Recurring concern

Unsafe medication administration

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First reported 19 Sep 2013•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to the end-to-end administration of prescribed medicines, including staff competence and supervision, administration accuracy and timing, monitoring, verification of ingestion, access and stock control, documentation, and follow-up of missed or incorrect doses.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing-only, medication-selection or clinical-review deficiencies where the concern is not tied to administration.
  • Excludes hazards involving counterfeit or unlawfully supplied medicines outside the administering organisation's medication-administration system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, staffing or training deficiencies that are not specifically dedicated to safe medication administration.
  • Excludes failures concerning unrelated information-sharing, assessment or care processes merely occurring in the same case.
Reports
115

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
147

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
192

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission7
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care6
Ministry of Justice4
NHS England4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Nursing and Midwifery Council3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Care UK2
Hc-One Limited2
Leeds Prison2
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Wright, who had poor mobility and was unable to communicate verbally, died at Belmont Residential Home on 16 September 2017; the post-mortem found extensive coronary artery atheroma. The report raised concerns about the incorrect administration and handling of Oramorph, medication management at a care home rated inadequate, and failures to recognise and address safeguarding risks after the medication incident.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent unauthorised access and repeated administration of Oramorph

    Wider context from the report

    “5. The home in question has been rated as inadequate by CQC and was under regular monitoring via an action plan. It was also being visited regularly by the Local Authority Quality Support Team every 10 days or so. One of the issues previously identified was poor management/documentation of medication. Notwithstanding that, access and unauthorised repeated administration of Oramorph took place; ”

    Source location

    Joan Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Significant impact from excess administration of opioids at any prescribed strength

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that Oramorph had different classifications depending on the strength prescribed. This impacts the storage/handling arrangements. The inquest heard that opioids can have a significant impact at whatever strength they are prescribed if given in excess; ”

    Source location

    Joan Wright · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Controlled Drugs Regulations establishing tighter controls and mandatory governance arrangements for prescribing, records, custody, monitoring and accountable officers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You mention the Shipman Inquiry in your report. In response to the Shipman Inquiry's Fourth Report¹, there have been significant changes in the governance arrangements for the use and management of controlled drugs.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Accelerate rollout of electronic prescribing for controlled drugs and medicines administration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, as part of the Government's response to the World Health Organisation's patient safety challenge on medicines safety, we are developing a programme of work led by NHS Improvement to improve medicines safety. Work is underway to accelerate the roll-out of electronic prescribing to controlled drugs and medicines administration, and to deploy more clinical pharmacists in primary care and care homes. We have also introduced monitoring of the highest risk prescribing practice linked to hospital admissions.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing controlled-drug governance measures are considered sufficient to detect and minimise inappropriate use, although they cannot prevent every incident.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “While no system can ever completely prevent the mismanagement or misuse of controlled drugs, we believe the measures that have been put in place mean that the inappropriate use of opioids and other controlled drugs can be detected more quickly and minimised, so that protracted poor practice is less likely to continue unchecked.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Registered providers and managers are responsible for ensuring the proper and safe management of medicines in care homes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is the registered provider and the registered manager’s responsibility to ensure the proper and safe management of medicines and guidance is available to support them to achieve this. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has produced a national guideline on the ‘Safe use and management of controlled drugs’ (NG46)⁶, published in 2016, and a social care guideline (SC1), published in 2014, provides guidance on ‘Managing medicines in care homes’⁷. Furthermore, the CQC has clear guidance on its website on ‘Storing controlled drugs in care homes’⁸.”

    Source location

    2018-0408-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 28 December 2018

    Open published response
  2. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN died on 7 June 2018 after presenting to A&E in a precarious state and later being found to have a perforated gastric ulcer. The report identified concerns about incomplete fluid monitoring, failure to administer prescribed potassium and sufficient intravenous fluids, missed ECG abnormalities, inadequate repeat blood testing, and delays in responding to her deterioration and providing planned treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed potassium

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) An ECG was ordered which showed abnormalities likely associated with her low potassium level. This was not seen by the doctor who requested it. The signature on it is illegible. A second ECG should have been requested. It was not. She was written up for potassium in A&E as well as intravenous fluids but was given no potassium and only half a litre of intravenous fluids in her entire 24 hour admission. It was the view of the Doctors giving the evidence that she should have received at least four litres to deal with her depleted state. So instructions given within three to four hours of her arrival in A&E (at 12.12pm on 6/6/2018) were not implemented. Why not? ”

