Recurring concern

Unreliable patient observation arrangements

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First reported 28 Mar 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes observation-level assessment, observation policies and support plans, staff allocation and reliable delivery of required intermittent or enhanced patient observations.

Not included

  • Condition-specific physiological or neurological monitoring
  • Management auditing of observations where frontline observation arrangements are otherwise reliable
  • Continuous eyesight or one-to-one observation where that dedicated control supplies a narrower parent
Reports
139

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
174

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
328

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission11
Department of Health and Social Care11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust7
NHS England7
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust5
Devon Partnership NHS Trust4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital, King's Lynn3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust2
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline Frances O'BRIEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline Frances O'Brien was treated for injuries from an accidental fall and later developed an intra-abdominal infection. She died in hospital on 4 November 2025 after deteriorating following transfer to a community hospital. The principal concerns were that staff failed to carry out checks or observations for about eight hours and failed to respond to family concerns about her worsening condition, resulting in a missed opportunity for earlier treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out checks or observations on a deteriorating patient

    Wider context from the report

    “It was agreed by the consultant who gave evidence at the inquest, and by the Trust's legal representative, that thereafter between 1230hrs and Mrs. O'Brien's departure for Pershore at 2025hrs that evening, there is no evidence of any further checks or observations being carried out. In fact, when Mrs. O'Brien was seen on the PDU by family members that same afternoon, it was clear to them that she was in a great deal of pain and distress. They raised their concerns with staff on the PDU, who assured them that she was alright. No member of staff appears to have acted on those concerns, and ensured that Mrs. O'Brien was checked. Those who transported Mrs. O'Brien to Pershore reported to staff there that she "had been in pain on transfer". On her arrival at Pershore at 2100hrs, it was clear to staff there and to an out of hours GP who was called to examine her, that she was in severe pain and very unwell, with a National Early Warning Score ( NEWS ) of 5. An ambulance was called to transfer her back to Worcester, and the paramedics recorded at 0111hrs that her NEWS score had risen to 10. I am therefore concerned at how staff on the PDU at Worcestershire Royal Hospital failed: (a) for some 8 hours to carry out any checks or observations on a patient who was clearly becoming very unwell; and (b) to follow up concerns raised by Mrs. O'Brien's family about her condition on the afternoon/evening of her discharge. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline Frances O'BRIEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete the commissioned case review to identify system improvements and examine its findings for wider learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An initial review has been undertaken and discussed in our Patient Safety incident Review Group (PSiRG) on 6th July 2026 and we have commissioned a case review to explore in more detail the events that day and what systems could be improved to aid our staff to care for patients safely and ensure records are accurate in a future scenario similar to this.”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 September 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the discharge lounge SOP on patient capacity, deteriorating-patient management, and exclusion criteria for unsuitable patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• We have identified and confirm that there were no documented observations in the discharge lounge, although the staff recall taking them but only on recording these on paper and not in the electronic patient record. We have reviewed the discharge lounge SOP as it lacked clarity around what we expect our staff and how often observations should be recorded whilst patients are in the discharge lounge.”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 September 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the discharge lounge team to record full observations electronically and use SBAR escalation for deterioration or medical emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• in the event of a deterioration or medical emergency the patients consultant team will be contacted and arrangements made for the patient to be reviewed”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 September 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient was in the discharge lounge before transfer, not the PDU.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to your specific concern listed above we would like firstly to clarify that Mrs O’Brien was on the discharge lounge prior to transfer to Pershore, we apologise for any misunderstanding that led you to believe it was PDU. Please find below the actions the trust have taken in relation to your concerns on her care before discharge:”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 September 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Abigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Abigail Louise Smith was found at Braintree Recreation Ground on 15 February 2022 after attempting to suspend herself; resuscitation was unsuccessful and she was pronounced deceased at 00:08 on 16 February 2022. The report identifies concerns about inadequate trained staffing and observation, unsuitable care arrangements, access to ligature materials, insufficient risk assessments and care plans, communication adjustments for autism and learning disability, and an unsafe discharge from hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of inappropriate or untrained staff for enhanced observation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. For a period of time Abbi was left under the observation of staff that were security personnel and were not appropriate or trained to undertake this work. Male security staff were informed that Abbi should use a commode due to her presenting risks and there were not sufficient trained female staff available. There had been a previous incident where actions taken to restrain Abbi by security personnel caused her trauma and there had been an allegation of assault, this was not considered in this admission. ”

