Recurring concern

Unsafe medication prescribing

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First reported 5 May 2013•Latest report 25 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures involving the clinical appropriateness of prescribing or medication selection, including inadequate assessment of indication, patient circumstances, relevant information, alternatives or dose.

Not included

  • Excludes failures limited to medication administration after an otherwise appropriate prescription.
  • Excludes generic documentation, training or communication deficiencies unless they directly result in or are explicitly tied to an unsafe prescribing decision.
  • Excludes dispensing, supply or monitoring failures that do not concern whether the medication prescription itself was clinically appropriate.
Reports
121

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
151

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
246

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care20
NHS England16
Care Quality Commission7
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board7
General Medical Council6
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence4
Recipient name withheld4
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency3
NHS Surrey and Sussex Integrated Care Board3
Royal College of General Practitioners3
Royal College of Physicians3
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust3
Welsh Government3
BNF Publications2
Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Local Health Board2

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    David Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Joyce, who had a history of mental health difficulties, died by suicide at his home on 31 August 2023 after being found having suspended himself. The concerns included a lack of follow-up and consideration of mental health referral after he first sought help, prescribing Quetiapine without specialist input despite his reported symptoms and overdose, and a delay of 15 weeks before a medication review led to a change in treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to seek specialist guidance on medication appropriateness in complex mental health presentations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. David presented to the GP surgery again on 26th June. He reported that he’d had a ‘severe mental breakdown due to ongoing psychosis’ which had resulted in him taking an overdose and being arrested for being in possession of a weapon, and he’d been advised by Police mental health services to contact his GP for support. When he spoke to the GP, David informed her that he considered his most significant issue currently was depression, and said that he had not taken Quetiapine since he moved to Exeter some years previously. Despite the fact that David indicated depression to be his overriding concern, he had taken an overdose which resulted in hospital attendance, and he’d not taken Quetiapine for some time (and seemingly for different symptoms), the GP prescribed Quetiapine, without seeking guidance or input from a psychiatrist or mental health professional about whether that was an appropriate medication in the circumstances. No routine follow up appears to have taken place following that consultation. The next communication does not occur until the GP is informed that there had been a further suicide attempt resulting in a Mental Health Act Assessment of David on 22nd August. ”

    Source location

    David Joyce · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mental health services retain responsibility for prescribing and antipsychotic dose changes when a patient is under specialist care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, had ████████, (a Senior Mental Health Practitioner) felt that David needed support from the Mental Health Team whom she works for I would have expected her to make that referral when she saw him on the 24th June. The practice felt there needs to be improved lines of communication between Primary Care and the Community Mental Health Team including consultants and Home Treatment Team for a patient who is currently under their care. Usually, the Mental Health Team take ownership and responsibility for prescribing and dose changes for anti-psychotic medication as they had for David.”

    Source location

    Response from Foxhayes Surgery GP Practice
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 August 2026

    Open published response
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Abbigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Abbigail Louise Smith was found at Braintree Recreation Ground on 15 February 2022 and was pronounced deceased shortly after midnight on 16 February 2022 from compression of the neck by ligature. The report describes concerns about failures in mental-health care, communication, staff training, risk assessment and discharge planning, including her discharge to supported living without an adequate plan to mitigate a known risk of self-harm.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuation and increase of Diazepam during crisis deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “9. Abbi’s diazepam was continued and increased during her crisis and deterioration. Abbi was prescribed a treatment medication regime that had been unsuccessful in the past and had not mitigated attempts to end her life by ligature whilst she was detained in her last admission under the Mental Health Act. ”

