Recurring concern

Medication dispensing and dispatch errors not reliably detected

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First reported 27 Jan 2014•Latest report 28 Nov 2024

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of checking, assurance or operational controls dedicated to detecting and correcting errors during medication dispensing or dispatch, including errors identified after prescribing where the dispensing process is implicated.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing errors with no dispensing or dispatch-control component.
  • Excludes medication administration errors unless the failure concerns an upstream dispensing or dispatch control.
  • Excludes generic incident-reporting, documentation or learning failures not explicitly tied to detecting or correcting medication dispensing or dispatch errors.
  • Excludes ambulance or other emergency-service dispatch concerns.
Reports
5

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2024

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
12

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency2
Clare House Surgery1
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board1
Department of Health and Social Care1
General Pharmaceutical Council1
NHS England1
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board1
Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust1
Nursing and Midwifery Council1
Pharmacy2U Limited1
Royal Pharmaceutical Society1
Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver James Billings · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver James Billings, aged 22, was found deceased at home on 6 December 2023 after consuming possibly as many as 266 prescribed 75mg tablets. The report describes concerns that a second prescription was issued without confirming the status of the first, that rapid dispatch limited opportunities to identify or correct the error, and that Oliver was expected to remedy the problem when Pharmacy2U could not be contacted.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Medication dispatch failing to allow mistakes to be noticed and remedied

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That the swift dispatch of medication (whilst admittedly necessary in many circumstances) does not allow for mistakes to be noticed and/or remedied. ”

    Source location

    Oliver James Billings · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor rejected electronic cancellation notifications daily and act on them when required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Reviewed processes related to rejected prescription cancellation notifications within our clinical system. This is an alert that will tell us within our clinical system if there has been a cancellation request that has been rejected due to already being downloaded by the pharmacy. To ensure that these are monitored, and acted upon when required, a member of the prescriptions team is assigned to review this each day.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Eliminate non-auditable messaging systems for clinical information in prescription management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improved Communication Protocols: We have eliminated the use of non-auditable messaging systems (e.g., screen messages) for clinical information to ensure transparency and accountability in prescription management as we believe that this method was used for communication between Prescription Clerk B and the GP who issued the second prescription.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 4 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The benefits of efficient, timely medicine supply outweigh the risks because prescribers should complete clinical appropriateness assessments before issuing prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Dispensing and supply of medicines from a community pharmacy The coroner’s report refers to the ‘swift dispatch of medication (whilst admittedly necessary in many circumstances) does not allow for mistakes to be noticed and/or remedied’. It is worth noting that under the NHS Community Pharmacy Contractual Framework Essential Service – Dispensing, there is a contractual obligation for community pharmacies in England to dispense medication for patients with reasonable promptness. Medicines optimisation is about ensuring that the right patient receives the right medicine at the right time. All assessments of the clinical appropriateness of a medication by a prescriber should be complete before issuing the prescription, therefore the subsequent benefits of a safe and timely supply of medicines would outweigh risks of supplying medicines efficiently.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Pharmaceutical Society
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing dispensing processes and required reasonable promptness are considered sufficient; planned delays to allow post-prescribing checks would be unsafe and disproportionate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NHS Community Pharmacy Contractual Framework requires that NHS medicines and appliances are dispensed by registered pharmacies for patients on demand with “reasonable promptness” (Exhibit 1). I consider that it would be neither safe nor proportionate to introduce planned delays into pharmacy processes to allow a prescriber extra time to identify any post-prescribing concerns over and above those delays which are a natural part of a pharmacy’s existing processes.”