    Source location

    Abigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient trained staffing for enhanced observations of patients at risk of severe self-harm

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There were not sufficient trained staff to conduct the enhanced observations required to monitor Abbi with her known risk of severe self-harm whilst she was awaiting assessment under the Mental Health Act and actively attempting to take her own life. ”

    Source location

    Abigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement enhanced supervision and engagement policy with risk-level assessment, staffing escalation, supervision handovers, daily review and family or carer involvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the Court has been provided with an updated copy of the Trust’s Policy for Enhanced Supervision and Engagement. This policy strengthens our assessment and guidance for patients requiring enhanced supervision as per the attached tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include enhanced supervision in mandatory training for staff providing enhanced supervision to patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Enhanced Supervision is part of mandatory training for all staff who are involved with providing enhanced supervision to patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No evidence was identified that Trust-employed security staff were allocated to patients that night, as would usually have been documented.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge the concerns of HM Coroner that lack of staffing led to the provision of a security guard in order to support the Mental Health Team. We have not identified any evidence of a Trust-employed security staff being allocated to patients that night, as would usually be documented. In any event, we are not able to comment on staffing of the mental health team or how that fell within the remit of Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust (EPUT).”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for mental health team staffing falls within Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust's remit, not this Trust's.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge the concerns of HM Coroner that lack of staffing led to the provision of a security guard in order to support the Mental Health Team. We have not identified any evidence of a Trust-employed security staff being allocated to patients that night, as would usually be documented. In any event, we are not able to comment on staffing of the mental health team or how that fell within the remit of Essex Partnership University Foundation Trust (EPUT).”

    Source location

    Response from Mid & South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Najib Ahmed NAAGI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Najib Naagi was found unresponsive in his mental health hospital bed on 3 January 2025, was resuscitated, and died in intensive care the following day from natural causes. The report raises concerns that observations were not conducted at the required times and that the clinical support worker’s records did not accurately reflect the observations made, misleading the court and undermining confidence in patient records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct patient observations at scheduled times

    Wider context from the report

    “The clinical support worker who had been tasked with conducting Mr Naagi’s observations recorded that she had observed Mr Naagi at the following times: • 4.30am • 5.30am • 6.30am She reiterated that in her statement and in her oral evidence at inquest. She did not volunteer the fact that her record was wrong. It was only when I put it to her in quite robust terms that she accepted this. In fact, the ward CCTV showed that she looked through the observation panel at the following times: • 4.48am • 6.18am Thus, the record she made did not reflect the actions she took. The consequences of this are as follows: 1. A patient’s medical record was wrong. Any healthcare professional seeking to understand when Mr Naagi had been observed to be well by reading the record would have been given the wrong information. 2. The fact that this record was wrong casts doubt on the remainder of the record, both in terms of this individual (was he actually well at the times recorded?) and the other patients (were they observed when the record indicates that they were observed?). 3. The court was misled. Observations should be conducted when they are meant to be conducted, but if they are not then this fact must be recorded contemporaneously. It was put to me by the trust’s solicitor that because the clinical support worker later looked through the observation panel at 6.36am, this meant that the number of observations recorded was accurate and so the later observation somehow made good the lack of earlier observation and corrected the wrong recording. That is simply not the case. Proper patient care demands that patient records are accurate and not in any way fabricated. Regarding the giving of inaccurate evidence in court, this may amount to a contempt of court, it may amount to perjury, it may be punishable by a fine or even by a term of imprisonment. For your patients, it obstructs learning from deaths. ”

