Recurring concern

Unreliable review of diagnostic imaging before consequential care decisions

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First reported 23 Sep 2013•Latest report 25 Sep 2025

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in the diagnostic-imaging review process where relevant images or reports are not reliably transferred, made available, tracked, reviewed or considered before a consequential clinical decision, including the anchor's failure to review CT C-spine images before surgery and comparable failures involving specialist advice or routine CT-report review.

Not included

  • Excludes errors in interpreting imaging after the relevant images or reports were reviewed; those belong to the existing diagnostic-imaging interpretation concern.
  • Excludes failures to perform or complete an imaging investigation where the material deficiency is access or completion rather than review before a consequential decision.
  • Excludes generic clinical-record, communication or information-transfer deficiencies unless they directly prevent review or consideration of diagnostic imaging before a consequential care decision.
  • Excludes delays or failures in acting on an imaging result after it was reliably reviewed when the review process itself was adequate.
  • Excludes failures confined to a separately named imaging pathway where that pathway supplies the more specific supported parent boundary.
Reports
8

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
8

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2025

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
13

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Care Quality Commission1
Department of Health and Social Care1
EMIS Group1
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust1
North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust1
North West Anglia NHS Foundation Trust1
Recipient name withheld1
the Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust1
York and Scarborough Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North Yorkshire and York

    AI-generated summary

    Pamela Ann HONEYBONE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pamela Ann Honeybone was admitted to Scarborough General Hospital after a fall and died there on 19 October 2024 after being moved to end-of-life care. Another patient with the same first name underwent her required CT scan in error, delaying diagnosis of an abdominal mass suggestive of lymphoma; the inquest concluded that it was not possible to determine whether this contributed to her death. The report identified continuing patient-safety risks from patient misidentification, delayed responses to recognised errors, incomplete investigation, and gaps in patient-identification processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to check CT scan outcomes before patient discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “1. It was accepted in evidence that neither the doctor who escorted the wrong patient from the Emergency Department to radiology, nor the radiographer who undertook the CT scan on her, checked the identity of the patient in question. No transfer checklist was completed, and the patient was not asked to complete and/or sign the CT scanning questionnaire herself. No member of staff inquired as to the outcome of this patient's CT scan prior to her discharge a few hours later. ”

    Source location

    Pamela Ann HONEYBONE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Jordanne Rose ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jordanne Rose ROBERTS was assessed in hospital after falling down stairs, but was discharged before the full CT scan report was read. The final report identified a pulmonary embolism, and Jordanne collapsed and died at home two days later. The principal concern was that locum doctors might not have received or completed training on reading both parts of CT scan reports, creating a risk that life-threatening conditions could go undiagnosed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure that all locum doctors receive training to read both parts of CT scan reports

    Wider context from the report

    “1) Jordanne’s death arose because a locum doctor, said to be the most senior doctor on duty in the Emergency Department on 10.8.24, did not know that her CT scan taken that day would be reported in two parts. The initial report did not mention the presence of a pulmonary embolism, but did make clear that a second and final report was to follow. The doctor proceeded to make the decision to discharge Jordanne without reading the second and final report, which highlighted the pulmonary embolism; 2) In her evidence at inquest, ████████ ( Head of Patient Safety at the Trust ) confirmed: (a) that all of the Trust’s own employed doctors receive training so that they ensure that both parts of any CT scan report are read; (b) that all new locum doctors working for the Trust are provided with an induction pack, which highlights the requirement to read both parts of any CT scan report. However, ████████ was unable to confirm that steps have been taken to ensure that all locum doctors already working at the Trust have received the equivalent training. She indicated that they have been invited to attend education sessions in which this topic has been covered, but that no record is kept of whether those doctors did in fact attend. I am therefore concerned that unless and until the Trust is able to ensure that all locum doctors working at its hospitals have received training about the need to read both parts of a CT scan report, there remains a risk that ( as in this case ) life-threatening conditions may go undiagnosed, and consequently that patients’ lives may be put at risk. ”

