Recurring concern

Unsafe recognition and response to significantly abnormal blood pressure

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First reported 10 Jan 2014•Latest report 3 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to recognising, assessing, escalating or responding to significantly abnormal blood pressure, including inaccurate severity assessment, failure to trigger medical review and failure to take appropriate action when abnormal blood pressure is known.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical assessment, escalation or staffing deficiencies that are not specifically tied to abnormal blood pressure.
  • Excludes unrelated abnormal observations, such as elevated NEWS scores, unless the asserted unsafe condition materially concerns blood-pressure recognition or response.
  • Excludes low or high blood pressure as a factual finding without an identified failure in its assessment, escalation or management.
  • Excludes downstream treatment failures where blood-pressure recognition and response were adequate.
Reports
10

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
16

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
22

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Belmarsh Prison1
Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
East Suffolk and North Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
Faculty of Sexual and Reproductive Healthcare1
General Medical Council1
Lathom Road Medical Centre1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital1
Luton and Dunstable University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust1
NHS England1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    JOHN SOUTHAM KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Southam Keen, who had a known ascending aortic aneurysm, developed sudden chest pain radiating to his back and neck at home on 19 August 2023. Paramedics recorded the aneurysm incorrectly as abdominal and took him to a local acute hospital rather than directly to a specialist arterial centre; after a delay, he suffered cardiac arrest before surgery, sustained a fatal hypoxic brain injury and died on 24 August 2023. The report raises concerns about the paramedics’ assessment, SWAST NHS’s inadequate incident review, and confusing and unclear ambulance guidance on suspected aortic dissection.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear interpretation of blood pressure in suspected aortic dissection

    Wider context from the report

    “2) Although responsibility for the content of the Joint Royal Colleges Ambulatory Liaison Committee (JRCALC) clinical guidelines does not lie with SWAST NHS (its lies with this named committee, which is part of the AACE, and therefore they have been asked to respond to the concerns raised here about a guideline – see below) it is important that ambulance trusts consider issues relating to paramedic guidance and that their views feed in to the work of JRCALC. Therefore, the same concern that is set out below for the attention of JRCALC is raised with SWAST NHS here, for them to consider the issues raised and to formally respond with their views. At the inquest, the content of SWAST NHS’s vascular emergencies guideline was considered. SWAST NHS confirmed that this local guideline was based on the JRCALC national vascular emergencies guideline (which had last been updated in July 2025) and that the substantive provisions in respect of clinicians considering a potential aortic dissection were set out in accordance with the national guideline. All those involved at the inquest who both asked and answered questions about this guideline (including myself, counsel for Mr Keen’s family and the author of SWAST NHS’s clinical review) considered that it was confusing, potentially contradictory and not at all user-friendly for paramedics. In particular, concerns were raised that: - there is a section entitled ‘aortic aneurysms’, but when the detail of this section is considered it becomes apparent that this only relates to potential rupture of an abdominal aortic aneurysm. There is then a separate section entitled ‘aortic dissection’ and it is clear that this relates primarily to ascending and descending aortic aneurysms, but also in some respects to abdominal aneurysms. The headings of these sections are confusing and it is not easily apparent which one should be considered in respect of each different type of aneurysm, which is of course particularly relevant to presenting symptoms, particularly location of pain. - in the ‘aortic dissection detection risk score’ table of the guideline, there are a number of predisposing conditions, pain features and examination findings listed as relevant to a calculation of risk. There is then a total possible score of 0 – 3, presumably depending on whether a risk factor is present in each of the three columns – however, there is then no information about what should happen given any particular score or how the total score should affect a clinician’s impression of clinical risk. This appears to be unhelpful. - hypotension on examination is listed as a risk factor in this risk score table, however later on in the guidance (in a section headed ‘risk factors’) it is stated that ‘hypotension is a poor prognostic sign’. Immediately above this it is stated that ‘blood pressure may be high as a consequence of the dissection’. It is therefore unclear whether, in respect of a potential aortic dissection, high or low blood pressure is concerning, or how the issue of a patient’s blood pressure may be relevant to overall clinical risk. - overall, the impression of those discussing and analysing this guidance at the inquest was that it was confusing, lacking in detail and clarity in some respects, but unhelpfully long-winded and unclear in others. Further, it was mentioned that this guidance compares unfavourably to other documents used in similar clinical situations, including the ‘Manchester Triage System’ for suspected aortic dissection, which the inquest heard was used in some emergency departments in the UK and sets out, on one page, what the concerning symptoms are which should raise the possibility of a patient suffering an aortic dissection, and how these should then inform the urgency of the clinical response. ”

