Recurring concern

Unsafe ventilator operation and safety controls

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First reported 17 Mar 2016•Latest report 17 Jan 2023

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls specifically dedicated to safe ventilator operation, including staff training and access to operating guidance, fault recognition, display or configuration standardisation, equipment safety assessment and removal from service when indicated.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical-equipment availability, maintenance or serviceability deficiencies unless they specifically concern ventilator operation or ventilator-related fault control.
  • Excludes generic staff training, documentation or information-access failures not directly tied to safe ventilator operation.
  • Excludes failures in patient monitoring, respiratory treatment or clinical decision-making where ventilator safety is not the identified unsafe condition.
  • Excludes unrelated equipment, such as vehicle lifts, piling rigs or transformers, even where manuals or warnings are deficient.
Reports
5

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2016–2023

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
20

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
Avon Care Homes Limited1
Care Quality Commission1
Mid Yorkshire Teaching NHS Trust1
Milton Keynes University Hospital1
NHS England1
Philips Electronics UK Limited1
Philips Respironics1
Royal College of Anaesthetists1
St George'S University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
St Richard's Hospital1
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard suffered a prolonged PEA cardiac arrest during emergence from general anaesthesia after an emergency caesarean section, following significant postpartum haemorrhage and bilateral tension pneumothoraces. She sustained a non-survivable hypoxic brain injury and died at home six weeks later. Concerns included failure to consider and promptly recognise tension pneumothoraces during resuscitation, and inadequate investigation, clinical governance and learning after her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to remove and assess anaesthetic equipment for faults after a suspected equipment-related event

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”

    Source location

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek confirmation that the Trust has an established process to isolate medical equipment potentially involved in an event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1.) Monitor the Trust’s progress and compliance in implementing the national medical examiner system by April 2023. 2.) Seek confirmation that the Trust have an established process for the isolation of any medical equipment involved when an event happens when equipment may be involved. 3.) Information sharing and collaborative working with HSIB. 4.) CQC will request information from the Trust which demonstrates compliance with Regulation 20: Duty of Candour.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 4 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend guidance to require a standardised investigation process automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote the amended catastrophic-event investigation process to the anaesthesia specialty.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the amended catastrophic-event investigation process through the Royal College of Anaesthetists’ Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review guidance to identify the need for a standardised investigation process automatically triggered after catastrophic events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend guidance to specify a standardised investigation process automatically triggered immediately after catastrophic events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Promote the amended catastrophic-event investigation process to the anaesthesia specialty.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed the amended catastrophic-event investigation process through the Royal College of Anaesthetists’ Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed our guidance in light of your report and we have recognised that we should be more explicit about the need for a standardised process of investigation which is automatically triggered immediately after a catastrophic event. This should ensure that responsibility for steps such as downloading information from the anaesthetic machine or the temporary removal of equipment from service for checking, is removed from those directly involved. We will amend our guidance accordingly, promote these changes to the specialty and embed this change into practice through the RCoA’s Anaesthesia Clinical Services Accreditation scheme. We also note that the implementation of our recommendation that all departments should have an appropriate electronic anaesthetic record system, linked to the wider electronic patient record, would aid the investigation of incidents.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    RCoA is responsible for clarifying anaesthetic-machine arrangements in its guidance, while CQC will respond to the report and recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Regarding your concerns around there being no temporary removal of the anaesthetic machine used in this case, or the downloading of information from the machine, we welcome RCoA’s commitment to update its guidance accordingly, to ensure responsibilities around this are made more explicit. We are also aware that the Care Quality Commission (CQC) will be issuing a response to your Report and will review their response and any recommendations made in due course.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The identified care, evidence-handling, Duty of Candour and investigation concerns fall outside HEE’s current role and statutory responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I write in response to your report of 17 January 2023, made under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. I have been asked to respond on behalf of Health Education England. Please may I start by offering my sincere condolences to the family of Teegan Marie Bernard, following her tragic death. However, having carefully considered the report, together with the facts of the case, we believe that whilst there are valuable lessons to be learned; Unfortunately, these do not come within the scope of HEE’s current role and statutory responsibilities.”

