Recurring concern

Unreliable detection and monitoring of prescription errors

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First reported 27 Jan 2014•Latest report 17 Nov 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes dedicated controls for detecting, centrally recording, reviewing, monitoring or analysing prescription errors, including pharmacy reviews intended to identify errors and systems intended to detect trends or repeat errors across prescriptions.

Not included

  • Excludes failures in investigating or learning from medication incidents after an error has already been identified where prescription-error detection or monitoring is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic clinical record-keeping, pharmacy staffing or medication-governance deficiencies unless they directly impair detection or monitoring of prescription errors.
  • Excludes prescribing, dispensing or administration errors themselves when no failure of the dedicated detection or monitoring control is identified.
  • Excludes monitoring of adverse medication outcomes or deaths where the asserted concern is not detection or monitoring of prescription errors.
Reports
3

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
11

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England2
Department of Health and Social Care1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
Princess Alexandra Hospital1
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain1
University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify prescription errors and prior doses during controlled-drug checks

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate networks for Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers and Medication Safety Officers to receive and spread learning from medication errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide guidance and tools to NHS Trusts for learning from patient safety incidents and improving controlled-drug safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a patients’ own controlled drug book in the emergency department to record and account for patients’ controlled medicines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The emergency department do not have a stock of MST. At the time there was not a patients’ own controlled drug book to record controlled medication. The administration was recorded on JAC, the Trust electronic medication system that his family had given his regular prescribed medication.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the option to modify existing prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system, requiring cancellation or discontinuation and reordering with clinical warnings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9th June on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify morphine product names and predefine twice-daily frequency for modified-release morphine prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have recognised there is a huge variation in morphine formulation and type and have made the naming of products clearer. For example, MST is noted as ‘Morphine MODIFIED RELEASE 12 HOURLY tablets’ on the system. We have also pre-defined the frequency as twice a day.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Education and training alone would not sufficiently mitigate recurrence; systems improvements and mechanisms are also required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NICE medicines optimisation guidance NG 5 (2015) referenced above recommends that organisations support healthcare professionals through training and education to ensure safe prescribing, dispensing and administration. In this specific case, education and training alone would not prevent these types of safety system issues and would not be sufficient to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence. Systems improvements and mechanisms will need to be implemented to ensure lessons are learnt and that the current organisational and systems factors and processes highlighted in this case are addressed, to ensure the safe and effective checking and administration of medications. This has been substantiated by safety research and incident analysis.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  2. Plymouth, Torbay and South Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Harry Glibbery · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Harry Glibbery had a chronically infected left hip replacement and underwent a Girdlestone procedure before developing pulmonary emboli. He died on 7 April 2016 after a catastrophic intracerebral haemorrhage while receiving Clexane. The principal concerns were that the Clexane prescription exceeded the Derriford Protocol dose, the error was not identified during pharmacy reviews, and difficulties weighing him may have prevented a dose review as he lost weight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Pharmacy reviews to identify prescription errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The doctor’s prescription error was not identified during Pharmacy reviews intended to pick up precisely this sort of shortcoming; ”

    Source location

    Harry Glibbery · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver a pharmacist learning package covering therapeutic Clexane dosing, weight dependence and weight-loss-related dose changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In response to this incident we have developed a learning package which is being delivered by the Deputy Senior Pharmacist to all pharmacists within the department emphasising the following points:”

    Source location

    2016-0292-Response-by-Plymouth-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 August 2016