    Source location

    JOHN SOUTHAM KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend hypotension wording to clarify the relevance of high and low blood pressure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Hypotension as a risk factor”

    Source location

    Response from Association of Ambulance Chief Executives
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Chloe HUNT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Chloe Hunt died in hospital on 15 March 2022 after swallowing pens that caused gastrointestinal obstruction and a fatal cardiac arrhythmia secondary to metabolic derangement. The concerns included insufficient consideration of her trauma-related difficulties in hospital, delays and inadequate planning for removal of the pens, and failure to recognise and respond to her deteriorating clinical condition.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate the underlying cause of persistent tachycardia and low blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “d. Chloe was tachycardic throughout her admission with low blood pressure and there was no investigation of the underlying cause in a young otherwise physically healthy woman. NEWS Scores should not replace consideration of the whole clinical picture for a patient. ”

    Source location

    Chloe HUNT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss the case with ward and governance staff to promote recognition of underlying causes of abnormalities in apparently stable patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Chloe’s case has been discussed with staff members, through the daily ward huddle and the Two at the Top meeting (outlined below) as well as at the joint governance meeting to promote learning from Chloe’s case and highlight additional actions that can be taken to help establish potential underlying causes for abnormalities in an otherwise seemingly stable patient.”

    Source location

    Response from East Suffolk and North Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate learning on persistent tachycardia and the need for further investigations to identify its underlying cause.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has however reviewed the case and acknowledge that a further electrocardiogram could have been undertaken during the admission to provide further clinical insight into Chloe’s condition.”

    Source location

    Response from East Suffolk and North Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care at Colchester General Hospital fall outside NHS England’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises concerns with the care provided to Chloe whilst she was a patient at Colchester General Hospital. It is appropriate that East Suffolk & North Essex NHS Foundation Trust respond to your concerns, which do not fall under NHS England’s remit.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    East Suffolk & North Essex NHS Foundation Trust is responsible for responding to concerns about care at Colchester General Hospital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your Report raises concerns with the care provided to Chloe whilst she was a patient at Colchester General Hospital. It is appropriate that East Suffolk & North Essex NHS Foundation Trust respond to your concerns, which do not fall under NHS England’s remit.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Tracey Ann FARNDON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tracey Ann FARNDON was admitted to hospital with diarrhoea, vomiting and severe lower back pain, deteriorated rapidly, suffered cardiac arrest and could not be saved. The post-mortem identified severe pneumonia and a septic spleen, with the medical cause of death recorded as septic shock due to sepsis secondary to community-acquired pneumonia. Concerns included delays in recognising and treating sepsis, failure to respond appropriately to an unrecordable low blood pressure, and emergency department overcrowding and insufficient staffing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise the seriousness of a low or unrecordable blood pressure and continue observations

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Ms Farndon's BP was not recordable when she first presented at the emergency department. It was likely to be very low. This was not considered by the staff concerned and no further attempts were made to assess Ms Farndon's BP. There is a concern staff do not understand the implication of a low BP, the importance of continued observations when a key parameter cannot be recorded and that this may indicate the patient is seriously unwell. This raises a concern of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Tracey Ann FARNDON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to make further attempts to assess an unrecordable blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Ms Farndon's BP was not recordable when she first presented at the emergency department. It was likely to be very low. This was not considered by the staff concerned and no further attempts were made to assess Ms Farndon's BP. There is a concern staff do not understand the implication of a low BP, the importance of continued observations when a key parameter cannot be recorded and that this may indicate the patient is seriously unwell. This raises a concern of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Tracey Ann FARNDON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver manual blood-pressure training and competency assessment for Emergency Department staff, including escalation and alternative perfusion assessment methods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A programme of manual blood pressure training and competence was commenced for all Emergency Department staff at QEHB in March 2024. This includes education regarding the limitations of cold blood pressure measurement, for example the unreliability when patients have atrial fibrillation, and the escalation process for situations when blood pressure cannot be recorded. All band 6 and band 7 staff who are not on extended leave have completed this training, with all band 5 staff expected to have completed training by the end of May 2024. There is always a dedicated senior emergency doctor in all areas to escalate to for urgent review if the blood pressure is unable to be recorded through automatic or manual means. Training also includes education regarding additional means of assessing perfusion such as palpation of radial pulse and capillary refill time.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Birmingham
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with NHS England to identify resources needed for healthcare professionals to recognise and respond appropriately to patient deterioration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “that updates to national sepsis guidance are disseminated and well recognised amongst a wide range of healthcare professionals who may encounter sepsis and acute deterioration. NHS England has developed several sepsis training and education resources, including e-learning, sector specific toolkits, and the ‘sepsis educational digital game,’ an accessible introduction to sepsis for clinical and non-clinical staff. We will continue to work with NHS England to understand what resources are needed to ensure that healthcare professionals recognise and respond appropriately when patients deteriorate.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is responsible for responding directly to concerns about assessing the patient’s low blood pressure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report also raised concerns regarding the assessment of Ms Farndon’s low blood pressure. I note you have shared your report and concerns with University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, to respond directly to your matters of concern. I have included below some of the local actions that the Trust has committed to in response to the concerns in your report.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Delina Etienne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Delina Etienne, who had schizo-affective disorder and was an inpatient receiving treatment, was found unresponsive in bed on 7 May 2021 and was declared deceased at the scene. The report identifies concerns about the chaotic response to her cardiac arrest, including failure to follow resuscitation procedures and an erroneous assumption that a DNACPR order was in place. It also identifies concerns about failures to escalate raised blood pressure and chest pain, assess VTE risk, and disclose the resuscitation error.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate episodes of raised blood pressure for medical review