    Source location

    Jordanne Rose ROBERTS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver anonymised investigation learning through regular shop-floor teaching and board rounds to reach staff, including locum doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The learning from this investigation via an anonymised case study was discussed in regular shop floor teaching and board rounds (i.e. teaching in the department with the staff on duty), done over a period of time to maximise saturation and to cover all staff. - A email containing this learning was sent to all our regular doctors, including locums, at the time - There was also a lesson of the week circulated post the completion of the report reminding staff of this fact (see attached)”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospital NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Email investigation learning to regular doctors, including locum doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The learning from this investigation via an anonymised case study was discussed in regular shop floor teaching and board rounds (i.e. teaching in the department with the staff on duty), done over a period of time to maximise saturation and to cover all staff. - A email containing this learning was sent to all our regular doctors, including locums, at the time - There was also a lesson of the week circulated post the completion of the report reminding staff of this fact (see attached)”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospital NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate a lesson-of-the-week reminder about reading both parts of CT scan reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- The learning from this investigation via an anonymised case study was discussed in regular shop floor teaching and board rounds (i.e. teaching in the department with the staff on duty), done over a period of time to maximise saturation and to cover all staff. - A email containing this learning was sent to all our regular doctors, including locums, at the time - There was also a lesson of the week circulated post the completion of the report reminding staff of this fact (see attached)”

    Source location

    Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospital NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 14 July 2025

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    William Charles Hare (Bill) · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Charles Hare (Bill) presented with abdominal and left loin pain in November 2022 and was subsequently diagnosed with metastatic urothelial cancer. He died in a hospice on 23 January 2024 after delays in diagnosis and treatment, including delays in biopsy, specialist review, MDT consideration, hospital transfer and scan results. The report identified systemic and procedural errors and ineffective coordination between Basildon and Southend Hospitals as substantive concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in MDT consideration of CT scan results and treatment plans

    Wider context from the report

    “iv. There was an additional delay between the further CT scan ordered by the Consultant, which took place on 5 June, and the MDT which considered the results and treatment plan on 29 August, notwithstanding the fact that the MDT meet weekly and Bill’s case could have been considered at any of those meetings. ”

    Source location

    William Charles Hare (Bill) · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate a focused weekly kidney and upper-tract urological cancer MDT reviewing relevant recent scans with specialist multidisciplinary participation across hospital sites.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A further key development is the creation of a focused weekly kidney/upper tract urological cancers MDT (multi-disciplinary team) meeting. By separating this MDT from the general pelvic MDT, patients with suspected upper tract urological cancers are reviewed in a very timely manner and it is our routine practice to review all relevant patient scans taken within the past 7 days.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use one comprehensive patient-tracking system across hospital sites to monitor cancer pathways, diagnostic reporting, timescales and required escalations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We now have one comprehensive patient tracking system for all hospital sites providing a centralised monitoring for all cancer patients and their progress through the cancer pathway.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Weekly specialist MDT meetings and centralised tracking are considered sufficient to prevent delays in scan review and treatment planning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We are not experiencing any delays between scans and the MDT review and patient clinics to review results are happening, and within the timescale prescribed within the cancer pathway.”

    Source location

    Response from Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2025

    Open published response
  4. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Richard David ROE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard David Roe underwent scans that showed evidence of pancreatic cancer, but the recommended review of the scan was not completed. A later scan showed metastatic pancreatic cancer, and he subsequently died. The principal concern was that there was no current system to ensure routine CT scan reports were reviewed and actioned by clinicians.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a method for ensuring clinician review of routine CT scan reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that there is currently no method for ensuring that routine CT scan reports are reviewed by clinicians. This is despite a similar occurrence in May 2021. The inquest heard that the Trust are investigating a new IT System which will be able to flag when such issues occur. However this is a medium/long term project with no current completion date known and there is no system in place at present to prevent a repeat of such an incident. ”

    Source location

    Richard David ROE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve the electronic records system to include requested reports and enable tracking of report viewing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is in the process of improving its electronic records system so that it is comprehensive and includes all reports requested by clinicians including radiology reports. This is a substantial financial investment by the Trust both in terms of the technology and the staff time needed to implement it. The details of the system haven’t yet been finalised but it will give the Trust more management and audit options and it is expected to include an easier ability to track the viewing of all types of reports including those for routine radiology scans.”