    Source location

    Abbigail Louise SMITH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a Trust-wide community benzodiazepine-prescribing audit against NICE and BNF requirements and use findings for quality improvement.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A Trust wide audit of benzodiazepine prescribing in the community has been commissioned to provide assurance that all prescribing adheres to NICE Guidelines and BNF guidance regarding indication, dosage, duration, and review, with findings informing quality improvement actions where required.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require short-term benzodiazepine prescribing, documented rationale, explicit review dates, and supervision-based monitoring of adherence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Consultant Psychiatrists are required to adhere to Trust policy and NICE guidance on benzodiazepine prescribing, with particular emphasis on short term use, clear documentation of clinical rationale, and explicit review dates. Adherence continues to be monitored via direct supervision reviews.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Diazepam or another benzodiazepine may be continued or increased during crisis when clinically indicated, because medications may not take effect immediately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust accepts that continued prescribing of Diazepam should have been supported by clearer review arrangements and consultant oversight. Please see responses to concerns 3 and 4.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 13 August 2026

    Open published response
  3. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Robert Smith, who was detained at HMP Thameside, died after an epileptic seizure led to cardiac arrest. The report describes concerns about medication prescribing and administration, hospital-to-prison discharge and communication, access to his cell, observation arrangements and records, staffing, and the lack of equipment for resuscitation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prescribe and administer medication at the correct dose

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The wrong dose of medication could be prescribed and/or administered with life threatening consequences. Albeit I have seen evidence of significant improvements in prescribing practice at HMP Thameside since 2019 (e.g HMIP report February 2026); as recently as 2024 to 2025 HMIP and IMB reports noted “significant risks with management of medicines” and “prescribing errors.” Whilst recent internal audits in 2025 show significant improvements, medication incidents (datix) are recorded in late 2025 and the principal pharmacist notes a very busy site with multiple prescriptions screened daily. Further, during the inquest it proved difficult to establish how Systm 1 (the medical note system) operated and whether there were risks inherent in the system itself. For example, it was suggested the system would convert mg into ml or pre-populate entries such as 100ml, in contradiction to the subsequent PFD evidence provided. (Practice Plus Group) ”

    Source location

    Mark Robert Smith · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Sean Perry WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sean Williams died in the back of a Serco van outside Thames Magistrates’ Court after suffering a fit during transport and then a cardiac arrest. Concerns included gaps in his custody healthcare assessment and treatment, inadequate Serco first-aid training and competence assessment, failure to provide timely first aid, unclear emergency procedures, and insufficient emphasis on preserving life.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assess and record the clinical picture before and after prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “For the MPS The MPS had already recognised before inquest that, following Mr Williams’ detention, he was not seen by a custody nurse for 23 hours. However, there was another sub optimal element of his care that did not appear to have been identified. The custody nurse who reviewed Mr Williams on two separate occasions in the twelve hours immediately before he attended court, did not on the second occasion take any observations of Mr Williams’ vital signs before (or after) prescribing dihydrocodeine, and did not record any part of Mr Williams’ clinical picture. Despite having prescribed dihydrocodeine for drug withdrawal, when giving evidence in court the nurse was unable to describe the signs and symptoms of withdrawal. For Serco By 18.11 hours, the Serco van that was transporting Mr Williams had returned to the court car park entrance and the driver had got out of the cab and into the back of the van. At that point, neither the escort nor the driver opened the door to Mr Williams’ cell to administer first aid - at the very least to relieve his slumped, squashed position to try to deal with any potential airway obstruction. At 18.15 hours when he stopped showing any signs of life, they still did not open his door. They only opened his door at 18.23 hours, removing him from the cell at 18.24 hours, and administering chest compressions at 18.25 hours. The driver did not press the emergency button in the cab to alert the operations control centre of the situation. The Serco crew did call the London Ambulance Service from the van, but were unable to give the postcode of their location. I put it to the Serco driver that the focus of the two Serco crew members seemed to be on talking to the three other prisoners in their cells, on phone calls, in fact on anything except getting Mr Williams out of his cell to see if the crew could help him. The driver agreed. The Serco driver eventually administered chest compressions but could not face giving rescue breaths. He seemed to have forgotten that he had a face guard hanging from his belt. Despite evidence from Serco that they were satisfied with the first aid training that was given to the two officers, the jury found that: - the Serco first aid training was inadequate; - it did not include a video of a seizure; - it did not sufficiently emphasise the urgency of potentially life saving measures such as use of the recovery position; - the Serco assessment of the first aid knowledge and competence of its staff was inadequate; - Serco failed to provide clear guidance on the emergency button procedures; - Serco’s policy appeared to conflict with its training slides about whether staff should or are even permitted to drive a casualty direct to hospital; - Serco gave insufficient emphasis on urgency and the paramount importance of preserving life. ”