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Whilst Mrs Etienne was an inpatient, the ward failed to escalate episodes of raised blood pressure for medical review in contravention of trust policy. ”

    Source location

    Delina Etienne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train staff on NEWS2 blood-pressure updates and revise NEWS2 scoring and recording templates in RiO.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NEWS 2-update training on blood pressure has been undertaken by 62 staff, and NEWS 2 scores template and recording within the RiO medical records has now been revised.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable automatic RiO alerts for physical-health observations outside expected limits, including action guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The electronic recording system for NEWS 2 now has automatic alerts for all physical health observations recorded which are outside expected limits. This highlights any concern and advises on action to be taken by the person entering the readings.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Cazaubon Ward staff training on elevated blood-pressure assessment and repeat measurement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A training template was created and reviewed with each Cazaubon Ward staff member in May 2022.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit Cazaubon Ward blood-pressure management monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Monthly audits of the ward in relation to management of blood pressure started in May 2022 and are ongoing.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2022

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lauren Louise MURDOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lauren Murdock died from a myocardial infarction at age 27. Concerns included a significantly elevated blood pressure reading that was not recorded in her medical record or brought to the GP’s attention, and errors in assessing clot and cardiovascular risks when prescribing the combined contraceptive pill. She died ten days after the elevated blood pressure reading was taken.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record significantly elevated blood pressure readings in the medical record

    Wider context from the report

    “At inquest, I heard that Lauren visited the practice on 13 October 2021 and saw a healthcare assistant. Her blood pressure was taken and was found to be significantly elevated at 166/90, with a heart rate of 98. That blood pressure reading does not appear to have found its way to Ms Murdock’s medical record, and it was certainly not brought to Dr ████████ attention. ”

    Source location

    Lauren Louise MURDOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to bring significantly elevated blood pressure readings to the responsible clinician’s attention

    Wider context from the report

    “At inquest, I heard that Lauren visited the practice on 13 October 2021 and saw a healthcare assistant. Her blood pressure was taken and was found to be significantly elevated at 166/90, with a heart rate of 98. That blood pressure reading does not appear to have found its way to Ms Murdock’s medical record, and it was certainly not brought to Dr ████████ attention. ”

