Recurring concern

Unreliable patient observation arrangements

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First reported 28 Mar 2013•Latest report 24 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes observation-level assessment, observation policies and support plans, staff allocation and reliable delivery of required intermittent or enhanced patient observations.

Not included

  • Condition-specific physiological or neurological monitoring
  • Management auditing of observations where frontline observation arrangements are otherwise reliable
  • Continuous eyesight or one-to-one observation where that dedicated control supplies a narrower parent
Reports
139

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
174

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
328

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission11
Department of Health and Social Care11
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust7
NHS England7
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust5
Devon Partnership NHS Trust4
East London NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service4
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
North London NHS Foundation Trust3
The Queen Elizabeth Hospital, King's Lynn3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust2
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust2
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Slack · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Slack, who had underlying health issues including asbestos-related pulmonary fibrosis, suffered an unwitnessed fall at a care home and waited over four hours for an ambulance. He later deteriorated, was transferred to hospital, and died on 13 April 2020. Concerns included limited care-home documentation and observations, unclear Covid-19 admission risk assessment and PPE arrangements, and ambulance delays linked to pandemic-related capacity pressures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake observations of sufficient quality

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The evidence given at the inquest was that the observations were of limited quality notwithstanding the diagnosis of Covid 19 and his vulnerability. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Slack · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Documentation, observations, vulnerability assessment, COVID-19 transmission, and ambulance delay were outside the respondent’s remit, control, and responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is not appropriate that this response provides detail regarding points in the Regulation 28 Report on the limited details in documentation available at the inquest from the home, the quality of observations and assessment of vulnerability of Mr Slack, the route of transmission of COVID-19 into the home and the delay of the ambulance, as these are outside the remit, control and responsibility of PHE.”

    Source location

    2020-0264-Response-from-Public-Health-England-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other named organisations, including the care home, regulators, NHS England, and the local partnership, were responsible for commenting on remaining concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “PHE understands that the Regulation 28 Report has been sent to the Care Quality Commission, The Vicarage Residential Care Home, NHS England, Greater Manchester Health and social care partnership who will be able to comment on the remaining concerns. Additionally, PHE has shared this report with the DHSC who will provide further comment.”

    Source location

    2020-0264-Response-from-Public-Health-England-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 January 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing post-fall and illness-management processes address the known risks, including appropriate observations, medical support and documentation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC expects all services to have robust systems to ensure the quality of service and monitors that policies and procedures are being followed. We found there were a variety of checks and audits carried out in the home to ensure it was safe for the people living there. These included reviews of action taken following accidents and incidents, care record entries and observation records. These were overseen by the Provider to ensure any actions were completed.”

    Source location

    2020-0264-Response-from-CQC-Redacted
    Page 4 · response
    Published 4 January 2021

    Open published response
  2. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Lee William Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee William Davies, a detained patient, absconded from a mental health ward on 17 June 2019 and was found unconscious the following day after an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest. He died in hospital on 18 June 2019 after treatment was withdrawn; the inquest recorded a brain injury caused by illicit drug use. Concerns included the reduction of his observation levels despite his risk of absconding to obtain drugs, and ward-garden planting and monitoring arrangements that could allow drugs or other items to be concealed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to observe patients in the garden unless eyesight observations are required

