Recurring concern

Unreliable reporting of safety-relevant information to the CQC

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 10 Jan 2014•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in arrangements for determining, preparing and submitting safety-relevant reports to the CQC, including unclear reporting thresholds and omitted mandatory notifications of significant events or care-related information.

Not included

  • Excludes reporting failures to NHSE, the MHRA or other bodies unless the assertion also directly concerns the CQC reporting process.
  • Excludes failures in CQC inspection, investigation, record access or regulatory action after information should have been reported.
  • Excludes generic incident reporting or information-sharing deficiencies without an identified CQC reporting obligation.
  • Excludes ordinary administrative notifications that have no identified safety relevance.
Reports
9

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
10

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
14

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Care Quality Commission4
Department of Health and Social Care2
NHS England2
Alternative Futures Group Limited1
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust1
Durham Constabulary1
Durham County Council1
Four Seasons Health Care Group1
gtd healthcare1
Hurst Hall1
Information Commissioner's Office1
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency1
NHS South Yorkshire Integrated Care Board1
Nursing and Midwifery Council1
Pentree Lodge1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Ruariri Thomas STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ruariri Thomas Stewart, aged 29, died from fatal cocaine toxicity at Weaver Lodge Independent Hospital on 31 July 2025 after a period of unescorted leave during which he probably obtained cocaine. The report identifies concerns about failures in documentation, communication, information sharing, leave decision-making, substance-misuse management, record keeping, and the quality of post-incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify the CQC of periods of absence without leave

    Wider context from the report

    “10. The CQC were not notified of periods when the patient went absence without leave ”

    Source location

    Ruariri Thomas STEWART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Submit general safeguarding concerns to the CQC and clarify staff statutory reporting requirements, including safeguarding duties.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Following the Inquest, a safeguarding submission was made by AFG to the CQC as regards the general concerns raised at the hearing, and AFG has in addition clarified and reminded all staff of their statutory reporting requirements, including in respect of safeguarding.”

    Source location

    Response from Alternative Futures Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    AFG was not legally required to report unauthorised absences to the CQC because Weaver Lodge did not meet the prescribed security-unit categories.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CQC were not notified of periods when the patient went absence without leave.”

    Source location

    Response from Alternative Futures Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Maureen POWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maureen Powell died from severe frailty after a prolonged period of ill health, hospitalisation and transfer to a nursing home. A serious pressure ulcer developed and worsened in the nursing home and contributed to her death. Concerns included inadequate recording and implementation of repositioning, failure to record skin inspections, delayed equipment and specialist referral, poor record-keeping, inaccurate reporting, and insufficient communication with her family.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate reporting of incidents to regulators and social care

    Wider context from the report

    “10. Inaccurate reports were made to the CQC and social care about the incidents; and ”

    Source location

    Maureen POWELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require serious-injury notification reports to receive Operations Manager review before submission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Point 10 – Previously it was the responsibility of the Home Manager, as the responsible person, to complete any necessary safeguarding or CQC notifications. Following the Inquest, this process has been amended to require that all serious injury notification reports must be sent to the Operations Manager for review prior to submission.”

    Source location

    Response from Red Oaks Care Home
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 June 2025

    Open published response
  3. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Sylvia Margaret Louisa SAVAGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sylvia Margaret Louisa Savage died on 25 April 2023 at the University Hospital of North Durham from bronchopneumonia, following a fall from her bed at Redwell Hills Care Home on 18 March 2023 and subsequent injuries and decline in health. The concerns included unclear fall-reporting arrangements, ineffective monitoring of her mobilisation, inadequate post-fall medical assessment, missing or insufficient care records, and failure to promptly reassess her care plan after falls.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear and timely internal and external fall reporting

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was I heard no clear definition of when to report falls externally & internally - this to me is perhaps the reason why the fall Mrs Savage suffered on 1/2/23 was not recorded internally, all be it CQC were notified on this occasion. The fall on 18/3/23 was not reported to CQC and whilst I understand staff at the care home did not know the outcome of Mrs Savage's treatment in hospital - she left the home by ambulance and did not return. This seems an occurrence worthy of reporting – It strikes me some clearer reporting structure is necessary - timely and accurate reporting both internally and to regulators allows for those concerned to assess the care home and decide on whether there are risks/issues that need addressing and protect residents. I would suggest over reporting is preferable to under reporting. ”