    Source location

    Najib Ahmed NAAGI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review observation competency compliance across substantive and temporary staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the investigation undertaken by NHSP, the CCTV was reviewed. This shows that no observations were conducted at 05:30. The Trust understands the importance of observations to support safe, person-centred care and the formulation of risk assessment. The Trust has reviewed observation competency compliance across substantive and temporary staff and has reinforced the requirement that all staff undertaking supportive observations complete observation training, competency assessment, and ward induction before undertaking observation duties.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce requirements for observation training, competency assessment, and ward induction before staff undertake observation duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of the investigation undertaken by NHSP, the CCTV was reviewed. This shows that no observations were conducted at 05:30. The Trust understands the importance of observations to support safe, person-centred care and the formulation of risk assessment. The Trust has reviewed observation competency compliance across substantive and temporary staff and has reinforced the requirement that all staff undertaking supportive observations complete observation training, competency assessment, and ward induction before undertaking observation duties.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor observation practice and documentation through audits, quality visits, safety huddles, senior reviews, and governance reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Compliance with observation practice and documentation standards will be reviewed through monthly observation audits, Matron quality visits and daily safety huddles, out-of-hours senior manager reviews and reporting through the Care Group Quality and Safety governance structure. Any themes and findings will be escalated further through the Trust’s governance arrangements where required.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the supportive observations policy and observation form to require and record each patient’s exact observation time.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As explained, the Trust recognises that the existing observation record form does not support staff to record observations contemporaneously. As a result, the Supportive Observations Policy has been amended to state that ‘staff must record the exact time that each patient is observed on every check, rather than relying solely on the hourly observation column. Accurate timings provide an auditable record of when observations took place and are essential for patient safety, incident investigations, CCTV reviews and other reviews of care. Recording a time that does not reflect when the observation occurred may constitute falsification of records and could result in disciplinary action’. In conjunction, the general observation form has been amended to allow staff to record the exact time they check each patient.”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust did not endorse treating later observations as correcting missed observations; the information offered a possible explanation for the worker’s timing error.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust acknowledges that there are no circumstances in which the completion of an observation at 06:18 can ever be interpreted to represent the completion of an observation required at 05:30 and nowhere in Trust policy is this accepted to represent acceptable practice. By referring the court to the number of observations completed, the Trust’s Solicitor was not seeking to suggest that the Trust endorses any such approach, or in any way makes light of this situation. This information was provided only to offer a possible”

    Source location

    Response from North London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    John McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John McKinlay died at Beech Hill Grange nursing home on 19 November 2025 after receiving end-of-life care. His death involved natural causes alongside a subdural haematoma and fractured neck of femur associated with a series of falls, including inpatient falls at Good Hope Hospital, Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital. The principal concern was that some falls may have occurred without the observation required by his falls risk assessment and care plan, and that evidence was not provided of investigations into falls at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide appropriate observation in accordance with falls risk assessments and care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence from witnesses was that Mr McKinlay had a total of 4 falls whilst an inpatient at the University Hospitals of Birmingham: on the 11th September 2025 at Good Hope Hospital, 28th September 2025 at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and on the 10th and 12th November 2025 at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Some, potentially all, of the falls occurred when Mr McKinlay was not receiving the appropriate level of observation in accordance with his falls risk assessment and care plan. He sustained a femur fracture requiring operative fixation from the fall on the 11th September and an acute bleed of a pre-existing subdural haemorrhage on the 28th September. He did not have any investigations into the November falls as he was already receiving end of life care and there was no clinical evidence of injury. There has been a mortality review of the events at Good Hope Hospital, including the fall on the 11th September. However, evidence has not been provided of investigations into the falls at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital and Queen Elizabeth Hospital. It therefore cannot be determined that appropriate lessons have been learnt and adequate action taken creating a risk the situation has not improved. ”