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of the inquest I heard evidence that it was likely that Mr Davies had absconded on 17/6/19 by scaling a perimeter fence in the garden of Laurel Ward. The Jury was told that patients had unrestricted access to the garden except when the doors were locked overnight between 10.30 pm – 7.30 am; (2) The inquest heard that on 5/6/19 Mr Davies attempted to climb over the fence with a chair; (3) Mr Davies had absconded from Laurel Ward on 2 occasions since he was detained under s3 MHA on 24/5/19 and on 15/6/19 and used drugs. On the latter occasion he was reported by a peer to have climbed over the fence. (4) On 16/6/19 Mr Davies attempted to abscond again by trying to climb over the fence and was stopped by staff. He was observed to be arranging items to help him climb over the fence namely a bin and a chair. (5) The deceased was admitted to the Centre with a known substance abuse problem; (6) The jury was told by the Responsible Clinician that the deceased was also at risk of obtaining drugs from within the ward itself as the ward was not secure; (7) I also received evidence during the investigation that when Mr Davies’s personal belongings were collected following his death, these included a crushed metal can likely to have been used for narcotic use; (8) The inquest heard evidence that the fence of Laurel Ward garden was approximately 3100 mm in height having been increased in 2015. (9) The inquest was provided with two photographs of the fence taken on the morning of the third day of inquest being 8/10/20 that showed a wooden panelled fence with a metal mesh/wire upper level behind a paved pathway with a shrubbery filled with green foliage and plants; (10) The photographs showed that some of the shrubbery plants were almost as high as the wooden part of the fence and very dense to the extent the fence could not be seen behind them and nor could the ground beneath due to ground level foliage; (11) I heard evidence at the conclusion of the inquest in the absence of the Jury that the shrubbery was not considered to be dense enough by the head of security to conceal any items and that after an incidents of absconding a anti climb review was undertaken; (12) My concern is that it is not sufficient to carry out a search of the area after a patient has absconded. The current planting arrangements based on the most recent photographs, do appear to provide ample ground coverage for ANY item to be concealed including drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, items that could be used as weapons and items in connection with absconding. (13) There was no evidence that the garden was searched on a regular basis, patients were not observed in the garden unless their level of observation included eyesight observations, and there was no CCTV covering the garden area. (14) My view is that circumstances of the current planting arrangements in the shrubbery present a risk of deaths which will continue to exist. This also extends to a risk of injury to staff on Laurel Ward and other patients. ”

    Source location

    Lee William Davies · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the lower portion of the day-room window film to improve visibility into the garden while retaining upper-level privacy screening.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The second point relates to a ‘film’ which is covering the windows in the day room which looks out onto the garden. This film has been installed for privacy against overlooking houses close to the ward perimeter and to reduce glare into the day room. However, it was highlighted that this can impact on observations into the garden from the day room and therefore, the film will be removed at a lower level (to allow for unhindered vision into the garden) and kept at a higher level (to enable privacy to be maintained and continue to limit glare).”

    Source location

    2020-0261-Response-from-Midlands-Partnership-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 December 2020

    Open published response
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    DAVID CRAIG KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Kerr was admitted to hospital after a fall at home and subsequently sustained a fractured neck of femur in a further ward fall after removing his oxygen. He became increasingly unwell and died on 27 April 2019; the inquest recorded accidental death, with respiratory failure and extensive idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis as the medical cause of death. Concerns included poor care on Ward D2, inadequate hydration and fluid recording, and too few clinical observations for a seriously unwell patient.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to perform clinical observations at appropriate frequency for sick patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There were few clinical observations on this sick patient. On 26th April, clinical observations were performed at 11.12 (MEWS 1) and 21.06 (MEWS 0). There were no clinical observations thereafter. No protocol was produced regarding the frequency of observations in sick patients on Ward D2. ”

    Source location

    DAVID CRAIG KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to produce a protocol for the frequency of observations in sick patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) There were few clinical observations on this sick patient. On 26th April, clinical observations were performed at 11.12 (MEWS 1) and 21.06 (MEWS 0). There were no clinical observations thereafter. No protocol was produced regarding the frequency of observations in sick patients on Ward D2. ”

    Source location

    DAVID CRAIG KERR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Speak to staff involved and remind them to record and escalate observations appropriately and promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure compliance with best practice standards in Ward D2, the following actions are being taken:”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver ward training on observation recording and escalation under Trust policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure compliance with best practice standards in Ward D2, the following actions are being taken:”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce daily NEWS2 reports for Matrons and Ward Managers and review whether appropriate action has been taken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• EWS daily reports are produced and sent via email to Matrons and Ward Managers with details for each area of patients who have scored on the NEWS2 which is reviewed to ensure appropriate action has been taken.”

    Source location

    2020-0100-Response-from-Stockport-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response
  4. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Edna May Davenport · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edna May Davenport, a resident of Oak Court House residential care home, sustained head injuries during an unwitnessed assault by another resident and died in hospital on 12 December 2019. The report raised concerns about the removal of her alarm without documented alternative arrangements, inadequate recording and monitoring of observations, insufficient risk assessment of the other resident, and delays in responding to signs of head injury and deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document increased observation arrangements in written records or care plans

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the course of the inquest, I heard evidence that buzzer/alarm in the deceased room had been removed/disabled due to a previous incident where the deceased had attempted to place the cord around her neck. The family were told that as a result, observations of the deceased had been increased to every 15 minutes day and night. There was no evidence of this in any written records or care plan and no evidence of alternative arrangements in her care plan being made to enable the deceased to call for assistance from her room should it be needed given her disabilities; ”

