Recurring concern

Unclear accountability for health and safety controls

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First reported 20 Dec 2013•Latest report 28 May 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to assign, communicate, maintain or exercise clear accountability for health and safety controls across strategic, operational and property or service-level functions, where unclear ownership can leave safety risks unmanaged.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to a specific risk assessment, inspection, maintenance task or remedial action when accountability for the wider health and safety control arrangement is not deficient.
  • Excludes generic organisational governance, leadership or responsibility concerns with no direct health and safety control or safety consequence.
  • Excludes ordinary disagreements about responsibility where a clear accountable owner exists and the control is operating reliably.
Reports
17

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
18

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
28

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

NHS England2
Welsh Government2
ABTA Ltd1
Agd Equipment Limited1
Ashford Borough Council1
Belmarsh Prison1
Bounce Til I Die1
Bridgend County Borough Council1
Caister-on-Sea Parish Council1
Capita Business Services Ltd1
Capita PLC1
Cardiff Council1
Children's Commissioner for Wales1
CMBC Supply Limited1
Construction Plant-hire Association1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Callum James Hargreaves · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Callum James Hargreaves died after his body was recovered from the sea in Newquay on 20 January 2024, following multiple injuries consistent with a fall from height; the report recorded a conclusion of suicide. Concerns included unresolved responsibility between the Council and a social housing provider for addressing safeguarding alerts about cuckooing and housing Callum, despite seven safeguarding conferences, as well as conflicting views about whether a social tenancy disqualified someone from making a homelessness application.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to rapidly resolve responsibility for housing cuckooed tenants who become effectively homeless

    Wider context from the report

    “1) On the facts of this case, Callum had a social tenancy with Sanctuary Housing but it is recognised the Council will have professional relationships with a number of housing providers. Safeguarding alerts were raised that Callum was being cuckooed. There was then a “stand-off” between Sanctuary and the Council as to who had responsibility for housing Callum. This was not resolved even though there were seven Safeguarding conferences held over half a year. It was felt by the Chair of the Safeguarding conferences that Callum had been failed and that the question of who was responsible for his accommodation should have been resolved much more quickly. Going forward, the Council may wish to reflect upon: - How it would like social housing providers with whom it has professional relationships to resolve concerns about the cuckooing of tenants. A separate Preventing Future Deaths report has been written to Sanctuary in this regard (with a copy sent to the Council); - How disagreements about who has responsibility for housing a cuckooed tenant who becomes effectively homeless may be resolved more rapidly; - Council witnesses held conflicting views as to whether a social tenancy disqualified a tenant from making a homelessness application. It is for the Council to decide how to ensure a consistent approach is taken by its staff. The situation generally is considered in greater detail at paragraphs 150-160 of the attached judgement. ”

    Source location

    Callum James Hargreaves · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct managers and supervisors to use the Escalation of Professional Differences Procedure and Guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. An escalation of Callum’s situation following the safeguarding/MDT meetings did not occur. Had the difficulties encountered triggered an escalation, then there may have been further opportunities to explore and potentially resolve the housing issue.”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Council (Housing)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure all managers and supervisors demonstrate understanding and application of the escalation procedure by August 2025.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In order to ensure this, managers and supervisors will be directed to the Council's ‘Escalation of Professional Differences Procedure and Guidance’ (- cios sab-escalation-procedure-october-2020.pdf). This document provides clear guidance on steps to resolve professional differences and strategic steps for the escalation of concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Council (Housing)
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Council cannot dictate individual social housing providers’ operational policies for resolving cuckooing concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. While we cannot dictate what individual providers do operationally in terms of their own policy, we are in a position to promote and encourage the adoption of a unified understanding of cuckooing and, if possible, reach consensus in the following key areas;”

    Source location

    Response from Cornwall Council (Housing)
    Page 3 · response
    Published 6 June 2025

    Open published response
  2. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Benjamin David Leonard, aged 16, died after slipping and falling from a cliff while descending the Great Orme during an Explorer Scout trip in North Wales. The report identifies concerns about inadequate planning, risk assessment, briefing, supervision, training, safeguarding, first-aid provision, oversight and the Scouts Association’s response to the death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of central oversight of local safety execution

    Wider context from the report

    “36. The Scouts Association is distant from its membership through its federated branches of 8000 charities and layers of hierarchy meaning that it cannot know how health and safety is executed at ground level. Training and POR are generated centrally, yet The Scouts Association defer accountability for safeguarding and safety to the individual charities. ”

    Source location

    Benjamin David Leonard · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 12 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue examining TSA’s safeguarding and governance concerns, including assessing corrective work and requesting supporting information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Commission can also look into past conduct by the trustees and what steps had been, and are being taken, to address all safeguarding and safety concerns set out in the Report and ensure the trustees are meeting their legal duties in governing the TSA and have suitable governance and adequate procedures, including to address your concerns as set out in the Report.”