    Open published response
  3. York City

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall was prescribed morphine sulphate 10mg twice daily, but a pharmacy dispensed 60mg capsules. She took the capsules as prescribed and was found dead on 30 September 2009; the inquest recorded bronchopneumonia and the effects of morphine, with a conclusion of accidental death. The principal concerns were pharmacy dispensing errors, the adequacy of checking and monitoring systems, and the absence of central monitoring of prescription errors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncertainty about availability of prescription-reading software alerts for drug identity or amount errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It is not clear whether there is any software, obtainable from the Department of Health or elsewhere, that could read prescriptions and raise an alert if the label sought to be created or if the drug sought to be dispensed is wrong in identity or amount. This would be of particular significance when a high risk drug is dispensed or when a drug is dispensed in an unusual quantity, dosage or form. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a central database of prescription errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) There is evidently no central database of all prescription errors so there can be no central monitoring of such errors and no means of determining trends or particular repeat errors. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of central monitoring and trend analysis of prescription errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) There is evidently no central database of all prescription errors so there can be no central monitoring of such errors and no means of determining trends or particular repeat errors. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare and publish a Patient Safety Alert to improve medication-error reporting and learning across healthcare sectors, including community pharmacy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) NHS England is preparing to publish a Patient Safety Alert on March 2014 to improve reporting and learning of medication errors from all sectors including community pharmacy. This will include the establishment of a National Medication Safety Network, the identification of medication safety officers in large healthcare provider organisations including community pharmacy companies and other measures into to increase the number, quality, timeliness and learning of medication error incident reports.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review community-pharmacy incident data and relevant research, and engage stakeholders to develop safer-practice guidance on dispensing medicines, technology and checking systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, there is little use of bar codes in the dispensing process in community pharmacy at present. Greater use of this technology in dispensaries could improve patient safety. The Safe Medication Practice Team in NHS England, plan to undertake a review of community pharmacy incident data, together with relevant research and engage with stakeholders to prepare a Patient Safety Alert for possible publication in 2014. The proposed Alert would better describe the risks arising from dispensing medicines and safer practices to further minimise these risks, including better use of technology and checking systems. This guidance will help inform health care commissioners, providers and regulators of actions that they can take to further minimise risks arising from dispensing medicines.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Negotiate the 2014/15 community pharmacy contract to specify minimum patient-safety incident reporting rates and highlight prescribing-error reporting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) NHS England is in the final stages of negotiating the community pharmacy Contract for 2014/15 and are planning to emphasise the requirement on community pharmacy to report patient safety incidents to the NRLS. We will look to achieve this by stipulating the minimum expected reporting rate and highlighting the requirement for prescribing error.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a National Medication Safety Network and identify medication safety officers in large healthcare provider organisations, including community pharmacy companies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) NHS England is preparing to publish a Patient Safety Alert on March 2014 to improve reporting and learning of medication errors from all sectors including community pharmacy. This will include the establishment of a National Medication Safety Network, the identification of medication safety officers in large healthcare provider organisations including community pharmacy companies and other measures into to increase the number, quality, timeliness and learning of medication error incident reports.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with MHRA and NHS England to ensure pharmacy professionals use the National Reporting and Learning System.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. The medicines regulator, the MHRA, has been working with NHS England to develop draft Patient Safety Alerts and guidance to increase adverse incident reporting via the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), which is a central database of patient safety incident reports. We continue to work with the MHRA and NHS England to ensuring that pharmacists and pharmacy technicians use the NRLS.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-General-Pharmaceutical-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for commissioning pharmaceutical services and has addressed the concerns in its detailed response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Secretary of State for Health, I am responsible for setting national priorities, monitoring the whole system’s performance and supporting the integrity of the system to protect the best interests of patients, the public and the taxpayer. Since 1 April 2013, most day to day decisions are taken by NHS England. NHS England is responsible for commissioning primary care services, including pharmaceutical services.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The regulator cannot require registered pharmacies to use automation to reduce dispensing errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. There is research that shows the use of automation within a dispensing process can reduce the rate of errors. Whilst we cannot require registered pharmacies to use automation, we do ensure that the way in which we regulate does not stifle the introduction of new technology.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-General-Pharmaceutical-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The National Reporting and Learning System is a central database for prescription errors, although community pharmacies underreport incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6) There is evidently no central database of all prescription errors so there can be no central monitoring of such errors and no means of determining trends or particular repeat errors.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The central prescription-error database is held by NHS England, which is expected to provide the relevant details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Regarding a central database of prescription errors, we are pleased to report that this does exist. The national learning and reporting system sits with NHS England and we expect they will be providing details of this within their response to you. http://www.nr ls.npsa.nhs.uk/”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-Royal-Pharmaceutical-Society
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026