Recurring concern

Unsafe medication administration

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First reported 19 Sep 2013•Latest report 19 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of controls dedicated to the end-to-end administration of prescribed medicines, including staff competence and supervision, administration accuracy and timing, monitoring, verification of ingestion, access and stock control, documentation, and follow-up of missed or incorrect doses.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing-only, medication-selection or clinical-review deficiencies where the concern is not tied to administration.
  • Excludes hazards involving counterfeit or unlawfully supplied medicines outside the administering organisation's medication-administration system.
  • Excludes generic record-keeping, staffing or training deficiencies that are not specifically dedicated to safe medication administration.
  • Excludes failures concerning unrelated information-sharing, assessment or care processes merely occurring in the same case.
Reports
115

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
147

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
192

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission7
Stockport NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care6
Ministry of Justice4
NHS England4
Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust4
HM Prison and Probation Service3
Nursing and Midwifery Council3
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust3
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Care UK2
Hc-One Limited2
Leeds Prison2
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust2
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Freda Weston · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Freda Weston was treated for septic arthritis in a replacement knee and died in hospital on 29 April 2015. The report states that Septrin led to disseminated intravascular coagulation and identifies concerns including delays in antibiotics, insufficient time to assess whether the new drug suited her, inadequate staffing, and failures in communication and escalation procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in administering prescribed antibiotics

    Wider context from the report

    “2. She was advised for teicoplanin on the 8th April at 17.10 hours yet she had not even been given the first dose thereof by 15.56 hours on the 9th April. 3. There was a 48 hour delay in her being given any antibiotics. ”

    Source location

    Freda Weston · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The patient did not receive Teicoplanin during this admission; oral Doxycycline followed the subsequent knee washout.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On 8th April our Microbiology department contacted the Trauma and Orthopaedic registrar to advise that the aspirate taken from the knee was growing an organism, although they were unclear as to what the organism was. They therefore recommended to the registrar that the patient be given intravenous Teicoplanin (as they normally would for an infected joint).”

    Source location

    Weston-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Intravenous antibiotics were not indicated during the 48-hour period because the patient was clinically well and revision surgery was not planned.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In Mrs Weston’s case she was clinically well, showing no signs of generalised sepsis and therefore giving intravenous antibiotics would have had no clear benefit for her at that time. ████████ had already ruled out the option of revision surgery and therefore the Trauma and Orthopaedic registrar made the decision to withhold intravenous antibiotic treatment until a definitive long term plan had been discussed with ████████ the outcome of which was likely to involve a joint washout to reduce the microbial load followed by long term oral antibiotics. ████████ Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon, confirmed this plan with ████████ the following day and clearly documented that IV antibiotics were not indicated, as the plan was for washout followed by long term infection suppression with oral antibiotics and that IV antibiotics would only be indicated if Mrs Weston became clinically unwell.”

    Source location

    Weston-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 February 2016

    Open published response
  2. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Steven Leslie Rogers · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Steven Leslie Rogers was admitted to Stepping Hill Hospital on 20 August 2015 with reduced consciousness and confusion and a history of unstable type 1 diabetes. His long-acting Levemir insulin was accidentally omitted during his admission, and he was discharged by a consultant who had not seen him; he was found dead at home two days later, having died from diabetic keto-acidosis. The substantive concerns were the discharge process and the omission and subsequent alteration of his insulin regimen.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed long-acting insulin as scheduled

    Wider context from the report

    “2. During his stay in the hospital, the staff had erroneously omitted to administer his Levemir long acting insulin. This was then given later but this meant that his regime had been altered and he would have to re-set the regime at home. ”

    Source location

    Steven Leslie Rogers · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a specialist Task and Finish Group to oversee the interim medication-chart solution.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A risk assessment is already in place within the Trust regarding this issue and staff are reminded on all wards to check for any paper charts. The Trust is moving towards a Trust wide electronic patient record (EPR) which should resolve this issue, but in the meantime, I can confirm that there is a specialist “Task & Finish Group” in place to further review this issue and develop an effective interim solution. This group reports to the Trust’s Risk Management Committee and through this to the Quality Governance Committee and the Quality Assurance Committee, which reports directly to the Board of Directors.”