    Source location

    Response from Charity Commission for England and Wales
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure TSA and its affiliated charities understand which safety improvements the Commission considers essential.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “24. TSA has assured us it will respond fully to the Report’s findings and have committed to sharing its response with the Commission. Its response will be relevant to our decisions about any regulatory action we may consider necessary to assist, or ensure, TSA make the changes that need to be implemented to address the concerns set out in the Report. We will ensure TSA and its affiliated charities are clear on the Commission’s view about what improvements are essential and must be made and we will continue to examine the concerns identified.”

    Source location

    Response from Charity Commission for England and Wales
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Build and operate a permanent internal Audit and Assurance team to audit local charities, monitor compliance and report nationally.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. In October 2023, The Scout Association agreed to make a significant investment into a new and permanent internal Audit & Assurance staff team which we are currently building. This new team, working in partnership with volunteer leadership, will look to audit and monitor all of our 8,000 charities at local level and provide reporting nationally to the Board. The new Audit & Assurance team will initially look at training compliance, permitting compliance, the quality and effectiveness of risk assessment against proposed activities, implementation, and management of the Nights Away Permit approval process and wider permitting. Furthermore, it will ensure that robust action plans are built, any issues are addressed, and, if required, stop an activity from happening in partnership with local volunteer leadership. It will also support local Scouts charity Trustees in their responsibilities.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 7 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a movement-wide assurance framework for local safety compliance monitoring and auditing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. A new movement-wide assurance framework to support local leaders, monitor and audit compliance, including in relation to safety (detailed in Section 1, point 5).”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 22 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase safety, adventurous-activities and training staffing capacity, including recruiting new safety roles and agreeing a permanent structure.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As highlighted during this inquest, we are continuing to build robust approaches to Safeguarding practices and culture. We are committed to doing all that is practical to ensure all young people are always safe, and building a clear and ever-present safety culture. In response to this inquest and the concerns expressed by HM Coroner, we are now making a further investment to increase the size of our safety staff team and building a volunteer pool of experts to respond to and support the issues identified. This will increase capacity and offer additional support to our volunteers, including training support.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 19 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and improve support, training, communication and accountability for County and District leadership and Trustees.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. Further reviewing the support we need to provide to County and District leadership, including Trustees, so they have the right tools and support in place to deliver the safest of provision. This is part of our volunteer transformation work.”

    Source location

    Response from Scouts
    Page 29 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue assessing the case and practicalities for further regulation of out-of-school settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Existing Work on Regulatory Models”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 10 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department cannot comment on the Scout Association’s internal structure, workings, or implementation of internal policies and procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Scout Association and the Charity Commission are expected to address matters concerning internal operations and charity trustees’ legal duties, respectively.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. Finally, we would note that various matters identified in your report concern the internal structure and workings of the Scout Association (for example their internal FAIP process). Where feasible, we have sought to address all matters of concern, but unfortunately we cannot comment on the internal set-up and structure of individual organisations, or charities in the case of the Scout Association. We understand that the Scout Association will provide a response to your report which we expect will address these issues. Similarly, we understand that the Charity Commission will provide a response which we expect will address matters relating to charity trustees’ legal duties and responsibilities in managing their charity.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Education
    Page 4 · response
    Published 26 February 2024

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Christian Kwame Tuvi · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Christian Kwame Tuvi, an escalator cleaner aged 44, died at Waterloo Station after the traveller moved while he was in a gap, causing blunt force trauma to the chest. The jury identified inadequate briefing, failure to complete a site-specific risk assessment, failure to give an audible warning, and failures concerning the inching pendant and compliance with the method statement. The report also raised continuing concerns about unresolved responsibility for training and competence to operate the travellator during cleaning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to allocate responsibilities and powers for training and travellator-operation competence in cleaning contracts