    Source location

    Response by North West Anglia NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Produce monthly reports identifying unviewed routine radiology scans using the current radiology system.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, as you note, the implementation of the improved records system is some way off and as an interim measure we’ve reviewed the abilities of the current radiology system and it can, and will, produce reports of unviewed scans (initially monthly) which can then be followed up with the requesting clinicians and/or their departments. The ability of the present system to provide information in detail is limited and at the moment it will identify a large number of unviewed images (most of which would be expected and not a concern) but in liaison with the external providers of the system we expect to be able to refine the information to better identify any scans that have been overlooked.”

    Source location

    Response by North West Anglia NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinicians who request routine scans and their departments remain primarily responsible for reviewing reports.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reviewing scan reports appropriately and timeously has always been, and will remain, the primary responsibility of the clinicians who requested them and/or their departments. However that failed for Mr Roe and we accept that there needs to be a system to ensure that routine scans aren’t overlooked which isn’t dependent on individual clinicians or their departments.”

    Source location

    Response by North West Anglia NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 24 December 2024

    Open published response
  5. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Mantador Ross · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Mantador Ross sustained a subdural haemorrhage and cervical spine fracture after falling down stairs at home on 8 July 2020. The spinal fracture was misinterpreted and remained undiagnosed; later failures to maintain immobilisation and delays in MRI contributed to cardiac arrest and severe neurological injury. He subsequently developed pneumonia following an aspiration episode, and the inquest found that neglect contributed to his death. Concerns also included failures to review and communicate CT findings and poor clinical record-keeping.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review CT C-spine images before burr-hole surgery

    Wider context from the report

    “1. A CT C-spine requested on the admission on 8 July 2020 was misreported as normal. 2. Following that report, during the initial referral of Mr Ross to neurosurgery, the reviewing surgeon noticed an abnormality in Mr Ross’s CT Spine, made no note of his finding and did not escalate his finding to any other clinician. 3. Prior to burr-hole surgery, the neurosurgical team did not review the CT C spine images. 1. A CT C-spine requested on the admission on 8 July 2020 was misreported as normal. 2. Following that report, during the initial referral of Mr Ross to neurosurgery, the reviewing surgeon noticed an abnormality in Mr Ross’s CT Spine, made no note of his finding and did not escalate his finding to any other clinician. 3. Prior to burr-hole surgery, the neurosurgical team did not review the CT C spine images. 4. Repeated failures in communication between; neurosurgical, emergency medicine, nursing staff, and physiotherapists led to serious harm to Mr Ross. 5. Clinical records were poorly maintained, exacerbating the lapses in communication between those treating Mr Ross. ”

    Source location

    Peter Mantador Ross · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Darran Busby · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darran Busby was at home with his family on 14 August 2021 and ended his life. Before his death, he had undergone an MRI scan after complaining of headaches, but the result was never reviewed by a clinician. The report raised concerns that weaknesses in the electronic systems could allow radiology results requiring urgent follow-up to be filed without clinical review, potentially creating a risk of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the result-filing function to prevent multiple-click filing of subsequent results without clinician review