    Source location

    Steven-Rogers-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2016

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the medication-chart interface problem and develop an effective interim solution through the specialist Task and Finish Group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A risk assessment is already in place within the Trust regarding this issue and staff are reminded on all wards to check for any paper charts. The Trust is moving towards a Trust wide electronic patient record (EPR) which should resolve this issue, but in the meantime, I can confirm that there is a specialist “Task & Finish Group” in place to further review this issue and develop an effective interim solution. This group reports to the Trust’s Risk Management Committee and through this to the Quality Governance Committee and the Quality Assurance Committee, which reports directly to the Board of Directors.”

    Source location

    Steven-Rogers-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2016

    Open published response
  3. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Robin Keith Brett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robin Keith Brett, an 18-year-old man with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, died on 14 June 2014 after being admitted with severe constipation and an addisonian crisis. He did not receive his prescribed steroids, and the concerns identified were that nursing staff failed to notice the missed dose and that prescribing systems lacked an alert for patients taking long-term steroids.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to detect missed steroid doses

    Wider context from the report

    “This patient was prescribed steroids appropriately but the nursing staff failed to notice a dose of steroids had been missed. There is no system on the paper drug chart or the electronic prescribing system for alerting medical staff to patients being on long term steroids. ”

    Source location

    Robin Keith Brett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Joyce Beatrice TOZER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joyce Beatrice Tozer died after her condition deteriorated dramatically and she suffered cardiac arrest minutes after receiving 100ml of Omnipaque through a central line during an interventional radiology procedure to insert bilateral nephrostomies. The inquest concluded that she died from a reaction to the contrast material, but it could not determine whether this was an allergic response or toxicity. Concern was raised that doses exceeding the manufacturer’s guidance were frequently administered, sometimes through central lines, potentially exposing patients to toxicity risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Frequent administration of Omnipaque doses exceeding manufacturer guidelines

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) ████████, Consultant anaesthetist for the procedure on the 12th June 2015, gave evidence that since Mrs. Tozer’s death, he has become concerned that the dose of 100ml omnipaque recorded in the notes as being administered by the radiologist minutes before Mrs. Tozer’s sudden deterioration was well in excess of the dose recommended by the manufacturer of omnipaque (1ml/kg) especially as it was being administered through a central line rather than peripheral venous access. At this time Mrs. Tozer’s weight was 52kg. ████████ stated that he was concerned that the administration of a hypertonic solution at this dose into a central line may have affected Mrs. Tozer’s heart rhythm although there was no way he could give an opinion as to whether it was the likely cause of her deterioration and death as the presentation of toxicity cannot be distinguished from an anaphylactoid reaction. ████████ gave evidence that having made enquiries about the dose with ████████ Lead Interventional Radiologist at the Trust, he has been told that a 100ml dose is often used. I am concerned that doses of omnipaque well in excess of the manufacturer’s guidelines are frequently administered, sometimes through central lines, and this practice could be exposing interventional radiology patients to risks from toxicity. ”

    Source location

    Joyce Beatrice TOZER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reviewed intravenous contrast administration protocols against manufacturer guidance and relevant literature.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A round table meeting was held on 24th December to discuss whether an overdose was a causative factor in the death of the deceased. The roundtable review noted that the deceased had become unwell following administration of 100ml Visipaque (Omnipaque was incorrectly documented in the medical notes, the correct contrast agent is recorded on the Trust’s imaging system. 100mls is considered to be a standard dose; Visipaque is iso-osmolar and therefore theoretically less toxic than Omnipaque).”