    Source location

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide prescribed Cyclazine

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) On the morning of the 7th at around 10.30 am. the attending Doctor wanted Mrs RAM-HENMAN to be given Cyclazine, intravenous fluids and for her to have a CT scan. None of this was achieved before her death two hours later. She should have at least received the intravenous fluids and the Cyclazine. Again it seems that at this stage there was a failure to realise that she had not been given the Potassium she had been written up for in A&E. ”

    Source location

    Kalma RAM-HENMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement an Electronic Prescribing System to prevent recurrence of fluid and potassium administration problems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you will see, we have implemented a new SBAR telephone handover form (copy attached for reference) as part of the revision of the Emergency Department Safety Booklet. The form includes prompts for staff on drains and lines present, and medication issues. In the longer term, the implementation of an Electronic Prescribing System will ensure that the problems that”

    Source location

    2018-0306-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 17 February 2019

    Open published response
  3. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Natalie Billingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Natalie Billingham was admitted to hospital with worsening foot pain, later developed necrotising fasciitis, underwent emergency surgery including a through-knee amputation, and died on the evening of 2 March 2018. The report identified concerns about inadequate communication and delays in reviewing abnormal blood results, recognising sepsis, and administering antibiotics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer antibiotics at an earlier stage

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Evidence emerged during the inquest that there was inadequate communication and delays in assessing the blood results when available. There were also missed opportunities for administering antibiotics at an earlier stage and recognising the development of sepsis. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Natalie Billingham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Patricia Violet PALIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patricia Violet PALIN died on 2 October 2017 after presenting to hospital with sepsis and kidney damage. The report describes delayed recognition and treatment, including delayed antibiotics, absence of oxygen administration, failure to remove leg dressings for examination, and failure to follow sepsis guidelines. Concerns also included limited access to GP records, insufficient A&E doctor cover, and an unavailable prescribed antibiotic.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of prescribed drugs in the A&E department

    Wider context from the report

    “3. I heard evidence that a prescribed drug Ertapenem was not in stock within the A&E department and that led to a delay of some two hours and twenty five minutes until administration. Other suitable alternative drugs were available but not considered. ”

    Source location

    Patricia Violet PALIN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Stock ertapenem in the Emergency Department to prevent treatment delays.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Doctor prescribing the Ertapenem was not made aware that it was not available in the department, so was unable to consider an alternative. The outcomes of the Root Cause Investigation were discussed with the team for learning to ensure communication is improved in the future. Furthermore, the drug is now stocked in the Emergency Department, to avoid recurrence in the future.”

    Source location

    2018-0183-Response-by-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review Emergency Department trolleys and assess a trial trolley containing equipment, antibiotics and fluids for immediate sepsis care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Alongside this we are reviewing the trolleys in the department, with the possibility of trialling a trolley that will allow for us to put everything into the trolley for immediate care of the septic patient, this includes antibiotics and fluids. The existing trolley in place does not carry everything required for immediate care.”

    Source location

    2018-0183-Response-by-Shrewsbury-and-Telford-Hospitals-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 July 2018

    Open published response
  5. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Philip David Ashton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Philip David Ashton, a resident of Mallard House, was administered warfarin in error on 13, 14 and 15 October 2017. He was found bleeding from an arteriovenous graft on 17 October, and the report raised concerns about the medication error, the lack of an emergency response and the unavailability of his medical information to ambulance staff; he later died in hospital.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer anticoagulation medication correctly

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That warfarin was administered to the deceased in error and the home should review their medication procedures and put in place a robust system for the administration of anti coagulation medication ”

    Source location

    Philip David Ashton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Joan Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joan Osborne, who had diabetes and advanced dementia, died on 25 August 2017 after repeated difficulties obtaining her blood glucose levels and administering her insulin. The concerns included failures by nursing home staff to seek medical assistance or escalate her missed insulin, inadequate records, failure to recognise her deteriorating condition, and inaccurate blood glucose measurement and treatment on 22 August 2017.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer Lucozade safely when blood glucose levels are unavailable or critically high

    Wider context from the report

    “(7) Mrs Osborne was incorrectly given Lucozade on the morning of 22.08.2017 at a point when her blood glucose levels had not been obtained, and were ‘HI’. ”