    Wider context from the report

    “The ORR informed the coroner that in 2020 an improvement notice was served on Cleshar Cleaners, requiring them to provide a safe system of work for communicating the movement of the conveyor which does not rely solely on verbal communication. Cleshar has appealed the Improvement Notice and the Employment Tribunal have stayed the notice until 2024. Although the improvement notice is under appeal Cleshar has made some changes to improve their safe system of work. These included a padlock for the operative to place on the nearest isolator switch before entering the gap, pressing the stop button in, KONE discussing with Cleshar where the gap is to be left prior to handing over control of the machine and the risk assessment and method statement now identify the need for a middle person to relay messages. The improvements that Cleshar made have allowed them to resume the deep clean of Waterloo moving walkway. However, the TfL familiarisation training for working in a plant room no longer provides inching as part of the course. TfL expects their contractors to provide inching training for their operatives. Without the evidence of competence to inch the machine the isolation/inching function remains with KONE as a temporary solution. It is unclear why this cannot be a permanent solution. I heard from witnesses that it would be safer for engineers, who are present during deep cleans, to operate the movements of the traveller, but I was told that it would lead to a lack of clarity as to who was in charge. This seems not to be insoluble given different contractors with different employees is a norm on building sites working safely under HSE rules across the country. More likely there are undisclosed issues perhaps related to assumption of responsibility for risk or financial considerations which explain the resistance. The inquest heard that prior to the accident, cleaners would attend a TfL training course with a signed form which TfL observed was a certificate of competence to inch and operate the controls of the traveller. But the issuing manager and cleaners thought that the TfL course provided that training. The withdrawal of that training and the inability to find another training facility, has led to the cleaners not being trained and so not permitted to operate the travellator. Cleshar Cleaners management have not in the past assessed their cleaners for competence to inch and there is no agreed standard of competence. Concerns were expressed in the inquest that most of the cleaners did not have English as their first language and that the risk assessment method statement was a huge technical document, with which the cleaners were not familiar and they all required training in the whole method of work, and not just the person in charge. MY CONCERN and reason for reporting this matter to the minister and not just the regulator and contractors, is that nearly four years have passed and there remains an impasse between the organizations as to whom should train whom, and the competence required to operate the travellator whilst it is being cleaned. It seems that TfL has the power to produce a resolution, but is leaving matters to others to resolve. It is hard not to conclude that there is corporate reluctance to assume risk for an important public service. The regulatory bodies and contractors in the supply chain have allowed this matter to remain unresolved for an unacceptable length of time and there may be a system failure in the allocation of responsibilities and powers in the process of contracting for cleaning escalators. ”

    Source location

    Mr Christian Kwame Tuvi · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Formal transport safety intervention is the Office of Rail and Road’s responsibility as the independent rail safety regulator.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you will be aware, my Department has limited powers to intervene formally in transport safety matters, which are the responsibility of the Office of Rail and Road in its capacity as the independent Rail Safety Regulator. Furthermore, my Department does not have powers to intervene in London Underground Limited’s day-to-day operations or processes, for which it is separately accountable to the London Mayor as a subsidiary of TfL.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Transport
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Day-to-day London Underground operations and processes fall outside departmental powers and are accountable to the London Mayor through TfL.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you will be aware, my Department has limited powers to intervene formally in transport safety matters, which are the responsibility of the Office of Rail and Road in its capacity as the independent Rail Safety Regulator. Furthermore, my Department does not have powers to intervene in London Underground Limited’s day-to-day operations or processes, for which it is separately accountable to the London Mayor as a subsidiary of TfL.”

    Source location

    Response from Department for Transport
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    KONE is responsible for training its staff and suppliers who undertake inching activities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will remember that KONE plc (KONE) agreed at the inquest that training of their staff, or any suppliers who work for them, was their responsibility.”