    Source location

    John McKinlay · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review every reported patient fall through local and central falls-team processes, identify learning, and implement appropriate corrective actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All patient falls within our organisation are reviewed locally and also centrally by our governance and falls teams. We have a dedicated falls team and part of their role is to review every reported incident where a patient has suffered a fall. The service runs Monday to Friday. Each of Mr McKinley’s falls were incident reported and reviewed by a member of the falls team in a timely manner prior to the incident being closed.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce ward handovers remaining inside patient bays through daily safety-huddle reminders and stay-in-the-bay armbands, with compliance monitoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As set out within the Senior Sister’s statement shared with the Coroner’s office on 16 December, she spoke to staff to ascertain how the fall occurred. In response, staff reflected that they had undertaken a handover outside of the bay instead of inside the bay which ultimately led to Mr McKinlay being able to get up unaided. The whole team were reminded of the importance of staying in bays during subsequent daily safety huddles. Stay in the bay arm bands were also introduced in order to reinforce this further. The Senior Sister continues to monitor compliance with this and the falls team have confirmed they have received no further incidents from this ward in relation to falls occurring when staff are leaving their designated area to handover.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Escalate staffing and patient-dependency pressures daily while reviewing ward establishment levels to address increased dependency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The situation was escalated to the senior nursing team and contact was made with an external Trust to request a registered mental health nurse to support the ward. Cover was provided on this date. We are aware of an increase in dependency of patients on this ward and a review is being undertaken by the Matron of the establishment level with a view to changes in this to meet the changes in patient cohort.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 June 2026

    Open published response
  5. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Robert Smith, who was detained at HMP Thameside, died after an epileptic seizure led to cardiac arrest. The report describes concerns about medication prescribing and administration, hospital-to-prison discharge and communication, access to his cell, observation arrangements and records, staffing, and the lack of equipment for resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete required patient observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) I am concerned there were numerous missed and falsified observation entries in Mark’s case and how similar incidents can be prevented given the reliance on handwritten sheets being scanned onto the system at a later stage. I appreciate the efforts made with training and audits. (Practice Plus Group) ”

    Source location

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Lajos MANDRIK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lajos MANDRIK died on 13 September 2023 after hanging himself during a period when no staff member was allocated to carry out intermittent observations on Ellis Ward at Tolworth Hospital. The report’s principal concern is that general and intermittent observations appeared not to be carried out in accordance with the Trust’s policy, including the required attempt at engagement.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to attempt engagement during patient observations

    Wider context from the report

    “The Trust's policy - in common with that of other Trusts - is that all observations should include an attempt, at least, at engagement. The written logs of observations suggest that, most of the time, no attempt is made at engagement during observations, in September 2023 or now. Intermittent observations may be recorded as, for example, 'Corridor - pacing' because the HCA has seen the patient but not attempted to engage with the patient. General observations, once per hour, appear to be no more than a headcount to make sure all patients are present on the ward (then and now). This impression, gleaned from the documentation, appeared to be confirmed by the oral evidence of HCAs at the inquest. It appears that the general and intermittent observations on Ellis Ward are not being carried out in accordance with the Trust's policy. If this was and remains the culture on Ellis Ward, it may also be the culture on other wards operated by the Trust (since some staff work on more than one Trust ward). ”

    Source location

    Lajos MANDRIK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct general hourly observations beyond a headcount

    Wider context from the report

    “The Trust's policy - in common with that of other Trusts - is that all observations should include an attempt, at least, at engagement. The written logs of observations suggest that, most of the time, no attempt is made at engagement during observations, in September 2023 or now. Intermittent observations may be recorded as, for example, 'Corridor - pacing' because the HCA has seen the patient but not attempted to engage with the patient. General observations, once per hour, appear to be no more than a headcount to make sure all patients are present on the ward (then and now). This impression, gleaned from the documentation, appeared to be confirmed by the oral evidence of HCAs at the inquest. It appears that the general and intermittent observations on Ellis Ward are not being carried out in accordance with the Trust's policy. If this was and remains the culture on Ellis Ward, it may also be the culture on other wards operated by the Trust (since some staff work on more than one Trust ward). ”