    Source location

    Response from Health Education England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 January 2023

    Open published response
  2. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Land · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Land, aged 76, was being treated for COVID pneumonia when she was found unresponsive with the tubing connecting her facemask to a BIPAP ventilator detached. The Inquest could not determine whether the detachment contributed to her death, but identified concern that the push-on connection could come undone and may require a more robust docking mechanism.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use of a mask-to-tubing push-on connection vulnerable to coming apart

    Wider context from the report

    “The Philips Respironics AF 541 mask connects to the tubing, linking it to the BIPAP ventilator by means of a ‘push on’ connection (rather than a fitting involving positive engagement). Evidence taken at the Inquest indicates this connection has come undone on other occasions as well. The introduction of a filter at the site of this union increases the potential for the joint to come apart. Consideration should be given to installing a more robust docking mechanism which is less vulnerable to working loose, or being inadvertently pulled apart, for example, by a patient suffering from delirium. ”

    Source location

    Mary Land · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current connector standards for breathing circuits.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have reviewed the current versions of ISO standards for connectors used within breathing circuits: BS EN ISO 5356-1:2015 and BS EN ISO 5356-2:2012.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-MHRA_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree Philips Respironics’ investigation plan and update schedule, ensuring assessment of connection design, filter use, disconnection risk, patient harm and corrective actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “By the end of November 2021: - Agree with Philips Respironics their investigation plan and a regular schedule for updates to be provided to MHRA, ensuring it is concluded in line with their regulatory obligations and any corrective actions identified are conducted. This includes ensuring they assess the impact of the connection design and the inclusion of the filter within the breathing circuit on the disconnection event and patient harm and measures to minimise this risk in the future.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-MHRA_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Engage Philips Respironics on maintaining compliance with the latest relevant designated or harmonised standards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Engage with Philips Respironics regarding maintaining compliance to the latest version of relevant and Designated or Harmonised Standards - Contact the British Thoracic Society and NICE to agree a time to discuss updating the published guidance relating to the management of COVID-19 patients to ensure that health care professionals prescribing and setting up breathing circuits and the inclusion of filters are in accordance with the breathing system device manufacturers’ instructions.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-MHRA_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with the British Thoracic Society and NICE updating guidance on breathing-circuit setup and filter use in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- Engage with Philips Respironics regarding maintaining compliance to the latest version of relevant and Designated or Harmonised Standards - Contact the British Thoracic Society and NICE to agree a time to discuss updating the published guidance relating to the management of COVID-19 patients to ensure that health care professionals prescribing and setting up breathing circuits and the inclusion of filters are in accordance with the breathing system device manufacturers’ instructions.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-MHRA_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigate manufacturer or other solutions and discuss with regional units how to improve tubing-circuit connection stability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Recommendation 2: Scope and discuss with regional units if there can be an improvement on securing tubing circuit connections”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Mid-Yorkshire-Hospitals_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss filter use and its effect on circuit stability with the Respiratory Team and non-invasive ventilation lead.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, the additional filter component inserted between the facemask and the ventilator tubing may have contributed to destabilisation of the circuit, although this cannot be clinically proven, and there is no current research/evidence to confirm or reject the theory that the additional filter caused/causes destabilisation of the circuit.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Mid-Yorkshire-Hospitals_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Screw-thread connectors could make urgent component changes difficult and introduce risk; push-fit disconnection risk is no greater than patient mask removal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In October 2021 we conducted stakeholder engagement with the Association of Respiratory Nurses in order to seek qualitative feedback on the use of breathing masks, tubing and filters and the means of connecting them to make a complete breathing circuit. In summary they stated that, connections between masks and hoses are universal and push-fit allowing for compatibility between the various manufacturer’s equipment. If the connection became a screw-thread style, then the ability to change and consumeable components, when required and when in situ, would be more difficult. It could cause components to seize up, making quick changes difficult. This could put in place a further risk, when a patient is dependent on therapy, and a quick mask/hose change is needed. They also acknowledged that the risk of disconnection is no more than patients removing masks themselves.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-MHRA_Published-1
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    When design solutions were researched, no all-in-one circuit integrating the filter into the mask was available.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Of note, at the time when the incident was investigated and design solutions were researched, there was no all-in-one circuit available, i.e. where the filter was an integral constituent of the mask, rather than an optional add-on component. As such, the Trust thanks you for raising this issue directly with the manufacturer, Philips Respironics.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Mid-Yorkshire-Hospitals_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The ventilator and mask operated as designed, while the facility used an unapproved configuration and failed to respond appropriately to alarms.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The last two circuit disconnect alarms logged were not acknowledged for a total of more than 27 minutes. Shortly after 5:00:00, the ventilator was turned off. Based on the information reviewed by the manufacturer – specifically the greater than 30 minutes of active alarming of the device, hospital verification that the circuit disconnect alarm sounded, incorrect connection of an inline filter, and use of an unapproved inline filter, Philips Respironics concludes that the AF541 mask and Trilogy EVO ventilator operated as designed. The facility apparently failed to follow the manufacturer’s instructions and did not respond appropriately to ventilator alarms. In addition, the mask at issue meets the applicable standard for mask to circuit connection. Therefore, no action for the design of the AF541 22mm non-latching conical connection is proposed.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Philips_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No design action is proposed for the AF541’s non-latching connection because it meets the applicable mask-to-circuit connection standard.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The last two circuit disconnect alarms logged were not acknowledged for a total of more than 27 minutes. Shortly after 5:00:00, the ventilator was turned off. Based on the information reviewed by the manufacturer – specifically the greater than 30 minutes of active alarming of the device, hospital verification that the circuit disconnect alarm sounded, incorrect connection of an inline filter, and use of an unapproved inline filter, Philips Respironics concludes that the AF541 mask and Trilogy EVO ventilator operated as designed. The facility apparently failed to follow the manufacturer’s instructions and did not respond appropriately to ventilator alarms. In addition, the mask at issue meets the applicable standard for mask to circuit connection. Therefore, no action for the design of the AF541 22mm non-latching conical connection is proposed.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Philips_Published-1
    Page 2 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MHRA is responsible for ensuring the device investigation complies with regulations and that any identified corrective action is taken.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have been made aware that the Medicine and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the regulator of medical devices and medicinal products, has provided a response to your report explaining the actions it has taken in relation to this incident and the concerns raised. You will therefore be aware that following the outcome of the inquest into Mrs Land’s death, Phillips Respironics has extended its investigation to look at the connection tubing and facemask. Phillips has also been asked by the MHRA to investigate the potential impact on performance of the breathing circuit of using a filter in the facemask. A final report of the investigation has been requested by the MHRA, and the MHRA will ensure that the investigation has been conducted in line with the relevant regulations and that any corrective action identified is taken.”