    Source location

    Edna May Davenport · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    John Francis GREGORY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Francis Gregory died after developing acute kidney injury associated with low oral fluid intake, in the context of Alzheimer’s disease and old age. Concerns included inadequate encouragement and monitoring of drinking in hospital rehabilitation and residential care, inaccurate fluid-intake records, and failures to escalate or respond to his deterioration at Muriel Street Resource Centre.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to monitor patients in communal areas

    Wider context from the report

    “3. On the day he was readmitted to hospital from Muriel Street, Mr Gregory’s family found him slumped unconscious in a public area of the home, a fact unnoticed by any member of staff. He was not properly strapped in to a wheelchair, slipping down because his feet were not on the foot rests. He was cold and inadequately dressed, with his shirt undone and not wearing socks. By then Mr Gregory was not capable of dressing himself. ”

    Source location

    John Francis GREGORY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase staffing and senior oversight on each floor by adding senior managers and team-leader walkarounds.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Muriel Street has also increased staffing levels since this incident, and there is now an increased senior presence on each floor with a senior manager (Deputy Manager, Clinical Lead or Care lead) based in each nursing office and the addition of a team leader who supports to carry out regular walk arounds of their floor / unit. The result of this is greater oversight of staff activities and monitoring of residents to ensure that residents' needs and safety are maintained.”

    Source location

    2020-0073-Response-from-Care-UK_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement daytime documented welfare checks and audit completion through the Home Manager’s daily random documentation checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Muriel Street also undertakes specific welfare checks upon residents at regular intervals throughout the day. Previously, whilst such checks would have been undertaken during the day as part of other care provision (e.g. during meal provision, or regular repositioning), there would be no separate documentation during daytimes. Having reviewed matters, since April 2020, in accordance with Care UK policy Muriel Street has now ensured that the welfare check sheets are completed during the day alongside the other documentation to food and fluid charts, activities log books, turning charts and daily notes in addition to at night where they were previously completed.”

    Source location

    2020-0073-Response-from-Care-UK_Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 April 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident occurred on arrival at Muriel Street, not during hospital readmission, and the resident was neither in public nor unresponsive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For completeness, our understanding of the evidence, supported by the documentation from the family, is that the incident when Mr Gregory was found unsecured in a wheelchair was on arrival at Muriel Street, and not on the day he was readmitted to hospital. Further, our understanding of the evidence is that Mr Gregory was not in a public place, nor was he unresponsive at this time. That said, he should have been transferred into an armchair in his room.”

    Source location

    2020-0073-Response-from-Care-UK_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 April 2020

    Open published response
  6. Derby and Derbyshire

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Kenneth Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Kenneth Clarke, a 74-year-old resident of a nursing home with dementia and a high risk of choking, left his room on 23 July 2017, accessed bread that had been left out, choked and died. The inquest identified that the nursing home had no formal policies covering resident observation, food storage, kitchen and cupboard locks, dementia residents, or residents on a liquid food diet.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of formal policies for observing residents

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that Normanton Village View Nursing Home had no formal policies covering how residents were to be observed, how foods were to be stored, locks on the kitchen and cupboards, dementia residents or residents on a liquid food diet. ”

    Source location

    Mr Kenneth Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Lauren Victoria Finch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lauren Victoria Finch, aged 23, died on 24 September 2018 after suspending herself from a bedroom door while detained as a patient at Atherleigh Park Hospital; she suffered a significant brain injury and later died in hospital. The principal concerns included inadequate suicide-risk assessment and review, inappropriate observation levels and practices, failures in the anti-barricade system, and delayed clinical record entries.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of investigation staff to correctly understand and apply the observation policy

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The Trust carried out an investigation following the death of Lauren. It was of concern that the lead investigator (who gave evidence at the inquest) did not understand the Observation Policy and suggested that observations should be carried out at irregular intervals (which was correct) but then gave an example of 10 minute observations being carried out at: 10 am, 10.08 am, 10.20 am (which is clearly not in accordance with the Policy). The interval should never exceed the 10 minute period (and there is 12 minutes between 10.08 am and 10.20 am). ”

    Source location

    Lauren Victoria Finch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ward management to understand the observation policy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The Deputy Ward Manager on Westleigh Ward at Atherleigh Park Hospital confirmed that she did not and still does not check that observations by staff are being carried out in accordance with the Trust policy, despite accepting that this was her role when the nurse in charge of a shift. Further, the Deputy Manager of Westleigh Ward did not understand the Policy and thought that observations were to be carried out at regular intervals (as referred to above). ”