    Wider context from the report

    “After it became apparent that the result of Mr Busby's MRI scan had not been reviewed by a clinician, a consultant employed by North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust ('the Trust') undertook an investigation. He noted that the Trust use EMIS as an electronic patient record. He explained that the Trust used a separate system called ICE to gather the results of tests or scans. ICE is capable of linking to EMIS to input results into the EMIS system. Once a test result has been linked to a patient in EMIS the result enters the EMIS record as a provisional result pending review, and is placed on a work list. The consultant or a deputy then reviews the result, files it with or without comment and records any actions taken. EMIS provides two options: 'file no comment' and 'file and comment'. Results of blood tests which are undertaken to monitor treatment and which are normal may be filed without comment. If there is an abnormality flagged, however, EMIS will default to the file with comment dialogue box even if file no comment is selected. This acts as a safeguard against missing a significant finding. Unfortunately, there is no flag attached in the ICE system for abnormal radiology results, and so no failsafe exists for defaulting to a 'file and comment' if a significant positive or negative finding is reported. In the course of investigating what occurred in relation to Mr Busby's MRI scan, it was determined that clicking more than once on the 'file no comment' button will result in the displayed result being filed, but will also result in filing of the next in the list if that result has no flag indicating the result is abnormal. Thus if a radiology result lies below a normal blood result and a clinician inadvertently double clicks to file the first result, the radiology result is also filed without comment and without the result being displayed. Furthermore, multiple clicks up to 6 (and perhaps even beyond) will lead to multiple filings. In the result it is possible that a clinician inadvertently clicking 'file no comment' more than once on one result would cause results which require urgent follow up being filed without a clinician being involved. I am concerned that this might lead to lost opportunities to treat patients whose scans reveal, for instance, early malignancies. It might also mean that scans which reveal the need for urgent action will be overlooked. I am therefore concerned that future deaths will occur. I was impressed by the candour of the report provided to me and the efforts that the Trust have already taken to resolve this issue. However I noted that the evidence I received was that "In order to fix this issue it is likely it will require action by the publishers of EMIS to prevent accidental filing of results. To attempt to mitigate this issue whilst a permanent fix is sought I have worked with colleagues from Pathology and Radiology to attempt to have all radiology results (where the greatest risk lies) flagged within the ICE system as abnormal, so that any attempt to file the result prompts via the file and comment dialogue box. Unfortunately at the time of writing this letter the flag, which is triggered in ICE for any radiology report originating within Cumbria Neuroscience, does not carry through to EMIS and we continue to seek a local solution to mitigate this newly identified risk." In the circumstances I have concluded that it is necessary for action to be taken to prevent future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Darran Busby · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test a workable EMIS solution and continue collaborating with EMIS on system fixes, user communication and escalation of identified risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust’s Digital Services has since engaged with EMIS in support of testing a workable solution, and have made available all resources necessary to support the work on this issue.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-North-Cumbria-Integrated-Care_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Return the Cockermouth Hospital community ward to the ICE Order Comms system after assessing the affected functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ward at Cockermouth Hospital reverted back to using the ICE Order Comms system (ICE was outlined in the Trust’s evidence to the inquest), following an initial assessment of the functionality. Whilst this option”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-North-Cumbria-Integrated-Care_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase Neurology team vigilance when reviewing results and stop using “file no comment” in favour of “File and Comment” to require clinician review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the interim Dr ████████ and the Neurology team have increased vigilance when reviewing results, and have accepted the key recommendation from the Digital Services to stop using the “file no Comment” button in favour of the “File and Comment” button. This approach will introduce a direct action by the clinician that means a result cannot be filed inadvertently as a pop box always appears. This introduces extra mouse clicks and is therefore more time consuming but does provide the assurance that the results cannot be filed without appropriate review until a more robust system based solution is in place.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-North-Cumbria-Integrated-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a separate Rad Alert system that emails referrers about significant radiology findings and escalates unacknowledged alerts to alternative clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this information has been shared with EMIS to inform their consideration of solutions to this issue the Trust has sought other appropriate remedies. The Trust is implementing a Rad Alert system, which will operate separately, though alongside ICE and upon recognising an alert code in a radiology report it will email the referring consultant/GP to advise them of a significant radiology finding. In the event the email is not acknowledged within a given time period (variable according to the severity of the alert) the system will alert the rad alert admin in order that alternate clinicians can be emailed. This should prevent a recurrence of this incident regardless of whether the report is being reviewed on EMIS or on ICE as it is a separate way of highlighting the significance of the report to the referrer. It is anticipated that the RAD system will be implemented in April 2022.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-North-Cumbria-Integrated-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Notify Primary Care colleagues using EMIS about the risk and required precautions through the CCG Chief Clinical Information Officer.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has notified colleagues in Primary Care as users of EMIS through discussion with the CCG Chief Clinical Information Officer, to minimise any similar adverse action within GP provision.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-North-Cumbria-Integrated-Care_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing EMIS Web failsafes, combined with appropriate user diligence, are considered sufficient to prevent inadvertent filing of multiple results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to any inadvertent filing activity, EMIS believe that there are sufficient failsafe measures within the system, alongside appropriate diligence from the user, to prevent such occurrence. It must be the responsibility of the clinician to review, file and subsequently archive results at a speed and with a level of diligence that fits the clinical nature of the results and the patient involved.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-EMIS_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinicians are responsible for reviewing, filing and archiving results at a speed and diligence appropriate to their clinical nature and patient context.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to any inadvertent filing activity, EMIS believe that there are sufficient failsafe measures within the system, alongside appropriate diligence from the user, to prevent such occurrence. It must be the responsibility of the clinician to review, file and subsequently archive results at a speed and with a level of diligence that fits the clinical nature of the results and the patient involved.”