    Source location

    Response from Pharmacy2U
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The practice cannot easily cancel prescriptions after pharmacy download because cancellation routes and pharmacy communications are not sufficiently accessible.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal review identified that initially the action taken was correct in that when Prescription Clerk A was asked by Mr Billings to change where the prescription was being sent, she informed him that he would need to contact Pharmacy2u to ask them to release the prescription so that his preferred pharmacy could dispense the prescription instead. This is in line with our policy and ensures that there is not a duplication of prescription. The process to change a pharmacy once the prescription has been sent involves contacting pharmacies directly and at present there is not a direct route for practices to easily do this. Where this change is at patient request, rather than as a result of an error, we put the onus back on the patient to arrange this.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Changing online pharmacies’ rapid prescription dispatch and automatic drawdown is outside the practice’s scope.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above we understand that rapid dispatch of medications can limit the window for rectifying errors. Unfortunately, it is not within our scope to change this. We would encourage Pharmacy2U and other online pharmacies to explore the feasibility of implementing a more accessible cancellation process. We feel that the automatic drawdown of prescriptions, which subsequently prevents cancellation should be reviewed to reduce the additional administrative burden on general practice and reduce cost to the NHS in fees, because of unnecessary medication dispensing.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Online pharmacies and relevant regulatory bodies are asked to review and improve prescription cancellation and communication processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As noted above we understand that rapid dispatch of medications can limit the window for rectifying errors. Unfortunately, it is not within our scope to change this. We would encourage Pharmacy2U and other online pharmacies to explore the feasibility of implementing a more accessible cancellation process. We feel that the automatic drawdown of prescriptions, which subsequently prevents cancellation should be reviewed to reduce the additional administrative burden on general practice and reduce cost to the NHS in fees, because of unnecessary medication dispensing.”

    Source location

    Response from Amicus Health
    Page 3 · response
    Published 2 December 2024

    Open published response
  2. South Wales Central

    AI-generated summary

    Mr. Donald Vernon Compton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Donald Vernon Compton, aged 87, was admitted to hospital after developing Stevens-Johnson Syndrome/Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis and Covid-19, and died on 14 February 2021. The principal concerns were prescribing and dispensing errors involving Co-trimoxazole despite a known trimethoprim allergy, including failures by hospital staff and a GP to identify the risk. A separate medication error involving excessive amiodarone dosing was also identified.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to detect prescribing and dispensing errors at discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “Prescribing and dispensing errors 1. At the time, the All Wales electronic prescribing tool (eDAL) permitted prescribers to avoid reading the section concerning known allergies; 2. The commonly prescribed antibiotic Co-trimoxazole comprises two constituent drugs trimethoprim and sulfamethoxazole. Allergies were not noted as Co-trimoxazole but to the constituent drug, trimethoprim. 3. Prescribing hospital doctors; overseeing pharmacist; and ward nurses all failed to pick up on this discharge prescribing and dispensing error suggesting drug safety on discharge is an area for scrutiny and input to ensure a similar error is avoided a patient safety is maximised. 4. That the Torbay GP also made an error in prescribing Co-trimoxazole to Mr. Compton in the knowledge he was allergic to trimethoprim indicates the lack of specific knowledge about this antibiotic and its constituent elements. It may also reflect a more general lack of knowledge about constituent components of commonly prescribed drugs. 5. A different prescribing error was made in respect of this same patient whilst under the care of RGH. The down titration of Amiodarone was overlooked resulting in too high a dose being administered over several days. ”

    Source location

    Mr. Donald Vernon Compton · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Ian Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ian Hall, who had Alzheimer’s disease and was vulnerable, was admitted to hospital after a fall. A medicines reconciliation identified that amitriptyline had been dispensed instead of his prescribed atenolol; he subsequently choked on medication, developed aspiration pneumonia, tested positive for Covid-19, and died from aspiration pneumonia and Covid-19 pneumonitis. Concerns included the unclear cause of the dispensing error and the checks in place to prevent inadvertent dispensing to vulnerable adults whose carers administered the medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of pharmacy checks to prevent inadvertent dispensing to vulnerable adults

    Wider context from the report

    “2. It was unclear what checks the pharmacy in question had or any pharmacy has to avoid the inadvertent dispensing to a vulnerable adult where the carers role is to administer whatever medications are collected from the pharmacy in the name of the individual. The inquest was told that the carers in this situation generally will have no clinical training. Therefore, their role is to check the medication is in an individual’s name and give it to the individual in compliance with what is on the label. It is not part of their role to cross check previous medications or query changes to medication. ”

