Recurring concern

Failure to use the appropriate emergency contact route

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First reported 20 Aug 2015•Latest report 6 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures to select or initiate the required emergency contact route or number for a safety-critical report, including use of 101 instead of 999 and use of 111 instead of 999 when emergency assistance is required.

Not included

  • Excludes delays or failures in call handling, dispatch, ambulance attendance, police attendance or hospital handover after the appropriate emergency contact has been initiated.
  • Excludes general uncertainty about whether emergency assistance is clinically required where the unsafe condition is the decision threshold rather than use of the wrong contact route.
  • Excludes ordinary non-emergency use of 101, 111 or other services where no safety-critical emergency report should have been made.
  • Excludes generic staff training, communication or escalation deficiencies unless they directly cause selection of the wrong emergency contact route.
Reports
4

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
5

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2015–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
7

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Association of Ambulance Chief Executives1
Care Quality Commission1
Castlehill Specialist Care Centre1
Department of Health and Social Care1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Electricity Networks Association1
gtd healthcare1
Health and Safety Executive1
Hurst Hall1
NHS England1
Ofgem1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mansoor Zaman, a 27-year-old man with a history of suicidality, substance misuse and EUPD, absconded from a mental health ward on 8 December 2024 after displaying suicidal intent and erratic and aggressive behaviour. His body was recovered on 29 December 2024. The substantive concerns included failures to use available mental health authorisations, reassess risk and observation levels, adequately document care, and promptly report him missing to police; the inquest jury identified some of these failures as factors that probably or possibly contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use the required emergency 999 number for the report

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The use of the police 101 number as opposed to the required emergency 999 number to make the report. ”

    Source location

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refine the Trust AWOL policy to clarify when emergency 999 police escalation is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “29. You heard at the inquest that the Trust’s AWOL policy has been refined and makes it clear when 999 should be called. Additionally, within the next two months, the ward staff will undergo refresher training on both policies and understand how they apply together in practice, so that AWOL procedures are followed consistently and safely.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver refresher training to ward staff on applying the Trust and Pan-London AWOL policies together in practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “29. You heard at the inquest that the Trust’s AWOL policy has been refined and makes it clear when 999 should be called. Additionally, within the next two months, the ward staff will undergo refresher training on both policies and understand how they apply together in practice, so that AWOL procedures are followed consistently and safely.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and implement mandatory AWOL policy training for all clinical staff, including competency assessment against both applicable AWOL policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “30. The senior clinical team will also develop and implement mandatory AWOL policy training for all clinical staff, including a competency assessment covering both the Trust AWOL Policy and the Pan-London Joint AWOL Policy.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Berkshire

    AI-generated summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Levi Louis Alleyne, a grab lorry delivery driver, died by electrocution at a building site after raising his lorry’s crane arm beneath overhead power lines. CPR was delayed because it was unclear whether the electricity remained live, and the ambulance control operator had no procedure or readily accessible emergency contact information for the relevant electricity network operator. The report identifies risks of delayed life-saving treatment or people approaching live electrical hazards and notes that similar mitigating procedures may not be adopted across England and Wales.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability and poor accessibility of correct DNO emergency numbers to ambulance control centre operators

    Wider context from the report

    “According to the evidence heard at the inquest: 1. At the time of the incident, the SCAS operator did not have any instruction in their Standard Operating Procedure to contact the local [DNO] to ensure that the electricity was cut off. There is no such instruction in the national Standard Operating Procedure. 2. The SCAS operator did identify and try to contact the DNO after the 999 call had ended. However, as they did not contact the correct emergency number provided by SSEN, they were kept on hold for several minutes. The emergency numbers are not incorporated into the software used by the ambulance control centre (CAD) and are not widely known. 3. There is considerable potential for confusion for ambulance control centres as there is not one national DNO emergency number to contact. There are 14 licensed DNOs and 12 ambulance service trusts in England and Wales with different boundaries. Ambulance control centres frequently pick up calls from other ambulance trust areas at times of high demand. The ambulance control centre must find the relevant DNO to contact and the relevant number for that DNO. 4. There was a delay in Mr Alleyne receiving CPR due to concerns about electricity still being live. There are thousands of incidents every day involving OHPLs. There is a risk that future deaths may occur due to confusion regarding electrical hazards. 5. The potential for future deaths is two-fold: ▪ unnecessary delay to life-saving treatment being given due to the fear (well-founded or otherwise) that OHPLs are still live, ▪ or potentially, by-standers or emergency services putting their lives at risk by approaching patients near electrical hazards where OHPLs remain live. ”

    Source location

    Levi Louis Alleyne · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share updated ambulance-service SOPs, including electricity-network maps and distribution-network-operator contact details, across NHS ambulance services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that actions taken by South Central Ambulance Service NHS Trust, to update their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) following the inquest, have been shared across all NHS ambulance services, including a map and the appropriate contact details for each of the electricity Distribution Network Operators. In addition, to reinforce the required steps, the matter is being discussed with all Heads of Emergency Operations Centres at their meeting in January 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from AACE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The membership organisation can provide guidance and collaboration but cannot mandate NHS ambulance services to implement safety action.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please note, AACE is a membership organisation, subscribed to by all UK NHS ambulance services, and as such can offer guidance, encourage collaboration across services, and represent sector views, but cannot mandate action.”