    Source location

    Lajos MANDRIK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the revised Observation and Engagement Policy, including clarified expectations for general and intermittent observations and an agreed staff code of conduct.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “the Nurse in Charge as well as weekly assurance Audits. There was continuous work done on revising the policy and adjustments made in line with the existing training package to include an agreed code of conduct that clearly lays out expectation on roles and responsibility by staff who undertake observation.”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver organisation-wide webinars launching the revised observation policy for substantive, bank and agency staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The governance process to support implementation of the revised policy will ensure a smooth transition for the implementation and the actions are as follows: - The revised policy was presented in the Quality Governance Group in May 2026, this will be ratified at the June 2026 meeting. - Webinars are scheduled for the launching of the policy from July through to September. This is across all inpatient services and includes both substantive and bank/agency staff. - The e-learning package has been updated to include the changes made in the policy and all staff will be expected to compete this with a new competency framework to demonstrate understanding and compliance with Observation. This will be reviewed by 30 December 2026 to ensure staff are compliant”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update observation e-learning and require staff to complete it alongside a new competency framework demonstrating understanding and compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The governance process to support implementation of the revised policy will ensure a smooth transition for the implementation and the actions are as follows: - The revised policy was presented in the Quality Governance Group in May 2026, this will be ratified at the June 2026 meeting. - Webinars are scheduled for the launching of the policy from July through to September. This is across all inpatient services and includes both substantive and bank/agency staff. - The e-learning package has been updated to include the changes made in the policy and all staff will be expected to compete this with a new competency framework to demonstrate understanding and compliance with Observation. This will be reviewed by 30 December 2026 to ensure staff are compliant”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot digital recording of general and intermittent observations across six inpatient wards, supported by PDSA cycles and evaluation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has an existing digital system that supports recording Constant and Enhanced Observation. To improve consistency, transparency and auditability of observations, the Trust will move general and intermittent observations to the same digital format. To enable this process, there is a plan to pilot the use of digital technology, ‘e-obs’ in 6 inpatient wards across the organisation, to ensure a collaborative approach to change in practice. This digital system will support a more detailed documentation which will include a safety and wellbeing check on patients during both general and intermittent observation. A set of PDSA cycles will be undertaken to ensure the change is supported and understood by staff. With a final evaluation of the pilot completed by 31 July 2026, with a planned phased roll-out across all inpatient wards by 31 October 2026, subject to evaluation findings.”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide staff with credit-card-sized observation memory cards distinguishing observation levels and minimum engagement expectations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, a new credit card sized memory Card has been created as an aid-memoir that can be kept on staff’s lanyard that will support staff at a glance to”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement mandatory competency-based observation assessments and reinforce staff roles, responsibilities and expectations through training and regular supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We acknowledge that HCAs were specifically referenced in HM Coroner’s concerns and recognising that sustainable improvement requires cultural as well as procedural change, the Trust is implementing a programme of workforce development for all disciplines across all inpatient wards including:”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase leadership oversight through regular ward visits to support safe observation practice and policy compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will also increase visibility of leadership by regular ward visits to support staff in safe management of patients on observation and better oversight on whether the Observation Policy is being followed by staff. This oversight will:”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create and deploy a dashboard showing the quality of observations to clinical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust also has a Nursing Optimisation & Workforce Programme that is focusing on compliance with observation and the quality of these. Having learned from the death of Mr Mandrik, the programme has reviewed the quality of observations and aims to ensure that all observations are supportive of the patient and are a therapeutic intervention. A dashboard to understand the quality of observation is being created and aim to be in use and visible to clinical staff in June 2026.”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring the effectiveness of observation improvements and embedding them into routine practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to monitor the effectiveness of these actions and ensure that they are embedded into routine practice.”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    General observations are intended to locate patients and visually check wellbeing, while meaningful engagement applies to intermittent observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Trust Policy – Clarification of the observation model The Trust has undertaken a comprehensive review of the Observation and Engagement Policy in line with NICE guidelines with an increased focus on quality observations to improve patient’s experience as well as to provide greater clarity regarding expectations for all levels of observation. Specifically, the revised policy outlines the expectation for staff carrying out General and Intermittent Observation stating: General observations are the baseline observation applied within the trust, these low-level observations are performed hourly with the intention of locating a patient and visually checking their wellbeing.”