    Source location

    Ian Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue best-practice guidance recommending differentiated medicine packaging to reduce selection errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The primary purpose of medicines labelling is the unambiguous identification of the medicinal product contained within the packaging. We have issued best practice guidance to the pharmaceutical industry which includes amongst other things, a need to ensure that medicines which may be stored together or used concomitantly by patients are well differentiated from each other by the judicious use of colour to reduce the likelihood of medication error.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Response-from-MHRA_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish a Drug Safety Update article reminding healthcare professionals to remain vigilant for medicine-name confusion errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We also issued an article in our 2018 Drug Safety Update (DSU) bulletin to remind healthcare professionals on the need for continued vigilance for these sorts of errors https://www.gov.uk/drug-safety-update/drug-name-confusion-reminder-to-be-vigilant-for-potential-errors. That guidance highlighted a known confusion between atenolol and amiodarone (another antihypertensive) but confusion between atenolol and amitriptyline has not been reported to us previously.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Response-from-MHRA_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review atenolol and amitriptyline packaging for potential improvements that could reduce future dispensing errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MHRA will review the packaging of these medicines and if we consider on assessment that improvements could be made we will contact any pharmaceutical manufacturers who supply these medicines and seek changes so that the likelihood of future errors of this nature may be reduced.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Response-from-MHRA_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Community pharmacy services fall outside the respondent’s responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Community Pharmacy Services are the responsibility of NHS England and I have therefore liaised with my colleagues at Greater Manchester Health & Social Care Partnership (GMHSCP) to address the issues raised.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Stockport-CCG_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for community pharmacy services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Community Pharmacy Services are the responsibility of NHS England and I have therefore liaised with my colleagues at Greater Manchester Health & Social Care Partnership (GMHSCP) to address the issues raised.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Stockport-CCG_Redacted
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The key safety issue is pharmacy dispensing, not carers’ clinical qualifications or medication-administration responsibilities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You refer to the role of a carer in the administering of medications to a vulnerable adult, making the point that as carer staff are not clinically qualified, their responsibility when giving a medication is to simply check that the medication is correctly labelled for the patient they are attending. Having carefully considered this point, I reach the conclusion that the key issue is the pharmacy process as the dispensing of an incorrect medication should not happen if all procedures are correctly followed. My focus has therefore been to address the issue of dispensing and I am satisfied that appropriate steps have been taken to reduce the likelihood of incorrect medications being labelled and dispensed for administering by a carer.”

    Source location

    2021-0202-Stockport-CCG_Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2021

    Open published response
  4. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Victor James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Victor James Hall died at Salford Royal Hospital on 29 June 2018 after being admitted with shortness of breath and an exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. He was mistakenly administered Phosphate Polyfusor instead of prescribed sodium bicarbonate after dispensing, pharmacy checking and ward checking errors, although the post-mortem and toxicology evidence concluded that the medication error played no role in his death. Concerns were raised about the similar Polyfusor product design and about medication-checking, recording, dispensing, training and supervision procedures.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of pharmacy-to-ward medication transfer procedures to require receipt checks against packaging, labelling and prescription charts