    Source location

    Joan Osborne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove Lucozade, provide fresh fruit juice only after an accurate blood-glucose reading, and make diabetic interventions nurse-led.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(8) All Lucozade has been removed from the building, and fresh fruit juice is now given if a resident is experiencing hypoglycaemia (determined by an accurate blood sugar reading.), as instructed in the training mentioned above. The Lucozade on the 22/08/2017 was given by a Senior Care Assistant and not a Nurse. In conjunction with the care plans for residents with diabetes, it is now clear that intervention with these residents is always nurse-led, and not carer-led. The care home also now has a very”

    Source location

    2018-0091-Response-by-Adbolton-Hall-Ltd
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Diabetes care is considered adequately assessed and provided because relevant authorities were satisfied the home’s complex-needs admissions were safe.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “their pre-admission assessments were sent to ████████, Management Officer for the Quality and Market Management Team within Nottinghamshire County Council, and ████████, Care Home Quality Lead Nottingham North and East, Nottingham West and Rushcliffe Clinical Commissioning Group, to ensure that they were confident that the home could meet each individual’s needs. On 26 March 2018, ████████ advised the home that they were not required to continue to send these to them, as they were satisfied that all the home’s admissions, including those with individuals with complex needs, were safe. We are confident therefore that diabetes care is adequately assessed and provided for.”

    Source location

    2018-0091-Response-by-Adbolton-Hall-Ltd
    Page 4 · response
    Published 16 June 2018

    Open published response
  7. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    James Robert Quinton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Robert Quinton collapsed after a period of vomiting and abdominal pain, with the inquest recording splenic rupture and combined morphine and methadone toxicity, alongside rivaroxaban therapy, as the cause of death. He did not respond to resuscitation and supportive measures. Concerns included poor-quality nursing and observation records, and noradrenaline intended as an infusion being administered as an intravenous bolus during resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of checking of verbally prescribed drugs before administration

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Furthermore, during the course of the resuscitation a decision was made for Mr Quinton to be given 4 mgs of Noradrenaline. This was to be given as an infusion. Unfortunately, this was actually given as a 4 mg iv bolus. Although the records suggest this did not have a detrimental effect on Mr Quinton (his blood pressure had been exceptionally low) this clearly could be highly significant for other patients. It also raises the question of other patients being given either the wrong drug or the wrong amount of drug or the wrong method of administration when the procedure for drugs to be prescribed in this scenario is on a verbal basis only. It would seem sensible to have some checking procedure by the person administering the drugs checking with the person who had prescribed it to make sure their understanding is correct. From the evidence I heard it seems there are no such procedures in place. ”

    Source location

    James Robert Quinton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a working group with Emergency Department and Anaesthetics representation to address emergency intravenous drug administration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold the working group’s scheduled meeting to examine resuscitation-area systems and processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribute the Intravenous Drugs Administration Policy to all qualified Emergency Department staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. I am informed by ████████ that a working group has been set up with representation from ED and Anaesthetics to explore further the issue of IV drug administration in emergencies during resuscitation. The first meeting is scheduled for the end of April to look at systems and processes for working together within the Resus area. I understand that the IV Drugs Administration Policy has also been sent to all qualified staff in the emergency department.”

    Source location

    2018-0056-Response-by-Doncaster-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 June 2018

    Open published response
  8. Staffordshire South

    AI-generated summary

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    John Keith Edwards, aged 64, was admitted to a care home for respite and subsequently suffered falls, seizures, reduced mobility, pressure sores and a rapid decline before dying in a nursing home on 19 December 2016. Concerns included inadequate care-home policies and care, failures to seek medical assistance and recognise deterioration, poor record-keeping, and inappropriate placement for his complex needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure availability and administration of prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Southwinds Care home did not appear to be able to cope with Mr Edwards complex care needs. Consequently the original placement appeared to be inappropriate (2) The Care Home had an inadequate policy to deal with falls and no policy for pressure sore prevention and care (3) Care Home staff applied a seizure policy which was not specific to the resident. (4) Care Home staff failed to seek medical assistance following seizures. (5) Care Home staff failed to deal with significant bruising which developed 8 days after admission to the Care Home. (6) Care records were retrospectively filled in. (7) Staff and management failed to recognise and seek help for the residents deteriorating condition other than by way of an out of hours attendance when the GP was given minimal information and the urgent follow up request was not done. (8) Staff were unaware that medication brought in by the family was available to Mr Edwards, therefore it was not given. None was sought from the GP. (9) Non patient specific dressings were used on pressure sores. (10) A non-patient specific mattress was used on his bed. (11) Visits by the placement officer and disability nurse failed to identify Mr Edward’s deteriorating condition. ”

