Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Devon, Plymouth and Torbay

    AI-generated summary

    William Antony Northcott · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    William Antony Northcott, who had treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found deceased on 13 July 2021 after suffering a sudden fatal cardiac arrhythmia. The report raised concerns about the adequacy and consistency of information on clozapine side effects and cardiac warning signs, the detection of cardiomyopathies in patients taking clozapine, and communication between agencies and care teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to achieve clear communication of key information with other agencies involved in patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “It is clear that patients suffering with treatment resistant schizophrenia are complex, and as such there are often a number of different agencies involved in an individual's care. In addition, there are often multiple members of the same team involved in an individual's care. During the inquest it became clear that, at times, communication of important issues was not as clear as it should have been. I note that Devon Partnership NHS Trust has significant training available for its staff and other agencies it engages with in relation to patients who are prescribed Clozapine. However, it would be of great assistance to understand what Devon Partnership NHS Trust is doing to ensure that optimum communication of key information is achieved within the community mental health team, and when dealing with its other agencies involved in a patient's care. ”

    Source location

    William Antony Northcott · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Adopt SystmOne electronic patient records to enable consent-based information sharing between primary and secondary mental health services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are a number of steps that Devon Partnership NHS Trust has adopted to ensure effective information sharing between those involved in the care of the patients.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 February 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and implement a process for sharing annual clozapine health-check outcomes with mental health services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice would be happy to communicate the findings and results of the annual health checks with the Mental Health Services, providing that the patient has consented to this. We had considered involvement of the ICB and LMC to facilitate a streamlined approach. However, we have established that there is a Local Enhanced Service in place which we are currently reviewing and implementing a process to be able to share the outcomes and results from the annual review with Mental Health Services.”

    Source location

    Response from The Pembroke Medical Practice
    Page 1 · response
    Published 7 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinical discussions with prescribers and care delivered by the Trust fall outside the regulator’s remit, so it cannot directly address them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have considered the evidence provided and the circumstances leading to Mr Northcott’s death and acknowledge that most of your concerns relate to clinical discussions between a patient and their prescriber or via the clinical care delivered by the Trust. Unfortunately, the MHRA cannot directly address these points, as it is not within our remit to comment on the clinical care in specific cases.”

    Source location

    Response from Medicines and Healthcare Projects Regulation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Devon Partnership NHS Trust is responsible for improving internal and cross-agency communication, so no direct response is provided.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 3: Patients with treatment-resistant schizophrenia typically receive support from multiple teams and agencies. During the inquest, it became apparent that communication between professionals was, at times, suboptimal. The Coroner seeks assurance that Devon Partnership NHS Trust is working to improve internal and cross-agency communication.”

    Source location

    Response from Devon ICB
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 February 2025

    Open published response
  2. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Tammy Denise Milward · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tammy Denise Milward, who had severe obsessive compulsive disorder and dependence on prescribed medication, was found unresponsive at home on 1 January 2024 after concerns were raised about her wellbeing. The medical cause of death was mixed drug toxicity, with toxicology showing prescribed medication in excess of prescribed levels and cocaine use shortly before her death. The principal concern was limited coordination and communication between primary and secondary care providers, including poor connectivity between their electronic record systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of primary and secondary care providers to access each other’s electronic medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “The Inquest heard evidence that Ms Milward’s case presented treatment challenges which several agencies sought to address but there was limited coordination, in particular that: a. The Coroner heard that the GP could not see GPimhs medical records (or any SABP notes) which are recorded on SystmOne and that GPimhs could not easily access the GP medical records held on EMIS. As a result, neither the GP practice, nor GPimhs was aware that the other had received messages from or about Ms Milward on 28 December 2023. The coroner heard from SABP that there is ongoing work ongoing to create greater connectivity between the various electronic record systems, but this work is not yet complete. b. The evidence heard suggests that there was little personal or practical interaction between the GP practice and GPimhs. The coroner was told that GPimhs had been recently introduced by SABP to work alongside GPs (addressing a need in primary care to provide mental health support) but that levels of interaction varied and was sometimes also undermined by a lack of suitable estate for co-location of GPimhs staff in GP practices. The coroner is concerned that the lack of coordination and communication between primary and secondary care providers may place patients at risk of early death. ”

    Source location

    Tammy Denise Milward · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Notify the ICB about the need for improved connectivity and clinical information sharing between electronic record systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As such in respect of this Concern a., we consider we cannot proactively do anything save bring this to the attention of the ICB as it is a commissioning issue, which we have done, and later react to requests from SABP, subject to approval from the ICB, to facilitate integration of the clinical IT systems which, of course we will do and would expect the other 100 plus practices to do likewise.”

