack of clinical leadership, judgment and action being taken. Mrs White lacked capacity due to her cognitive impairment and so was unable to appreciate the risks that immobility posed to her. She was entirely reliant (because of age, cognitive impairment and general infirmity) on the Home to anticipate her risks and needs in this regard. ”

    Source location

    Irene Joy White · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026