    Source location

    2021-0322-Response-from-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care_Published-1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 October 2021

    Open published response
  3. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Glenda May Logsdail · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glenda May Logsdail was admitted with acute appendicitis and underwent emergency surgery. During induction of anaesthesia, an endotracheal tube was misplaced in the oesophagus and this was not recognised for a prolonged period, resulting in hypoxia, cardiac arrest, irreversible brain damage and her death. Concerns included failures to confirm tube placement, fixation on an incorrect diagnosis, inadequate team leadership and communication during the emergency, and inconsistent ventilator display configurations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent ventilator display configurations across clinical areas

    Wider context from the report

    “(8) I heard that there were variable and different configurations with respect to the displays on the ventilators in different theatres and anaesthetic rooms and ITU through the hospital. This was confusing for staff and had potential to put patients at risk. ”

    Source location

    Glenda May Logsdail · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with anaesthetic and respiratory device suppliers to support development of engineered solutions for variable monitor displays and alarm configurations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In situ multidisciplinary team training for emergency scenarios can also highlight systemic issues that can affect a team’s response in an emergency. Your report highlights the variable configurations of monitors across the hospital as one such issue. We will work with the Association of Anaesthetic and Respiratory Device Suppliers (B arema) to support the development of”

    Source location

    2021-0295-Response-from-Royal-College-of-Anaesthetists_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 September 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with anaesthetic and respiratory device suppliers to support engineered solutions for variable monitor display and alarm configurations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report highlighted the variable configurations of monitors across the hospital as a systemic human factors issue. We continue to work with the Association of Anaesthetic and Respiratory Device Suppliers (B arema) to support the development of engineered solutions to the issue of variable and different configurations of the displays and alarms notifications of monitors.”