    Source location

    Sean Perry WILLIAMS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement SYSTMOne templates requiring vital-sign and other observation recording during initial assessments and clinical reviews.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is a requirement that the HCP records a full set of vital signs and other observations (e.g. COWS - Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Scale) prior to medication administration. In April 2024, the new SYSTMOne³ templates were created which mandate a set of vital signs (unless the patient refuses) to be recorded at the initial clinical assessment and when reviews take place.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police Service
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit healthcare practitioners’ clinical documentation and provide feedback, guidance, and additional training where practice or records fall below the required standard.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Practice Guidelines followed by HCP in custody highlight this approach to safe care and assessment of detainees. Compliance with guidelines and quality of care delivered is monitored through HCP audits led by the Senior HCPs in each area. Feedback and guidance are provided where the documentation falls below, standards or there are learning needs to provide the standard of care expected from all HCPs working in MPS Custody Suites.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police Service
    Page 3 · response
    Published 24 February 2026

    Open published response
  5. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Oliver Marc Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Oliver Robinson was 34 when his body was discovered at home on 24 November 2023. The Court found that he died by self-ligature tied during acute emotional dysregulation, in the context of multiple psychosocial stressors and cannabis dependence. The principal concerns were that Cureleaf prescribed medicinal cannabis despite incomplete information, insufficient relevant psychiatric expertise and treatment options not being exhausted, failed to liaise with treating psychiatrists, and that continued prescriptions obstructed appropriate psychiatric and addictions care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuation of medicinal cannabis prescriptions obstructing appropriate psychiatric and addictions care

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The continuation of prescriptions for medicinal cannabis acted as an obstacle to Oliver receiving appropriate psychiatric and addictions care. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Marc Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to exhaust available treatment options before prescribing medicinal cannabis

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Consultant Psychiatrist who reviewed Oliver at Cureleaf specialised in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and had no Consultant level experience in treating adult patients with Oliver’s complex presentation or in the type of treatments available for adult patients with treatment-resistant depression. Treatment options had not been exhausted at the time that medicinal cannabis was prescribed. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Marc Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to base prescribing decisions on complete and current clinical information

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Cureleaf's initial prescribing decision was based on an out-of-date GP summary care record and without the knowledge that Oliver was under the care of a Consultant Psychiatrist at the Priory. As such the prescribing decision was based on incomplete information. ”

    Source location

    Oliver Marc Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Required CMHT contact and explicit consent or non-objection before commencing CBMP treatment for patients receiving CMHT care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• For patients under Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) care, the clinic’s established process now requires that contact is made with the CMHT and that a decision to prescribe is not made until this has been confirmed.”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reviewed the approach to patients with complex psychiatric presentations and reinforced coordination with relevant external mental health services through coordinated-care arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Curaleaf Clinic has reflected carefully on the concerns raised in this case. The following changes have been implemented:”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 8 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implemented access to the NHS National Care Records Service to obtain contemporaneous clinical information for assessments and ongoing care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal investigation identified the reliance on SCRs as an area for improvement. The following changes were implemented prior to the inquest:”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforced documentation of available clinical information and review of incomplete external information through MDT and clinical governance processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our internal investigation identified the reliance on SCRs as an area for improvement. The following changes were implemented prior to the inquest:”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 5 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuing medicinal cannabis did not obstruct psychiatric or addictions care, which continued through the GP, Priory and NHS services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Coroner’s concern: The continuation of prescriptions for medicinal cannabis acted as an obstacle to Oliver receiving appropriate psychiatric and addictions care.”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 7 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Treatment options were considered exhausted because multiple medication classes and extensive non-pharmacological treatments had already been tried.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Exhaustion of Treatment Options”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The summary care record was less than a year old and contained information sufficient for the prescribing assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Coroner’s concern: Curaleaf’s initial prescribing decision was based on an out-of-date GP summary care record and without the knowledge that Oliver was under the care of a Consultant Psychiatrist at the Priory. As such the prescribing decision was based on incomplete information.”