    Source location

    Lauren Louise MURDOCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Place a sign above the blood-pressure machine directing patients to give their readings to reception.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A sign has been placed above the blood pressure machine guiding patients to hand the reading to the receptionist once checked.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre_Event Analysis
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain staff vigilance to ensure patients using the machine submit their readings before leaving.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staff to remain vigilant of any patients using the machine to ensure patients do not leave without submitting a reading.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre_Event Analysis
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relocate the blood-pressure machine to the opposite reception-area wall to improve staff oversight while preserving confidentiality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Re-site the machine closer to the reception desk so staff can keep a closer eye on the patients using the machine, the only problem with this is that it can’t be placed right next to the reception desk as it would raise confidentiality issues with the patients already queuing at the front desk. Reception staff suggested to place the machine on the opposite wall of the reception area where they would have better oversight of the patient – we shall try this.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre_Event Analysis
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a reception blood-pressure monitoring protocol covering receptionist duties, doctor notification and abnormal readings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have also created a protocol for blood pressure monitoring in the reception area for staff to follow, this clearly highlights the role of the receptionist in the monitoring process, guidelines for informing the doctor, abnormal values.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain receptionist vigilance and, where possible, supervise patients using the monitor to ensure readings reach the doctor.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A significant event analysis meeting was also held on 20th April 2022. This included doctors, practice manager and reception staff. We discussed possible options to prevent this scenario recurring and have actioned the most feasible options. Where possible, the receptionist should remain with the patient and supervise the blood pressure monitoring, ensuring the reading is brought to the attention of the doctor. This of course may not be possible when short staffed or during busy periods, however staff to remain vigilant of any patients using the machine so ensure they do not leave before submitting a reading.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuous staff supervision of every patient using the blood pressure machine is not always possible because reception staff are already occupied with front-desk duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. Dr ████████ suggested having a dedicated member of staff to supervise each patient checking their blood pressure throughout the process. ████████ mentioned that this is not always going to be possible as staff are already busy at the front desk and wouldn’t always have time to supervise every patient. We agreed that if staff members are free then they should try to stay with the patient though the monitoring process, failing that they should give the patient clear instructions to submit their readings to the front desk.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre_Event Analysis
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Receptionist supervision of blood pressure monitoring may not be possible during short staffing or busy periods.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A significant event analysis meeting was also held on 20th April 2022. This included doctors, practice manager and reception staff. We discussed possible options to prevent this scenario recurring and have actioned the most feasible options. Where possible, the receptionist should remain with the patient and supervise the blood pressure monitoring, ensuring the reading is brought to the attention of the doctor. This of course may not be possible when short staffed or during busy periods, however staff to remain vigilant of any patients using the machine so ensure they do not leave before submitting a reading.”

    Source location

    Response from Lathom Road Medical Centre
    Page 1 · response
    Published 26 April 2022

    Open published response
  6. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Edward Arthur AKROYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Edward Arthur Akroyd was delivered by forceps on 13 January 2018 at Calderdale Royal Hospital after concerns arose during his mother’s labour, including pre-eclampsia and abnormal CTG tracing. He was transferred to Leeds General Infirmary for intensive treatment and died there on 17 January 2018. The principal concerns included inadequate monitoring and treatment of his mother’s elevated blood pressure, incomplete handover and medical records, failure to communicate laboratory results, and delayed recognition and interpretation of non-reassuring CTG findings.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately assess significantly elevated blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The registrar who was seized of Mrs Akroyds care following transfer to Calderdale Royal hospital, in evidence stated that both at the time and also from the position of hindsight, considered Mrs Akroyds blood pressure both prior to and post transfer was only marginally elevated and he based his treatment plan on this view. I heard evidence from various consultants, that Mrs Akroyds blood pressure was significantly elevated, which required urgent treatment and careful review. I am concerned that if similar circumstances were to reoccur, and the same clinician were to hold similar views this may pose a risk to the wellbeing of the expectant mother and unborn child. ”

    Source location

    Edward Arthur AKROYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of awareness of recommended treatment for elevated blood pressure in labour

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The same registrar in evidence stated that he was not aware of the recommended treatment for elevated blood pressure at this stage of labour and that he had recognised Mrs Akroyd had pre-eclampsia and that he understood that the appropriate treatment of pre-eclampsia was the delivery of the baby. I am concerned that if the same facts were to reoccur, and the same registrar were to adopt the same treatment plan within similar time scales, it may present a risk to the wellbeing of the expectant mother and her unborn child. ”

    Source location

    Edward Arthur AKROYD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide compulsory annual training for midwives and maternity staff covering CTG monitoring, maternal monitoring and obstetric emergencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of disseminating guidance, refreshing the knowledge of staff and monitoring compliance: All new and revised guidelines are placed on the Trust’s intranet and are available at any time electronically. The weekly Maternity Risk Management Newsletter will have a notice about new or revised guidelines. The compulsory annual Obstetric Emergency Training Day contains reminders about these guidelines.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The doctor’s reflection, assessment, training, subsequent practice and case reviews are considered sufficient to establish competency in managing obstetric emergencies and related concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “He has reflected on this case with his clinical supervisors and with a number of consultant colleagues. He has had annual appraisals and undergone the vigorous process of assessment and was awarded a CESR certificate and recognised on the specialist register by the GMC on 30 November 2020. Since his involvement in Mrs Akroyd’s care, he has since progressed to a substantive Consultant post at the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (1)
    Page 5 · response
    Published 8 March 2022