    Source location

    Response from South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 April 2026

    Open published response
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian tied a fatal ligature in her room on Longview Ward on 17 April 2021 and died two days later in hospital. The principal concerns included inadequate and falsified observations, insufficiently trained and staffed ward personnel, poor communication about ligaturing and self-harm, medication-recording errors, failures involving Oxevision, and other care and record-keeping deficiencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain staff observation of the Oxevision monitor during WiFi disruption

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mental Health Trust Staff on Longfield Ward: a. Elise was neurodiverse and staff were not trained in Autism b. were inexperienced. The majority were new bank and agency staff with limited experience working with detained children, and this matter had been raised by the Care Quality Commission about other Trust services in January 2021. c. Did not have sufficient staffing to conduct observations required by the doctors for patients on the ward. This was known to the mental health Trust management and had been raised by the ward manager. During the time of Elise’s admission, the staff member allocated for observations was required to conduct approximately 66 observations within an hour. This was not logistically possible. Management knew that staffing allocation on Longview Ward was not sufficient to conduct the required levels of observations to keep the patients safe. Evidence was heard during the inquest that there are still observations that are not being conducted either as required or at all within the Trust and remains an ongoing concern. Datix reporting incidents are not always raised. d. The mental health Trust implemented a system called Oxevision with a Project Board to assist with the planning and roll out of the new system. There were difficulties with the roll out on St.Aubyns ward who were part of the pilot, due to WiFi coverage and the Oxevision system not operating correctly. e. The clinical management at the Trust Project Board meeting overseeing the roll out for Oxevision, required that ward staff implement a procedure where the Oxevision fixed monitor in the ward office be observed by a member of staff whilst the WiFi problem was resolved. This did not happen on Longview Ward. f. The Trust Project Group had reports that WiFi was not working and any issues were required to be reported as incident reports on Datix forms but these were not being completed. The Trust Project Board did not question why they were not receiving the Datix forms with the known issues. There was no oversight of what was required to ensure that the roll-out was operating appropriately and/or what the Project Board expected in the interim whilst the WiFi difficulties were being investigated. g. Not all the Trust staff on the ward were trained to use the Oxevision System. h. There was disputed evidence about the volume on the fixed terminal for Oxevision in the office about whether the alert volume could be turned down or ‘muted’. It was established that there was no incident unrelated to Elise’s death where a doctor did turn this volume down on the ward. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct observations in accordance with Trust policy

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The observation level for each young person is decided by the medical staff at the Trust and can be altered dependent on the patient’s risk level. The Trust Policy had a protocol on how observations should be conducted. All observations should be recorded by the staff on formal observation sheets. There were sheets for Level 1 and another sheet for the levels 2,3 & 4. Risk assessments were incomplete and not all ligatures were included. The entries in the records were not all consistent, some contradicted others and this included the levels of observations required to keep Elise safe on the observation charts that were required to be completed. This was confusing and remains a concern as these are entries made by qualified Trust staff who have received training in observations. During the Trust internal investigation after Elise’s death, the investigator visited the ward and found observations were not being conducted in accordance with the Trust Policy. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide required observations by trained staff