    Source location

    Response from Curaleaf Clinic
    Page 4 · response
    Published 10 February 2026

    Open published response
  6. Sunderland

    AI-generated summary

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Avery Jake Hall died at Sunderland Royal Hospital on 13 November 2024, aged four days, after developing global hypoxia and diffuse alveolar damage following his birth. The report was concerned that his mother continued taking Candesartan during pregnancy because she was not given clear and definitive advice to stop it, and that the medication remained available on repeat prescription without warnings identifying her pregnancy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Candesartan remaining available on repeat prescription during pregnancy

    Wider context from the report

    “Avery’s mother continued to suffer from migraines during her pregnancy and was unaware of the risk posed by taking Candesartan in pregnancy due to a lack of clear and definitive advice about the risk. I am concerned that she was able to resume taking Candesartan approximately 14 days after her initial GP consultation as the medication remained on a repeat prescription which she was able to continue to request during her pregnancy, and each request was approved without a detailed review. The last repeat prescription being approved only 12 days prior to Avery’s birth. ”

    Source location

    Avery Jake Hall · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and apply an SOP covering pregnancy-related safety checks for new medicines, including stopping or replacing medicines unsafe in pregnancy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. An SOP has been implemented in relation to prescribing medication to women of child bearing age (15-55 years old). I attach the SOP. A clinical practice meeting has been arranged for 26 February 2026 at which the SOP will be discussed and laminated copies distributed.”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain a mandatory prescribing assessment within GP specialty training that assesses prescribing for pregnancy and other special groups.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To give context to the family, The Royal College of General Practitioners works to improve patient care by encouraging the highest possible standards in general medical practice by supporting members, setting standards, providing education and training, promoting research and advocating and representing the College and its 56,000 members.”

    Source location

    Response from the Royal College of General Practitioners
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Manually reviewing every repeat medication request and creating linked pregnancy alerts is impractical due to workload and lack of technical IT skills.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have also considered further whether it is possible to identify or flag a pregnant patient when they request repeat medication. This would be an important safeguard for doctors reviewing the two hundred or so repeat medication requests received on a daily basis. Due to their volume and the other priorities for clinicians’ time, it is not practical for the doctor to review each patient’s records when authorising every request. We do not have the technical IT skills at the practice to make changes to the computerised records system and I have therefore contacted our system provider EMIS to ask for their advice and input on whether it is possible, and if so how, to introduce a flag which would identify the pregnancy coding on the patient’s record and link it to the repeat prescriptions for the patient (and ideally include the BNF advice for that medication as well).”

    Source location

    Response from Riverview Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 2 February 2026

    Open published response
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Sidra Aliabase · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sidra Aliabase was born prematurely at Chelsea and Westminster Hospital and later died there aged 3 weeks after being wrongly prescribed sodium acid phosphate instead of sodium chloride at approximately five times the recommended neonatal dose. The report describes concerns about communication between paediatric cardiology and hospital teams, delayed planning and diagnosis for long QT syndrome, reliance on appropriate cardiology advice, and prescribing systems that may contribute to errors involving similarly named drugs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Drug-selection errors associated with drop-down menu prescribing for similarly named drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “4. That drop-down menu prescribing is more likely to lead to errors in drug selection for drugs of similar names. ”