    Source location

    Response from Esher Green Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement temporary or other changes recommended by the ICB or SABP to support clinical information sharing and communication pending IT integration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “(ii) Pending IT integration, which needs to be effected as soon as possible, we will implement any temporary measures recommended by the ICB, alongside the other 100 plus practices. We believe it is important that any changes are effected Surrey-wide and not on an ad hoc basis for an individual practice; and”

    Source location

    Response from Esher Green Surgery
    Page 3 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide live GP medication and correspondence feeds with embedded single-sign-on access through the Surrey Care Record.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Currently the Surrey Care Record does share a live feed of the GP medication, all GP held letters and also any letters sent from an acute trust to the GP (live feed again). By mid-April we will have been able to implement a live feed from the GP system which will show the entire consultation free text, including historic consultations. This will effectively give the meat (all clinically relevant) GP record to the health professional treating that patient. Patient/pharmacy messages are stored within the GP record as an administration consultation and as such any messages from the pharmacist to the GP will be fully visible to the GPimhs team. Of note, there is embedded link (single sign on) from within the SABP system so that it requires only one button push from the SABP System One record, in order to automatically open up the Surrey Care Record for that patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Surrey Heartlands ICB
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a live Surrey Care Record feed displaying complete GP consultation free text, including historic consultations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Currently the Surrey Care Record does share a live feed of the GP medication, all GP held letters and also any letters sent from an acute trust to the GP (live feed again). By mid-April we will have been able to implement a live feed from the GP system which will show the entire consultation free text, including historic consultations. This will effectively give the meat (all clinically relevant) GP record to the health professional treating that patient. Patient/pharmacy messages are stored within the GP record as an administration consultation and as such any messages from the pharmacist to the GP will be fully visible to the GPimhs team. Of note, there is embedded link (single sign on) from within the SABP system so that it requires only one button push from the SABP System One record, in order to automatically open up the Surrey Care Record for that patient.”

    Source location

    Response from Surrey Heartlands ICB
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Electronic record connectivity is a commissioning responsibility for the Surrey-wide ICB, not an individual GP practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “General Practice Integrated Mental Health Service (“GPiMHS”) is a Surrey wide system run by Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (“SABP”) and commissioned by Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Board (“ICB”).”

    Source location

    Response from Esher Green Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The practice cannot independently improve communication across Surrey; practice-level action will not address the wider issue without a uniform SABP approach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Clinical space in GP practices is usually fully utilised by the practices themselves and this is the case at our Practice. We are currently working with the ICB on finding a solution to our own estate’s challenges but are aware that there is pressure on GP space Surrey wide. As such, we consider that in-person interactions are unlikely to be effected Surrey-wide so email and telephone interactions should be prioritised in our view. This concern b. is not specific to the Practice but is Surrey-wide for all practices and any action taken by the Practice alone will not address the wider community unless SABP seek a uniform approach.”

    Source location

    Response from Esher Green Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Surrey Care Record access is considered sufficient to resolve the risk of GPimhs staff lacking necessary GP record information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Any data is only two mouse clicks away. This should fully resolve the issue of the GPimhs staff not being able to see the GP record to the degree that is required to mitigate this risk.”

    Source location

    Response from Surrey Heartlands ICB
    Page 1 · response
    Published 16 January 2025

    Open published response
  3. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Mark-Anthony SUMMERSETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark-Anthony Summerset attended Worthing Hospital Emergency Department on 5 February 2024 after expressing suicidal thoughts, but left before triage or assessment and was found deceased in his car in Arundel on 7 February 2024. The principal concern was insufficient recording, information flow and information sharing between the agencies involved, including failures to notify Police that he had left the Emergency Department, which may have limited efforts to locate, contact and urgently treat him.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of sufficient recording, flow and sharing of information across agencies and teams

    Wider context from the report

    “Whilst I heard evidence that the UHS Foundation Trust has a Missing Person policy – Walkouts/absconding patients (approved 23 May 2024), in Mr Summerset’s case there was a lack of recorded and/or shared information across all the agencies and teams with whom he had contact, or to whom he was known, such that an accurate and fully reflective risk assessment was not achieved, exacerbated by delays in the triage process in the ED. Mr Summerset was not notified to Police as a missing person and nor were Police informed he had left the ED, despite them simultaneously raising a safeguarding risk via a Vulnerable Adult Single Combined Assessment of Risk Form. In sum, there was therefore a lack of information sufficiency, flow and sharing across the agencies whilst he was present in, and at and after the point he left, the ED, which might have enabled greater efforts to locate, contact and more urgently treat him. ”

