Recurring concern

Failure to maintain effective regulatory airworthiness controls for aircraft

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First reported 2 Feb 2024•Latest report 30 May 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of regulatory airworthiness controls for aircraft, including mandatory inspection or certification, design approval, continued-airworthiness review and controlled life limits for safety-critical aircraft components.

Not included

  • Excludes routine operational maintenance, pilot competence, flight safety or accident-response failures where regulatory airworthiness control is not the identified concern.
  • Excludes non-aircraft equipment inspection or certification schemes, including amusement devices and other products.
  • Excludes generic product-quality or manufacturing defects unless the report specifically identifies a regulatory airworthiness-control failure.
  • Excludes failures confined to a particular aircraft component where no regulatory airworthiness-control deficiency is asserted.
Reports
2

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2024–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
12

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Civil Aviation Authority2
British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association Limited1
European Union Aviation Safety Agency1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Leicester City and South Leicestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 27 October 2018, a helicopter crashed shortly after departing Leicester's King Power Stadium, killing pilots Eric Swaffer and Izabela Lechowicz and passengers Vichai Srivaddhanaprabha, Nusara Suknamai and Kaveporn Punpare. The report states that Ms Lechowicz died from head and chest injuries, while the other four died from inhaling combustion products. The principal concerns relate to EASA's handling of recommendations about helicopter component design, certification, life limits, post-service assessment, load-spectrum standards and system-level failure analysis.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to require provision of system and flight-testing data to specialist suppliers of critical parts

    Wider context from the report

    “In these circumstances, I am concerned by EASA’s rejection of the AAIB safety recommendation, which would appear to propose a meaningful improvement to requirements for aircraft design work. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined and controlled life limits for non-structural critical parts in aircraft designs already in service

    Wider context from the report

    “In these circumstances, I am concerned that EASA has not implemented the recommendation in relation to designs already in service. Although ████████ said that EASA had explained that it considered that issues with non-structural critical parts would be picked up as part of continued airworthiness review, that does not strike me as a response which meets the recommendation. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to require system-level failure modes analysis for potentially catastrophic failure modes

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that the AAIB’s apparently sensible suggestion of requiring failure modes analysis to be conducted at a system level continues to be rejected. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to address rolling contact fatigue failure in critical-part bearing certification requirements

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that an issue raised by the AAIB to the effect that CS-29 and/or AMC may be improved to address risks of rolling contact fatigue failure in critical part bearings has not been addressed by EASA by a time over 18 months after the AAIB report on this crash was issued. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of comprehensive and uniform standards for calculating design load spectrums for non-structural critical parts

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that EASA has responded to this AAIB recommendation by citing action it has taken which does not appear to meet the AAIB’s concerns. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of comprehensive post-removal assessment programmes for critical parts in in-service helicopters

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that EASA does not intend making changes which would allow in-service helicopters to benefit from the proposed new CIVP requirements. ”

    Source location

    Eric Swaffer and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a Certification Memorandum requiring applicable critical-bearing supplier data to be recorded and assessed before aircraft certification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. is developing a Certification Memorandum (“CM”) which will clarify that applicable data from the supplier of critical bearings (including installation and operating limitations, bearing design specification, and applicable best practice) should be recorded and assessed by the TCH of the aircraft prior to certification. This CM will apply to all critical bearings, including both metallic and hybrid designs. The CAA will share this CM with EASA for discussion;”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the Certification Memorandum with EASA for discussion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “c. is developing a Certification Memorandum (“CM”) which will clarify that applicable data from the supplier of critical bearings (including installation and operating limitations, bearing design specification, and applicable best practice) should be recorded and assessed by the TCH of the aircraft prior to certification. This CM will apply to all critical bearings, including both metallic and hybrid designs. The CAA will share this CM with EASA for discussion;”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advance rulemaking to clarify critical-part airworthiness status and life-limit definitions and publication for aircraft operators.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. has initiated rulemaking projects to update the UK regulatory framework to:”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review whether to clarify AMC1 29.571 and AMC1 27.571 so critical bearings are always considered.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Acceptable Means of Compliance AMC1 29.571 (introduced with Amendment 11 of CS-29) addresses Rolling Contact Fatigue (RCF) which should be included, when applicable, in the fatigue tolerance evaluation of Principle Structure Elements (PSE). This AMC describes possible steps to be taken to minimise the risk of crack initiation due to RCF on PSEs and in particular for integrated bearing races. A fail-safe approach is recommended wherever possible, such that cracking of the affected structural element(s) is detected prior to its residual strength capability falling below the required levels prescribed in CS 29.571(f). In addition to following a fail-safe approach, inspection and retirement times may be needed in order to ensure that the assumptions supporting the fail-safety and detection of failure remain valid throughout the operational life of the component.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider introducing new AMC to CS 29.927(a) addressing certification testing, inspection intervals and retirement times.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(ii) evaluated for the need of dedicated certification testing to demonstrate adequate performance and suitable intervals. EASA is currently considering the possibility of introducing new AMC to CS 29.927(a) (Additional tests) to address this aspect. This would clarify the need to support inspection intervals and retirement times with appropriate directly applicable data.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 8 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advance rulemaking extending required safety assessments of rotor and rotor-drive systems to reduce component-failure hazard severity.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. has initiated rulemaking projects to update the UK regulatory framework to:”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt updates to Acceptable Means of Compliance addressing rolling contact fatigue in critical bearings classified as Principal Structural Elements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “a. has adopted updates to Acceptable Means of Compliance to CS-27 and CS-29 relating to rolling contact fatigue in critical bearings classified as Principal Structural Elements;”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Include a proposed CS-27 and CS-29 amendment in the next rulemaking notice under RMT.0128.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “EASA is however reviewing the opportunity to clarify the scope of application of AMC1 29.571, and similarly of AMC1 27.571, to ensure that critical bearings are always considered. A proposed amendment of CS-27 and CS-29 is planned to be included in the next Notice of Proposed Amendment under rulemaking task RMT.0128 ‘Regular update of the Certification Specifications for Very Light Rotorcraft (CS-VLR), Small Rotorcraft (CS-27), and Large Rotorcraft (CS-29)’.””