    Source location

    Sidra Aliabase · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue and deliver updated guidance and training on safer Cerner drug-search practices to reduce medication-selection errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Issued further guidance to clinical teams on safer drug search practices in Cerner (e.g., entering more characters before selection) to mitigate mis-selection risk. This is already factored into training and has been updated to reflect the issues identified in Sidra's care. Training took place across the Acute Provider Collaborative (Imperial College Healthcare, Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS FT, The Hillingdon Hospitals and London North West University Healthcare) in the week of 02 March 2026, as well as in induction for new doctors.”

    Source location

    Response from Chelsea and Westminster Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide regular neonatal simulation training covering medication-selection error scenarios in in-situ and StiNE courses.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Simulation training is regularly given to the Neonatal team with this scenario for both in-situ and StiNE courses (simulation training in neonatal emergencies)”

    Source location

    Response from Chelsea and Westminster Hospital
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 January 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Oracle must determine whether mitigations can be implemented within the Cerner prescribing system to reduce drug-selection errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust electronic patient system ("Cerner") is provided by Oracle. This is a nationally-distributed electronic system that supports NHS Trusts with appointments, admissions, theatre management, clinical note recording, observations and assessments, ordering procedures, discharging patients and medication administration.”

    Source location

    Response from Chelsea and Westminster Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 January 2026

    Open published response
  8. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review the patient before prescribing a controlled drug

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to scrutinise prescribed medication and medication-system information

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate networks for Controlled Drugs Accountable Officers and Medication Safety Officers to receive and spread learning from medication errors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide guidance and tools to NHS Trusts for learning from patient safety incidents and improving controlled-drug safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England offers support to providers to improve the safe use of controlled drugs. NHS Trusts must appoint a Controlled Drugs Accountable Officer and a Medication Safety Officer. Their remits differ however both have a duty to ensure the safe use of opioids in their organisations. NHS England operates networks for both groups to receive and spread the learning from errors. We also offer guidance and tools to enable NHS Trusts to effectively learn from patient safety incidents through the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework. We note that the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan for the Princess Alexandra Hospital includes workstreams to improve safety in ED, in Medicines management, controlled drugs and medicines reconciliation.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remove the option to modify existing prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system, requiring cancellation or discontinuation and reordering with clinical warnings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9th June on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clarify morphine product names and predefine twice-daily frequency for modified-release morphine prescriptions in the electronic prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we have recognised there is a huge variation in morphine formulation and type and have made the naming of products clearer. For example, MST is noted as ‘Morphine MODIFIED RELEASE 12 HOURLY tablets’ on the system. We have also pre-defined the frequency as twice a day.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Education and training alone would not sufficiently mitigate recurrence; systems improvements and mechanisms are also required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The NICE medicines optimisation guidance NG 5 (2015) referenced above recommends that organisations support healthcare professionals through training and education to ensure safe prescribing, dispensing and administration. In this specific case, education and training alone would not prevent these types of safety system issues and would not be sufficient to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence. Systems improvements and mechanisms will need to be implemented to ensure lessons are learnt and that the current organisational and systems factors and processes highlighted in this case are addressed, to ensure the safe and effective checking and administration of medications. This has been substantiated by safety research and incident analysis.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  9. Black Country

    AI-generated summary

    Danielle Monique Christina JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Danielle Jones was found unresponsive at home on 13 May 2025 and was confirmed deceased by paramedics. Post-mortem toxicology found high levels of amitriptyline, excess zopiclone and recent substantial cocaine use; the recorded cause was combined multidrug toxicity. The principal concerns were that, despite reported prescription overdoses and concerns raised by a drug and alcohol service, her repeat prescription medication does not appear to have been reviewed and was continued in large quantities at 28-day frequency.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continued prescribing of repeat medications in large amounts at 28-day frequency after overdose disclosure

