Failure to maintain effective regulatory airworthiness controls for aircraft
First to latest report 2 Feb 2024 — 30 May 2025
Reports that mention this concern
2
Times this concern has been raised
8
Stated actions linked to this concern
12
What this concern includes
Includes failures of regulatory airworthiness controls for aircraft, including mandatory inspection or certification, design approval, continued-airworthiness review and controlled life limits for safety-critical aircraft components.
What is not included
Excludes routine operational maintenance, pilot competence, flight safety or accident-response failures where regulatory airworthiness control is not the identified concern.
Excludes non-aircraft equipment inspection or certification schemes, including amusement devices and other products.
Excludes generic product-quality or manufacturing defects unless the report specifically identifies a regulatory airworthiness-control failure.
Excludes failures confined to a particular aircraft component where no regulatory airworthiness-control deficiency is asserted.
Trends
Reports over time
Reports mentioning this concern, over time
Reports about this concern issued each year.
* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.
Most frequent recipients
Most frequent recipients
Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.
Civil Aviation Authority2
British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association Limited1
European Union Aviation Safety Agency1
Aviation regulator2
Aviation sector body1
Reports and published responses 2 reports
See individual reports that have raised this concern, and the actions taken in response
Leicester City and South Leicestershire
Concerns raised6
Failure to require provision of system and flight-testing data to specialist suppliers of critical parts
Lack of defined and controlled life limits for non-structural critical parts in aircraft designs already in service
Failure to require system-level failure modes analysis for potentially catastrophic failure modes
Failure to address rolling contact fatigue failure in critical-part bearing certification requirements
Lack of comprehensive and uniform standards for calculating design load spectrums for non-structural critical parts
Unavailability of comprehensive post-removal assessment programmes for critical parts in in-service helicopters
Linked responses
Civil Aviation Authority
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.11
Civil Aviation Authority
Develop a Certification Memorandum requiring applicable critical-bearing supplier data to be recorded and assessed before aircraft certification.
Civil Aviation Authority
Share the Certification Memorandum with EASA for discussion.
Civil Aviation Authority
Advance rulemaking to clarify critical-part airworthiness status and life-limit definitions and publication for aircraft operators.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Review whether to clarify AMC1 29.571 and AMC1 27.571 so critical bearings are always considered.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Consider introducing new AMC to CS 29.927(a) addressing certification testing, inspection intervals and retirement times.
Civil Aviation Authority
Advance rulemaking extending required safety assessments of rotor and rotor-drive systems to reduce component-failure hazard severity.
Civil Aviation Authority
Adopt updates to Acceptable Means of Compliance addressing rolling contact fatigue in critical bearings classified as Principal Structural Elements.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Include a proposed CS-27 and CS-29 amendment in the next rulemaking notice under RMT.0128.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Issue and publish certification guidance addressing compliance demonstrations for rotorcraft hybrid bearings.
Civil Aviation Authority
Advance rulemaking requiring defective critical parts to be removed from service and returned to type certificate holders for analysis.
Civil Aviation Authority
Consider EASA’s final Continued Integrity Verification Programme proposals and reflect them in equivalent UK provisions where appropriate.
Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.5
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
The existing regulatory framework adequately requires applicants to provide relevant testing information, so new prescriptive requirements are not needed.
Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Existing regulations adequately establish and control life limits for critical parts already in service, so their airworthiness status need not be redefined.
Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Existing certification provisions adequately address hazardous and catastrophic failures, so systematically mandating additional design mitigations could be counterproductive.
Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
The claimed non-conservative loads calculation is not accepted as the sole cause of bearing failure, and existing methodology does not require complete reconsideration.
Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency
Existing type-certificate-holder reporting and analysis obligations adequately address critical-part reliability, so no retrospective post-removal assessment programme is needed.
Existing arrangements considered sufficientThe respondent said that existing arrangements were sufficient, so no further action was needed.
West Yorkshire (Western)
Concerns raised2
Lack of licensing for use and registration of class BGD Luna 2 paragliders
Lack of regulatory quality and airworthiness control for class BGD Luna 2 paragliders
Linked responses
British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (BHPA
Civil Aviation Authority
Stated actions An action is something a respondent says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.1
Civil Aviation Authority
Revise, publish and distribute Paramotor Code guidance on maintaining SPHG aircraft airworthiness.
Respondent positions A position is what a respondent says about the concern when they do not describe a specific action.2
British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (BHPA
The organisation cannot compel pilots, including non-members, to join, undertake training or complete its qualification schemes.
Unable to actThe respondent said that a constraint prevented them from taking the relevant action.
Civil Aviation Authority
Mandatory airworthiness requirements for SPHG aircraft are not proportionate because accident rates and risks to third parties remain low.
Disputes the concernThe respondent disagreed with part of the concern or the basis for it.
Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.
Actions and positions describe what organisations say in published responses. Implementation is not independently verified.