    Source location

    Joyce-Tozer-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The administered contrast dose was within accepted ranges, was not an overdose, and toxicity was unlikely to have caused the death.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The radiographer administering the contrast acted entirely appropriately and within the limitations of the expanded practice IV protocol;”

    Source location

    Joyce-Tozer-Response
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 December 2015

    Open published response
  5. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dean Ronald Edmund Boland was found unresponsive in his cell at HMP Birmingham on 17 April 2015 and was pronounced dead shortly afterwards. Post-mortem examination confirmed multiple drugs in his system, and the inquest concluded that he died from mixed drug toxicity. The principal concerns included inadequate awareness, communication, monitoring, searching and security measures relating to drug use within the prison.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check prisoners' mouths during general medicine administration

    Wider context from the report

    “3. General medicine administration does not involve a check of the mouth so prisoners can easily conceal tablets to sell later. ”

    Source location

    Dean Ronald Edmund BOLAND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Observe and record medication swallowing, supplementing opioid-substitution administration with mouth checks and officer presence to address concealment concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Administration of IDTS medication is supplemented by a check of the mouth in line with the compact signed by IDTS recipients to comply with their treatment pathway. This is similar to supervised consumption being requested by the prescriber in the community.”

    Source location

    2015-0468-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    There is no clinical requirement to check prisoners’ mouths when administering controlled or general medication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Controlled drug administration is carried out by two nursing staff in line with medicine code policy. There is no clinical requirement to check the mouth of prisoners. However, in accordance with the published standard operating procedure, the designated practitioner observes the prisoner taking his medication and annotates the medication chart to indicate that it has been taken and swallowed.”

    Source location

    2015-0468-Response-by-NOMS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 November 2015

    Open published response
  6. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Marc GROOM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Marc Groom stood in front of a lorry after spending seven hours in the emergency unit of Whittington Hospital, where he was seen by emergency medicine and mental health staff. Concerns included delays in his mental health assessment, prescribed diazepam not being administered, inadequate planning for his possible departure, failure to seek urgent hospital security assistance, and incomplete communication with police.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to administer prescribed medication

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Diazepam was prescribed but never administered. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Marc GROOM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refresh and embed the emergency-department medication protocol defining prescriber and nursing responsibilities for checking and administering prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) We have refreshed and embedded a Whittington ED departmental protocol that clearly defines the responsibility of prescribers to inform the assigned nurse once a prescription has been issued. It also directs the nurses to regularly check patient’s drug charts to check for any medications prescribed. In circumstances such as Mr Groom’s, where the patient is not in a defined cubicle with an assigned nurse, prescribers should highlight the prescription to the nurse-in-charge of the area.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adapt regular audit to check whether prescribed medication has been administered.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) This protocol will be monitored through regular audit, which has been adapted to incorporate checking for medication administration.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen handover between emergency-department and liaison teams to explicitly check prescribed, refused, outstanding and administered medications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c) We have strengthened handover of patient information between Whittington ED and Camden and Islington Mental Health Liaison Team so that this now involves explicit checking between the teams as to whether:”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Arrange for liaison-team prescribers to receive honorary contracts enabling them to prescribe medication in the emergency department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d) We are making arrangements to reduce the risk of psychiatric or anxiolytic medication being inadvertently omitted, we are making arrangements to ensure that Camden and Islington Mental Health Liaison Team prescribers can prescribe in Whittington ED. The Camden and Islington liaison psychiatry consultant is providing the details of Mental Health Liaison Team prescribers who will then be issued with honorary Whittington contracts in order that they can then prescribe medication in Whittington ED.”

    Source location

    Matthew-Groom-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refresh and embed the emergency-department medication protocol requiring prescribers to notify nurses and nurses to check prescribed medicines.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a) We have refreshed and embedded a Whittington ED departmental protocol that clearly defines the responsibility of prescribers to inform the assigned nurse once a prescription has been issued. It also directs the nurses to regularly check patient’s drug charts for any medications prescribed. In circumstances such as Mr Groom’s, where the patient is not in a defined cubicle with an assigned nurse, prescribers should highlight the prescription to the nurse-in-charge of the area.”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adapt regular audit to check whether prescribed medication has been administered.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) This protocol will be monitored through regular audit, which has been adapted to incorporate checking for medication administration.”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Strengthen handover between emergency-department and mental-health liaison teams by explicitly checking medication status and recording findings in patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c) We have strengthened handover of patient information between Whittington ED and Camden and Islington Mental Health Liaison Team so that this now involves explicit checking between the teams as to whether:”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Arrange honorary contracts enabling mental-health liaison prescribers to prescribe medication in the emergency department.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d) We are making arrangements to reduce the risk of psychiatric or anxiolytic medication being inadvertently omitted, we are making arrangements to ensure that Camden and Islington Mental Health Liaison Team prescribers can prescribe in Whittington ED. The Camden and Islington liaison psychiatry consultant is providing the details of Mental Health Liaison Team prescribers who will then be issued with honorary Whittington contracts in order that they can then prescribe medication in Whittington ED.”