    Wider context from the report

    “5. Although Miss Jones was signposted to Mental Health Services by her GP, her prescription medications do not appear to have been reviewed and the GP surgery continued to prescribed repeat medications in large amounts at 28 day frequency without any further review subsequent to her appointment on 25/2/25. 6. She was issued with repeat prescriptions on 3 occasions subsequent to her appointment on 24th and 25th February 2025 when she self-closed an overdose of prescription medication. 7. On 6/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed 8. On 27/3/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████ Miss Jones was prescribed Amitriptyline ████████ Diazepam ████████ lamotrigine ████████ mirtazapine ████████ pregabalin ████████ zopiclone 9. On 28/4/25 despite a recent self-reported admitted overdose of prescription medication of ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████ Miss Jones was prescribed ████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ 10. Miss Jones died on 13/5/25 from the combined toxic effects of a fatal level of amitriptyline along with an excessive amount of zopiclone. 11. The clinical lead at Cranstoun had previously had discussions with the GP about reducing Miss Jones prescription for zopiclone. 12. No medication review appears to have taken place after Miss Jones self-reported overdose of prescribed medication nor after concerns were raised by Cranstoun. 13. GMC Guidance requires a practitioner to prescribe drugs or treatment including repeat prescriptions, only when they have adequate knowledge of the patient’s health and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient’s needs and to keep clear, accurate and legible records, reporting the relevant clinical findings, the decisions made. 14. There is no clinical rationale recorded for the continued prescribing of Miss Jones’s repeat medications in terms of managing Miss Jones’s risk of overdose given her recent disclosure e.g. reducing the frequency to 7 days rather than 28 days. 15. There is no evidence of any medication review having taken place after Miss Jones’s disclosure of overdose of prescription medication or prior to her repeat prescriptions being issued on 6/2/25, 27/3/25 or 28/4/25. Her last reported medication review was on 23/8/24. ”

    Source location

    Danielle Monique Christina JONES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the self-harm follow-up policy to require medication review and consideration of reducing prescription quantities where ongoing risk exists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will amend our follow up policy to specifically mention the need for medication review at the time of pro-active follow up, and in particular to consider reducing the amount of medication per prescription if there is any ongoing risk of further self-harm and especially with high-risk medications.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend the self-harm risk-assessment template to record medication review discussions, stockpiling, medication safety, prescription quantity, and medication supervision options.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will amend our risk assessment template to include a mental health medication review code and free text advice regarding the following with a free text box to record discussions.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 3 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the annual proactive self-harm follow-up audit to record medication reviews and discussions about prescribed medication quantities.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will re-launch this amended policy in January 2026 with our clinicians and add the recording of medication review and recording of consideration of reducing amount of medication on each issue as part of the annual audit program.”

    Source location

    Response from Your Health Partnership Regis Medical Centre
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 October 2025

    Open published response
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paula Doreen Hughes was admitted to hospital after a fall and received paracetamol in excess of the recommended dose because paracetamol was prescribed alongside co-codamol. The overdose was not recognised until she had developed fulminant acute liver failure, and timely treatment was not provided. The principal concerns included preventing duplicate paracetamol prescriptions and administration, recognising and managing therapeutic excess, accurately assessing confusion, recording over-the-counter medicines, mitigating confirmation bias, and providing guidance for virtual patient reviews.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol-containing drugs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. In respect of preventing concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs and otherwise preventing prescribing errors resulting in therapeutic excess of paracetamol (NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA, LGT) (1) NHSE, RPS, Cerner, MHRA I consider that the risk of concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs is of wider national concern. The Cerner prescribing system offers a duplicate checking functionality that is not a standard feature. It is hard stop and can be overridden and was not adopted by the LGT when the system was introduced. All the healthcare professionals were aware that co-codamol contained paracetamol and should not be prescribed with paracetamol. However, the 2 prescribing doctors failed to recognise that Mrs Hughes was already prescribed a paracetamol containing drug. 2 nurses failed to recognise they were administering 2 paracetamol containing drugs. A pharmacist failed to identify the concurrent prescriptions during reconciliation. (2) LGT LGT’s response to the incident was swift and commendable. A hard stop was introduced to the electronic prescribing system which eliminated concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol containing drugs. Further refinements of the system significantly reduced therapeutic excesses of paracetamol based on weight, which had been identified as an issue when investigating Mrs Hughes’ death. However, it is my understanding that consideration is being given to changing the electronic record and prescribing system. My concern is that during any move to a new system, the safety nets introduced by the Trust will be diluted or lost. ”