    Source location

    Response from AACE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Preparing or overseeing local or national standard operating procedures and nationally overseeing 111 or 999 operations fall outside NHS Pathways’ remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS Pathways remit does not extend to preparing or overseeing local or national standard operating procedures or providing national oversight of 111 or 999 operations. Standard operating procedures relating to a range of operational requirements are locally set by 111 and 999 providers. NHS Pathways is a clinical decision support system and more operationally focused content such as how to contact a utility provider sits outside the remit of the NHS Pathways system.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Digital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Distribution and transmission network operators have suitable and effective arrangements with local emergency services for incidents involving electricity-network equipment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have contacted the Energy Networks Association (ENA), who have advised that DNOs and Transmission Network Operators (TNO) have suitable and effective arrangements in place with their local emergency services providers. This includes ensuring that emergency services have suitable emergency contact details for their DNO and that they know how to respond to an incident involving equipment on the electricity network. In future, the ENA has requested that DNOs and TNOs check their arrangements with the emergency services on an annual basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Health and Safety Executive
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 November 2022

    Open published response
  3. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Eric Harold Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Eric Harold Bird, a 91-year-old man with dementia and assessed as being at high risk of falls, suffered seven falls during a four-week period in a specialist care centre. After a fall on 21/11/20, he sustained a subdural haematoma and died in hospital on 30/11/20. The principal concerns included failures to follow procedures after head injuries, delays in contacting emergency services and gaining ambulance access, and inadequate updating and review of his falls risk documentation and care plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the policy requiring 999 calls after falls involving head injury

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The inquest heard that Castlehill polices had not been followed after each fall whereby Mr Bird hit his head. Mr Bird was taking apixaban which meant he was at a higher risk of bleeding. Evidence was heard that policy required 999 to be called. This was not done on 1/11/20 nor on 14/11/20. ”

    Source location

    Eric Harold Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow the policy requiring 999 calls after falls involving head injury

    Wider context from the report

    “3. On 21/11/20 the nurse on duty called 111 instead of following policy to call 999; ”

    Source location

    Eric Harold Bird · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue making 111/999 calls after falls and call 999 whenever a resident prescribed Apixaban falls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will continue to make 111/999 calls following any fall and will call 999 whenever a resident falls who is prescribed Apixaban. This will continue despite some concern from the Local Authority that we are availing of these services too often.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Castlehill-Specialist-Care-Centre-Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct management reviews and assess available evidence about the provider’s falls-management concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The matters of concern which arose from the preventing future deaths report have prompted the CQC to take action. In direct response, we held a management review meeting on 17 February 2021. Following the management review meeting, we reviewed the evidence we held about Castlehill Specialist Care Centre, the information held following the specific incident review related to Mr Bird’s death and information following the inspection completed in January 2021.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 2 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC will not progress a criminal investigation because the evidence does not meet the required threshold of proving avoidability beyond reasonable doubt.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• As a result of these findings, CQC held a management review meeting on 18 March 2021 to discuss the findings under our specific incident guidance. In order to open a formal criminal investigation, we have to be able to evidence a Registered Person (either a Registered Provider or Registered Manager) failed to provide safe care and treatment to Mr Bird in relation to this incident and can prove beyond reasonable doubt this incident was avoidable. We did not feel that this threshold was met and therefore will not progress the case.”

    Source location

    2021-0122-Response-from-Care-Quality-Commission-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 May 2021

    Open published response
  4. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Elsie Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elsie Clarke was a resident at Hurst Hall care centre and developed significant pneumonia on 10 February 2015, dying later that day. The report identified concerns about missed opportunities to summon medical help, inadequate staff training and observations, failures in record-keeping and handover, and deficiencies in out-of-hours medical processes and death reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of staff training in appropriate use of 999 or 111

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There was an apparent lack of training for the staff at Hurst Hall in the appropriate use of calling either 999 or 111. ”

    Source location

    Elsie Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide refresher training on the appropriate use of 999 and 111.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action taken The senior staff at Hurst Hall had previously attended first aid training which did cover appropriate use of 999 but they have also attended further refresher training on 21/7/15 which clearly explained the actions that need to be taken and the circumstances when these are required.”

    Source location

    Elsie-ClarkeR
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 August 2015

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026