    Source location

    Lauren Victoria Finch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to carry out patient observations at irregular intervals within the permitted time window

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Nursing staff and Health Care Assistants on Westleigh Ward at Atherleigh Park Hospital were carrying out (and continue to carry out) observations of patients at precise intervals (for example, if a patient is on half-hourly observations, staff explained that they would aim to carry out observations at 10.00 am, 10.30 a.m., 11 am etc.). Further, all records showed that the timings of observations were at precise intervals. This is not in accordance with the Trust’s policy of observations (which confirms that observations should be irregular but within the (e.g. 30 minute) window. The reason for this policy is clearly to avoid a situation whereby a patient can predict when they will next be observed (and offer an opportunity for the patient to take action to harm herself during that period of time). ”

    Source location

    Lauren Victoria Finch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of ward supervision to check compliance with the observation policy

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The Deputy Ward Manager on Westleigh Ward at Atherleigh Park Hospital confirmed that she did not and still does not check that observations by staff are being carried out in accordance with the Trust policy, despite accepting that this was her role when the nurse in charge of a shift. Further, the Deputy Manager of Westleigh Ward did not understand the Policy and thought that observations were to be carried out at regular intervals (as referred to above). ”

    Source location

    Lauren Victoria Finch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop standard serious-incident-investigation terms of reference requiring assessment against evidence-based practice, NICE guidance, policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Lead investigators are supported during the course of investigations by assigned clinical experts. The Trust has developed a standard suite of terms of reference which are to be considered as part of a serious incident investigation; this includes to assess if care delivered was concordant with evidence based practice, NICE guidance, policies and procedures.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a refresher training package on therapeutic observations, including policy procedures and clinical case studies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A training package has been developed to support face to face refresher training for all Nursing staff and Health Care Assistants. This training not only reminds clinicians of the correct procedure when completing therapeutic observations, but will use case studies to discuss various scenarios in how this policy should be applied in clinical practice. This training is to be delivered to all Nursing staff (including health care assistants) working at Atherleigh Park during December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Support the Deputy Ward Manager’s ongoing policy-compliance reflection and quality-assurance responsibilities through ward-manager supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Following the inquest, the Assistant Clinical Director completed a reflective session with the Deputy Ward Manager in respect of the number of concerns identified. This session included a discussion about the requirements of the policy when completing 10 minute observation checks. The Deputy Ward manager will also attend the refresher training previously described. In addition to this, the new ward manager on Westleigh Ward is supporting this ongoing reflection in supervision to ensure that policies are adhered to, and the Deputy Manager is fulfilling the quality assurance elements of her role.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver face-to-face refresher training on observation and engagement policy, including delayed record-keeping requirements, to nursing staff and healthcare assistants.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A training package has been developed to support face to face refresher training for all Nursing staff and Health Care Assistants. This training not only reminds clinicians of the correct procedure when completing therapeutic observations, but will use case studies to discuss various scenarios in how this policy should be applied in clinical practice. This training is to be delivered to all Nursing staff (including health care assistants) working at Atherleigh Park during December 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate learning from the death and the requirement to stagger therapeutic-observation checks to nursing staff and healthcare assistants.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A communication has been sent from the Assistant Clinical Director to all Nursing staff and Health Care Assistants working at Atherleigh Park in respect of the points of learning from Lauren’s sad death. This correspondence has stipulated the specific requirement of staggering the times of checking a patient, in line with the policy. This is in order to ensure that where therapeutic”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce electronic observations to record exact observation times in electronic care records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “observations are in place for the purpose of reducing risk of suicide or self-harm, there is not a predictable pattern of observation that may reduce the risk reducing impact of this intervention. The introduction of e-observations, early next year, will mean that the exact time observations are taken will be immediately populated on the electronic care record. This will mean a regular audit can be obtained to provide assurance that the requirements of the policy have been fulfilled. This audit will be completed each month and the results will be discussed at the local quality safety and safeguarding group for assurance purposes. The introduction of e-observations is a joint undertaking between our Trust and Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust, with Atherleigh Park targeted as a priority in the rollout of the project.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit electronic observation records monthly and discuss results at the local quality, safety and safeguarding group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “observations are in place for the purpose of reducing risk of suicide or self-harm, there is not a predictable pattern of observation that may reduce the risk reducing impact of this intervention. The introduction of e-observations, early next year, will mean that the exact time observations are taken will be immediately populated on the electronic care record. This will mean a regular audit can be obtained to provide assurance that the requirements of the policy have been fulfilled. This audit will be completed each month and the results will be discussed at the local quality safety and safeguarding group for assurance purposes. The introduction of e-observations is a joint undertaking between our Trust and Mersey Care NHS Foundation Trust, with Atherleigh Park targeted as a priority in the rollout of the project.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular ward audits of compliance with the observation policy and report findings to the Borough senior leadership team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Additionally, the operational manager is completing regular audits, in order to identify any gaps in compliance with the policy. A baseline audit was completed in November 2019 and this will be repeated each month. This is reported into the Borough senior leadership team meeting for assurance.”