    Open published response
  7. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Douglas Robert Owens developed acute cardiac failure, hypotension, aspiration pneumonia and multi-organ failure after cataract surgery, treatment for raised intraocular pressure, ongoing eye pain and painful urinary retention. He died in intensive care on 7 July 2018. Concerns included arrangements for urgent ophthalmic transfer, specialist assessment, monitoring and review of deterioration, fluid documentation, and recording medication doses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the review process after a marked blood pressure drop

    Wider context from the report

    “(4)That the evidence disclosed that the review process was not followed upon the Deceased’s blood pressure dropping by more than 40mmHg, notwithstanding the fact that observation had been recorded. Unless action is taken, there is a risk that any deterioration in the condition of patients which might put their lives at risk will not be reviewed at the earliest opportunity. ”

    Source location

    Douglas OWENS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver deteriorating-patient simulation training for Emergency Department staff using Trust pathways and NEWS2 escalation algorithms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Over recent months, the Trust and the Emergency Department (ED) have committed to major improvement projects and programmes to improve the ‘recognise and act’ element in the care and treatment of a deteriorating patient. The ED currently are 92.91% compliant with the Trust’s Recognise and Act Mandatory Training (120 staff are compliant, nine staff are waiting to attend, three of which are new staff and two are paediatric nurses). We have a plan for all outstanding staff to attend the training, although limited places are available due to social distancing. Our two Advanced Clinical Practitioner’s (ACPs) are running simulation training sessions for all staff to attend, following the Trust Pathways of the recognition of the deteriorating patient. Both ACPs are Advanced Life Support (ALS) trainers and follow the ALS algorithms and the NEWS 2 Escalator.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish the Deteriorating Patient Collaborative to test safer recognition and response to clinical deterioration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At an organisational level, the Quality Improvement Strategy describes a new Deteriorating Patient Collaborative, to test ways of working that will help teams to recognise and respond to the clinical deterioration of patients and reduce preventable deaths. A Project Initiation Document has been prepared and a Senior Responsible Officer and Improvement Programme Manager have been identified to support the work. The Board of Directors support commencement of the Deteriorating Patient Collaborative and agreed to receive regular updates on progress as part of the Quality Improvement Strategy reporting mechanism.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct regular Emergency Department spot audits and huddles to verify NEWS2 recording, prompt escalation and completion of fluid charts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the interim, the Head of the Emergency Department and the Matron will ensure senior clinical staff will undertake regular spot audits / huddles, to ensure all patients in the ED have their NEWS2 score recorded correctly, that any changes in score are acted upon promptly and that fluid charts are completed correctly and acted upon promptly. The ED complete a Consistency in Care Audit daily, where 40 patients’ notes (approximately 20% of all patients daily) are reviewed in real time and this includes a review of the NEWS 2 and fluid balance. This is used to monitor the compliance and manage any inconsistencies in care at the time. Additionally the ED undertakes an intentional round, where all patients who have been in the department for longer than 4 hours, are reviewed by the EPIC (Emergency Physician in Charge) to ensure that appropriate plans of care are in place.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete daily real-time Consistency in Care Audits reviewing NEWS2 and fluid-balance compliance and manage identified inconsistencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the interim, the Head of the Emergency Department and the Matron will ensure senior clinical staff will undertake regular spot audits / huddles, to ensure all patients in the ED have their NEWS2 score recorded correctly, that any changes in score are acted upon promptly and that fluid charts are completed correctly and acted upon promptly. The ED complete a Consistency in Care Audit daily, where 40 patients’ notes (approximately 20% of all patients daily) are reviewed in real time and this includes a review of the NEWS 2 and fluid balance. This is used to monitor the compliance and manage any inconsistencies in care at the time. Additionally the ED undertakes an intentional round, where all patients who have been in the department for longer than 4 hours, are reviewed by the EPIC (Emergency Physician in Charge) to ensure that appropriate plans of care are in place.”