    Source location

    Paula Doreen Hughes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commission and maintain the ePRASE toolkit, including therapeutic duplication scenarios in its finalised 2025 release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England commissioned the ‘ePrescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation’ (ePRASE) toolkit, which is an online self-assessment tool that NHS secondary care providers are able to register to use with annual releases. It is intended to test how effectively e-prescribing systems respond to high-risk prescribing scenarios. The 2025 release is now finalised and therapeutic duplication as a theme is included. This incident will be considered as part of the review of the scenarios for the next release in 2026 as a priority area.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review therapeutic-duplication scenarios as a priority for the 2026 ePRASE release.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England commissioned the ‘ePrescribing Risk and Safety Evaluation’ (ePRASE) toolkit, which is an online self-assessment tool that NHS secondary care providers are able to register to use with annual releases. It is intended to test how effectively e-prescribing systems respond to high-risk prescribing scenarios. The 2025 release is now finalised and therapeutic duplication as a theme is included. This incident will be considered as part of the review of the scenarios for the next release in 2026 as a priority area.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise with NHS England about preventing prescribing systems from dispensing two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have liaised with NHSE with regard to the ability of the prescribing system to dispense two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol and we understand they will incorporate learning from this incident into the commissioning of the ePRaSE tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete a detailed review of Millennium’s duplicate-prescription and paracetamol overdose alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Oracle Health was saddened to learn of, and deeply regrets, the various medical omissions at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital (“QE Hospital”) and extends its condolences to the family of the Deceased and others bereaved. Oracle Health assures the Deceased’s family that the contents of the Report are taken extremely seriously. While there is no suggestion that Oracle Health’s Millennium software deployed at the QE Hospital was in any way at fault or contributed to the Deceased’s death, Oracle Health conducted a detailed review of that software in response to the Report and concludes as follows (key findings are highlighted in bold throughout):”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue augmenting the content and functionality of Millennium alert notifications, including overdose-related alerts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue working with Trust clients to inform and educate them about available alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss safeguards against paracetamol dosing incidents with Trust clients through quarterly meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.4. Oracle Health has no record of LGT raising any relevant service or test issues as part of the deployment testing process or subsequent to the systems going live. Approaches to safeguard against paracetamol dosing incidents were discussed with a number of Trust clients, including LGT, at a regular quarterly meeting in June 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce the UK Administration Alert Notification and explain its triggers, operation and implementation options to Trusts through a Special Interest Group meeting.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13. Oracle Health holds Special Interest Group (“SIG”) meetings approximately every quarter, which enable Oracle to share enhancements, upgrades, and best practices with regard to Millennium functionality. They also enable clients to come together and present on any issues encountered within particular fields. At a SIG meeting in September 2022, Oracle Health introduced the Administration Alert Notification in the UK, including details about its form, how the alert is triggered, and how Trusts could seek to implement it. Trust clients in attendance also provided feedback on how the alert notification might be refined in the future. At a SIG meeting in June 2024, LGT raised in general terms paracetamol dosing incidents as a topic for discussion among other Trust clients, including whether any additional alert notifications may have been implemented by those Trusts internally.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Present updates to the Administration Alert Notification, including patient-weight-based maximum-dose calculations, to Trust clients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the same meeting, Oracle Health presented updates to the Administration Alert Notification, including functionality that would take into account the patient’s weight in calculating the maximum dose before triggering the alert notification.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue reviewing and monitoring Trust-client awareness of duplicate-prescription and paracetamol overdose alert functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “15. Oracle Health considers that the Millennium prescribing system features are appropriate and functioning as designed in respect of the risk of duplicate paracetamol doses, including the Prescription Duplicate Alert Notification and the Administration Alert Notifications. Oracle Health will continue to review and monitor awareness of this functionality among its Trust clients.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue discussing potential software or configuration enhancements with clients, including their appropriateness and workflow impact.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. As noted above, Oracle Health continuously engages in ongoing dialogue with its clients regarding software code and configuration enhancements to its Millennium solutions. Such enhancements can arise at the global, or national, level in response to the knowledge and experience gained by Oracle Health from working with its extensive client base. They can also arise in response to specific issues at the level of local deployments. In each case, Oracle Health will discuss with its client the appropriateness of taking a potential upgrade and its impact on existing workflows and the user interface. Ultimately, the decision on whether to take a particular code or configuration enhancement remains with the client and can involve clinical and commercial considerations.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain electronic prescribing alerts preventing duplicate or excessive paracetamol prescribing and administration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are several safety elements incorporated into the Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust (LGT) electronic prescribing and medicines administration (EPMA) system, iCare. This includes a ‘hard stop’ on prescribing concomitant paracetamol containing products and a number of ‘soft stops’ as listed below:”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Seek assurance that Epic will implement iCare paracetamol safety features when introduced across the three Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In May 2027, the Trust will be joining Epic, an electronic records and prescribing system shared by our neighbouring Trusts, Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (GSTT) and King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (KCH).”