    Source location

    Mark-Anthony SUMMERSETT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement direct handover of police-conveyed patients to Trust staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following the investigation report into Mr Summerset’s attendance and suicide in February 2024, I would firstly confirm that the two key actions in the action plan (support for triage at times of high demand and handover from police to Trust staff) have been addressed.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 1 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and implement the Trust-wide Missing Persons policy, including risk assessment, detention, communication, escalation and post-departure procedures.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has fully reviewed and revised the Missing Persons policy, with more information around the required processes in relation to patients who are at risk of absconding, and actions to be taken when patients do leave. This was done collaboratively across primarily the medical divisions and ED teams, but also with the other Divisions. There is detailed information around the legal principles and powers available to staff to detain and prevent patients from leaving (Mental Health Act and Mental Capacity Act) alongside more detailed information about the police response to missing persons, and criteria of those patients of critical concern who they will respond to. There are clear guidelines, flow charts and documentation to be used for the assessment of vulnerable patients, a process if concern are intending to leave and once have left.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Disseminate Missing Persons policy guidance, flow charts and documentation to wards, emergency departments and clinical staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The policy essential documentation and guidelines therein, were circulated to all wards and EDs before May 25th when phase 2 of RCRP was introduced across Sussex, and the main documents and flow charts to be used sent as separate, ready to hand information. These were further recirculated in Q2 (following slight update/ minor amendments to the policy early September, which included the system escalation responses) to ensure there was a renewed focus for clinical teams.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update emergency-department triage, mental-health liaison, observation and communication documentation with partner clinicians.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Divisions of Medicine have continued to work collaboratively with SPFT colleagues over the year reviewing ED documentation (reviewing assessments of both triage and Mental Health Liaison Team (MHLT), enhanced observation processes, and the communications between the EDs and the”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 2 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Send daily reports of police-referred missing patients to Trust and emergency-department nursing leaders for risk review, feedback and learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Since May 2024, UHSx have worked further with Sussex Police to review missing patients who have been referred to police for follow up post absconding. Daily reports are sent to the hospital nurse directors, medicine divisional directors of nursing, and ED matron/heads of nursing, in order to review the patients, to confirm if request for police follow up was appropriate in terms of risk of patient or not, and also to share any feedback and learning.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold fortnightly multidisciplinary missing-patient meetings involving nursing, emergency, police, mental-health and security teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has commenced on the Royal Sussex County Hospital and Princess Royal Hospital sites a fortnightly meeting to discuss cases with senior nurse leads/ED, police, SPFT and security teams present. This is helping to inform learning and improve processes and communication between all system partners. Similar meetings will be set up for Worthing Hospital and St Richard’s Hospital sites to facilitate the same shared learning and improvements in processes. It is hoped these can commence in March 2025.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and recirculate quick-reference absconding guidance, flow charts and missing-person documentation for wards and emergency departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Post coroner’s inquest, the Divisional Director of Nursing for Medicine, Worthing, has further followed up with lead in SPFT for Worthing site, and having reviewed the guidelines produced for MHLT colleagues, has developed some similar bullet point guidelines for wards and EDs for quick easy reference, and is recirculating these across the Trust with the key flowcharts and missing person documentation from the policy. This will provide further quick reference laminated guidance at point of care to help staff at the time when faced by an absconding patient, to ensure correct processes are followed to promote the patient’s safeguarding to reduce potential harm after leaving the department. This can be provided as evidence should HM Coroner request this.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals Sussex
    Page 3 · response
    Published 13 January 2025

    Open published response
  4. West Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Henry Joseph GRIERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry Joseph Grierson was last seen at home on 20 April 2024 before leaving the address, later being found in a wooded area and pronounced dead by paramedics at 10:11 hours. The report raised concern that communication between Huddersfield New College, CAMHS and Recovery Steps was not maintained, leaving the college without awareness of his current mental health and his decision, with his family, to discontinue external support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain communication between the college and external mental health support organisations

    Wider context from the report

    “On the 13th November 2023 Henry Joseph Grierson with the consent of his Parents discontinued his referral and treatment from the organisation CAMHS, and on the 9th April 2024, Mr Grierson gave notice if his intention to discharge himself from the support organisation Recovery Steps. No evidence has been presented to this Inquest as to the knowledge of these matters by the safeguarding team at Huddersfield New College. No information concerning the current mental health issues of Mr Grierson had been provided to the College within a mitigation statement provided by him. The evidence before the Court is that the latest communication concerning Mr Grierson's mental health provided by CAMHS was dated October 2023. It is a matter of concern that communication between the college and CAMHS and Recovery Steps was not seemingly maintained to enable an awareness by the College of the current mental health of Mr Grierson in April 2024 and the decisions taken by himself and his family, to remove such external support. ”