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Detained patients including Elise were not kept under observations by trained staff and mealtimes were chaotic with patients moving between areas without the required supervision. On 17 April the activity co-ordinator left a box of mobile phone chargers and headphones that posed a ligature risk, with a member of ward staff in a communal area, asking that she look after this whilst he collected some takeaway food that had been ordered by patients from the ward entrance. On his return, the box was unattended in the presence of patients with a high risk of ligature and suicide, with no member of ward staff present to keep patients who required level 2 and level 3 observations. This was not reported to the nurse in charge, and no incident report was completed. Evidence was that there were many new staff and that breaches of procedure were a regular occurrence. This left patients at risk. Evidence was heard that patients are still being left without the required observations since this death. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement electronic observations, staff training videos, engagement plans, and revised observation policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Trust Observation and Engagement project group was established in 2021 who took forward a number of actions Trust wide. The CAMHS staff were part of this project. Actions included:”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Retrain clinical staff in Oxevision and observation use in accordance with the relevant procedures and policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Again, all clinical staff are being retrained or trained in the use of Oxevision and observations. In line with the Oxevision SOP and the Therapeutic engagement and supportive observation policy.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement staffing controls requiring appropriately skilled and inducted bank and agency staff, supported by rota review and competency oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A review of Rotas undertaken to ensure staffing requirements met including right staff with right training and competency skills.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement patient-specific engagement and observation plans and maintain a maximum allocation of three level-two patients to one staff member in CAMHS.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ In June 2021 the Trust completed the new Engagement and Observation plan for each current inpatient, these were submitted to the CQC”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen observation monitoring through nurse-in-charge checks, handover checks, compliance audits, escalation, and staff accountability processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The Nurse in Charge checks Observations intermittently during the day to ensure completed and takes immediate action with staff where any gaps are found in relation to administrative / recording errors.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing systems are considered robust enough to identify missed observations and ensure appropriate follow-up action with staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response The Trust acknowledges that there are times when observations are not carried out in line with observation prescriptions. This is often down to human error. As outlined above there are robust systems in place to identify missed observations and the onward action that is addressed with staff.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 10 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mansoor Zaman, a 27-year-old man with a history of suicidality, substance misuse and EUPD, absconded from a mental health ward on 8 December 2024 after displaying suicidal intent and erratic and aggressive behaviour. His body was recovered on 29 December 2024. The substantive concerns included failures to use available mental health authorisations, reassess risk and observation levels, adequately document care, and promptly report him missing to police; the inquest jury identified some of these failures as factors that probably or possibly contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to reassess the frequency and quality of required observations

    Wider context from the report

    “4. His second escape from the ward in identical circumstances to the first. The failure of Trust staff to re-assess the frequency and quality of observations that Mr Zaman should be subject to during the afternoon of 8th December 2024. ”

    Source location

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver mandatory refresher training on structured risk assessment, dynamic risk documentation and appropriate observation levels, with monthly compliance audits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. To improve staff risk assessment and observation practice the Ward staff will undertake mandatory refresher training on completing structured risk assessments and documenting dynamic changes in risk. This includes practical guidance on when observations should be increased and when zonal observations should be used. It will also highlight clear expectations for recording changes in presentation in real time. This will take place within the next two months.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  9. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Judith Hughes had significant heart disease, was admitted to hospital following a seizure and later worsening heart failure, and died at home at 0030 hours on 07 October 2020. The inquest heard concerns that ambiguity in the Trust’s Close Observation Risk Assessment could lead to incorrect scoring, insufficient observation, and an increased risk of falls and death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Close Observation Risk Assessment to clearly distinguish fall-related scoring factors

    Wider context from the report

    “The Inquest heard evidence about the Trust's use of the 'Close Observation Risk Assessment' (p1903 Medical Records Bundle). This requires scores to be attributed to several factors including 'inpatient falls during this admission' and 'previous falls'. The overlap between these two factors and what they actually refer to is unclear and confusing. This creates a risk that the overall score may be calculated incorrectly resulting in insufficient levels of observation, increased risk of falls and death. ”

    Source location

    Judith Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Enhanced Care Risk Assessment Form to distinguish previous community falls from inpatient falls during the current admission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Mrs Hughes died over five years ago on 7th October 2020. Policies and Forms are, of course, subjected to regular review. As was mentioned at the inquest the relevant Form had already been revised in 2022 (a copy of the Policy which contains this is enclosed) following a routine review of the Policy.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Anglia Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the relevant Policy and Form within the next few months and take the coroner’s comments into account.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The relevant Policy and Form are due to be reviewed again in the next few months and we will ensure that your comments are taken into account in this process.”