    Source location

    Sylvia Margaret Louisa SAVAGE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate RADAR incident reporting with mandatory fall details, investigation workflows, escalation prompts and regulatory notification requirements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Group operates a digital incident management platform (RADAR) which allows team members of all grades to report incidents affecting residents, team members and any visitors to the care home. The system also offers prompts to ensure appropriate categorisation of the incident and to support necessary further actions including referral to external agencies and management by regional support teams.”

    Source location

    Response from Four Seasons Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide mandatory falls-awareness training and refresher training for care and clinical staff through blended learning and face-to-face delivery.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Clinical Risk Management Policy (also exhibited to ████████’s statement) was adopted by the Group in 2021, with a body of supporting material for guidance on falls risk and post-falls management. Falls Awareness training was introduced as part of an induction program to new home starters across the Group from April 2020 and then as mandatory training for all care and clinical team members from April 2021.”

    Source location

    Response from Four Seasons Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Analyse falls incidents monthly, validate home practice through regional reviews and use trend monitoring to identify and address emerging risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Each home in the Group is required to complete an incident analysis each month which is produced via the RADAR system, this is then validated during the Regional Manager Provider Validation Review which is”

    Source location

    Response from Four Seasons Healthcare
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response
  4. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Yousef Al-Kharboush and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Aviva Otte died in January 2014 after receiving TPN provided and compounded by an NHS establishment; the TPN was, on balance, contaminated with Bacillus cereus. Oscar Barker and Yousef Al-Kharboush died in June 2014 after receiving TPN compounded by a commercial provider that was also contaminated with Bacillus cereus. The principal concerns were unclear or absent requirements for section 10 exempt entities to report adverse-event findings and uncertainty about reporting thresholds and wider dissemination of information that could help other providers assess risks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear thresholds for section 10 entity reporting to NHSE and the CQC

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) There is no requirement for a section 10 exempt entity to report any of its findings to the MHRA or indeed to other Trusts or the industry in general if an adverse event occurs. (2) The current reporting structures (for a section 10 entity) involve reporting to NHSE and the CQC but the threshold of necessity for such reporting appears unclear and, in essence, up to the Trust. (3) There may be times when section 10 entities reach conclusions which would assist the wider industry and help to assist both other Trusts and commercial organisations in assessing their own risks and improving the provision of highly specific medication to a group of vulnerable patients. (4) the same may also be true of commercial organisations but they have the power of the MHRA controlling and effecting recalls and actions and the wider dissemination of information. ”

    Source location

    Yousef Al-Kharboush and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish updated national guidance governing assurance and escalation for NHS section 10 aseptic preparation units.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The reporting structure for section 10 units is now much clearer following the publication of the NHS England » Assurance of aseptic preparation of medicines.pdf in March 2023, and replacing the previous guidance from 1997. This guidance “applies to all NHS pharmacy aseptic facilities in England undertaking preparation of sterile medicinal products under Section 10 exemption to the Medicines Act 1968 (as amended)…”. It is my understanding that a copy of this was previously shared with the Coroner. The document outlines the escalation processes for:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate quarterly section 10 unit status reporting with immediate escalation of high-risk failures and serious patient safety incidents.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Quarterly unit status overview reports are routinely sent to NHSE Regional Chief Pharmacists (RCPs), the NHSE Chief Pharmaceutical Officer and CQC Medicines Optimisation. This achieves a cross sector sharing of s.10 exempt manufacturing and ensures the CQC have awareness of any high risk failings or serious incidents. This notification/reporting is not a decision made at local level by an NHS body/Trust, but forms part of the SPS oversight and escalation in place. Following implementation of the new guidance, the first of these quarterly reports was received in Jul 2024. There is immediate escalation of high-risk failings or serious patient safety incidents to the relevant RCP in the first instance.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree and implement an MoU with NHSE for routine updates and dissemination of actionable incident learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Accordingly, the MHRA will work with NHSE with a view to implementing a memorandum of understanding to enable appropriate categorisation and mutual dissemination of actionable safety information and learning from incidents at both an executive and operational level. The MHRA is also exploring with NHSE enabling better sharing of information with Trusts whose Section 10 NHS hospital pharmacy is under compliance monitoring by the NHS Specialist Pharmacy Services (SPS) and under the oversight of the MHRA’s IAG which, as noted above, is MHRA’s escalation route where critical failings in GMP are identified and the need for regulatory action against a licence may be required.”