    Source location

    2015-0503-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 November 2015

    Open published response
  7. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Jean Dorothy Gillespie · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jean Dorothy Gillespie was residing in a care home for respite care when her prescribed Pyridostigmine ran out, with the last dose administered on 25 April 2015. She developed symptoms attributable to myasthenia gravis, was taken to hospital, and died on 8 May 2015. The report raised concerns that care staff did not know about her condition or the urgency of replacing the medication, and that care home records did not document the condition, its symptoms, or the medication's purpose.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of care home records to document conditions, symptoms and medication purposes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard that a senior member of the care staff with responsibility for administering medication to residents and for re-ordering supplies of medication did not know that the deceased suffered from myasthenia gravis, nor was this a condition she had heard of before. 2. When supplies of the necessary medication were about to expire she did seek to re-order supplies. When they did not materialise she did not appreciate the urgency the situation demanded until symptoms became evident. 3. I am concerned that irrespective of whether this is a care home rather than a nursing home that staff with responsibility for administering and / or re-ordering supplies of medication for potentially life threatening conditions are aware of the conditions and what the medication is prescribed for so that staff can then react accordingly. 4. Further, consideration of the care home records made no reference to the name of the condition, the symptoms that can materialise, nor what the prescribed medication was for. A member of staff previously unfamiliar with this patient who may have responsibility for administering her medication would not have been able to familiarise themselves with the necessary knowledge from a perusal of the care home records and I am concerned there is a risk of future deaths were this situation to be replicated. ”

    Source location

    Jean Dorothy Gillespie · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Catherine Bloom, who had dementia and reduced oral intake, was admitted with probable left-leg ischaemia and died in hospital on 4 February 2014. Concerns included failures to record her weight, consult haematology, obtain baseline and follow-up blood tests, and make the heparin administration guidance sufficiently visible. There was also no discussion with her next of kin before a DNAR order was placed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient visibility of the heparin administration poster’s direction to seek haematology advice for underweight patients

    Wider context from the report

    “The poster for the administration of heparin include a direction that: An obese/underweight patient who weigh over 131 kilograms and under 40 kilograms should be treated on an individual basis. Please seek haematology advice. This direction is written in very small writing at the bottom of the heparin administration poster. It appears to have been missed by 2 doctors involved in the prescribing of heparin to Mrs Bloom. There is concern that this may have been missed as it was not sufficiently visible on the poster. ”

    Source location

    Mary Catherine Bloom · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen Chatterley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Chatterley died at Royal Bolton Hospital on 24 December 2014 after a fall causing a right hip fracture, subsequent dislocations and multiple surgical procedures. The report raised concerns that a possible excess dose of lorazepam was not investigated and that medication stock in patient drawers and ward cupboards was not recorded or controlled, although the Inquest accepted that any excess dose did not contribute to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuous stock records and verification for non-controlled ward medications

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that i. There was no investigation by the hospital in relation to the concerns expressed by the family in relation to the administration of an excess dose of Lorazepam. ii. There was no record of the stock of medication in relation to non-controlled drugs in the medication drawer allocated to a patient nor in and the medication cupboard on the ward. Accordingly medication could be removed from the medication cupboard on the ward and used either for an elicit purpose or excess dosage without any knowledge or record with reference to stock control. Evidence was given at the Inquest that the pharmacist checked medications on the ward on a daily basis but there was no check or record of the number of medications or the number of tablets in the allocated medication drawers or the cupboard on ward, particularly between the daily inspections by the pharmacist. ”

