Recurring concern

Unreliable operation of the Lorenzo clinical information system

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First reported 14 Nov 2017•Latest report 31 May 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the named Lorenzo system and its directly integrated clinical workflows that impair system availability, staff access, recording, booking or triage information, or other safety-relevant system functions used in patient care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic clinical-record, IT-access or information-sharing deficiencies where Lorenzo is not the deficient system.
  • Excludes failures of other named electronic systems, including EMIS, NOMIS, STORM, CAD and PACS, unless the assertion explicitly concerns their Lorenzo integration.
  • Excludes failures of clinical judgement, staffing or care delivery where Lorenzo operated reliably and did not contribute to the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes the substantive quality of booking, triage or clinical decisions where the Lorenzo system itself was not deficient.
Reports
4

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
4

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2017–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
4

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care3
NHS England2
NHS Tameside and Glossop Clinical Commissioning Group1
Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust1
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust1
Tameside General Hospital1
University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glennis CONNELLY died at home on 11 November 2022 from end-stage renal failure due to tubulo-interstitial nephritis caused by tazocin, despite a previously identified allergy to the drug. The principal concerns were that this allergy was not recorded in the hospital records at Queens Hospital Burton upon Trent and that electronic patient records across the same trust did not automatically share allergy information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of electronic patient records to automatically share renal team entries between hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Queens Hospital Burton Upon Trent and the the Royal Derby Hospital are governed by the same hospital trust, they have different electronic patient records. Entries made by the renal team at the Royal Derby Hospital are not automatically visible to medical staff at the Queens Hospital, "allergies" do not automatically cross populate despite entries being made on the Lorenzo system and the GP records being updated on 6th & 12th February 2020. ”

    Source location

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the unified electronic patient record across Trust sites, with staged rollout underway and allergy functionality planned for the first phase.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the incident was multifactorial, the unification of the EPR systems is something the Trust is working hard to remedy. As noted, the Trust currently has two enterprise wide systems which include all patient administrative and clinical functionality, appointments, waiting lists, test results, medications, emergency care, maternity and clinical noting.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide cross-record patient links between the two electronic patient records and links to the GP Summary Care Record through the Master Patient Index.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Pending implementation of a unified system, the Trust has created a Master Patient Index, enabling us to create a patient context link from each EPR to the other, meaning that staff would be able to click a link to be taken to a mobile version of the other EPR/eCasenote systems without needing to log in or search for the patient again. Similarly, access was created to link the GP surgery held Summary Care Record (SCR). Patients have to agree to share their information on SCR in order for the information to be accessible.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot extend an existing EPR across all sites because of contractual, technical, support-life and specialist-function constraints.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Implementing an entirely new system is not a small undertaking. It is important to get this right for the five hospital sites now and into the future. These EPR systems are not created by the Trust, but rather bought under contracting arrangements with their associated contractual periods, support and shelf life. As was heard at inquest, it has not been possible to extend one of the existing systems to the whole site as they need to function effectively across all specialisms. In the case of one system it is reaching the end of its support life. Any system has to be then integrated into the wider Trust in a safe way, operating alongside our other systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Care Quality Commission will assess the incident and determine whether further regulatory action is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where there is any death or serious injury at a provider or service registered by the CQC, the CQC will consider this in line with their specific incident guidance to identify if a patient has suffered avoidable harm or they were placed at significant risk of avoidable harm. This includes when there are issues relating to digital systems, and a specific incident review would consider the role of the system, as well as the registered providers involved.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will address specific local actions in its separate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will be separately responding to the report and commenting on specific local action in their response.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Holden · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Thomas Holden was diagnosed with Covid-19 and subsequently developed a deep vein thrombosis in his left calf, which led to a pulmonary embolus. He collapsed at home on 26 February 2021 and attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. Concerns included the lack of a face-to-face GP examination, failure of the electronic system to alert staff to a markedly raised D-Dimer, and NICE guidance not addressing Covid-19-related clotting risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Lorenzo electronic system to trigger alerts for markedly raised D-dimer results

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The D-Dimmer of over 10,000 did not trigger an alert on the Lorenzo electronic system due to how it was reported and the configuration of Lorenzo at that time at the Trust. The Trust have taken steps to change how the reports are input into Lorenzo to ensure a raised D- Dimmer such as this triggers an alert. It was unclear if that learning has been shared across the NHS to other trusts who use Lorenzo to ensure that alerts are triggered. ”

    Source location

    Mark Holden · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Adrian Jennings · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Adrian Jennings had a history of mental health issues and self-harm attempts and died on 10 December 2016 after taking a fatal cocktail of drugs and alcohol. The principal concerns included poor communication and inadequate discharge support planning between mental health services, failures to record key information when he arrived at hospital, and a policy gap concerning the reporting of high-risk absconding before triage.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Lorenzo electronic booking and triage system to capture key information about police conveyance

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Tameside Hospital cannot change their electronic booking in/triage system to allow them to include drop down boxes for key information such as the fact that Police Officers have brought an individual to the Hospital because it is a national IT system. Any trust operating the Lorenzo system will struggle to capture this information at booking in ”

    Source location

    Adrian Jennings · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The current Lorenzo Emergency Department module provides mandated fields to record police transport and attendance source.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have consulted with NHS Digital in relation to your concern about the trust being unable to capture that an individual had been brought in by police officers because they were operating Lorenzo, a national system. This function was not available in 2016 but the Emergency Department (ED) module has recently been updated and includes mandatory data collection to fulfil the Emergency Care Data Set (ECDS) requirements (please see https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/ts/ec-dataset/).”

    Source location

    2018-0111-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 June 2018

    Open published response
  4. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    BRIAN STANNARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Stannard was a resident at Eversley Nursing Home and was found drowned on a beach at Great Yarmouth on 14 November 2016 after being seen asleep in his room earlier that morning. The report raised concerns about the nursing home’s capacity to manage his mental ill health and threats of self-harm or suicide, as well as incomplete staff records and limited use of the Lorenzo computer system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the Lorenzo computer system to be fully operational

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The Lorenzo computer system was brought in some years ago. It does not appear to be fully operational and used to its full potential by all staff. ”

    Source location

    BRIAN STANNARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Lorenzo electronic patient-record system across the Trust to replace paper records and consolidate electronic systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Lorenzo computer system was implemented across the Trust in May 2015, replacing paper records and, in some areas, consolidating separate electronic systems into one. This has improved clinical safety by providing access to clinical information regardless of location and improving communications between different teams caring for the same patient.”

    Source location

    2017-0394-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with Lorenzo system suppliers to improve system performance and usability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The system is fully operational, however the Trust is aware and is addressing some issues with it. Staff are currently receiving site visits from business change and training specialists to continue to develop their use of the system and the Trust is working with the system suppliers to improve its performance and usability.”

    Source location

    2017-0394-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Lorenzo electronic patient record system is fully operational, although the Trust is addressing some issues with it.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report noted the Lorenzo electronic patient record system was introduced some years ago but that it does not appear to be fully operational and used to its full potential by all staff. The report does not detail the specific areas of concern.”

    Source location

    2017-0394-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 February 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026