Recurring concern

Unreliable assessment and management of extremist risk in offenders

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First reported 3 Nov 2021•Latest report 20 May 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the dedicated assessment and management of extremist risk in offenders, including excessive reliance on apparent compliance, failure to consider the full intelligence picture, discounting extremist risk because of mental-health diagnoses or symptoms, inadequate professional curiosity, and failure to translate identified extremist risk into proportionate supervision or protective action.

Not included

Excludes general offender management, probation supervision or public-protection failures where extremist risk is not a material part of the asserted concern.
Excludes generic mental-health assessment or treatment deficiencies unless they directly cause extremist risk to be underestimated or inadequately managed.
Excludes failures in information sharing, intelligence systems or multi-agency schemes when they are not specifically connected to assessment or management of extremist risk in offenders.
Excludes failures occurring after extremist risk has been reliably assessed and an appropriate management plan is in place, unless the management process itself remains deficient.

Reports: 2
Individual concerns: 4
Date range: 2021–2024
Stated actions: 26

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Home Office2

Ministry of Justice2

Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust1

College of Policing1

Department for Education1

Learning Together CIC1

Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1

NHS England1

Office for Students1

Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust1

Staffordshire Police1

Thames Valley Police1

The Security Service1

University of Cambridge1

West Midlands Police1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

20 May2024
Central Criminal Court
Concerns raised1
1. Failure to avoid discounting extremist risk because of personality disorder and PTSD symptoms
This report raised 5 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 21
1. Action
  Continue implementing the One Team model, including One Assessment and place-based multidisciplinary post-assessment meetings.
  Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated in progress
2. Action
  Use the new streamlined risk assessment form, including enhanced consideration of risk to others.
  Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completed
3. Action
  Deliver the revised risk-training programme incorporating response learning and real clinical case studies.
  Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated in progress
1. Action
  Establish and operate a Harm to Others multidisciplinary risk panel providing specialist input to care planning.
  Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated planned
2. Action
  Expand the Nurse Consultant Network’s clinical support and continue twice-yearly harm-to-others learning sessions for staff and Probation colleagues.
  Stated by Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation TrustStated completed
3. Action
  Issue and require use of the Pathfinder Guidance Framework and Controls and Interventions Matrix for active terrorist-risk cases, supported by trained assessors.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated completed
4. Action
  Issue guidance and training to improve healthcare engagement and practitioner understanding of mental-health needs in Pathfinder risk management.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated completed
5. Action
  Plan further Pathfinder reforms to review referral thresholds, align terrorist-risk understanding and establish a National Pathfinder process with senior oversight.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated planned
6. Action
  Roll out the independently endorsed Prevent assessment framework nationally to improve referral triage and cumulative-risk assessment.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated in progress
7. Action
  Train CTCOs to complete the Prevent assessment framework, using assessed readiness checks and further training where needed.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated planned
8. Action
  Monitor and quality-assure Prevent assessment framework use through CT-ARC, CTPHQ and Home Office systems, including longer-term evaluation.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated in progress
9. Action
  Update Prevent and Channel guidance to strengthen risk understanding, training, assessment and progression of referrals meeting the Prevent threshold.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated completed
10. Action
  Introduce refreshed ideology categories with supporting case-officer training and guidance, and review categories annually while monitoring pathway decision-making.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated in progress
11. Action
  Reinforce to Channel Chairs that mental-health needs do not replace Prevent support and that the Clinical Consultancy Service is available.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated completed
12. Action
  Continue reviewing Prevent policy to identify improvements in managing mental-health and neurodiversity issues.
  Stated by Home OfficeStated in progress
13. Action
  Operate the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group to review below-threshold cases, support risk decisions and escalate cases when necessary.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated completed
14. Action
  Strengthen CTPSE FIMU supervisory checking by adding qualitative assessment of intelligence completeness and decision quality, with learning fed back to staff and the national capability board.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated in progress
15. Action
  Implement NCIA access and associated Developed Vetting for relevant CTPSE Prevent staff.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated in progress
16. Action
  Require all CTP Prevent staff to complete the CTPHQ-accredited Prevent training pathway, including its specified online and face-to-face modules.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated completed
17. Action
  Complete delivery of the CTPHQ Interventions Welfare Training to CTPSE Prevent and Nominal Management staff during 2024.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated in progress
18. Action
  Require senior-officer authorisation before closing repeat Prevent referrals.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceStated completed
Respondent positions 2
1. Position
  CTPHQ is responsible for operational Prevent risk management and monitoring, including the operational issues identified in the Report.
  Stated by Home OfficeRedirects responsibility
1. Position
  All FIMU assessments cannot be reviewed because of assessment volumes, so a percentage-based dip-checking regime is used.
  Stated by Counter Terrorism Policing South-East and Thames Valley PoliceUnable to act
AI-generated summary