    Source location

    Response from Transport for London
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 July 2023

    Open published response
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Heather Findlay was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act at Mile End Hospital and ran away while on escorted leave on 11 June 2020. She was later found by a member of the public in a nearby park; the inquest concluded that she died by suicide, with a medical cause of death of hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy and ████████ toxicity. The principal concerns included staff preparedness and procedures when a detained patient absconds, unclear responsibilities between ELFT and the police, communication of suicide risk, and the adequacy of risk grading and organisational learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of police and health-trust partnership working to allocate responsibility for patient retrieval

    Wider context from the report

    “4. I heard that Right Care, Right Person is an operational model developed by Humberside Police that changes the way the emergency services respond to calls involving concerns about mental health. I understand that it is in the process of being rolled out across the UK as part of ongoing work between police forces, health providers and government. I heard that the MPS has already created a similar model under the resource and demand team. The protocol is called Affinity. It attempts to target preventable demand from the mental health trusts. I was told that ELFT and the MPS work in partnership, so I asked the MPS what is meant to happen if an escort is following a patient who has run away and about whom the escort is worried. I was told that this is primarily a health problem. It was pointed out that doctors, nurses and other hospital staff have the same powers as the police under section 18 of the Mental Health Act. Hospital employees have the legal authority to take a sectioned patient into custody and return them to hospital. However, I heard nothing of an ELFT protocol that would advise staff on the ward to come out to assist an escort who already following a patient. I heard nothing of a trust contingency plan that would allow a ward to function without the doctors and nurses needed to undertake such a task. I heard nothing of any training given to doctors and nurses in how to restrain a patient in the middle of the street and to transport them back to the ward. From the evidence I heard, the police / health trust partnership working allows each agency to regard such a situation as the other’s responsibility, whilst nobody is on the ground attempting to retrieve a seriously ill patient who is meant to be inside a locked ward for their own safety. Whether this is a matter of policy or practice, the result is the same. If partner agency working is to be effective in caring for this extremely vulnerable cohort of patients, there needs to be crystal clear understanding by all those involved, from the highest policy maker to the most junior member of a team at the sharp end, of how to tackle these difficult situations and exactly who is meant to be doing what. ”

    Source location

    Heather FINDLAY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Right Care, Right Person approach with health partners, aligning policies, terminology and information requirements for risk assessment and police support.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, ████████, wrote to Health and Social Care Partners on 24th May 2023, to set out the Met Police’s intention to implement the national Right Care, Right Person approach. Under Assistant Commissioner ████████ a team is now working to put this in place, and an initial senior board has taken place with senior health and social care providers to work towards RCRP implementation. This is also in parallel with the work being done by health care providers on the London mental health concordat. A key aspect of this is working with all of the”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish an external partner delivery group with health and social care partners to clarify responsibilities and support Right Care, Right Person implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The preparatory work being done on implementing Right Care, Right Person provides the Mental Health Trusts with the opportunity to refresh their policies and training to allow them to meet their legal obligations under s18 Mental Health Act and Article 2 and 3 ECHR, in respect of someone who has absconded. In many cases this will be about asking trusts to implement in practise policies that currently exist. The MPS will be meeting with Health and Social Care partners from July to establish a RCRP External Partner Delivery Group to allow all parties to be clear on roles and responsibilities and for health and social care partners to develop their contingency plans to respond to patients who are Absent Without Leave from Mental Health facilities and the other pillars of Right Care, Right Person.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 6 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue joint discussions with the MPS and local health stakeholders on AWOL responses and respective organisational roles.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust notes that you are aware of the Affinity protocol which is already in place between the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the Trust.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Affinity Protocols, Joint Responsibility Agreements and national frameworks sufficiently define police and health partners’ roles for absconded patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPS and medical agency partners already work to an existing framework which sets out roles and responsibilities. They are:”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Retrieving sectioned patients who leave medical settings is generally a healthcare responsibility unless locating or detaining them engages core policing duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The core responsibilities of the police are to prevent and detect crime, protect life and property and maintain the Kings Peace. The retrieval of persons sectioned under the Mental Health Act, who have left the medical setting in which they reside, is a health care responsibility unless the need to locate them and/or take them into police custody, falls into one of the core policing duties. Involving the police in mental health issues where there is no crime or threat to life risks criminalisation of patients, and in London in particular, where there is a higher percentage of mental illness within some minority communities, has a disproportionate criminalising effect on them.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Health partners generally remain responsible for transporting located patients back to hospital, rather than police providing transport.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In instances where police do respond, unless the patient is subject to criminal proceedings (e.g. Part III MHA 1983), or S18 MHA applies, then police will generally not provide transport for the purpose of returning patients from the location they are found. This is clearly set out in the National Missing Adult Framework and is therefore a position which makes clear with which partner the responsibility sits. The National Missing Adult Framework also highlights that for many patients, being transported in a police vehicle is a traumatic experience and the most appropriate professional should return the patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational decisions about missing-person investigations are outside the Home Office’s authority.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the response to the missing person report made by the East London Foundation Trust (ELFT) to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the police investigation of a missing person report is an operational decision for individual police forces. The Home Office has no authority to intervene in operational policing matters. I cannot comment on the action and decisions taken by police officers in the course of their duties because operational matters are the responsibility of the Chief Officer of the force concerned. However, my officials have consulted the MPS to gain assurance that the correct protocols are in place in order to prevent future incidents of this nature.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for operational missing-person decisions rests with individual police forces and their Chief Officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regards to the response to the missing person report made by the East London Foundation Trust (ELFT) to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the police investigation of a missing person report is an operational decision for individual police forces. The Home Office has no authority to intervene in operational policing matters. I cannot comment on the action and decisions taken by police officers in the course of their duties because operational matters are the responsibility of the Chief Officer of the force concerned. However, my officials have consulted the MPS to gain assurance that the correct protocols are in place in order to prevent future incidents of this nature.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MPS Affinity Protocol is considered sufficient because it reflects the NPCC framework for missing persons from healthcare settings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MPS response will set out details of its Affinity Protocol, a joint agreement between the MPS and ELFT, which aligns with the NPCC’s framework, published in October 2020, and accessible at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-multi-agency-response-for-adults-missing-from-health-and-care-settings-a-national-framework-for-england.”