    Source location

    Henry Joseph GRIERSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss multi-agency safeguarding communication with the NHS South West Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding our view that the discussion around multi-agency co-operation is not completely within our purview, representatives from the College have discussed the issue with their counterparts at the NHS South West Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust who have responsibility for CAMHS. In terms of steps that may be taken locally to improve the communication of information we can only act on matters within our control. We understand that the Trust have agreed in principle to write to you to set out the steps they will take as the provider of CAMHS services to address the concern you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Huddersfield New College
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and amend procedures for contacting external safeguarding agencies, including obtaining updates under Welfare Plans and during permanent exclusion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of matters that are within our control, the College has reviewed and amended relevant policies and processes for contacting external agencies, particularly where a Welfare Plan has been created or when permanent exclusion is being implemented as a last resort. Included in this review of processes is College staff requesting and expecting updates from the external agencies involved in the safeguarding of a student, as identified and specified in their Welfare Plan. The College’s safeguarding team will remind external agencies of the responsibilities that they have to share safeguarding information, as detailed in ‘Keeping Children Safe in Education’ and ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children 2023’.”

    Source location

    Response from Huddersfield New College
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind external agencies of their safeguarding information-sharing responsibilities under applicable national guidance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In terms of matters that are within our control, the College has reviewed and amended relevant policies and processes for contacting external agencies, particularly where a Welfare Plan has been created or when permanent exclusion is being implemented as a last resort. Included in this review of processes is College staff requesting and expecting updates from the external agencies involved in the safeguarding of a student, as identified and specified in their Welfare Plan. The College’s safeguarding team will remind external agencies of the responsibilities that they have to share safeguarding information, as detailed in ‘Keeping Children Safe in Education’ and ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children 2023’.”

    Source location

    Response from Huddersfield New College
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementing multi-agency communication changes is outside the College’s authority and requires discussion at a higher level.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The College will always do anything we can to support our students, and we welcome the Coroner’s findings. We agree with the Coroner’s conclusion that steps need to be taken to enhance the communication from organisations such as CAMHS to schools and colleges, but consider this to be a conversation that needs to be had at a much higher level. Given that the College does not have the power to make and implement changes on behalf of other organisations, we have met with representatives of the Department for Education to explain the issues and to bring their attention to the challenges regarding multi-agency communication. The provision of clearer guidance about what triggers communication from such organisations would provide valuable clarity for the whole sector.”

    Source location

    Response from Huddersfield New College
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The NHS Trust responsible for CAMHS services is responsible for setting out steps to improve local information-sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Notwithstanding our view that the discussion around multi-agency co-operation is not completely within our purview, representatives from the College have discussed the issue with their counterparts at the NHS South West Yorkshire Partnership Foundation Trust who have responsibility for CAMHS. In terms of steps that may be taken locally to improve the communication of information we can only act on matters within our control. We understand that the Trust have agreed in principle to write to you to set out the steps they will take as the provider of CAMHS services to address the concern you have raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Huddersfield New College
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 November 2024

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Armstrong · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Armstrong became unwell on 30 January 2024 and, after an initial ambulance-service call, became increasingly unwell before a further call led to an ambulance attending. He suffered an Addisonian Crisis, cardiac arrest and severe brain injury, and died on 2 February 2024. Concerns included the failure of the NHS Pathways system to ask about existing medical conditions, the lack of sharing of information supplied through 111 online with ambulance call handlers, and call handlers' lack of access to relevant medical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share information supplied to 111 online with ambulance call handlers

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The evidence indicates that information supplied to 111 online is not shared with NWAS. This may mean that a caller expects that their medical history and condition are known by ambulance call handlers when this is not the case. This risks such callers not volunteering details of the medical history. ”