    Wider context from the report

    “During the Inquest, evidence was heard that:- 1.Salford Royal Hospital had undertaken an internal investigation and concluded that one of the root causes for the medication error, was the Phosphate Polyfusor product design. i. The Pharmacy and Nursing Matron Lead, concurred that the staff involved in the incident had relied on the word Polyfusor, without actually checking the medication packaging against the prescription chart and label. Salford Royal Hospital, wrote to the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in 2018, requesting the word Polyfusor be removed from the Phosphate design product packaging to prevent future medication errors. Despite repeated requests from Salford Royal Hospital for an MHRA update, the product design for Phosphate Polyfusor remains the same. 2. I request that The Chief Executive, Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) reviews the: i. Product design on the Polyfusors in question 3.The Chief Executive, Nursing & Midwifery Council, 23 Portland Place, London W1B 1PZ reviews the: i.Guidance given to their members in relation to the administration of medication to consider and include the simplest of steps, namely that a Healthcare Professional should check the name of the medication on the prescription chart against the name of the medication on the packaging and labelling of the medication at the time of each administration of medication to ensure that the correct medication is always administered to a patient. ii.Guidance given to their members in relation to their duties, to accurately record and contemporaneously document the packaging, label an prescription checks they have undertaken to ensure the correct medication is always administered to a patient. 4.The Chief Executive, Salford Royal Hospital, NHS Trust Hospital, Stott Lane, Salford M6 8HD reviews the: i.Guidance and procedures in relation to the dispensing and transfer of medications from the Pharmacy Department to a ward, to include a system of checking medications against the packaging, labelling and prescription chart at the time of receipt by the ward. Furthermore, to consider documentary evidence of the fact that the medication packaging has been checked against the prescription chart and an acknowledgement of receipt of the correct medication by the pharmacy and ward staff, evidenced by a signature of the recipient. ii.Training, Auditing, Supervision and monitoring of all staff, particularly Nursing and Pharmacy staff, in relation to the above issues. ”

    Source location

    Victor James Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement closed-loop dispensing by linking electronic prescribing, pharmacy dispensing and robotic systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “| ████████ | 31st January 2020 Reviewing the layout of the dispensary with the aim of separating the areas used for different parts of the dispensing process and improving the flow of work. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Implementing “closed loop dispensing” (linking the electronic prescribing system to the pharmacy dispensing system and robot) with the aim of reducing dispensing errors and improving efficiency and therefore reducing the number of staff needed in the dispensary. | ████████ | 30th June 2020”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement closed-loop medication administration using electronic barcode scanning of patients and medications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Implementing “closed loop medication administration” (electronic barcode scanning of patients and medications) to ensure that patient’s receive the right drug at the correct dose by the right route at the intended time. This will indicate to nursing staff (at the point of administration rather than the point of receipt) that the prescribed medication has been correctly sourced. | Digital Team | 30th June 2020”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update accuracy-checking procedures to require a second check for all intravenous fluids.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action | Action Lead | Completion By Updating the accuracy checking procedure which will incorporate a second check for all intravenous fluids. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing an electronic sign off to indicate that key procedures have been read and understood by relevant staff. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Reviewing the number of items required to complete dispensing and accuracy checking logs during induction. | ████████ | 31st December 2019 Introducing a formal revalidation procedure for staff involved in dispensing errors | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Introducing a recurrent accuracy checking log for all accuracy checkers to ensure competence. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Identifying formal supervisory duties and responsibilities in the dispensary.”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ensure nursing staff recognise different Polyfusor products and check all medication details in full.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “| ████████ | 29th February 2020 Analysing near miss data to identify common dispensing errors and introducing on-going communication of this to staff. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Reviewing the accuracy checking test to incorporate a wider range of medications. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 Monitoring of compliance of medicines safety training completed by nursing staff on Ward H2. | ████████ | Commenced Monitoring of medicine safety incidents on ward H2 | ████████ | Commenced Policy to be published about the process to follow when involved in a medicines safety incident. | ████████ | 29th February 2020 All nursing staff to be made aware that there are many different types of Polyfusor products. In order”

    Source location

    2019-0482-Response-by-Northern-Care-Alliance-NHs-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 October 2019