    Source location

    Maureen Chatterley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit all clinical areas quarterly against safe and secure medicines-handling standards and discuss results with ward managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All clinical areas are audited quarterly, by pharmacy staff, against these standards and the results are discussed with the ward managers. In addition to this the Medicines Safety Group has recently introduced additional measures to audit the security of medicines by introducing the NHS Protect’s Medicines Security Ward/Department checklist. These are completed by ward staff and collated for each division and the results and action plans discussed at the Medicines Safety Group. Copies of both audit forms have been included for information.”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use the NHS Protect Medicines Security Ward/Department checklist to audit medicines security, collate divisional results and agree action plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All clinical areas are audited quarterly, by pharmacy staff, against these standards and the results are discussed with the ward managers. In addition to this the Medicines Safety Group has recently introduced additional measures to audit the security of medicines by introducing the NHS Protect’s Medicines Security Ward/Department checklist. These are completed by ward staff and collated for each division and the results and action plans discussed at the Medicines Safety Group. Copies of both audit forms have been included for information.”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate one-stop dispensing to use patients’ own medicines, reduce stock-medicine use and record dispensing and stock-review information electronically.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To facilitate the flow of patients through the organisation, Bolton NHS Foundation Trust has in place a one stop dispensing process. This not only encourages the use of patients own drugs during admission but also encourages the dispensing of medicines to patients for individual use, therefore reducing the use of stock medicines. The process in pharmacy provides a permanent record in the patient’s shared electronic record of the date of dispensing, the quantity supplied and a date to review the stock levels and need for re-supply before the supply is exhausted.”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a new Wardex recording pharmacists’ clinical reviews and medicine supply.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Target Date | To be actioned by Introduce new Wardex, which includes a section for pharmacists to record reviews of the wardex. This includes the clinical review and supply of medicines | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group Develop and implement a local endorsement policy by pharmacy staff of the Wardex, to include supply and quantity details. | Feb 2016 | Medicines Safety Group Safe and Secure Handling of Medicines Audits (Duthie) to be presented to Medicines Safety Group for discussion and agreement of action plans. | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement a pharmacy policy endorsing Wardex entries, including medicine supply and quantity details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Target Date | To be actioned by Introduce new Wardex, which includes a section for pharmacists to record reviews of the wardex. This includes the clinical review and supply of medicines | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group Develop and implement a local endorsement policy by pharmacy staff of the Wardex, to include supply and quantity details. | Feb 2016 | Medicines Safety Group Safe and Secure Handling of Medicines Audits (Duthie) to be presented to Medicines Safety Group for discussion and agreement of action plans. | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present Safe and Secure Handling of Medicines audit results to the Medicines Safety Group for discussion and agreement of action plans.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Target Date | To be actioned by Introduce new Wardex, which includes a section for pharmacists to record reviews of the wardex. This includes the clinical review and supply of medicines | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group Develop and implement a local endorsement policy by pharmacy staff of the Wardex, to include supply and quantity details. | Feb 2016 | Medicines Safety Group Safe and Secure Handling of Medicines Audits (Duthie) to be presented to Medicines Safety Group for discussion and agreement of action plans. | Dec 2015 | Medicines Safety Group”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing systems were considered sufficient to ensure ward medicines are stored securely and their stock can be verified.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I am confident that the Trust has the necessary systems in place to ensure that medication which is kept on wards is stored safely and securely and that the Trust is able to verify at any point in time the medication stored in both stock cupboards and patient’s medication drawers.”

    Source location

    2015-0404-Response-by-Bolton-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 October 2015

    Open published response
  10. Powys, Bridgend and Glamorgan Valleys

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs. Mary Patricia James · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs. Mary Patricia James had a prosthetic heart valve requiring anticoagulation, but INR monitoring was inadequate and there was uncertainty about whether she was taking Warfarin. Concerns included failures in communication between the INR Unit, care home and GP, and that she was not admitted to hospital on 15 May 2015 despite concern about a possible ischaemic leg. The inquest concluded: “Ischaemic leg contributed to by inadequate Warfarin monitoring and dosing”.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of certainty whether Warfarin was being taken

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Lack of certainty whether Warfarin was being taken by the patient; ”

    Source location

    Mrs. Mary Patricia James · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026