    Source location

    Lee Armstrong · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England will respond to concerns about sharing and accessing information from NHS 111 and patient records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “reduce unwarranted variation across services, helping ensure appropriate prioritisation, equity of access and uniformity of response across England. In the case of Mr Armstrong, I understand that his pre-existing condition of Addison’s disease would have changed his call categorisation, and that NHS England, as the appropriate body, will be responding to your concerns raised on this matter as well as on the issue of appropriate patient record sharing and access to information gained from NHS 111. However, I would note that interpreting full medical records is outside of the scope and expectations of call handlers.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS 111 online does not transfer information when advising users to call 999 because further telephone assessment is deliberately required before ambulance dispatch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is correct that where, as in Lee’s case, the disposition is to ring 999 there is no transfer of information from 111 online to the 999 service, and following the advice and dialling 999 is reliant on the user following the instructions. NHS 111 online is a self-service, digital remote triage service for the public and is designed for anonymous use. It is unassisted, meaning there is no health advisor or 111 clinician input to probe and validate the call 999 outcomes. This means there is no automated ambulance dispatch facility. The advice to ‘call 999’ occurs where the triage indicates potential high acuity presenting symptoms, and leads to the user/patient being assessed further over the phone and advised if an ambulance is required.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 November 2024

    Open published response
  6. South Yorkshire (Western)

    AI-generated summary

    Bryan Andrews and Mary Andrews · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Bryan and Mary Andrews died at their home on 27 November 2022 from multiple stab wounds inflicted by their adult son. The principal concern was a lack of communication between services about the relationship between his epilepsy and psychotic symptoms, resulting in treatment delays, rejected referrals and failures to share important information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate clinically relevant information between services about epilepsy and psychosis

    Wider context from the report

    “There was a lack of communication between services about the relationship between the diagnosis of epilepsy and the psychotic symptoms experienced by the person responsible for the deaths. This led to significant time lapses in treatment and rejection of referrals, most notably: i. On 18 November 2020 an urgent referral was made to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner, concerned about his prolonged suicidal ideation. He was referred back to his General Practitioner by the Single Point of Access Team with a request that the General Practitioner refer him to access the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service. ii. On 20 November 2020 his General Practitioner referred him to the Single Point of Access Team again, requesting they liaise with the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service as per Trust guidelines. iii. Correspondence between the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service and the Single Point of Access Team revealed that whilst the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service offered work on living with chronic conditions, they did not have a programme specific to epilepsy. A referral to the Neurology Therapy Service was made and it was decided a request to the General Practitioner for the mental health nurse in the surgery to offer an assessment was appropriate. The surgery were not informed of this. iv. On 16 December 2020 the Single Point of Access Team received a referral from a consultant neurologist requesting a medication review as his anxiety levels were affecting his epilepsy treatment. It was felt at that as the General Practitioner was reviewing his medication, a review wasn’t required. This was not communicated to the consultant neurologist. v. On 29 April 2022 he called the Single Point of Access Team saying he was having a serious psychotic episode and thought he was going to kill someone. The call was treated as a crisis call during which he decided to attend the emergency department. Once there he was assessed by the Liaison Psychiatry Team. He was referred to the Home Treatment Team, but his consultant neurologist was not informed. vi. On 3 May 2022 a trial of anti-psychotic medication was discussed at a medical review. The required consultant review of whether to prescribe anti-psychotic medication with his epilepsy medication was not carried out. vii. On 4 May 2022 a referral to the Early Intervention Service was rejected as not meeting the criteria for first episode psychosis, despite clear evidence of psychosis in the assessment by the Liaison Psychiatry Team on 29 April 2022 and in subsequent contacts with the Home Treatment Team. viii. On 5 May 2022 a first referral was made to the Emotional Wellbeing Service via email asking for their input into his care. The email was sent to an address not manned daily. When a response was provided it was unclear whether a new treatment episode had been opened. ix. On 09 May 2022 he was discharged from the Home Treatment Team. The discharge was reliant on Emotional Wellbeing Service intervention and a follow up from his General Practitioner. A discharge summary was not sent to his General Practitioner. x. On 4 October 2022 a referral was sent to the Single Point of Access Team by his General Practitioner that he was presenting as paranoid and delusional with suicidal ideation. A screen for urgency found this was a routine referral. The referral was triaged on 22 November 2022 when he was invited to contact the Single Point of Access Team for a further discussion. ”

    Source location

    Bryan Andrews and Mary Andrews · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide Neurology Department with electronic crisis assessments and outcome plans for service users receiving neurological treatment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Single Point of Access Service within SHSC is no longer in operation, following a transformation programme of our Urgent and Crisis Services. We have, therefore, not set out any actions in this response relating to how this service deals with referrals, given that referrals now go into each individual service. We are committed to taking the following actions:”

    Source location

    Response from Sheffield Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 October 2024

    Open published response
  7. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Sean Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Sean Heath died on 25 August 2023 in an apartment from injuries involving his pericardial sac. The inquest jury determined that he died by taking his own life while suffering an acute mental health crisis. Principal concerns included police and mental health service responses, inter-agency communication, continuity of care after his return from Gibraltar, and access to appropriate mental health support.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish agreed communication means and maintain relevant patient information in an accessible central repository