    Open published response
  5. York City

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Judith Lesley Marshall was prescribed morphine sulphate 10mg twice daily, but a pharmacy dispensed 60mg capsules. She took the capsules as prescribed and was found dead on 30 September 2009; the inquest recorded bronchopneumonia and the effects of morphine, with a conclusion of accidental death. The principal concerns were pharmacy dispensing errors, the adequacy of checking and monitoring systems, and the absence of central monitoring of prescription errors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Uncertainty about availability of prescription-reading software alerts for drug identity or amount errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) It is not clear whether there is any software, obtainable from the Department of Health or elsewhere, that could read prescriptions and raise an alert if the label sought to be created or if the drug sought to be dispensed is wrong in identity or amount. This would be of particular significance when a high risk drug is dispensed or when a drug is dispensed in an unusual quantity, dosage or form. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of colleague checking to prevent dispensing medication errors

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Despite a system of checking by a colleague it is apparent that there can be a mistake in dispensing medication which in this case was a controlled opiate drug. The consequences were fatal. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of mandatory read-back procedures for dispensing details

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Mandatory procedures requiring a ‘read-back’ of the drug, its dosage, its frequency of administration and its total quantity may prevent such dispensing errors. In so far as the error in this case can be attributable to ‘Human Error’ it is concluded that the dispensing pharmacist focused on the figure of 60 and incorrectly attributed that to the dosage as well as to the number of capsules. ”

    Source location

    Judith Lesley Marshall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Prepare and publish a Patient Safety Alert to improve medication-error reporting and learning across healthcare sectors, including community pharmacy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b) NHS England is preparing to publish a Patient Safety Alert on March 2014 to improve reporting and learning of medication errors from all sectors including community pharmacy. This will include the establishment of a National Medication Safety Network, the identification of medication safety officers in large healthcare provider organisations including community pharmacy companies and other measures into to increase the number, quality, timeliness and learning of medication error incident reports.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review community-pharmacy incident data and relevant research, and engage stakeholders to develop safer-practice guidance on dispensing medicines, technology and checking systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, there is little use of bar codes in the dispensing process in community pharmacy at present. Greater use of this technology in dispensaries could improve patient safety. The Safe Medication Practice Team in NHS England, plan to undertake a review of community pharmacy incident data, together with relevant research and engage with stakeholders to prepare a Patient Safety Alert for possible publication in 2014. The proposed Alert would better describe the risks arising from dispensing medicines and safer practices to further minimise these risks, including better use of technology and checking systems. This guidance will help inform health care commissioners, providers and regulators of actions that they can take to further minimise risks arising from dispensing medicines.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight existing dispensing-error guidance, including involving two people where possible, in the next Regulate+ newsletter.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. The GPhC has published guidance which contains information about minimising the risk of dispensing errors (http://www.pharmacyregulation.org/sites/default/files/Responding%20to%20complaints%20and%20%20concerns%20.pdf). The guidance explains that two people should be involved in the dispensing process where this is possible. Whilst I understand that in this case, two people were involved in the dispensing process, we can highlight our guidance in the next edition of our newsletter through Regulate+.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-General-Pharmaceutical-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for commissioning pharmaceutical services and has addressed the concerns in its detailed response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Secretary of State for Health, I am responsible for setting national priorities, monitoring the whole system’s performance and supporting the integrity of the system to protect the best interests of patients, the public and the taxpayer. Since 1 April 2013, most day to day decisions are taken by NHS England. NHS England is responsible for commissioning primary care services, including pharmaceutical services.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The regulator cannot require registered pharmacies to use automation to reduce dispensing errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. There is research that shows the use of automation within a dispensing process can reduce the rate of errors. Whilst we cannot require registered pharmacies to use automation, we do ensure that the way in which we regulate does not stifle the introduction of new technology.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-General-Pharmaceutical-Council
    Page 2 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandatory read-back procedures are not introduced because definitive evidence that they reduce dispensing errors is lacking.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4) Mandatory procedures requiring a ‘read-back’ of the drug, its dosage, its frequency of administration and its total quantity may prevent such dispensing errors. In so far as the error in this case can be attributable to ‘Human Error’ it is concluded that the dispensing pharmacist correctly had the figure of 60 and incorrectly attributed that to the dosage as well as to the number of capsules.”

    Source location

    2014-0039-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 27 January 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026