Recurring concern

Unreliable Prove The Gun drill procedures

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First reported 18 Jul 2018•Latest report 18 Jul 2018

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the Prove The Gun drill process, including unclear terminology, unclear triggers or timing, inadequate guidance, training or communication, and inconsistent understanding that can affect when or how soldiers perform the drill.

Not included

  • Excludes general weapons training, firearm-handling or ammunition-safety deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the Prove The Gun drill.
  • Excludes failures in the design, manufacture or maintenance of weapons unless the report directly identifies their connection to the operation of the Prove The Gun drill.
  • Excludes generic communication, training or documentation deficiencies without a specific Prove The Gun drill connection.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
2

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2018–2018

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
2

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

BAE Systems plc2
Ministry of Defence2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing a breech explosion, intense fire and blast-related injuries. The principal concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate communication about the condition of tanks and the absence of written procedures for checking, removing and storing the BVA assembly. The report also identified insufficient consideration of the hazard during the gun’s design and manufacture, inadequate communication about the opportunistic experience shoot, and routinely unstowed charges that caused a secondary explosion.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of soldier clarity about Prove The Gun drill timing and terminology

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement revised AESPs clarifying when to prove the gun and requiring specific checks for the BVA, obturator and shim.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SEMP reviewed the procedures in the Army Equipment Support Publications (“AESPs”) ‘2350-P-102-201 – Tank, Combat, 120mm Gun Challenger 2 – Operating Information’ and ‘2350-P-102-601 – Tank, Combat, 120mm Gun Challenger 2 - Maintenance Schedule’. The SEMP concluded that had the extant procedures detailed in the AESPs been followed, the absence of the obturator assembly (consisting of the Bolt Vent Axial, thrust housing and shim) would have been identified. However, it also concluded that the accident could be repeatable and there were areas where procedures could be adjusted to reduce the risk of a re-occurrence of the accident. The SEMP directed that:”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train all CR2 crews in the revised drills and procedures, incorporating the prove-the-gun drill into Weapons Handling Tests and assuring training through sampled retesting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The panel of gunnery SMEs recommended specific adjustments to the AESPs. These recommendations were presented to the SEMP, examined in detail and then endorsed. The changes have been fully implemented in to the current AESPs and all documents which support the delivery of training. Prior to implementation, the AFVTTS School’s Instructors tested the new drills and procedures. The new procedures were then cascaded down to Regimental”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MoD is responsible for the specific content of army drills, although those drills would be considered in any design process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can also confirm that any such design or assessment of design would take account of the foreseeable use of the armament in practice, which would incorporate the army drills for training and operations. The specific content of those drills is obviously a matter for the MoD but they would be considered as part of any design process. However as explained above, such a gun designed today in accordance with the relevant Standard should not be able to fire at all if a component of the obturation system is missing.”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-BAE-Systems
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The revised drills and procedures provide clarity about when the “prove the gun” drill must be completed, so no lack of clarity remains.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SEMP and the panel of SME’s convened at the AFVTTs Gunnery Wing consider that the changes made to the AESPs have reduced the risk to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable (“ALARP”). All CR2 crews are appropriately trained, there is no lack of clarity about when drill must be completed, the delivery of that training and the crew’s understanding of that training is appropriately assured and any risk of reoccurrence is ALARP.”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

  2. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Cpls Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson died after a Challenger 2 tank fired while its BVA assembly was absent, causing hot pressurised gases to enter the turret, the breech block to explode and a subsequent fire. The substantive concerns included unclear use and meaning of the Prove The Gun drill, inadequate information about tank status available to the Range Conducting Officer, and insufficient risk assessment of the gun’s ability to fire without the BVA assembly.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity among soldiers about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of “work” in the drill

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I remain concerned that soldiers are not clear about when to use the Prove The Gun drill and the meaning of the word “work” in the drill. This was supported by the evidence of ████████ who stated there was still a lack of clarity. The MOD should ensure that soldiers are clear about the meaning of the word work in the drill and when the drill should be undertaken. ”

    Source location

    Matthew Karl Hatfield and Darren Paul Neilson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement revised AESPs clarifying when to prove the gun and requiring specific checks for the BVA, obturator and shim.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SEMP reviewed the procedures in the Army Equipment Support Publications (“AESPs”) ‘2350-P-102-201 – Tank, Combat, 120mm Gun Challenger 2 – Operating Information’ and ‘2350-P-102-601 – Tank, Combat, 120mm Gun Challenger 2 - Maintenance Schedule’. The SEMP concluded that had the extant procedures detailed in the AESPs been followed, the absence of the obturator assembly (consisting of the Bolt Vent Axial, thrust housing and shim) would have been identified. However, it also concluded that the accident could be repeatable and there were areas where procedures could be adjusted to reduce the risk of a re-occurrence of the accident. The SEMP directed that:”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train all CR2 crews in the revised drills and procedures, incorporating the prove-the-gun drill into Weapons Handling Tests and assuring training through sampled retesting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The panel of gunnery SMEs recommended specific adjustments to the AESPs. These recommendations were presented to the SEMP, examined in detail and then endorsed. The changes have been fully implemented in to the current AESPs and all documents which support the delivery of training. Prior to implementation, the AFVTTS School’s Instructors tested the new drills and procedures. The new procedures were then cascaded down to Regimental”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The MoD is responsible for the specific content of army drills, although those drills would be considered in any design process.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can also confirm that any such design or assessment of design would take account of the foreseeable use of the armament in practice, which would incorporate the army drills for training and operations. The specific content of those drills is obviously a matter for the MoD but they would be considered as part of any design process. However as explained above, such a gun designed today in accordance with the relevant Standard should not be able to fire at all if a component of the obturation system is missing.”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-BAE-Systems
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The revised drills and procedures provide clarity about when the “prove the gun” drill must be completed, so no lack of clarity remains.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SEMP and the panel of SME’s convened at the AFVTTs Gunnery Wing consider that the changes made to the AESPs have reduced the risk to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable (“ALARP”). All CR2 crews are appropriately trained, there is no lack of clarity about when drill must be completed, the delivery of that training and the crew’s understanding of that training is appropriately assured and any risk of reoccurrence is ALARP.”

    Source location

    2018-0231-Response-by-Ministry-of-Defence
    Page 5 · response
    Published 23 September 2018

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026