    Source location

    Response from Home Office
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Many concerns concern East London Foundation Trust and Metropolitan Police policy, making NHS England inappropriate to respond to them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The concerns in your Report relate to organisational policy at East London Foundation Trust as well as policy within the Metropolitan Police Service. NHS England is not therefore the appropriate organisation to respond to many of the concerns raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma collapsed during separate military selection runs at Whittington Barracks and later died after being taken to hospital. Both were found to have metabolic acidosis, acute kidney injury, rhabdomyolysis and sickle cell trait; the final causes of death remained under investigation, with the most likely cause of collapse described as sickle cell trait combined with military exercise. The principal concern was the risk of death or harm to non-UK selection candidates, including the need to consider screening for sickle cell trait.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clearly identifiable person responsible for reviewing and investigating health and safety incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear lines of responsibility for organisation-wide health and safety risk assessment and incident information gathering

    Wider context from the report

    “Sickle cell trait (SCT) screening process and identifying SCT in candidates: 1. The Inquest heard evidence that since these tragedies there had be 12 (13 as one incident includes 2 people) near misses where the process that had been put in place following these tragedies had not be followed. This resulted in 3 candidates at High Risk for SCT according to their family origins questionnaire undertaking the 2km run. 1 of these had self-identified to a Group Leader prior to the exercise but was directed to complete the RFT(E) run element in any case. This raises a concern about the screening process may be safe and effective. 2. The inquest was told that the Air force and Navy are not screening any candidates for SCT. The Army are. Both services are recruiting from the Commonwealth. Medical evidence at the inquest confirmed screening was the only way to safely identify candidates at risk. This raises a concern that the recruitment process is not safe and effective. Training and Education 1. The near miss incidents lead to a concern that staff involved in the selection process and RFT assessments are still not aware of the risk associated with SCT given that in one case the person was directed to undertake the run despite knowing he was at high risk of developing exertional rhabdomyolysis associated with SCT. 2. The lack of screening in the Navy and Air Force leads to a further concern about the level of understanding regarding the risks associated with SCT – the evidence at the inquest said this risk was unpredictable . 3. The inquest heard evidence that there is no standardised way to identify SCT candidates who are going through the selection process as the different services were considering using different colours wrist bands in different services. The raises a concern about the ability to identify those candidates who have SCT. 4. There should be a review of the wording used and rationale for including questions for candidates regarding ‘cola coloured urine’ in the PMSA. Dr Gupta, an expert haematologist at the inquest, informed the court that this is not always a sign of SCT as an individual can get cola urine from hepatitis. This raises a concern about the level of understanding of the significant of "cola coloured urine" and what it might indicate. Reporting and investigation 1. The inquest heard how Capita have set up a clinical oversight board to review any incidents. First this board did not appear to have reviewed or audited any of the near misses referred to above and second it does not include a representative from the Army. This raises concerns about the lack of joined up thinking for an incident between Capita and the army and the safety of the new process. 2. Reporting of incidents: the majority of the 12 near misses were not investigated at the time they occurred which indicates the present process is not safe and effective. 3. There is no system to audit whether incidents are being correctly processed and investigated. 4. The reporting system continues to use two parallel reporting forms for Capita (Casper) and the Army (Durals). These are on separate IT systems. This raises a concern that there is no "one version of the truth". The inquest heard evidence that Capita were unclear if they had resolved the issue in their Casper system associated with the drop down menu options and the fact that non work related incidents close investigations automatically. 5. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group has a clear identifiable person to take responsibility for the review health and safety incidents and to ensure adequate investigation is undertaken. Specifically it was still not clear that any oversight of the medical incidents fell within the remit of the Capita Head of Health and Safety. 6. It was unclear from the evidence whether the Recruiting Group act as one entity regarding health and safety issues with a clear lines of responsibility for global risk assessment (and promoting information gathering & investigation) of incidents of any nature. The Inquest heard evidence that ‘H&S at work’ is considered differently to any medical risk, which is supported by the lack of investigation of the near misses. Medical response: 1. Inquest heard how Lichfield had specialist medical staff on site in the medical training unit but there was no system for getting urgent medical attention on the base if needed. There was no mechanism to put a tannoy out for a medical emergency but the Inquest heard evidence that this could be done for a cake sale. 2. All the services should consider whether there should be a generic policy for the treatment of exertional collapse (of any cause) as per US Army where during training there is a clear medical plan with availability of essential medical treatment (eg oxygen and fluids) before hospitalisation. ”