    Source location

    2022-0011-Response-from-EMIS_Published
    Page 5 · response
    Published 20 January 2022

    Open published response
  7. North and West Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    William Walter Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Walter Jackson was diagnosed with severe aortic disease and underwent aortic valve and ascending-aorta replacement surgery in June 2013. After becoming unwell in August, a CT scan showed haemorrhage in the descending aorta, but the report did not identify features of a contained rupture; he died on 4 September 2013. The concerns included the lack of a formal record of advice from the Freeman Hospital, uncertainty about whether the CT images were reviewed, and the potential risk to patients from how such advice was given.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review CT scan images before providing specialist advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The CIC records showed that an A&E doctor had spoken to a Specialist Cardio Thoracic Registrar at the Freeman Hospital. Inquiries of the Freeman showed that there was no record/ recollection of this contact. (2) I understand there is no system at the Freeman to formally record sudden interactions. This means no traceable record and no means by which the Freeman doctor could be identified let alone recall the advice given. (3) The advice appears to have been given without the Freeman doctor actually seeing the CT scan. Has the images been reviewed it is possible that the true state of the deceased’s health would have been ascertained. (4) Independent of the issue of an enquiry being able to establish what advice was given at the time; there is a risk that the way such advice appears to have been given could place patients lives at risk. ”

    Source location

    William Walter Jackson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further develop the recording system to prompt documentation of key items, including radiological images viewed when providing an opinion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(ii) Further planned actions:”

    Source location

    2014-0509-Response-by-Newcastle-upon-Tyne-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 24 November 2014

    Open published response
  8. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Yvonne Sydney Annie Perry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Yvonne Sydney Annie Perry fractured her left hip after a fall at home, and the possibility of the fracture identified on 19 December 2012 was not acted upon until early January 2013. She later developed a severe urinary tract infection and died of sepsis on 2 February 2013; concerns included the lack of a robust process for tracking radiology reports and the absence of GP access to electronic hospital notes and records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a robust process for tracking review of radiology reports by emergency department consultants

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the x-ray taken of Mrs. Perry’s hip, reported on by the consultant radiologist on the 19th December 2012, was not acted upon until the 3rd January 2013. It was recognised that the Hospital “do not have a robust process for tracking that the emergency department consultants have looked at the radiology reports.” Without such a system I believe further deaths may occur in the future. ”

    Source location

    Yvonne Sydney Annie Perry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026