    Source location

    Response from MHRA
    Page 4 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind GPhC, PSNI and CQC of responsibilities concerning Section 10 medicines and information exchange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The MHRA already has Memoranda of Understanding with the GPhC and PSNI and will use these (including updating, as necessary) to highlight the need to ensure formal exchange of information related to the preparation of Section 10 medicines. Similarly, the MHRA will enter into dialogue with the CQC which regulates other healthcare settings in England e.g. independent hospitals and their equivalents, as these may also prepare medicines under the Section 10 exemption and should also be included in the planned programme of increased clarification of roles and responsibilities, information exchange and learnings.”

    Source location

    Response from MHRA
    Page 5 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing NHS England guidance, SPS oversight, escalation, and patient-safety reporting routes sufficiently address reporting by section 10 NHS aseptic units.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The reporting structure for section 10 units is now much clearer following the publication of the NHS England » Assurance of aseptic preparation of medicines.pdf in March 2023, and replacing the previous guidance from 1997. This guidance “applies to all NHS pharmacy aseptic facilities in England undertaking preparation of sterile medicinal products under Section 10 exemption to the Medicines Act 1968 (as amended)…”. It is my understanding that a copy of this was previously shared with the Coroner. The document outlines the escalation processes for:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reporting requirements for trusts are now more clearly defined than they were in 2014.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Key matter of concern (2) is that:”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England, MHRA and CQC are responsible for implementing responses to the identified gaps; DHSC will coordinate their actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the gap you identified has not been fully addressed by this and there is more work to do in this area. NHS England, MHRA and CQC will be sending their individual responses to the PFD report to set out how they will address the concerns raised. This includes:”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other Section 10 providers fall under the relevant pharmacy or healthcare regulators, rather than the MHRA.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As detailed above there is a legal requirement for the holder of any manufacturer’s licence, be they commercial organisations or NHS Trusts, to notify MHRA and work with us to instigate an appropriate recall. While the matter in question relates to NHS pharmacy units, the MHRA notes that the Section 10 exemption is not limited to NHS sites. Registered pharmacies (i.e. retail/commercial pharmacies) are under the jurisdiction of the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) in Wales Scotland and England and the Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland (PSNI) for Northern Ireland.”

    Source location

    Response from MHRA
    Page 5 · response
    Published 15 November 2024

    Open published response
  5. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted, a five-year-old boy with significant neuro-disabilities, was found deceased in his cot on 17 May 2017 during a residential neuro-rehabilitation stay. The investigation determined that he died following entrapment by a loose cot bumper causing airway obstruction. Concerns included inadequate cot maintenance and securing, lack of regular direct visual night-time supervision, and failures to preserve the scene, inform relevant bodies, and investigate the circumstances openly and transparently.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide accurate information to the CQC about a death

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Probity and Investigation by the Children’s Trust, Tadworth The Police and the coroner’s service attending the Trust shortly after being informed of Connor’s death were not fully informed of the circumstances of his death. The scene had not been preserved. They were not told of the position Connor was found, that he had been dead for some time (likely hours) or that the padded board was initially found across his neck and that it required force by either one or two nurses for it to be pushed down to be removed. Connor’s death was sudden and unexpected, and the senior management of the Trust (chief nurse and medical director) were concerned at the time the role the padded board may have played in Connor’s death. However, they did not keep a copy of Connor’s medical records, nor did they undertake their own initial internal enquiries, or inform the relevant statutory bodies of their concerns. Furthermore, they arguably misled the CQC as to the circumstances of Connor’s death. Likewise, the pathologist who undertook the autopsy on Connor was not informed of the circumstances of his death thereby preventing a forensic post-mortem to have taken place to establish the role the cot bumper may have played in his death. In addition, the Trust engaged an expert opinion from a forensic pathologist without fully informing him of the position the cot bumper may have played in Connor’s death. The Trust undertook several Serious Investigation reports, the first of which was six months after Connor’s death. These reports did not acknowledge or address the role the cot bumper may have played in Connor’s death despite evidence from multiple witnesses indicating it was likely to be significant. ”