    Wider context from the report

    “The means of communication is known and agreed between all mental health agencies to ensure all relevant patient information is held in an accessible central repository. ”

    Source location

    Michael Sean Heath · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Integrate mental health practitioners within NWAS and GMP control centres through the Mental Health Tactical Advice Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust continues to prioritise effective communication and information-sharing between agencies. Our revised protocols include the integration of mental health practitioners within key control centres such as the North-West Ambulance Service (NWAS) and Greater”

    Source location

    Response from Great Manchester Mental Health NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide a mental health option on NHS 111 enabling callers to access Trust mental health practitioners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, the new mental health option on the NHS 111 service allows callers to directly access mental health practitioners within the Trust. This improvement enhances connectivity across agencies, ensuring real-time access to accurate and relevant patient information.”

    Source location

    Response from Great Manchester Mental Health NHS
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Policing, mental health management, cross-service collaboration and GP decision-making do not concern Trafford Council’s actions or decisions, so it cannot address them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Within your listed matters, you have raised over-arching concerns regarding Policing, the management of mental health patients, the quality of collaboration between mental health services both abroad and in the UK upon repatriation whilst the patient remains ill and GP decision-making – and I note that there is no specific reference to the actions of Trafford Council within those listed concerns. As these concerns do not relate to the actions nor decision-making of Trafford Council, you will appreciate that I am unable to specifically address these with a respective timetable for action.”

    Source location

    Response from Trafford Council
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Policing, advocacy, communication, and interagency information access should be addressed by the other individuals and organisations named in the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We note that your Report has also been addressed to individuals including the Home Secretary and the Minister of Policing, along with organisations including the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, North West Ambulance Service, Greater Manchester Police and Trafford Council. It is appropriate that these individuals and organisations address some of the matters of concern, namely around those issues relating to policing, advocacy and communication and access to information between the local agencies and staff involved in Michael’s care. NHS England will review and consider carefully the other responses in due course.”

    Source location

    Response from NHSE
    Page 1 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communication arrangements between mental-health agencies should be established locally by Greater Manchester and other local bodies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You have also raised concerns around ensuring that means of communication are known and agreed between all mental health agencies to ensure relevant patient information is held in an accessible central repository. Communication arrangements should be established locally at system level, so the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust and the other local bodies to whom you have sent your report should be able to provide further information about local arrangements in this case.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establishing communication arrangements and a central repository for information across mental-health agencies sits outside CQC’s remit.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have given careful consideration to this point and have concluded that this, regretfully sits outside of CQC remit. We note that this report has also been sent to the Department of Health and Social Care and believe they will be of greater assistance in addressing this aspect of your concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department of Health and Social Care is better placed to address communication arrangements across mental-health agencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have given careful consideration to this point and have concluded that this, regretfully sits outside of CQC remit. We note that this report has also been sent to the Department of Health and Social Care and believe they will be of greater assistance in addressing this aspect of your concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from CQC
    Page 4 · response
    Published 3 October 2024

    Open published response
  8. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Ryan Louis Ouslem · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ryan Louis Ouslem was found deceased at home on 1 August 2022 after previously posting a Facebook message that raised concerns for his welfare and indicated that his flat was unsafe to enter. The report raises concerns about police mental-health training and assessment, the sharing of relevant information between police and mental-health services, and the lack of joint training under new working arrangements.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share all relevant information with mental health practitioners in a timely manner

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence from a Street Triage practitioner who was embedded with the police on the 29/07/22. She explained that they are reliant on the police to share relevant information, for example from the police CAD system. In this case not all relevant information was passed to the mental health practitioner in a timely manner. An SPFT witness stated that it was not for them to provide training to the police and that she had not been on any cross-service training. I was informed that a new system of working with the police is being introduced this will be called the ‘Rapid Response Service’ and mental health workers will no longer be embedded with the police. SPFT has provided me with the way the new system is anticipated to function and this has been helpful in understanding the changes. No policy documents yet exist for this system and an SPFT witness told me that how information is to be shared between them and the police service is yet to be ironed out. Some of this service will not be dissimilar to the Street Triage service. I am concerned because this new approach under the ‘Right Care, Right Person’ policy will still need police officers to understand mental health issues in order to know when to pass matters on for mental health services to deal and what information to provide. Despite the significant change of working arrangements there does not appear to have been any joint training undertaken; nor am I informed that any is planned. I am concerned that the importance of sharing all relevant information will not be understood unless each organisation understands what information to provide to the other or what questions to ask. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Louis Ouslem · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of defined information-sharing arrangements for the Rapid Response Service