    Source location

    Kamil Iddrisu and Youngson Nkhoma · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Direct incident reports to medical and health-and-safety leaders and provide them with joint investigation accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Recruiting Group Clinical Oversight Board was established on 19 May 2022. Nine of the twelve identified Sickle Cell Trait related near misses occurred before this date. The Clinical Oversight Board did not examine three incidents following its establishment because, while Incident Reports were filed in all cases, they were not disseminated to key stakeholders at the time due to Incident Reports not going to functional leads such as the Chief Medical Officer and Health and Safety Manager. That has changed – the Chief Medical Officer, Deputy Chief Medical Officer and Health and Safety Executive Manager now directly receive all Incident Reports and initiate the Joint Lessons Learnt Panel process and subsequent review by the Clinical Oversight Board.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 9 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate joint Army–Capita health-and-safety governance forums and shared risk-management processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Recruiting Group acts as one entity for health and safety issues through joint (Army and Capita) forums including a Joint Risk Management Board, the Joint Lessons Learned Panel, Clinical Oversight Board, quarterly Joint Health, Safety and Environment reviews and the quarterly Joint Assurance Group. Policies and procedures are reviewed and approved by both partners to ensure clarity and coherence. This joint governance framework supports a proactive and coherent approach to risk management and a more robust, timely and effective response to reported incidents and organisational learning.”

    Source location

    2019-0416 - Response from Secretary of State for Defence and Capita
    Page 15 · response
    Published 30 December 2019

    Open published response
  6. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony David RODÈ · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony David RODÈ was a Coastwatch volunteer who fell from a bank onto a concrete path while using his own strimmer to cut overgrown grass on 24 July 2021, sustaining injuries that led to his death. The principal concern was a dispute between Great Yarmouth Borough Council and Caister-On-Sea Parish Council over responsibility for the land, resulting in neither organisation maintaining it and a volunteer undertaking the grass cutting in unsafe circumstances.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish responsibility for the coastline section

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There is a dispute between Great Yarmouth Borough Council and Caister-On-Sea Parish Council as to who is responsible for the stretch of land where Mr Rodè was strimming the grass. 2. Caister-On-Sea Parish Council state that the bank is part of the sea defences and so is the responsibility of the Great Yarmouth Borough Council. 3. Great Yarmouth Borough Council state the land belongs to the Parish Council and so is their responsibility. 4. As a result, neither organisation has taken responsibility for this section of coastline and the grass on the dunes has grown to such a height as to obscure the view of the Coastwatch volunteers along the beach. 5. Accordingly, the Coastwatch volunteers are unable to properly carry out their role to provide the “eyes and ears” along the coast and to assist in the protection and preservation of life at sea along the coastline. In addition, in this case, it has resulted in a volunteer maker taking the decision to cut the grass himself in circumstances when it was not safe to do so ”