    Source location

    Connor Samuel Timothy Wellsted · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Carry out a comprehensive review of the Report’s concerns at the Children’s Trust through South East regional representatives.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I note that you also sent your Report to the Chief Executive and Medical Director of the Children’s Trust, Tadworth, and I have had sight of their response as referred to above. On 15 July 2022, representatives from the South East Region attended upon the Trust and carried out a comprehensive review of all of the points that you made in your Report. They concluded that there were no current quality concerns, however there was room for improvement. The outstanding actions for improvement will continue to be monitored by NHS England South East. I am assured that the Children’s Trust, Tadworth, have addressed all of the concerns raised in your Report.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop clear protocols and training for unexpected child deaths using relevant national and local guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to this, we have reviewed The Royal College of Pathologists guidelines on ‘Sudden unexpected death in infancy and childhood: Multi-agency guidelines for care and investigation’, 2016, and guidance produced by the Surrey Child Death Review Partnership. We are further developing a clear protocol and training for our nursing and medical staff in the event of an unexpected child death. We accept that our training has historically focussed on basic life support and actively assessing and supporting children who we do not anticipate will die unexpectedly. Whilst our staff will continue to receive their basic life support training, we will have clear guidelines on processes and actions to be taken in the event of a sudden unexpected death. We are also planning to expand our existing simulation training beyond medical emergencies and basic life support, to cover unexpected deaths.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children's Trust
    Page 8 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The statutory notification described the padded bumper as being against the child’s chest, rather than his neck.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CQC response: The statutory notification shared with the CQC on the day Connor died, described his position in the cot and stated that the padded bumper was found against his chest, rather than his neck.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The statutory notification described Connor’s position, the cot bumper and emergency assessment, although it inaccurately reported the overnight checking frequency.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our former head of nursing and care formally notified the CQC of Connor’s death via their online statutory notification system on the 17th May 2017, the day of Connor’s death. The notification clearly stated the position he was found in, the position of the cot bumper ‘across his chest area’ and the emergency “ABC” assessment performed. In this notification we did incorrectly advise that Connor had been checked every 15 minutes overnight. However, once the medical notes were returned from the Coroner’s Office in November 2017 and we could begin our investigation, we realised our error. We contacted the CQC on 29th November 2017 explaining the sleep monitoring arrangements that had in fact been in place for Connor. The CQC has confirmed they have a record of this call and have provided us with the transcript.”

    Source location

    Response from The Children's Trust
    Page 9 · response
    Published 17 May 2022

    Open published response
  6. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Dylan Jay Henty · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dylan Jay Henty had a complex medical history including schizophrenia, a cerebral tumour, communication difficulties and seizures. He went missing after declining prescribed medication on 17 February 2018, and his body was found at Fistral beach on 21 February 2018; the cause of death was recorded as multiple injuries, with no evidence explaining the apparent fall or how he entered the sea. Concerns included an unsupervised seizure in a bath, inadequate awareness of hoarding, medication compliance, inconsistent reporting of absconding incidents, and arrangements for monitoring residents at risk of absconding.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inconsistent reporting of absconding incidents

    Wider context from the report

    “iv. There appeared to have been inconsistency in the reporting of incidents of absconding. You may wish to reflect on the need, in similar circumstances, for reports to be made to the GP, care coordinator and CQC. Further, you may wish to consider at what point there is a need for such matters to be considered at MDT level, for example, to consider whether current residential arrangements continue to be appropriate. ”

    Source location

    Dylan Jay Henty · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear reporting of seizure-related incidents to relevant bodies