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence from a Street Triage practitioner who was embedded with the police on the 29/07/22. She explained that they are reliant on the police to share relevant information, for example from the police CAD system. In this case not all relevant information was passed to the mental health practitioner in a timely manner. An SPFT witness stated that it was not for them to provide training to the police and that she had not been on any cross-service training. I was informed that a new system of working with the police is being introduced this will be called the ‘Rapid Response Service’ and mental health workers will no longer be embedded with the police. SPFT has provided me with the way the new system is anticipated to function and this has been helpful in understanding the changes. No policy documents yet exist for this system and an SPFT witness told me that how information is to be shared between them and the police service is yet to be ironed out. Some of this service will not be dissimilar to the Street Triage service. I am concerned because this new approach under the ‘Right Care, Right Person’ policy will still need police officers to understand mental health issues in order to know when to pass matters on for mental health services to deal and what information to provide. Despite the significant change of working arrangements there does not appear to have been any joint training undertaken; nor am I informed that any is planned. I am concerned that the importance of sharing all relevant information will not be understood unless each organisation understands what information to provide to the other or what questions to ask. ”

    Source location

    Ryan Louis Ouslem · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the newly implemented Rapid Response Service through a single point of contact to support consistent guidance and information sharing with police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The soft launch of the RRS went live on 4 November 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue monitoring information sharing between the Trust and Sussex Police through the Rapid Response Service.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Prior to the launch of the RRS, representatives from the Trust met with Sussex Police's Mental Health Lead and a representative from West Sussex Fire and Rescue Service on 16 July 2024 which enabled a discussion of how it was anticipated the RRS would function when launched on 4 November 2024. One of the conclusions from the meeting was that there is scope for improvement of the flow of information between the police and mental health services and I address below the action the Trust has taken (and will continue to monitor) to make these improvements.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a trust-wide Standard Operational Procedure covering partner contact arrangements, risk management, documentation, information sources and evidence-based decisions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A trust wide Standard Operational Procedure for the RRS is being developed which will provide guidance to staff working within the RRS. This will embed the expectations placed”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 25 September 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The operational Blue Light Line and existing policy are sufficient; police officers will not need to change practice when Rapid Response launches.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As it stands, the Rapid Assessment Service or Rapid Response will be accessed by our officers via the Blue Light Line. The Blue Light Line is already operational, and it is current policy to utilise this service when dealing with a mental health incident. The Blue Light Line retains records of the contact and ensures information is correctly processed. There will be no change in practice required for police officers when the Rapid Response Service is launched, and it anticipated it will enhance the offer of service from the Blue Light Line.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Police 1
    Page 1 · response
    Published 25 September 2024

    Open published response
  9. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony Paul Nixon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony Paul Nixon, aged 45, was found deceased at his home on 12 June 2023 after a drug overdose involving a combination of substances. The report identified concerns that a pharmacy supplied additional doses of a controlled drug in advance and contrary to the supervised-consumption prescription, leaving him in possession of multiple doses without notifying his drug treatment provider. The inquest concluded that the death was drug related and that the pharmacy’s actions contributed more than minimally by supplying the additional doses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert the drug treatment provider to dispensing outside the prescription

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Pharmacist in this case gave evidence that he believed that he had a discretion to provide ████████ in advance, and not in accordance with the prescription for supervised provision of ████████ on specific days, and maintained this was a “standard practice” when the Pharmacy was open for half a day on Saturdays. He interpreted the wording on the prescription namely “please dispense instalments due on a Pharmacy closed days on a prior suitable date” to include Saturdays when the Pharmacy was open for half a day, despite the prescriptions stipulating the specific days that the ████████ was to be provided, including specification of the dose each Saturday. (2) This led to a situation where the deceased was in possession of multiple doses of a controlled drug, namely ████████, on a regular basis in the period leading up to his death, which was not in accordance with the prescription, which had been carefully considered to attempt to manage the obvious risks of such. (3) The Pharmacy had been specifically chosen by the deceased’s drug treatment provider because it was able to provide supervised administration of ████████ on a 6 day per week basis and because in their assessment this was required to attempt to manage the risks inherent in the deceased having access to multiple doses. (4) The treatment provider were not alerted to the fact that the deceased was regularly receiving additional doses of ████████ not in accordance with the prescription they had issued, and so was unable to risk manage the suitability of the prescribing arrangements. (5) I was not reassured that the Pharmacist fully appreciates the gravity of this situation, and that in evidence he continued to maintain that he could exercise a discretion in relation to the provision of ████████, a controlled drug, and provide this not in accordance with specific prescription instructions on the days specified when the Pharmacy was open, and further that was described as a standard practice. (6) For the avoidance of doubt, the circumstances of this case have been alerted to the General Pharmaceutical Council, as the appropriate regulator, but there has been no update received as to whether an investigation has been undertaken or any action recommended. ”