    Source location

    2021-0295 - Response from Royal College of Anaesthetists
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 September 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Standardising multiparameter monitor displays could remove necessary flexibility, create unnecessary monitoring requirements and adversely affect patient safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The displays of the multiparameter monitors used during anaesthesia have to be customisable so they can accommodate the different types of monitoring devices, which may be required for different types of anaesthesia and surgery being undertaken. This is necessary because the needs of the patient vary according to the complexity of the surgery being undertaken. If there was standardisation, this would either remove this flexibility or require unnecessary monitoring parameters where they are not essential. This in turn would have unintended impacts on patient safety.”

    Source location

    2021-0295-Response-from-Department-of-Health-Social-Care_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 9 September 2021

    Open published response
  4. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    William Edward Marson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Edward Marson, who had breathing difficulties assisted by a ventilator, became anxious after believing the ventilator was not working and died on 18 June 2015. Evidence at the inquest raised concerns that staff had not been adequately trained to use the ventilator, were unaware of the user manual, and lacked information about its correct operation and fault identification.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the ventilator Users Manual extracts to provide guidance on normal operation, fault recognition and fault rectification

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the Inquest, evidence was heard from several witnesses as to the fact that no formal training on the correct use of the ventilator had been given to all members of staff. As a result there was no understanding of how the ventilator presented when it was working correctly, or as to the identification of any issues which would indicate that it was not working correctly and how they might be resolved. Although a copy of the Users Manual, for the ventilator had been printed off (in part) and placed in William's room, its existence and location were unknown to the sister or carers on duty. In any event I found that the extracts that had been printed off, would not have assisted in diagnosing that in fact the machine was functioning correctly, which may have reduced Williams anxiety, had that been made known to him. (1) That the staff on duty at Sutton Veny House had not been adequately trained if at all in the use of the ventilator. (2) That the staff were unaware of the existence of a Users Manual or its location. (3) That the extracts printed off in the Users Manual did not include details of how the machine presented when working correctly or how to recognise faults and how to rectify them. ”

    Source location

    William Edward Marson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure staff awareness of the ventilator Users Manual and its location

    Wider context from the report

    “During the course of the Inquest, evidence was heard from several witnesses as to the fact that no formal training on the correct use of the ventilator had been given to all members of staff. As a result there was no understanding of how the ventilator presented when it was working correctly, or as to the identification of any issues which would indicate that it was not working correctly and how they might be resolved. Although a copy of the Users Manual, for the ventilator had been printed off (in part) and placed in William's room, its existence and location were unknown to the sister or carers on duty. In any event I found that the extracts that had been printed off, would not have assisted in diagnosing that in fact the machine was functioning correctly, which may have reduced Williams anxiety, had that been made known to him. (1) That the staff on duty at Sutton Veny House had not been adequately trained if at all in the use of the ventilator. (2) That the staff were unaware of the existence of a Users Manual or its location. (3) That the extracts printed off in the Users Manual did not include details of how the machine presented when working correctly or how to recognise faults and how to rectify them. ”

    Source location

    William Edward Marson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Create an accessible specialist-equipment governance pack covering manuals, settings, checks, risk assessments, policies and best-practice evidence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A user friendly version of the equipment manual as well as the full manual would be devised and team members would be notified of the location of these documents. The location of this information would also be documented on the residents electronic and hard copy records.”