    Source location

    Response from Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHSE is responsible for incorporating incident learning into commissioning the ePRaSE prescribing system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have liaised with NHSE with regard to the ability of the prescribing system to dispense two concurrent medicines containing paracetamol and we understand they will incorporate learning from this incident into the commissioning of the ePRaSE tool.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines & Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Building electronic prescribing alerts requires national oversight to coordinate work with secondary-care system suppliers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We believe that steps could be taken to try and build alerts and warnings for the unacceptable duplication of medicines in these electronic prescribing systems to make them safer. This would require national oversight to coordinate work with secondary care system suppliers.”

    Source location

    Response from Royal Pharmaceutical Society
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No evidence has been identified that the software contains a defect or deficiency relevant to duplicate paracetamol prescribing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.1. Oracle Health was invited to comment on one specific issue in the Report, out of a number of identified issues, which issue related to concurrent prescriptions of paracetamol and duplicate checking functionality. Further to its review, Oracle Health has not identified any evidence of any defect or deficiency in its software.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing prescribing and administration alert functionality is considered appropriate and functioning as designed, so further alert-notification code development is unnecessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2.5. Oracle Health does not consider that any further code development of alert notifications is required, but it continues to augment the content and function of all alert notifications and Millennium in general. Oracle Health will continue to work closely with its Trust clients to inform and educate them on the available functionality.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The client decides whether to adopt particular code or configuration enhancements, taking account of clinical and commercial considerations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “14. As noted above, Oracle Health continuously engages in ongoing dialogue with its clients regarding software code and configuration enhancements to its Millennium solutions. Such enhancements can arise at the global, or national, level in response to the knowledge and experience gained by Oracle Health from working with its extensive client base. They can also arise in response to specific issues at the level of local deployments. In each case, Oracle Health will discuss with its client the appropriateness of taking a potential upgrade and its impact on existing workflows and the user interface. Ultimately, the decision on whether to take a particular code or configuration enhancement remains with the client and can involve clinical and commercial considerations.”

    Source location

    Response from Oracle
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026