James Furlong and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

James Furlong, Joseph Ritchie-Bennett and David Wails were murdered by Khairi Saadallah in a premeditated attack in Forbury Gardens, Reading, on 20 June 2020. The principal concerns were failures by multiple bodies to assess and share intelligence about Saadallah’s risks, provide an adequate integrated response, and provide adequate mental healthcare in the community and prison; the report states these failures probably or possibly contributed to the three deaths.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to avoid discounting extremist risk because of personality disorder and PTSD symptoms
Wider context from the report
“The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to: a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading; b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder); c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison. The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD. The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police) The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust) ”
Source location
James Furlong and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 4 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Continue implementing the One Team model, including One Assessment and place-based multidisciplinary post-assessment meetings.

Verbatim wording from the response
“BHFT have continued the development of the One Team model as described in February and helpfully summarised in the Regulation 28 report. This is an ongoing and gradual roll out of associated changes to service delivery. There are monthly team updates and a number of engagement events that have taken place with BHFT staff, external stakeholders (such as local authorities in Berkshire, Primary Care Networks,”

Source location
Response from Berkshire Healthcare
Page 1 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Use the new streamlined risk assessment form, including enhanced consideration of risk to others.

Verbatim wording from the response
“There will be a streamlined, holistic, personalised care and support plan, co-produced between the service user and the named key worker and regularly reviewed. A new risk form went live on 15 June 2024, and this is a more streamlined record of risk assessment that is easier to navigate for all clinicians involved.”

Source location
Response from Berkshire Healthcare
Page 2 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Deliver the revised risk-training programme incorporating response learning and real clinical case studies.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The MDT described above will agree a clear formulation which will help inform the care plan, as well as identify the best person to lead on the plan of care using the named key worker approach. Where mental health services are not indicated, a clear rationale will be communicated to referrers and any other relevant parties. Risk training has been reviewed and a new programme of risk training has started which will encapsulate elements discussed within this response and case studies based on real clinical cases will help to inform this training.”

Source location
Response from Berkshire Healthcare
Page 3 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Establish and operate a Harm to Others multidisciplinary risk panel providing specialist input to care planning.

Verbatim wording from the response
“An escalation Standard Operating Procedure was produced for the Judge Coroner at the Inquests. Since the Inquests, escalation processes have been further aligned with the new One Team model. The MDT described above will enable shared decision making and where agreement cannot be reached this will be escalated to Heads of Service. An enhanced MDT can be arranged to support this process. On the rare occasion that the Head of Service decision and enhanced MDT is challenged, this will be escalated to the Clinical Director who will make the final decision regarding the plan. In addition to the Positive Risk Panel referred to in the inquest proceedings, an additional ‘Harm to Others’ MDT risk panel is being established. This is in recognition of the increasing awareness of vulnerable individuals who may not fit neatly into a forensic pathway but carry a level of risk.”

Source location
Response from Berkshire Healthcare
Page 3 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Expand the Nurse Consultant Network’s clinical support and continue twice-yearly harm-to-others learning sessions for staff and Probation colleagues.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Our Nurse Consultant Network has expanded, and this has allowed for an enhanced focus on supporting our teams to improve clinical effectiveness across our inpatient and community services. The evidence presented at the Inquests described a pilot project between Probation and BHFT using Nurse Consultants as a conduit to offer a layer of decision-making where conflict arises. This project has now been evaluated. Recommendations have been made to Probation and BHFT are building upon the learning that has come from the Pilot. The Nurse Consultants will continue to offer this additional support to Probation colleagues, and the learning sessions delivered by the Nurse Consultants to Probation will continue twice yearly. Internally, BHFT sessions have been reviewed to reflect the findings of the project alongside the learning from these Inquests.”

Source location
Response from Berkshire Healthcare
Page 4 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Issue and require use of the Pathfinder Guidance Framework and Controls and Interventions Matrix for active terrorist-risk cases, supported by trained assessors.

