Recurring concern

Unreliable shift handover processes

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First reported 21 Nov 2013•Latest report 26 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of shift-change handover processes, including incomplete handover content, failure to review or communicate relevant information, and premature destruction or unavailable handover records where this impairs reference by responsible staff.

Not included

  • Excludes clinical handover failures between services or teams where no shift-change handover process is identified.
  • Excludes generic record-retention deficiencies involving records unrelated to shift handover.
  • Excludes failures of patient observations, care delivery or escalation where the shift-handover process is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes generic communication or documentation deficiencies that are not specifically part of a shift-change handover.
Reports
36

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
41

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
50

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

HM Prison and Probation Service4
Care Quality Commission2
Department of Health and Social Care2
Ministry of Justice2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Pennine Acute Hospitals NHS Trust2
Alternative Futures Group Limited1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Bedford Prison1
Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB1
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust1
Bolton NHS Foundation Trust1
Care UK Limited1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Devon Partnership NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Exeter & Great Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Elaine JOBE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elaine JOBE, an informal voluntary psychiatric patient aged 53, was found hanging in a bathroom at Ocean View on 2 February 2011 after being placed on general hourly observation. Resuscitation and transfer to hospital did not avert her death. Concerns included inadequate records of risk assessments and observations, staff training, and communication of patient status and monitoring responsibilities between shifts.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate patient status to incoming staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(3)Communication of patient status to incoming staff Communication of patient status with other members of staff and identification of a named nurse with responsibility for each patient on every shift needs to be reviewed so all staff are clear as to which patients they must monitor. ”

    Source location

    Elaine JOBE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use ward allocation boards, shift planners, staff identification boards and minimum handover standards to communicate patient allocations and status to incoming staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since the death of Elaine the ward has an allocation board that is completed for every 24-hour period, showing the staff on duty and which patients they are allocated to. The board is in a prominent position on the ward so that staff and patients can see it. Next to this board is a staff photo board to help patients recognise staff members if they are new to the ward.”

    Source location

    2014-0350-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 July 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing policies, standards and guidance address the concerns; new standards are not required, though further assurance actions will be implemented.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has policies, standards and guidance in place for the areas of concern noted in the report. It is not seen as required to introduce new standards, but to ensure the embeddedness of those currently in place. The Trust has several assurance measures in place, but further actions as described below will be put in place to provide additional assurance.”

    Source location

    2014-0350-Response-by-Devon-Partnership-NHS-Trust
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 July 2014

    Open published response
  2. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Jake Reginald Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jake Reginald Hardy, a 17-year-old detained at HM YOI Hindley, died on 20 January 2012 after being found partially suspended by a ligature in his cell. The report describes failures to identify, record and respond to his vulnerabilities, self-harm risk and reports of verbal bullying, including failures in safeguarding, ACCT care planning, supervision and overnight risk assessment. Concerns also included ligature points in cells, inadequate personal officer support, staff training and communication systems, and limited access to family telephone support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a reliable system for recording and reading important wing information and outstanding tasks during Senior Officer handover

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The shift patterns of Senior Officers working on the wings within HM YOI Hindley are such that they do not always overlap and handover is often by means of written entries in a “handover book”. The handover book I saw contained short notes addressing random matters and there was apparently no routine recording of a more comprehensive review of the shift. There is no system in place to ensure that important information and outstanding tasks are sufficiently recorded by one Senior Officer at the end of his shift and then read by the next Senior Officer at the start of his shift. It was clear from the evidence that it is the Senior Officer’s responsibility to have an overview of what is happening on the wing and matters of relevance to the safeguarding of detainees housed there. Therefore, the passing of key information and outstanding tasks between Senior Officers on a wing is of real importance to the safety of detainees. This concern may be of relevance to other Young Offender Institutes also. ”

    Source location

    Jake Reginald Hardy · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin

    AI-generated summary

    Peter James FAREBROTHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter James Farebrother was found deceased on 24 August 2013, hanging from a belt ligature attached to the en-suite shower door in his room at Pine Ward. Concerns included the delayed transfer to Pine Ward, failures in handover and observation assessment, the return of his belt, and the suitability of the shower door as a ligature attachment point. The inquest jury concluded that the risk of returning his belt and placing him on general observation was not fully recognised and that these factors combined contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of handover to provide sufficient patient knowledge and review time

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The lack of personal knowledge in the handover procedure and the limited time the assessing assistant practitioner had at the start of the morning shift to read Mr Farebrother’s papers. ”