    Source location

    2020-0210-Response-from-Blackpool-Teaching-Hospitals_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 December 2020

    Open published response
  8. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laurence Boyens died in prison on 15 November 2012 from Methadone, Tramadol and Diazepam intoxication. The jury identified concerns about the combination and interaction of prescribed drugs, failures to monitor intoxication symptoms and blood pressure, and failures to suspend or withhold Methadone and Tramadol when signs of toxicity were present.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate and define reporting parameters for pre-administration blood-pressure readings

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a general misunderstanding how health care professionals should comply with DH Clinical Management of Drug Dependence in Adult Prison Settings Guidelines 12.3 and 12.4. In particular this relates to the requirement to ensure that patients who are undergoing Methadone or Buprenorphine stabilization have not experienced a lowering of blood pressure or drowsiness before administration of the controlled drug. • Health care assistants routinely took the blood pressure before administration but did not inform the nurse of the reading and may not have had instruction when to report the reading • The evidence of six nurses and a health care assistant showed that previous blood pressure recordings were not sought or examined to determine if there had been a lowering of BP • The record of blood pressure was often written on paper and not usually entered in the medical records at the time and sometimes not at all • A health care assistant who did record a BP of 93/68 was asked by a nurse to repeat it and reported back to the medication hatch that it was still low. No apparent action was taken by nurses to suspend the medication or escalate the concern to a doctor on 11th. • One nurse, who did not see the BP of 93/58 recorded in the records and administered Methadone, did not know what she would do if he had discovered a previous higher BP. • One nurse was surprised that a BP of 105/60 having a reading of 128/68 and 93/68 the previous day and 121/81 the day before that, should trigger withholding Methadone and escalating to the doctor. • The expert GP, who had been clinical director in the health care team provided to the prison, identified a sequence of seven BP recordings over 4 days, six of which (the second was considered rogue) should have triggered suspension of administration of drugs and escalation to the doctor, but in no case did this occur. • The head of health care at the time, who was an inexperienced nurse, did not accept that advice and asserted it would be impractical to implement it, as it would lead to significant delays. • In a local policy on Buprenorphine a threshold triggering suspension of drug and escalation was defined as 90/60 without reference to the trend. None was found in a section on Methadone and no definition of lowering of blood pressure or how to record it was found in any local policies. • No nurse saw the entry in the medical records by a doctor at 18.56 on 13th November which read: “Unusually drowsy. Eyelids close when not engaged. communicative alert. no sadness or dsh. Plan stop Citalopram and monitor for signs of overdose.. may req further urine test before further Methadone testing...”. • At 17.57 on 13th, one hour from the doctor’s assessment, when he must have been unusually drowsy, no nurse found him drowsy when he presented at the hatch for medication, and he was given Methadone and Tramadol. • On the morning of 14th he was given further Methadone and Tramadol, without measuring the blood pressure, or testing, as the previous day was last day of his Methadone titration regime and his 5 day review. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review blood-pressure trends before controlled-drug administration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a general misunderstanding how health care professionals should comply with DH Clinical Management of Drug Dependence in Adult Prison Settings Guidelines 12.3 and 12.4. In particular this relates to the requirement to ensure that patients who are undergoing Methadone or Buprenorphine stabilization have not experienced a lowering of blood pressure or drowsiness before administration of the controlled drug. • Health care assistants routinely took the blood pressure before administration but did not inform the nurse of the reading and may not have had instruction when to report the reading • The evidence of six nurses and a health care assistant showed that previous blood pressure recordings were not sought or examined to determine if there had been a lowering of BP • The record of blood pressure was often written on paper and not usually entered in the medical records at the time and sometimes not at all • A health care assistant who did record a BP of 93/68 was asked by a nurse to repeat it and reported back to the medication hatch that it was still low. No apparent action was taken by nurses to suspend the medication or escalate the concern to a doctor on 11th. • One nurse, who did not see the BP of 93/58 recorded in the records and administered Methadone, did not know what she would do if he had discovered a previous higher BP. • One nurse was surprised that a BP of 105/60 having a reading of 128/68 and 93/68 the previous day and 121/81 the day before that, should trigger withholding Methadone and escalating to the doctor. • The expert GP, who had been clinical director in the health care team provided to the prison, identified a sequence of seven BP recordings over 4 days, six of which (the second was considered rogue) should have triggered suspension of administration of drugs and escalation to the doctor, but in no case did this occur. • The head of health care at the time, who was an inexperienced nurse, did not accept that advice and asserted it would be impractical to implement it, as it would lead to significant delays. • In a local policy on Buprenorphine a threshold triggering suspension of drug and escalation was defined as 90/60 without reference to the trend. None was found in a section on Methadone and no definition of lowering of blood pressure or how to record it was found in any local policies. • No nurse saw the entry in the medical records by a doctor at 18.56 on 13th November which read: “Unusually drowsy. Eyelids close when not engaged. communicative alert. no sadness or dsh. Plan stop Citalopram and monitor for signs of overdose.. may req further urine test before further Methadone testing...”