    Source location

    2019-0506-Response-from-North-West-Boroughs-Healthcare-NHS-Foundation-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 May 2020

    Open published response
  8. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Ms Shannon Quinn · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ms Shannon Quinn, a 24-year-old woman with a complex mental health history and repeated self-harm, was found hanging in her room at Oak House on 9 January 2019 and was pronounced deceased shortly afterwards. The report identified concerns including inadequate information sharing and joint care planning, insufficient staff training, escalating ligature risk without sufficient environmental measures, and failure to adhere to five-minute observations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to adhere to the five-minute patient observation level

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The patient observation level of 5 minutes was introduced to minimise risk of self-harm but not adhered to. ”

    Source location

    Ms Shannon Quinn · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Alex Blake · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Alex Blake died from a self-administered heroin overdose while a sectioned in-patient at Lambeth Hospital, sometime before 04.13 on 24 June 2018. The jury found that inadequate observations, unsuitable record sheets, ineffective observations and poor communication meant his death went unnoticed for several hours. Concerns were also raised about unreliable or potentially false accounts and records by staff regarding observations of him before he was found dead.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to perform required patient observations

    Wider context from the report

    “The first was RMN T, who gave evidence that the deceased was half out of bed, wearing pyjamas and assumed to be asleep at 05.00. When asked whether he could have been dead, the nurse said she did not know, but it was too dark to see and no torch was used. She chose to wait until 06.00 to conduct a proper observation. She could not answer the question why she had not gone to get a torch or returned before 06.00. When found in the same position an hour later, she says she was concerned and asked Health Care assistant K if he was breathing as he had been in the same position for an hour. HCA K denies that this conversation took place before he was found dead. RMN T on finding the deceased said that it still did not occur to her that he might be dead. Her evidence to the court that he was wearing pyjamas at 05.00 is in contrast to the electronic patient journal, which confirms that when he was found dead he was topless. The second was RMN E, whose evidence was read due to his unavailability. He made an entry in the electronic journal at 05.59, which is about the time which he was found dead, that “he went to his bedroom and was observed asleep from 23.00 hrs. Alex remains asleep and was observed breathing regularly at the time of this entry (05.52).” The deceased was already dead at the time this entry claims to have been written. RMN T told the court that she had no communication with RMN E about his observations and RMN E was not one of those who found him dead at about 06.10 hours. This raises concern about what prompted the unusual entry at 05.59. The third was health care assistant K, whose evidence in court was that the deceased was observed at 03.00 and he held his phone in his hand which was lit up, and so assumed to be watching a film. The witness was unable to answer why he had then recorded the deceased as being asleep, as it would be likely then that the light of the phone would not be visible. The evidence of these three witnesses cannot be said to be reliable. The evidence of the two nurses would seem to go beyond that of poorly conducted observations. It would be reasonable to suspect that either the two nurses did not perform the observations at all or that they have provided false evidence to the Trust and to the court. ”

    Source location

    Mr Alex Blake · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct timely and adequate observations of patients whose condition is uncertain