    Source location

    Anthony Paul Nixon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Miles Ethan Hurley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Miles Ethan Hurley died at 5.58am on 10 July 2022 after intentionally driving his father’s car towards an HGV lorry while experiencing a psychotic episode. The report identified concerns about inadequate communication and documentation between police officers, the Liaison Diversion Service and mental health services, including the handling of family information and mental health assessments while he was intoxicated. It also identified gaps in guidance, availability and procedures for mental health assessment, appropriate adult support and ongoing care in custody.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of LDS and police information sharing about custody mental health presentation

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Memorandum of Understanding between Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust, Sussex Police and Mitie The MOU does not adequately address the practical issues facing an LDS and the police services to ensure appropriate management of mental health assessment and ongoing care whilst an individual is in Custody. There is an absence of local or national ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ or guidelines as to when to obtain a mental health assessment if an individual is intoxicated, a lack of formal documentation procedures, or steps to be taken to encourage further sharing of available information between the LDS service and the police (the LDS practitioner was not fully informed of Miles’s presentation at arrest, was not informed of the concerns raised by the family regarding Miles’s acute deterioration in his mental health and had no access to police records to be better informed). Nor are there any appropriate templates available with regard to liaison between LDS and the police to ensure consistency and accuracy of available evidence. ”

    Source location

    Miles Ethan Hurley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 7 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standard template and guidance with NPCC and CPS for transferring relevant Liaison and Diversion assessment information to police.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “‘NHS England to provide clear guidance to practitioners on what information should be uploaded to police custody logs to ensure consistency and relevance for decision-makers (e.g. custody welfare, bail, police and court outcomes). To be achieved in collaboration with the CPS and local police services.’”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain documented, verbally delivered and CCTV-recorded custody handovers, with live risk updates, shared access, audit trails, staff training and peer review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the point of handover, the Principal Sergeant will refer to a handover document (a copy of which is supplied at Appendix 1) from which they will brief the oncoming team verbally. All members of the current duty team and the oncoming team will be present. They are each given a copy of the handover document which they can refer to during the briefing. The briefing is delivered by the Principal Custody Sergeant in person and is recorded on CCTV which is accessible at any time.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Police
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Record custody risks and concerns discussed with Liaison and Diversion staff on the detainee’s risk assessment and care plan.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “LDS Nurses will proactively triage detainees listed on the Custody White Board between 08:00hrs and 20:00hrs. This is a virtual white board accessed via NICHE which LDS nurses can independently access at any time. It contains details of all detainees in each Custody Centre. A Professional Discussion will be held between the LDS Nurse and Principal Sergeants to identify assessments that may need to be prioritised.”

    Source location

    Response from Sussex Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider best practice through the Betterment Workstream, including a nationally recognised pre-arrival risk assessment for communicating custody risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The practice of arresting officers risk assessments being formally completed prior to arrival at custody is inconsistent across forces. Best practice is being considered through the NPCC Betterment Workstream to include a nationally recognised pre arrival risk assessment in place to communicate risks and concerns that may have been raised.”

    Source location

    Response from NPCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Raise NHS Trust information-sharing failures between criminal justice pathways as a detainee welfare concern.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “f) NHS Trust information sharing has also been raised as a concern by the NPCC in that the inability or refusal to share clinical records between criminal justice pathways adds risk to a detainees welfare.”

    Source location

    Response from NPCC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add a standard template for written information shared with police colleagues to the Custody Pathway SOP.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In direct response to your concerns raised during the inquest into Mr Hurley’s death regarding the lack of guidelines to support a Liaison and Diversion practitioner as to when it is appropriate to undertake a formal mental health assessment if an individual is intoxicated rather than feeling obliged to do so because of their availability, MPFT are currently reviewing the Custody Pathway SOP. It has been agreed with the Senior Leadership Team in MPFT Health and Justice Services that written guidelines, regarding assessment of individuals who are intoxicated, are needed for MPFT staff. MPFT Custody Team Leaders are meeting on the 9th October 2024 to review the SOP to add:”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 July 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026