    Wider context from the report

    “i. While it appears to have had no bearing on the circumstances of Dylan’s death, I was concerned to hear evidence of Dylan suffering a seizure in a bath while unsupervised. Similar episodes elsewhere in the country have resulted in criminal prosecutions. It is not clear to me whether reports were made to the CQC, GP and/or care coordinator. You may wish to reflect on the need for clear guidance and training to all staff on the arrangements for those residents with a known risk of seizure to take baths (as opposed to showers) where there is an obvious risk of drowning should a seizure occur. Similarly, those in management positions must be clear about the circumstances in which formal reports should be submitted to relevant bodies and you may feel there is a need to ensure these standards are rigorously checked and met. ”

    Source location

    Dylan Jay Henty · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish direct liaison and incident-notification arrangements with GPs, mental health services, care teams, and police for relevant health and absconding events.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The home recognised that there were communication errors between MDT and can only apologise. Firstly we now liaise with the GP and mental health team regarding relevant issues we face. Notifying all concerned via telephone or email and documenting where appropriate. All incidents of absconding are reported to the relevant bodies ranging from the Care Team to the Police. Measures are then taken to prevent further incidents occuring, such as observations following the relevant laws and legislations such as DOL’s , Capacity Assessment, Mental Health Assessment that need to take place before the home has the power to prevent someone leaving the building as the home is an open facility. Lawfully this documentation needs to be put in place and legislation followed.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce assisted or escorted bathroom use, showering preference, specialist epilepsy input, and associated seizure-safety measures for residents with diagnosed seizures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Any resident that is known/diagnosed with seizures is to be encouraged to be assisted/escorted in the bathroom, in compliance with the relevant acts, dignity and consent from the resident. A shower is encouraged/advised over a bath and the relevant measures/training to be put in place. Care Plans and Risk Assessments to be done with the support and advice of the Specialist Epilepsy Nurse. All relevant physical illnesses where an ambulance/out of hours doctor are called, accidents or hospital admissions are reported to the relevant bodies i.e. Care co-ordinators. The GP has access to this information via R.I.O. A report is also sent to the GP from the relevant bodies.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 1 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    As an open facility, the home cannot prevent residents leaving until legally required deprivation-of-liberty and capacity documentation is completed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The home recognised that there were communication errors between MDT and can only apologise. Firstly we now liaise with the GP and mental health team regarding relevant issues we face. Notifying all concerned via telephone or email and documenting where appropriate. All incidents of absconding are reported to the relevant bodies ranging from the Care Team to the Police. Measures are then taken to prevent further incidents occuring, such as observations following the relevant laws and legislations such as DOL’s , Capacity Assessment, Mental Health Assessment that need to take place before the home has the power to prevent someone leaving the building as the home is an open facility. Lawfully this documentation needs to be put in place and legislation followed.”

    Source location

    2019-0334-Response-by-Pentree-Lodge-Care-Home
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response
  7. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Sophie Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sophie Elizabeth Alice Bennett died at Kingston Hospital from injuries caused by applying a ligature at Lancaster Lodge, a care home operated by RPFI. The Jury identified concerns about inadequate governance, staffing, training, documentation, leadership and oversight, and found contributory errors or omissions in risk management, including failure to follow advice to take Sophie to A&E, inadequate observation and poor control of access to ligature items.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to report resident hospital admissions to the CQC