    Source location

    Peter James FAREBROTHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  4. Plymouth, Torbay and South Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Audrey Christine DAWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Audrey Christine Daws was admitted to Derriford Hospital with chest pain and other symptoms, but her chest X-ray was delayed and its result was not identified promptly. The X-ray eventually showed air under the diaphragm indicating a perforation; she underwent surgery, deteriorated and died. The principal concerns were inadequate handover of outstanding investigations and delays in ordering, performing and reviewing the X-ray.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to hand over outstanding investigations and required result checks during staff shift changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Handover of Information. The need for Mrs Daws to undergo a chest X-ray and for the result to be checked appears to have been lost as medical staff have changed at the end/start of consecutive shifts. You may wish to consider whether there needs to be a formal handover in respect of every patient where outstanding investigations are highlighted. ”

    Source location

    Audrey Christine DAWS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use ward patient plans and boards to track investigations, tests and urgent treatment, with daily nursing and medical review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Each ward has a plan for every patient (this involves a whiteboard with a clear plan of daily investigations together with the tests ordered and expected for each patient, which can be tracked by nursing and medical staff). A second board, which includes tests or treatment which are urgent for the on-call doctors is evident by the nurses station. The plans for each patient are discussed on a daily basis with nursing and medical staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0318-Plymouth-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 July 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require review of outstanding tests and verbal and written handover before transferring MAU patients to wards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There is a full handover of every patient on the MAU with outstanding tests – no patient is transferred until all tests have been reviewed and there has been a verbal and written handover to the receiving team on the ward.”

    Source location

    2014-0318-Plymouth-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 July 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct formal handovers for every on-call team to transfer information and identify outstanding tests and concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There are now formal shift handovers for every on-call team, both within the week and weekend, which manage the transfer of information between shifts and identify outstanding tests and cases of concern.”

    Source location

    2014-0318-Plymouth-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 July 2014

    Open published response
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Natasha Raghoo was admitted to The Dene Hospital in April 2012 for treatment related to bipolar disorder and was later detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act. She was found unresponsive in bed on 5 May 2012 and died from anaphylactic shock caused by an unknown allergen. Concerns included inconsistent physical observations, lack of ECG assessment, staff training in resuscitation and defibrillator use, and communication and handover problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent shift handover communication

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Staff handovers occur twice daily in the morning and evening. Those finishing a shift hand over information about the patients to the incoming shift. It was apparent that communication was inconsistent, particularly when bank or agency staff were involved. ”

    Source location

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and standardise handover procedures using signed formal handover documents with a physical-health section.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons Learned and changes made”

    Source location

    2014-0100-Response-by-Partnership-in-Care
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 March 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review, revise and reissue the observation policy, brief relevant staff, obtain responsibility acknowledgements, and audit implementation with spot checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons Learned and changes made”

    Source location

    2014-0100-Response-by-Partnership-in-Care
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The handover concern did not apply on the relevant shift because staff attended handover and the late-arriving worker received a separate handover.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “All staff, regardless of their employment status, attend the nursing handover. On the shift in question, there were no agency staff.”

    Source location

    2014-0100-Response-by-Partnership-in-Care
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 March 2014

    Open published response
  6. Manchester North

    AI-generated summary

    Jack William PARTINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jack Partington was born by planned caesarean section on 25 November 2011 and developed breathing difficulties requiring neonatal ventilation. After developing a pneumothorax, he was treated with intubation and ventilation but deteriorated and died on 26 November 2011. Concerns included gaps in neonatal handover and care planning, treatment decisions made without multidisciplinary consultation, lack of routine use of exhaled carbon dioxide detectors, absence of national guidance on paralysing agents and neonatal ventilation, and inadequate monitoring of ventilatory pressure after intubation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside handover at shift change

    Wider context from the report

    “1) That there was no 1:1 neonatal nurse/cotside ‘handover’ at shift change, no individualised neonatal nursing care plan in use and no routine checks of medical records for new neonatal admissions. ”

    Source location

    Jack William PARTINGTON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Staffing, training, governance and clinical issues are local matters that should be addressed by the NHS Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that you have sent a Regulation 28 report to the local NHS Trust for its response. I believe that the issues concerning staffing, staff training, governance and clinical issues are local issues that should properly be addressed by the Trust.”

    Source location

    2013-0308-Response-by-Department-of-Health
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2014

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026