. • At 17.57 on 13th, one hour from the doctor’s assessment, when he must have been unusually drowsy, no nurse found him drowsy when he presented at the hatch for medication, and he was given Methadone and Tramadol. • On the morning of 14th he was given further Methadone and Tramadol, without measuring the blood pressure, or testing, as the previous day was last day of his Methadone titration regime and his 5 day review. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to suspend controlled drugs and escalate low blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a general misunderstanding how health care professionals should comply with DH Clinical Management of Drug Dependence in Adult Prison Settings Guidelines 12.3 and 12.4. In particular this relates to the requirement to ensure that patients who are undergoing Methadone or Buprenorphine stabilization have not experienced a lowering of blood pressure or drowsiness before administration of the controlled drug. • Health care assistants routinely took the blood pressure before administration but did not inform the nurse of the reading and may not have had instruction when to report the reading • The evidence of six nurses and a health care assistant showed that previous blood pressure recordings were not sought or examined to determine if there had been a lowering of BP • The record of blood pressure was often written on paper and not usually entered in the medical records at the time and sometimes not at all • A health care assistant who did record a BP of 93/68 was asked by a nurse to repeat it and reported back to the medication hatch that it was still low. No apparent action was taken by nurses to suspend the medication or escalate the concern to a doctor on 11th. • One nurse, who did not see the BP of 93/58 recorded in the records and administered Methadone, did not know what she would do if he had discovered a previous higher BP. • One nurse was surprised that a BP of 105/60 having a reading of 128/68 and 93/68 the previous day and 121/81 the day before that, should trigger withholding Methadone and escalating to the doctor. • The expert GP, who had been clinical director in the health care team provided to the prison, identified a sequence of seven BP recordings over 4 days, six of which (the second was considered rogue) should have triggered suspension of administration of drugs and escalation to the doctor, but in no case did this occur. • The head of health care at the time, who was an inexperienced nurse, did not accept that advice and asserted it would be impractical to implement it, as it would lead to significant delays. • In a local policy on Buprenorphine a threshold triggering suspension of drug and escalation was defined as 90/60 without reference to the trend. None was found in a section on Methadone and no definition of lowering of blood pressure or how to record it was found in any local policies. • No nurse saw the entry in the medical records by a doctor at 18.56 on 13th November which read: “Unusually drowsy. Eyelids close when not engaged. communicative alert. no sadness or dsh. Plan stop Citalopram and monitor for signs of overdose.. may req further urine test before further Methadone testing...”. • At 17.57 on 13th, one hour from the doctor’s assessment, when he must have been unusually drowsy, no nurse found him drowsy when he presented at the hatch for medication, and he was given Methadone and Tramadol. • On the morning of 14th he was given further Methadone and Tramadol, without measuring the blood pressure, or testing, as the previous day was last day of his Methadone titration regime and his 5 day review. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined criteria and recording requirements for lowering blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There appeared to be a general misunderstanding how health care professionals should comply with DH Clinical Management of Drug Dependence in Adult Prison Settings Guidelines 12.3 and 12.4. In particular this relates to the requirement to ensure that patients who are undergoing Methadone or Buprenorphine stabilization have not experienced a lowering of blood pressure or drowsiness before administration of the controlled drug. • Health care assistants routinely took the blood pressure before administration but did not inform the nurse of the reading and may not have had instruction when to report the reading • The evidence of six nurses and a health care assistant showed that previous blood pressure recordings were not sought or examined to determine if there had been a lowering of BP • The record of blood pressure was often written on paper and not usually entered in the medical records at the time and sometimes not at all • A health care assistant who did record a BP of 93/68 was asked by a nurse to repeat it and reported back to the medication hatch that it was still low. No apparent action was taken by nurses to suspend the medication or escalate the concern to a doctor on 11th. • One nurse, who did not see the BP of 93/58 recorded in the records and administered Methadone, did not know what she would do if he had discovered a previous higher BP. • One nurse was surprised that a BP of 105/60 having a reading of 128/68 and 93/68 the previous day and 121/81 the day before that, should trigger withholding Methadone and escalating to the doctor. • The expert GP, who had been clinical director in the health care team provided to the prison, identified a sequence of seven BP recordings over 4 days, six of which (the second was considered rogue) should have triggered suspension of administration of drugs and escalation to the doctor, but in no case did this occur. • The head of health care at the time, who was an inexperienced nurse, did not accept that advice and asserted it would be impractical to implement it, as it would lead to significant delays. • In a local policy on Buprenorphine a threshold triggering suspension of drug and escalation was defined as 90/60 without reference to the trend. None was found in a section on Methadone and no definition of lowering of blood pressure or how to record it was found in any local policies. • No nurse saw the entry in the medical records by a doctor at 18.56 on 13th November which read: “Unusually drowsy. Eyelids close when not engaged. communicative alert. no sadness or dsh. Plan stop Citalopram and monitor for signs of overdose.. may req further urine test before further Methadone testing...”. • At 17.57 on 13th, one hour from the doctor’s assessment, when he must have been unusually drowsy, no nurse found him drowsy when he presented at the hatch for medication, and he was given Methadone and Tramadol. • On the morning of 14th he was given further Methadone and Tramadol, without measuring the blood pressure, or testing, as the previous day was last day of his Methadone titration regime and his 5 day review. ”