    Source location

    2016-0394-Response-by-Avon-Care-Home
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 November 2016

    Open published response
  5. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Jacqueline Emma Brown Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jacqueline Emma Brown Scott was admitted to hospital on 31 March 2015 with worsening shortness of breath and reduced mobility and was treated with a BIPAP machine. The machine was running on battery because of a failed power socket, but this was not recognised before the battery ran out; she died shortly afterwards. Concerns included the machine’s battery warnings and alarms, staff training, ward power provision and the absence of systems to identify power failures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the BIPAP display to keep the battery-power indicator visible during multiple alarms

    Wider context from the report

    “(i)The BIPAP Trilogy 202 machine had a subtle visual display symbol which denoted when the machine was running on battery power. That symbol is not visible if there are many alert alarms as the alarm messages fill up the screen as they come in pushing the earlier alerts (including low battery) off the screen. In Mrs Scott’s case there had been 17 alert alarms in the space of 50 minutes. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline Emma Brown Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to train BIPAP staff to recognise battery-power indicators and battery-depletion alarms

    Wider context from the report

    “(iii) Staff who were experienced and trained on the BIPAP machine did not appear to be trained to be alert to the situation or to the significance of a battery symbol showing on the machine when the machine was plugged in to the mains or to any particular alarm which denoted battery depletion rather than mask slippage. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline Emma Brown Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the BIPAP alarm system to provide a distinct urgent warning for battery depletion

    Wider context from the report

    “(ii)The BIPAP Trilogy 202 machine has the same alarm sound for battery depletion as for circuit disconnect (where for example the face mask slipped) which was the more usual and expected reason for an alarm and these two factors separately and together did not have any feature of urgent warning to alert staff to battery depletion. ”

    Source location

    Jacqueline Emma Brown Scott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Retrain NIV staff on battery depletion indicators, alarms and Trilogy ventilator safety, with competencies documented for all staff except two new starters.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this incident staff working in this area have undergone a period of retraining by Phillips which includes the points raised in point 1. These key aspects of training have further been incorporated into the training delivered by the practice educator and specialist nurses. The unit has further employed a dedicated practice educator to work with staff in ADU. All staff other than two new starts have now received training on NIV and this device and competencies are held within the department.”

    Source location

    St-Georges-Hospital-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Incorporate battery depletion and alarm-safety content into training delivered by the practice educator and respiratory specialist nurses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this incident staff working in this area have undergone a period of retraining by Phillips which includes the points raised in point 1. These key aspects of training have further been incorporated into the training delivered by the practice educator and specialist nurses. The unit has further employed a dedicated practice educator to work with staff in ADU. All staff other than two new starts have now received training on NIV and this device and competencies are held within the department.”

    Source location

    St-Georges-Hospital-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider the adequacy of HTM guidance on alerts relating to power-supply interruptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The HTM also provides guidance on the provision of audible and visual alarms in relation to interruptions to power supply failures and the need to provide indication at the nurse’s station for the relevant medical area.”

    Source location

    2016-0112-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns require action by Philips Healthcare and the NHS Foundation Trust rather than the Department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Many of these issues need to be addressed by Phillips Healthcare and the NHS Foundation Trust. However, I do acknowledge your concerns about the design of the BiPAP machine and the safe provision of power supply which I will address.”

    Source location

    2016-0112-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manufacturers cannot be compelled to improve compliant devices without changes to UK and EU regulatory requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My officials contacted colleagues at NHS England who have advised that the design of some non-invasive ventilation (NIV) systems and other critical devices could be improved by having safety features which warn staff of delivery problems, such as disconnection and power failure. NHS England has a close working relationship with the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA) and is able to share such concerns with them. Their collective power to improve the design of medical devices is often limited however, as manufacturers are not required to make changes to a product if it”

    Source location

    2016-0112-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Staff involved in the incident were appropriately trained on non-invasive ventilation and the Trilogy ventilator, contrary to the concern raised.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The panel was satisfied during the investigation that all nursing staff involved in the care of Mrs Scott were appropriately trained on the particular machine and NIV therapy. There was also access to senior help and a practice educator was available on the day when the incident happened. The nurse directly involved in the incident was a trained ITU nurse of six years, who had additional training on the NIV and the Trilogy machine. The panel found, however, that there was no consistent documentary evidence of the training that staff had received.”

    Source location

    St-Georges-Hospital-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 March 2016

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026