    Wider context from the report

    “The governance of Lancaster Lodge, and of the staff, and others, working there during the material period, was inadequate in the following respects: 1. There was no “registered manager” who met the statutory criteria. 2. The staff were (despite RPFI’s assertions to the contrary), generally, untrained, unqualified and too few in number. 3. There were no, or no adequate, checks and controls by the staff, or by the acting manager, on the keeping of essential documents, including risk assessments and progress notes, which were, in consequence, themselves inadequate, unreliable and misleading - with corresponding risk to the safety of the residents. 4. The changes to which the determined circumstances refer were made following an audit by ████████ out: • ████████ was not qualified clinically, or in the field of mental health, to conduct that audit; • the audit conducted by him (which led to the proposals for change) took only a single day, which was grossly inadequate; • there was no, or no adequate, consultation with the staff, or by the staff with the residents, regarding the substantial changes introduced, and to be made; and • the changes were introduced at a “launch”, with no, or no adequate regard to the negative impact of their sudden introduction on the mental stability of the residents. 5. Leadership and oversight by the Board of RPFI was grossly inadequate, in relation to: • the need to have in place robust employment procedures; • the matters listed under paragraphs 1 to 4 above; • the appointments of the clinically unqualified ████████ and, later, the clinically unqualified art therapist as Clinical Lead, of a statutorily-approved registered manager, and of an adequate number of trained and qualified staff; • supervision and control of the changes introduced at ████████ instigation; • decisions made by the (unqualified) acting manager and staff in relation to the treatment to be given to the residents, and other steps required to meet their needs, and safety; • communication with other agencies involved in the care of the residents; • the keeping and production (including to the Court, for the purpose of the inquest) of the Board’s own records, communications and contracts; and • knowledge and performance of the Board’s fundamental obligations, including their duty of candour (not least in the Board having failed to fulfil its mandatory obligation to report to the CQC five instances of admission of Lancaster Lodge residents to hospital). 6. Advice to the acting manager was provided by ████████ - the founder of RPFI - and significant decisions regarding Lancaster Lodge and the residents, were made by her (in each case as a “consultant” to the Board, rather than by the Board of RPFI), and were followed by RPFI staff, when: • ████████ was neither a director, nor a Trustee, of RPFI (one Board member describing her role as “somewhat ambiguous”, and the evidence suggesting that she was a “shadow director”); and • ████████ had never visited Lancaster Lodge, and had never met (or had any knowledge, firsthand, knowledge of the residents). 7. The possibility of there being: • a conflict between the interests of ████████ (who, it appears, may have had a personal or family connection with the ownership of Lancaster Lodge) and those of RPFI itself; and • financial impropriety, in relation to the lease under which Lancaster Lodge was (it seems) held. 8. The post-death investigations carried out on behalf of RPFI: • were inadequate, verging on self-serving, and not objective; and • give rise to concerns as to their veracity and accuracy (the authorship of certain supposedly contemporaneous statements being denied by the staff member whose name appears on them as their maker). 9. The facts that: • a director and trustee of RPFI is also the Chairman of RCI; and • ████████ appears to have some family connection with the owner of RCI’s premises give rise to concerns in relation to RCI corresponding to those itemised under paragraphs 5 to 7 above. ”

    Source location

    Sophie Bennett · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Elsie Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elsie Clarke was a resident at Hurst Hall care centre and developed significant pneumonia on 10 February 2015, dying later that day. The report identified concerns about missed opportunities to summon medical help, inadequate staff training and observations, failures in record-keeping and handover, and deficiencies in out-of-hours medical processes and death reporting.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of understanding of prompt Care Quality Commission reporting requirements

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) There seemed to be a complete lack of understanding about the legal requirement for prompt reporting of such matters as occurred in this case to the Care Quality Commission. ”

    Source location

    Elsie Clarke · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement central checks to ensure deaths trigger immediate notifications to the Care Quality Commission.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Action Taken The Home Manager did not submit the required notification until the 17/2/15. This was a clerical oversight and systems are now in place centrally to ensure that when a death is recorded there is a check made to ensure that the required notifications are sent to the Care Quality Commission immediately.”

    Source location

    Elsie-ClarkeR
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 August 2015

    Open published response
  9. Coventry

    AI-generated summary

    Mary WALDRON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mary Waldron became unwell at St Mary's Nursing Home on 24 August 2013 and was transferred to University Hospital, Coventry, where she died after suffering a cardiac arrest during the transfer. Concerns included failures to recognise and appropriately respond to her acute illness and low blood pressure, inadequate ongoing staff training, shortcomings in the nursing home's investigation and reporting, uncertainty about the CQC investigation, and potential confusion between ambulance drivers and paramedics about transfer times.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inaccurate reporting by nursing home managers to the Care Quality Commission

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) inaccurate reporting by the nursing home managers to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) that internal protocols had been appropriately followed, when evidence given at the inquest was that this was not the case; ”

    Source location

    Mary WALDRON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026