    Source location

    Laurence Boyens · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sari Marlene KEEN underwent surgery to remove colon tumours on 23 October 2013, developed a faecal anastomotic leak causing peritonitis and shock, and died following cardiac arrest on 24 October 2013. The substantive concerns were insufficient staffing and failures to recognise deterioration, escalate care, and call the Hospital Crash Team when her blood pressure became unrecordable.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of staff to recognise an un-recordable blood pressure as a medical emergency requiring a crash call

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) It was apparent that many Senior and Junior Members of Staff were not aware that an ‘un-recordable blood pressure’ was a ‘medical emergency’ and should have resulted in a crash call going out for immediate resuscitation. Perhaps the Protocols for the Crash Team need to be reviewed. ”

    Source location

    Sari Marlene KEEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Pilot a revised observation and escalation process, with registered nurses observing patients requiring observations more frequently than every four hours.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A revised observation and escalation process is currently being piloted on 4 wards. A key change is the introduction of registered nurses to undertake the observations of all patients who require observations more than 4 hourly. Health Care Assistants also undertake observations but it was noted that the registered nurse has a greater ability and opportunity to identify other factors that might indicate deterioration where a Health Care Assistant would not be skilled enough to identify the patient during the actual observation process. Early indications are that there is a more timely escalation from nurses at the earlier signs of deterioration.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Emphasise Medical Emergency Team availability during mandatory basic life support training for all staff groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have a separate “Medical Emergency Team” policy, designed to be activated in situations where a patient is deteriorating but is not yet in cardiac arrest. This involves activation of the bleeps of the medical registrar and the ITU registrar by switchboard with a message asking the medical emergency team to go to ward X immediately. For patients deteriorating between 8am and 10pm, we have the third option of summoning the ITU Outreach team to review the patient. This can be initiated by either medical or nursing staff, and results in a review by a nurse trained in assessment of critically ill patients who can then escalate to either the medical team or the ITU team as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Evaluate current nurse and doctor training on identifying deteriorating patients and develop an improvement proposal informed by cardiac-arrest learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Evaluation of the current training for nurses and doctors on the identification of the deteriorating patient is in progress with a proposal to improve the content as reflected in the learning from Root Cause Analysis of cardiac arrests.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing cardiac-arrest protocols, medical-emergency procedures and mandatory training are considered sufficient arrangements for activating the appropriate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have very clear and specific protocols for activation of the cardiac arrest process, which every member of staff is expected to be conversant with. It is taught through basic life support, which is an element of mandatory training for all clinical staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0180-Response-by-Luton-Dunstable-University-Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 April 2014

    Open published response
  10. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    Mary WALDRON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Waldron became unwell at St Mary's Nursing Home on 24 August 2013 and was transferred to University Hospital, Coventry, where she died after suffering a cardiac arrest during the transfer. Concerns included failures to recognise and appropriately respond to her acute illness and low blood pressure, inadequate ongoing staff training, shortcomings in the nursing home's investigation and reporting, uncertainty about the CQC investigation, and potential confusion between ambulance drivers and paramedics about transfer times.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of nursing home staff to take appropriate action when aware of low blood pressure

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) failure of the nursing home staff to undertake appropriate action when they were aware of the low blood pressure; ”

    Source location

    Mary WALDRON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026