    Wider context from the report

    “The first was RMN T, who gave evidence that the deceased was half out of bed, wearing pyjamas and assumed to be asleep at 05.00. When asked whether he could have been dead, the nurse said she did not know, but it was too dark to see and no torch was used. She chose to wait until 06.00 to conduct a proper observation. She could not answer the question why she had not gone to get a torch or returned before 06.00. When found in the same position an hour later, she says she was concerned and asked Health Care assistant K if he was breathing as he had been in the same position for an hour. HCA K denies that this conversation took place before he was found dead. RMN T on finding the deceased said that it still did not occur to her that he might be dead. Her evidence to the court that he was wearing pyjamas at 05.00 is in contrast to the electronic patient journal, which confirms that when he was found dead he was topless. The second was RMN E, whose evidence was read due to his unavailability. He made an entry in the electronic journal at 05.59, which is about the time which he was found dead, that “he went to his bedroom and was observed asleep from 23.00 hrs. Alex remains asleep and was observed breathing regularly at the time of this entry (05.52).” The deceased was already dead at the time this entry claims to have been written. RMN T told the court that she had no communication with RMN E about his observations and RMN E was not one of those who found him dead at about 06.10 hours. This raises concern about what prompted the unusual entry at 05.59. The third was health care assistant K, whose evidence in court was that the deceased was observed at 03.00 and he held his phone in his hand which was lit up, and so assumed to be watching a film. The witness was unable to answer why he had then recorded the deceased as being asleep, as it would be likely then that the light of the phone would not be visible. The evidence of these three witnesses cannot be said to be reliable. The evidence of the two nurses would seem to go beyond that of poorly conducted observations. It would be reasonable to suspect that either the two nurses did not perform the observations at all or that they have provided false evidence to the Trust and to the court. ”

    Source location

    Mr Alex Blake · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct ongoing investigations into concerns arising from the case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that the concerns raised were acted upon immediately and are currently the subject of ongoing investigations. I would therefore wish to assure all concerned that action will be taken to remedy any identified organisational or individual deficits arising from this process in the interests of patient safety.”

    Source location

    2019-0259-Response-from-NHS-Professionals-Redacted-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include evidence of completed and updated observation competency assessments in the whole-systems review actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to statutory and mandatory training, individual Client Trusts may have specific additional training requirements for bank staff who are provided via NHS Professionals and, where this is the case, NHS Professionals works in partnership with a Client Trust to support delivery of this additional training. The Trust Engagement and Observation Policy Version 6.1 (July 2017) includes a Nursing Verification of Competence proforma which requires a competency assessment prior to any ‘nurse’ undertaking any level of observation. This is undertaken at ward level.”

    Source location

    2019-0259-Response-from-NHS-Professionals-Redacted-1
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 September 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Client Trusts deliver substantive staff training, and ward staff undertake competency assessments before nurses perform observations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Substantive Registration is the primary registration route, which is available to applicants who hold a substantive post within a Client Trust. The substantive registration process allows substantive staff, referred to as Multi Post Holder Bank Members, to work back at the Trust where they are substantively employed and in an area of work that has been authorised by a Trust Manager. All training requirements for substantive staff are delivered by the Trust.”

    Source location

    2019-0259-Response-from-NHS-Professionals-Redacted-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 September 2019

    Open published response
  10. Buckinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Emma Felicity BUTLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Emma Butler was an inpatient at Ruby Ward who died at Stoke Mandeville Hospital from blood loss after incised wounds inflicted outside the Whiteleaf Centre while she was on unescorted leave. The report raised concerns about access to means of self-harm on and outside the ward, hourly observations, urgent access to ward support, and planning for discharge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Variation in the timing and conduct of hourly patient observations

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) General observations. The process for conducting and recording hourly observations left scope for significant variation on the actual time between and the manner in which such observations of a particular patient were undertaken and recorded. There was an indication that this would be reviewed but the risk remains of an incident of planned or spontaneous self-harm occurring between observations for a patient not on a higher level of observations. ”

    Source location

    Emma Felicity BUTLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and revise the Safe and Supportive Observations policy to improve the safety and effectiveness of observation practices.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The policy is currently undergoing a review. It was last discussed at the Clinical Effectiveness Sub-Committee in April 2019. Your concerns are being considered as part of that review. The revised policy will be presented to the Sub-committee on 18th July 2019 by the Trust’s Deputy Director of Nursing for Mental Health.”

    Source location

    2019-0133-Response-by-Oxford-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and evaluate new approaches to enhanced observations through a quality improvement project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can also add that the issue of enhanced observations was the subject of a 2018/19 quality improvement project completed by Oxford Healthcare Improvement (OHI) in partnership with one of our wards, the results of which were reported to our Quality Committee in May 2019. OHI trains and develops staff at the Trust in order to deliver better and safer care through a programme of quality improvement projects, training and research. OHI works with national and international organisations, universities, health and social care providers, commissioners, the academic health science network, patient safety collaborative and industrial partners. The outcome of the project was extremely encouraging and patients and staff have reported very positive outcomes from new approaches to enhanced observations.”

    Source location

    2019-0133-Response-by-Oxford-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026