Verbatim wording from the response
“33. In October 2022, the Pathfinder Guidance Framework (PGF) Operational Delivery Guidance was issued. The PGF assesses susceptibility to extremism and what is required by way of interventions to address this. It has been designed to help document, structure and support decision making and the case management of terrorist risk offenders. It should be completed alongside the Controls and Interventions Matrix (CIM). It should be used by CT Specialists to guide consideration of the extremism concerns and to help direct further actions and interventions. It was issued to trained assessors, supervisors and staff involved in the management of terrorist risk cases across HMPPS. The PGF is an assessment tool which must be completed for all terrorist risk offenders who have been made an active case of concern at Pathfinder. It must be completed within 8 weeks of the offender being made ‘active’.”

Source location
Response from Ministry of Justice
Page 9 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Issue guidance and training to improve healthcare engagement and practitioner understanding of mental-health needs in Pathfinder risk management.

Verbatim wording from the response
“36. In June 2022, HMPPS and NHS England jointly issued guidance for healthcare staff entitled “Increasing the Engagement of Prison Integrated Healthcare Teams in Pathfinder”. This followed a JEXU Review of mental health provision after the attacks in Forbury Gardens. The review identified the need to improve the engagement of healthcare teams in Pathfinder. The aim of this guidance has been to encourage healthcare attendance at case management meetings in custody, and in turn to help ensure mental health information is being used to inform the assessment and management of terrorist risk. Follow-up surveys on the implementation of this guidance show an increase of 21 percentage points in healthcare’s attendance at Pathfinder meetings from 59% in the first half of 2022 to 80% in the second half of 2022. The surveys were not mandatory but provide an indicative representation.”

Source location
Response from Ministry of Justice
Page 10 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Plan further Pathfinder reforms to review referral thresholds, align terrorist-risk understanding and establish a National Pathfinder process with senior oversight.

Verbatim wording from the response
“41. As part of ongoing continuous improvement activities, HMPPS and partners are planning to make further improvements to Pathfinder. These reforms will build on the established foundations of multi-agency, CT-specialist case management processes already operating in the prison and probation sector, developing these further to improve our ability to make agile, informed decisions around CT case management, by creating timely, secure access to the right information and intelligence, at the right time, by the right people.”

Source location
Response from Ministry of Justice
Page 11 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Roll out the independently endorsed Prevent assessment framework nationally to improve referral triage and cumulative-risk assessment.

Verbatim wording from the response
“As I understand Chief Constable ████████ will also be addressing in Thames Valley Police’s response to you from the operational perspective, the Home Office and CTPHQ have also worked with the national CT Assessment and Rehabilitation Centre (CT-ARC)⁴ to develop a new Prevent assessment framework (PAF). I understand that this replaces the Vulnerability assessment framework and is designed to ensure that the triaging of referrals into Prevent is consistent, rigorous, and proportionate. I am told the PAF, which has been independently endorsed, will ensure that thresholds and decision-making are implemented consistently across all ideological threats by creating a framework that is easily understood, easily completed, and supports CTCOs in their decision making.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 3 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Train CTCOs to complete the Prevent assessment framework, using assessed readiness checks and further training where needed.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The PAF is being rolled out in Autumn of 2024 to all regions. Prior to using it, CTCOs must attend an assessed training day to become familiar with the PAF, how to complete it, how it fits into current processes, and to practise completing it. During the training day there are three assessment points where attendees will be assessed as either ‘Ready’ or ‘Not Yet Ready’ to complete a PAF for live cases. If awarded ‘Not Ready’, attendees will be provided a further opportunity to complete the task training.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 3 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Monitor and quality-assure Prevent assessment framework use through CT-ARC, CTPHQ and Home Office systems, including longer-term evaluation.

Verbatim wording from the response
“I understand that the PAF has been piloted since November 2023 in the South-West and Eastern regions. During this pilot stage, as well as receiving feedback on the PAF, I am told that CT-ARC have been quality assuring the PAF process monthly to assess the quality of use and completion by looking at how integrity to the guidance is upheld. We will continue to monitor the PAF with CT-ARC and CTPHQ to ensure it is robust, efficient, evidence-informed, operationally viable and well-integrated into the current system. Details of how longer-term quality assurance will be conducted will be finalised in August ahead of national PAF rollout later in autumn. However, this will include continuous and regular review of PAF use, as well as a longer-term evaluation.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 3 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Update Prevent and Channel guidance to strengthen risk understanding, training, assessment and progression of referrals meeting the Prevent threshold.