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue and publish certification guidance addressing compliance demonstrations for rotorcraft hybrid bearings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, as lessons learned from this accident, EASA considers that future approvals of hybrid bearing with ceramic balls will deserve more attention as regards to the failure mechanics and the sensitivity of the bearing to its working conditions (including abnormal conditions originated by e.g. manufacturing defects, degraded lubrication, improper maintenance, etc..) in order to better cope with a wider range of scenarios.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 6 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advance rulemaking requiring defective critical parts to be removed from service and returned to type certificate holders for analysis.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. has initiated rulemaking projects to update the UK regulatory framework to:”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider EASA’s final Continued Integrity Verification Programme proposals and reflect them in equivalent UK provisions where appropriate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d. will consider EASA’s final proposals in relation to the Continued Integrity Verification Programme (CIVP) once they are issued and will reflect those provisions in the equivalent UK regulatory provisions if appropriate to do so;”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing regulatory framework adequately requires applicants to provide relevant testing information, so new prescriptive requirements are not needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““Pursuant to point 21.A.20 of Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, the applicant for aircraft type certification is responsible for the demonstration of compliance with the type certification basis (that includes certification specifications), and to record justifications of compliance within the compliance documents as referred to in the certification programme. This implies ensuring that parts and systems reach minimum performance and reliability targets.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing regulations adequately establish and control life limits for critical parts already in service, so their airworthiness status need not be redefined.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““In accordance with point 21.A.7 of Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012, the Type Certificate Holder (TC Holder) must provide Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for critical parts, either structural or non-structural, and, in case of large rotorcraft, the preparation of ICA must be performed in compliance with the Certification Specification (CS) 29.1529.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing certification provisions adequately address hazardous and catastrophic failures, so systematically mandating additional design mitigations could be counterproductive.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Nevertheless, additional CS-29 provisions help to meet the intent of this safety recommendation:”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 7 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The claimed non-conservative loads calculation is not accepted as the sole cause of bearing failure, and existing methodology does not require complete reconsideration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““The accident investigation report mentions a non-conservative loads calculation at the time of certification as a root cause of the bearing failure.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 6 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing type-certificate-holder reporting and analysis obligations adequately address critical-part reliability, so no retrospective post-removal assessment programme is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““Point 21.A.3A of Annex I (Part 21) to Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 defines the obligations applicable to the Type Certificate Holders (TCHs) to establish and maintain a system for collecting, investigating and analysing occurrence reports. This includes, as per point 21.A.3A(a)(1), identification of adverse trends or deficiencies that might cause adverse effects on the continuing airworthiness of the product.”

    Source location

    Response from European Union Aviation Safety Authority
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 June 2025

    Open published response
  2. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Shaun CROSSFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shaun Crossfield died on 9 August 2022 after his paramotor became uncontrollable during flight and descended in a spiral before impacting the ground. The report raises concerns about damage and repairs to the propeller and control mechanisms, and about the absence of regulatory inspection, certification, licensing and registration for the aircraft type.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of licensing for use and registration of class BGD Luna 2 paragliders

    Wider context from the report

    “It appears to be the case that no regulatory authority is available to control the quality or airworthiness of the class BGD Luna 2 Paraglider flown by the deceased. The absence of such quality control and licensing for use and registration of such aircraft does provide the opportunity for future deaths to occur. Had a mandatory inspection and certification of fitness been carried out and imposed by qualified inspectors, in all likelihood such a death as suffered by the deceased may not have occurred. ”

    Source location

    Shaun CROSSFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of regulatory quality and airworthiness control for class BGD Luna 2 paragliders

    Wider context from the report

    “It appears to be the case that no regulatory authority is available to control the quality or airworthiness of the class BGD Luna 2 Paraglider flown by the deceased. The absence of such quality control and licensing for use and registration of such aircraft does provide the opportunity for future deaths to occur. Had a mandatory inspection and certification of fitness been carried out and imposed by qualified inspectors, in all likelihood such a death as suffered by the deceased may not have occurred. ”

    Source location

    Shaun CROSSFIELD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise, publish and distribute Paramotor Code guidance on maintaining SPHG aircraft airworthiness.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CAA therefore considers that it would be appropriate for it to publish new safety guidance on the importance of maintaining the airworthiness of all operational SPHG aircraft to a high standard.”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The organisation cannot compel pilots, including non-members, to join, undertake training or complete its qualification schemes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The BHPA is a members' organisation established as a Company Limited by Guarantee. It is not a regulatory authority. It has no powers of compulsion, even over its own members. Inter alia, it seeks to promote safety within the sports of hang gliding and paragliding and the power variants of those aircraft through progressive training schemes, education, encouragement, and persuasion.”

    Source location

    Response from British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mandatory airworthiness requirements for SPHG aircraft are not proportionate because accident rates and risks to third parties remain low.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Given the available safety data, it is the opinion of the CAA that the probability of an SPHG accident having unintended consequences for uninvolved third parties remains low. The consequences of such an occurrence, given the lightweight profile of these aircraft, are also considered to be low, when compared to more complex aviation activities that create greater risks to the public, including private transport, flight training and commercial operations.”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 4 · response
    Published 12 February 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026