    Source location

    Response from North West Anglia Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 11 November 2025

    Open published response
  10. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Alan HORROCKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alan Horrocks was admitted to hospital on 19 February 2025 with a suspected stroke, later diagnosed as viral encephalitis. He deteriorated, developing a Hyperosmolar Hyperglycaemic State and an upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage, and died on 17 March 2025 after treatment was withdrawn. The hospital investigation identified that overnight observations were not completed in accordance with escalation guidance and raised concerns about increased ward capacity without a corresponding increase in nursing establishment, alongside gaps in the existing nursing establishment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document reasons for incomplete ward observations

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mr Horrocks death an investigation was undertaken by the hospital, the report in respect thereof being provided to the court late on the afternoon 22 October 2025. The hospital investigation identified inter alia that observations were not completed on the ward overnight on 14 March 2025 in accordance with escalation guidance with no documented reason. Whilst the evidence did not identify Mr Horrocks "baseline" NEWS score, evidence at the inquest hearing from consultants involved in Mr Horrocks care identified a NEWS score of 5 required further observations and possible escalation. Further, that it was likely that there was an ongoing deterioration from late on 14 march 2025 into 15 March 2025 which was only appreciated further observations were undertaken shortly before midday on 15 March 2025 identifying an increase in the NEWS score to 12. The evidence indicated however that in Mr Horrocks case, even if his deterioration had been identified sooner, on a balance of probabilities, it would not have avoided his death when it occurred. The hospital investigation also identified that during this period the ward bed capacity had been increased from 27 to 33 beds owning to winter pressures with no corresponding change to the nursing establishment on the ward. Further, during this period there were gaps in the existing nursing establishment on the ward. Whilst the hospital investigation had identified these matters, there were no recommendations that these were issues for wider learning or how, if at all, these issues were to be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Alan HORROCKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to complete ward observations in accordance with escalation guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “Following Mr Horrocks death an investigation was undertaken by the hospital, the report in respect thereof being provided to the court late on the afternoon 22 October 2025. The hospital investigation identified inter alia that observations were not completed on the ward overnight on 14 March 2025 in accordance with escalation guidance with no documented reason. Whilst the evidence did not identify Mr Horrocks "baseline" NEWS score, evidence at the inquest hearing from consultants involved in Mr Horrocks care identified a NEWS score of 5 required further observations and possible escalation. Further, that it was likely that there was an ongoing deterioration from late on 14 march 2025 into 15 March 2025 which was only appreciated further observations were undertaken shortly before midday on 15 March 2025 identifying an increase in the NEWS score to 12. The evidence indicated however that in Mr Horrocks case, even if his deterioration had been identified sooner, on a balance of probabilities, it would not have avoided his death when it occurred. The hospital investigation also identified that during this period the ward bed capacity had been increased from 27 to 33 beds owning to winter pressures with no corresponding change to the nursing establishment on the ward. Further, during this period there were gaps in the existing nursing establishment on the ward. Whilst the hospital investigation had identified these matters, there were no recommendations that these were issues for wider learning or how, if at all, these issues were to be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Alan HORROCKS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate incident learning through ward safety huddles and the Sisters’ meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons learned were shared through ward safety huddles at every handover for the week following the reporting of the incident in March 2025. Those in attendance at ward safety huddles are all ward nursing staff on that shift. They occur every morning and every night. To ensure embedding of the actions, the incident was discussed again by Matron at the Sisters’ meeting on 10th October 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct weekly audits of patient observation charts and report the results to the Clinical Governance Committee.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, a weekly audit of 10 patient observation charts was commenced immediately following the incident being identified. No further omissions have been identified since implementation. Audit reports are retained for inspection. They are also reported to the Clinical Governance Committee.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide documented staff feedback and mandatory retraining on NEWS escalation requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Once the patient safety event was recorded actions included local informal investigation, documented feedback, and mandatory retraining on NEWS.”

    Source location

    Response from Bradford Teaching Hospitals
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026