Verbatim wording from the response
“In 2023 the Home Office updated the Prevent duty guidance (England and Wales)⁵ and the Channel duty guidance⁶. My understanding is that this is to better enable those sectors subject to the Prevent duty (such as local authorities, police, health, education, and prisons and probation) as well as those working on Channel panels, to be effective at understanding and mitigating terrorism risk, and to have structures in place that identify and support people vulnerable to radicalisation. The new guidance provides clearer advice on how to understand and manage risk, including by ensuring comprehensive training and risk assessments take place. It also introduces new tools for frontline practitioners to ensure that those meeting the Prevent threshold are progressed for Prevent specific support, with a focus on ideology as a determinant of Prevent thresholds.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 4 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Introduce refreshed ideology categories with supporting case-officer training and guidance, and review categories annually while monitoring pathway decision-making.

Verbatim wording from the response
“We are using Prevent referral data (from the new case management system) and training data to identify where the quality of referrals is lower, or not in line with the risk in that area or sector. This has enabled us to better target Prevent outreach and training to improve the quality of referrals. Alongside this, a refreshed list of ideology categories has also been created for use in the new case management system, which will be accompanied by updated training and guidance for case officers to ensure accurate recording of data and evidence about ideology. We will review the ideology categories on an annual basis to ensure they are reflective of the wider ideological picture and routinely monitor Prevent data, carrying out dip sampling to provide assurance that there are no disparities in decision-making throughout the Prevent pathway.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 4 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Reinforce to Channel Chairs that mental-health needs do not replace Prevent support and that the Clinical Consultancy Service is available.

Verbatim wording from the response
“To further this point, we have written to all Channel Chairs to raise awareness of the concern in the report that KS’s risk assessment was incorrectly focused on his mental health difficulties, and to reinforce that the purpose of Channel is both to safeguard individuals and to manage the potential terrorist risk they may pose. Therefore, the existence of or need for wraparound mental health support for an individual does not negate the need for the person to receive Prevent support. We also reminded Channel Chairs that the CCS is available to provide Prevent officers with advice, guidance and options to help manage the individuals in their casework with mental health needs.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 5 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Continue reviewing Prevent policy to identify improvements in managing mental-health and neurodiversity issues.

Verbatim wording from the response
“We keep our operational policy approach to Prevent under constant review, and we will continue to look at mental health issues and neurodiversity as part of this, to identify areas we can strengthen.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 5 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Operate the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group to review below-threshold cases, support risk decisions and escalate cases when necessary.

Verbatim wording from the response
“CTPSE have also piloted the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group, which is now led by a Detective Inspector. The point of it is to consider cases such as KS that fall below the threshold for coverage or intervention by MI5, to make sure they are being addressed correctly, to ensure that they sit in the right space for intervention, the cases are escalated quickly where necessary, and to provide staff with a further support in their risk assessment decision making. This approach is being rolled out in other parts of the country but it is most developed in the South East as a direct result of the Forbury Gardens attack.”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Strengthen CTPSE FIMU supervisory checking by adding qualitative assessment of intelligence completeness and decision quality, with learning fed back to staff and the national capability board.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Across CTP, supervisory reviews are now carried out on a set percentage of FIMU assessments. It is not possible to review all assessments due to the volume, so a ‘dip checking’”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Implement NCIA access and associated Developed Vetting for relevant CTPSE Prevent staff.

Verbatim wording from the response
“I acknowledge the concerns you set out regarding Prevent at §§19-21 of your regulation 28 report. The changes made or planned to the FIMU described above clearly interlock with these concerns: for example, ensuring that there is an assessment of the totality of the available evidence of sufficient quality, made available by the FIMU to Prevent staff to ensure that they can make a properly considered assessment of risk. This should ensure that Prevent staff, in future, would be aware of an individual’s links to proscribed organisations or other terrorist offenders, where this information is known by CTPSE. To support this, CTPSE has begun to implement access to NCIA (and the associated requirement for Developed Vetting) for some Prevent staff. The Prevent Gateway Team within CTPSE has also, since 2019, been co-located with the FIMU.”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 7 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Require all CTP Prevent staff to complete the CTPHQ-accredited Prevent training pathway, including its specified online and face-to-face modules.