    Source location

    John Keith Edwards · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Patrick Stephen Moran · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patrick Stephen Moran was admitted with severe peripheral vascular disease, left foot gangrene and ongoing leg pain. During angiography and angioplasty, he suffered an iliac artery rupture; his left leg became non-viable and was amputated, while his right leg later deteriorated. The report identified concerns about a tenfold insulin dosing error involving use of a standard syringe, the lack of mandatory diabetes and insulin-device training, and the absence of an organisation-wide process to review compliance with safety alerts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use insulin-specific syringes when drawing up and administering insulin

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) During the procedure under local anaesthetic on 25 July 2017 Mr Moran continued to bleed due to the unknown existence of the rupture at that time. He developed hyperkalaemia and was administered an insulin-dextrose infusion. He was to be infused 10 units (0.1ml) on insulin but was mistakenly infused with 100 units (1ml). The serious incident investigation identified that the ST4 Anaesthetist did not use an insulin syringe but instead used a normal 1ml syringe. The use of this syringe was common practice within the anaesthetic department in spite of the issue of alert NPSA/2010/RRR013. (2) Since 2010 diabetes was removed from the mandatory training requirements across the organisation. As a result there is currently no mandatory training provided to doctors within the Trust to advise them of use of insulin specific devices when drawing up and administering insulin. It is apparent from the action plan that emails have been sent to Consultant Anaesthetists in this regard. (3) There is currently no process across the organisation to review continued compliance with CAS alerts and ensure that changes made across the Trust still reflect the requirements of previously issued alerts. ”

    Source location

    Patrick Stephen Moran · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Stephen George Coulson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stephen George Coulson was discharged from Manchester Royal Infirmary after an increased Fentanyl patch was applied, with no record that the previous patch had been removed and despite confusion and agitation requiring further observation under hospital policy. He was found in cardiac arrest at home in the early hours of 1 January 2016 and died in intensive care later that day. The principal concerns were controlled-drug administration and documentation, failure to escalate the need for observation and review before discharge, and the Trust’s investigation failing to identify lessons.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the system for administration of controlled drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Controlled drugs – the system in place for the administration, documentation and audit of processes associated with the use of controlled drugs ”

    Source location

    Stephen George Coulson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Trust’s controlled drugs policy and share proposed improvements with the Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, the Trust have a controlled drugs policy in place. The pharmacy team within the Commission has reviewed this policy. The policy is of an acceptable standard, with some suggestions for improvements, such as making it clear who has responsibility for investigating medicines incidents, which occur outside of pharmacy. We will share these with the trust.”

    Source location

    2017-0307-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Trust’s controlled drug standard operating procedures through ongoing engagement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The trust must also have in place a controlled drug Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). We will review these as part of our ongoing engagement with the trust. For your information, we have recently implemented a system of having a named pharmacist inspector who has responsibility for the Trust and who meets with the head pharmacist. They are aware of this Regulation 28 report and will include this as part of their next meeting.”

    Source location

    2017-0307-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The controlled drugs policy is of an acceptable standard, although improvements to incident-investigation responsibilities have been suggested.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, the Trust have a controlled drugs policy in place. The pharmacy team within the Commission has reviewed this policy. The policy is of an acceptable standard, with some suggestions for improvements, such as making it clear who has responsibility for investigating medicines incidents, which occur outside of pharmacy. We will share these with the trust.”

    Source location

    2017-0307-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The information currently held provides no evidence that the concerns reflect a systemic issue.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, in light of the Regulation 28 report, we have also considered whether there is sufficient evidence to take further regulatory action regarding this matter. We have concluded, based on the information we currently hold, that there is no evidence there is a systemic issue. However, please be assured we will continue to monitor the issues you have raised from a regulatory perspective and use the information to inform future regulatory activity at the Trust.”

    Source location

    2017-0307-Response-by-CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further regulatory action is considered necessary regarding this matter based on the information currently held.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, in light of the Regulation 28 report, we have also considered whether there is sufficient evidence to take further regulatory action regarding this matter. We have concluded, based on the information we currently hold, that there is no evidence there is a systemic issue. However, please be assured we will continue to monitor the issues you have raised from a regulatory perspective and use the information to inform future regulatory activity at the Trust.”

    Source location

    2017-0307-Response-by-CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 November 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026