    Source location

    Anthony David RODÈ · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    William DOLEMAN and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Four patients died following ERCP-related complications within a six-month period. The concerns included inadequate pre-procedure assessment and patient pathways, insufficient recording of procedure vetting, non-personalised consent, and unclear accountability between professionals for vetting and consent.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of accountability between professionals for consent

    Wider context from the report

    “4. A lack of accountability between professionals for ensuring robust vetting and consent. ”

    Source location

    William DOLEMAN and 3 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The described vetting and consent arrangements are expected to resolve accountability between professionals, so no additional action is identified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. A lack of accountability between professionals for ensuring robust vetting and consent.”

    Source location

    2021-0432-Response-from-City-Hospital-Campus_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 December 2021

    Open published response
  8. Newcastle upon Tyne

    AI-generated summary

    Neil James STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Neil James Stewart travelled to Amsterdam in November 2017 and, on 18 November 2017, entered the Noordzeekanaal after jumping from a party boat; his body was recovered on 3 December 2017. The concerns addressed written safety policies and warnings for guests, venue-specific risks, and clarity about safety responsibilities between entertainment providers and venue organisers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to document the division of safety responsibilities with another provider

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) When providing entertainment services in venue where another provider is responsible for organisation, safety of guests – discuss with the provider the details and clearly document the distinction in those responsibilities and give guidance to guests accordingly ”

    Source location

    Neil James STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Central and South East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    YUGAL LIMBU · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yugal Limbu became separated from his family after drinking with friends and family, was last seen walking towards home while intoxicated, and was later found deceased in the River Stour. The inquest concluded that he accidentally fell into the river and suffered submersion. Concerns were raised about a hazardous gap and sloped surface near the footbridge at Victoria Way, including uncertainty over which local authority was responsible for the area.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about authority responsibility for the area

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Victoria Park is well used by the public including at night and Kent Police raised a concern at the inquest hearing that there is an area by the footbridge where the path meets the river at Victoria Way, Ashford that is a hazard to the public. There is a clear gap and a sloped surface, and evidence from Kent Police is that this is dangerous for those using the path in diminished daylight or at night. (2) This matter has been drawn to the attention of Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council following the inquest hearing and it is unclear which authority has responsibility for the area. ”

    Source location

    YUGAL LIMBU · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Jenson James Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jenson James Francis was delivered by caesarean section and developed chorioamnionitis and funisitis in the context of maternal sepsis. The report records cardio-pulmonary failure following a failure to deliver him in good time and states that he was exposed to the effects of developing maternal sepsis. Principal concerns included poor CTG interpretation and training, unclear clinical leadership and communication, inadequate records, insufficient staffing and escalation, and wider systemic shortcomings in the maternity unit.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear responsibility for identifying and ameliorating staffing and acuity risks

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) There were insufficient staffing levels, and very high acuity, despite which there was no consultant attendance and the escalation policy was not used. There was evidence that there was no clear line of responsibility for identifying this and ameliorating it. ”

    Source location

    Jenson James Francis · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Recruit additional midwifery staff and monitor midwifery and medical staffing monthly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staffing has significantly improved since August 2018 with ongoing recruitment of midwifery staff. The merger of the two units has assisted in managing any staffing shortfalls as we are no longer providing cover for two units.”

    Source location

    2019-0158-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a Birth Rate Plus assessment of workforce needs for the new unit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Midwifery and medical staffing are being reported on a monthly basis via the Maternity Improvement Board. We are currently undergoing a Birth Rate Plus Assessment of our workforce needs in the new unit. The final assessment report will be available in September 2019.”

    Source location

    2019-0158-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an escalation policy, incident-reporting process and senior-midwife out-of-hours escalation rota.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a new escalation policy and staff are incident reporting times of high acuity this is being monitored via datix reporting. There is a senior midwife on call rota to support staff with any concerns in clinical practice out of hours and for concerns about escalation.”

    Source location

    2019-0158-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Birthrate Plus labour-ward acuity system and support staff to use it for timely escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Birthrate plus acuity system for labour ward has been implemented into the unit and staff are currently being supported to use this to support timely escalation.”

    Source location

    2019-0158-Response-by-University-Health-Board
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 July 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026