Verbatim wording from the response
“To address the weaknesses in training in Prevent, it is now a requirement that all CTP Prevent staff undergo a CTPHQ-accredited training pathway. This training aims to build on existing policing expertise, whilst providing additional knowledge, skills, and awareness for the CTP context. The National Interventions Foundation Programme (NIFP) has four online modules, one day face-to-face on the assessment framework and one day face-to-face on welfare/disguised compliance. An interactive exercise will be included in the NIFP but is still under development at the time of writing. While the NIFP and its training courses are signed off/accredited by CTPHQ, there is no official external accreditation for the content of those courses.”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 7 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Complete delivery of the CTPHQ Interventions Welfare Training to CTPSE Prevent and Nominal Management staff during 2024.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The requirement to embed professional curiosity more consistently when dealing with potential terrorists is a theme within both Intelligence and Prevent. This is particularly relevant to the phenomenon that is often called ‘Disguised Compliance’ but is increasingly being referred to by CTP as ‘Sincerity of Change’. Training in this area forms part of the initial Prevent ‘Conversations’ module, which is delivered for Prevent staff by CTPHQ (see above). Additionally, CTPHQ ODU (Operational Development Unit) have recently released a new face-to-face training package entitled ‘Interventions Welfare Training’, which specifically focuses on Sincerity of Change.”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 9 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Require senior-officer authorisation before closing repeat Prevent referrals.

Verbatim wording from the response
“You have raised a concern about how CTPSE handles repeat Prevent referrals in light of the fact that KS was referred to Prevent on four separate occasions between 2017 and 2019. CTP Prevent policy has now been amended to provide additional scrutiny to the cumulative impact of repeat referrals related to the same subject, even if the subject had been closed from Prevent previously at an early juncture without management or interventions. In such cases, Counter Terrorism Case Officers (CTCOs) and their supervisors are now required to obtain the authorisation from a senior officer (Inspector or above) before closing a ‘repeat referral’ from the case management system. This change is intended to bring added assurance that, in cases where CTP has been notified of a radicalisation risk more than once, greater scrutiny is afforded to the case circumstances and decision making within it.”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 9 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
CTPHQ is responsible for operational Prevent risk management and monitoring, including the operational issues identified in the Report.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The Home Office's Prevent directorate provides the strategic direction for Prevent, including Prevent relevant training to non-police Prevent statutory partners within local authorities. The police are responsible for managing the terrorism risk of individuals throughout all stages of the Prevent pathway, as well as the policy, assessment tools, and training of police officers and staff conducting these assessments. As all of KS’s referrals were closed at the initial assessment stage by Counter Terrorism Policing Prevent officers, the Home Office Channel programme did not manage the case. Therefore, effective monitoring of the operational Prevent issues raised in the Report is best addressed by CTPHQ.”

Source location
Response from the Home Office
Page 2 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
All FIMU assessments cannot be reviewed because of assessment volumes, so a percentage-based dip-checking regime is used.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Across CTP, supervisory reviews are now carried out on a set percentage of FIMU assessments. It is not possible to review all assessments due to the volume, so a ‘dip checking’”

Source location
Response from Thames Valley Police
Page 5 · response
Published 23 May 2024
Open published response
3 Nov2021
London City
Concerns raised3
1. Insufficient consideration of extremist offenders’ dishonest self-presentation
2. Lack of precautionary search capability for terrorist offenders on licence
3. Excessive reliance on compliance in management of extremist offenders
This report raised 21 other concerns. They are not shown here because they do not form part of this recurring concern.
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 5
1. Action
  Continue working with partners and stakeholders to update offender-management guidance and products to reflect changes resulting from the report.
  Stated by College of PolicingStated in progress
2. Action
  Deliver training and bespoke guidance promoting professional curiosity and balanced assessment of extremist offenders.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated completed
3. Action
  Provide reduced NSD caseloads and senior practitioner oversight through countersigning and regular supervision.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated completed
1. Action
  Legislate for a personal-search power applicable to terrorist offenders whose licence conditions require such searches.
  Stated by Home Office and The Security ServiceStated in progress
2. Action
  Create a licence condition requiring terrorist offenders to submit to personal searches.
  Stated by Ministry of JusticeStated planned
Respondent positions 1
1. Position
  Other bodies are taking forward substantive work on the concerns, so further College guidance or training would risk duplicating their work.
  Stated by College of PolicingRedirects responsibility
AI-generated summary

Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

On 29 November 2019, Usman Khan carried out a terrorist attack at Fishmongers’ Hall, fatally stabbing Saskia Jones and Jack Merritt before being fatally shot by firearms officers on London Bridge. The report raised concerns about risk assessment and communication for events involving high-risk offenders, and about the assessment, information-sharing, supervision and management of terrorist offenders released into the community.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Insufficient consideration of extremist offenders’ dishonest self-presentation
Wider context from the report
“The facts of this case give rise to concern that probation officers may give insufficient regard to instances of dishonesty in self-presentation by extremist offenders. ”
Source location
Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 14 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of precautionary search capability for terrorist offenders on licence
Wider context from the report
“The facts of this case gave cause for concern that those involved in managing terrorist offenders on licence may lack a valuable means of addressing risks they pose, namely an ability to carry out a search on a precautionary basis. ”
Source location
Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 14 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Excessive reliance on compliance in management of extremist offenders
Wider context from the report
“Based on the facts of this case, there is cause for concern that probation officers may attach excessive weight in their management of extremist offenders to “compliance” (i.e. absence of evidence of breach of licence conditions and police behaviour). ”
Source location
Saskia Jones and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
Page 27 · concerns
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Continue working with partners and stakeholders to update offender-management guidance and products to reflect changes resulting from the report.

Verbatim wording from the response
“The ‘offender management’ guidance and products have been developed over a number of years and we will continue to work with partners and stakeholders to ensure they are updated to”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
Page 4 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Deliver training and bespoke guidance promoting professional curiosity and balanced assessment of extremist offenders.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• The OASys Guidance for TACT and TACT related offenders, dated April 2018 stated: “Extremist offenders can have a well-rehearsed script in relation to their offending and may not be open or candid about their thinking, associations and affiliations. They may also have been advised by extremist associates not to respond to professionals”. We encourage report authors and case managers to take a triangulation approach whereby they consider a range of sources including the offender's account to understand the risk. In addition, the core group approach will guard against conditioning and manipulation as the group will provide check and balances for all decisions.”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
Page 8 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Provide reduced NSD caseloads and senior practitioner oversight through countersigning and regular supervision.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• The reduced caseloads in NSD enable Senior Probation Practitioners (SPPs) to provide greater management oversight of cases. SPPs countersign all OASys assessments and provide regular supervision for Probation Practitioners (PPs) creating opportunities to review cases and ensure PPs are taking a balanced view.”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
Page 8 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Legislate for a personal-search power applicable to terrorist offenders whose licence conditions require such searches.

Verbatim wording from the response
“Following the Fishmongers’ Hall terror attack, Jonathan Hall QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), was asked by the Home Secretary and then Lord Chancellor to conduct an independent review of MAPPA used to supervise terrorist and terrorism-risk offenders. Mr Hall QC’s recommendations included the creation of new police powers, including the consideration of whether a new power of personal search is required.”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-Home-Office_Published
Page 5 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Create a licence condition requiring terrorist offenders to submit to personal searches.

Verbatim wording from the response
“• The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill provides a power enables the Police to make a personal search of a terrorist offender on licence provided their licence includes a search condition. It forms one of several measures included in the Bill in response to ████████ independent review of MAPPA and the management of terrorist offenders. This new power will enable the search to be conducted without reasonable suspicion and outside exceptional circumstances. For the police to use this power, we will create a new licence condition that requires offenders to submit to a personal search.”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-MoJ_Published
Page 14 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Other bodies are taking forward substantive work on the concerns, so further College guidance or training would risk duplicating their work.

Verbatim wording from the response
“In developing our response, we are grateful to the other addressees (and national Counter Terrorism policing) who have shared their responses with us. We note from their responses that these addressees have taken forward, or plan to take forward, substantive work to address the seven MCs listed above.”

Source location
2021-0362-Response-from-College-of-Policing_Published
Page 4 · response
Published 3 November 2021
Open published response

Data last updated 7 September 2026

What this concern includes

Not included

Reports over time

Concerns raised1

Failure to avoid discounting extremist risk because of personality disorder and PTSD symptoms

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.21

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.2

Concerns raised3

Insufficient consideration of extremist offenders’ dishonest self-presentation

Lack of precautionary search capability for terrorist offenders on licence

Excessive reliance on compliance in management of extremist offenders

Actions described in response An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.5

Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.1

Actions described in response 21

Respondent positions 2

Actions described in response 5

Respondent positions 1