Recurring concern

Unreliable inter-agency information sharing for coordinated care

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First reported 29 May 2013•Latest report 15 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the inter-agency care information-sharing system, including inadequate arrangements, communication channels, shared records or contact mechanisms when these prevent timely access to relevant care, needs or risk information between agencies.

Not included

  • Excludes information-sharing failures unrelated to coordination between agencies supporting a person.
  • Excludes failures confined to a single organisation's records, assessment, documentation or communication process unless the report directly links them to inter-agency information sharing.
  • Excludes generic staffing, confidentiality, policy or technology deficiencies that are not specifically tied to the unsafe inter-agency information-sharing condition.
  • Excludes hazards involving public access to harmful information or physical communication and rescue equipment.
Reports
212

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
235

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
492

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care57
NHS England39
Ministry of Justice14
Home Office11
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership9
HM Prison and Probation Service8
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board8
Care Quality Commission7
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust7
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust6
Metropolitan Police Service6
College of Policing5
Greater Manchester Police5
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Lee Spencer PURKIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee Purkis, aged 54, was found in an advanced state of decomposition on the floor of his home on 9 March 2023, having been there for up to two months; the cause of death was unascertainable. Before his death, he was subject to a mental health treatment requirement, but the receiving Trust was not informed of it and discharged him without learning about it. The report identifies a risk that failures to transfer or oversee such requirements could affect their proper administration in other cases.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of probation oversight to ensure awareness and proper administration of mental health treatment requirements

    Wider context from the report

    “My concern here is that Lee Purkis had been, in the period leading up to his death, the subject of a mental health treatment requirement (MHTR) imposed by the Crown Court as part of a community order, but the Trust that ended up treating him were not aware of it, and discharged him from its care without learning about it. There is no evidence that it made any difference in this case but that is because of the particular (and unfortunate) circumstances of how long it took to find Mr Purkis and the corresponding absence of evidence about how he died. There is, however, a real risk that it might make a difference in another case. This order was handed down by a sympathetic Crown Court judge, supported by probation in the pre-sentence report, and it seems to have been a potentially creative solution for a complex man. The use of MHTRs is, it seems to me on the evidence, to be encouraged, but that objective will be undermined if they are not understood and administered properly and so people don’t see them working. In Mr Purkis’s case, the particular problem appears to have occurred because the Trust that agreed the order (a requirement of it being imposed in the first place) then transferred the care because the accommodation area changed. That is not unusual, but the relevant Trust then failed to transfer or inform the receiving Trust of the fact of the MHTR and what it required. This means that it was, of course, a Trust error, but I am sending this report to probation because the evidence suggests that it is probation that should have oversight, and it should be ensuring all involved in the administration of the requirement are aware of it. I therefore consider there is a risk associated with these circumstances, and that action should be taken, such as ensuring that probation officers keep an eye on MHTRs when they have them, and ensure the other services do so too. There are not many of them; there probably should be more; but again, that means ensuring the ones that there are get used properly. ”

    Source location

    Lee Spencer PURKIS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Collaborate with the Forensic and Specialist Directorate to examine Kent Secondary Care Mental Health Treatment Requirement practice and responsibilities across the intervention.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “More specifically in Kent we have begun collaborating with the Service Director of the Forensic and Specialist Directorate to explore current practice with Secondary Care MHTRs from pre-sentence stage through to delivery of the treatment requirement and the roles both Probation and Secondary Care play in the intervention. We aim to upskill Secondary Care Responsible Clinicians and Probation Court and Sentence Management staff to ensure we are identifying the right people at Court who may benefit from this Order and overseeing the case in a robust manner.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 8 August 2024

    Open published response
  2. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Zara Natasha Aleena · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Zara Natasha Aleena died at the Royal London Hospital on 26 June 2022 after sustaining a severe traumatic brain injury during an unprovoked attack while walking home in Ilford. The report identifies concerns about understaffing, risk assessment, information sharing, supervision, recall procedures and coordination across the Probation Service, police and other agencies, as well as concerns about training and reporting of predatory behaviour.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of checks on sharing up-to-date and accurate risk assessments

    Wider context from the report

    “(5) There were no checks to ensure the provision of up to date and accurate risk assessments to partner agencies (such as the housing team). ”

    Source location

    Zara Natasha Aleena · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and use a process map guiding Police Offender Managers and supervisors to obtain, record and manage risk information before and after prison releases.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following inquest, the MPS has reflected on the sufficiency of information sharing from the HM Prison & Probation Service and the need for clarity around recalls to prison. The MPS has developed a new process map, which provides clarity and guidance for Police Offender Managers to ask HM Prison & Probation Service a broad range of questions, with the intention to increase the likelihood of all relevant information being shared with IOM partners. The new process highlights and clarifies the actions to be undertaken by Police Offender Managers and their supervisors, both before and after prison releases, including the recording of informed risk management decisions.”

    Source location

    Response from Metropolitan Police
    Page 5 · response
    Published 2 August 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Maintain mandatory professional registration for Probation Officers to strengthen continuing development, performance and accountability.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5.1. We accept that in this case up to date and accurate assessments of ████████ ████████’s risk were not shared with partner agencies. We are committed to improving professional standards of practice and have introduced mandatory professional registration for Probation Officers, which aims to sharpen focus on Continuous Professional Development and drive improved performance and personal accountability to deliver public protection. Whilst managers do oversee Probation Officer work, we would not expect them to check every referral before it is made. The professional standards will, alongside increased staffing levels and improved digital checks/safeguards, ensure that Probation Officers do all that is required of them, including the sharing of risk information with partner agencies, whose contribution is vital to the efficacy of risk management plans.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS and MoJ
    Page 5 · response
    Published 2 August 2024

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Omar Abdi Ahmed · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Omar Abdi Ahmed, who had significant comorbidity and bilateral lower-limb amputations, was found unresponsive and severely hypothermic at home on 15 November 2023 after receiving domiciliary and district nursing care. He died in hospital on 20 November 2023; the inquest concluded that hypothermia, with pneumonia and ischaemic heart disease contributing, was the medical cause of death. Concerns included poor communication between care organisations, shortcomings in district nursing oversight, and domiciliary care arrangements that did not adequately address his personal care, nutrition, cleaning, and heating needs.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of communication between care providers and public services to identify deterioration in living conditions and health

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Poor standards of communication between the domiciliary care company, the local authority and NHS trust resulted in a failure to identify the deterioration in Mr Ahmed’s living conditions and health. ”

    Source location

    Omar Abdi Ahmed · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop an escalation procedure for partners to flag high unmitigated risk or differing risk assessments, including reviews of no-reply and refusal-of-care protocols.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Adult Social Care will lead on the development of an escalation procedure which will enable partners to flag cases where there is concern about a high level of unmitigated risk or differences of opinion about level of risk. This procedure will involve reviews of the following protocols:”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Newham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver reflective sessions for Adult Social Care staff and selected partner staff on safeguarding decision-making, multi-agency working and Making Safeguarding Personal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “5. The issues regarding the safeguarding activity in this case will be addressed by reflective sessions which cover the following areas”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Newham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver reflective sessions for Adult Social Care staff and selected partner staff on risk assessment and management, information sharing, coordinated intervention, thresholds and social isolation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “6. The issues regarding risk assessment and risk management will be addressed by a reflective session which covers the following areas:”

    Source location

    Response from London Borough of Newham
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update safeguarding, notification, response and monitoring policies, including 24-hour reporting, 48-hour response expectations and proactive follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to updating and, where necessary amending our policies, we commenced an eight-week implementation programme on 5 August 2024. A summary of this programme setting out the topics of training, appears in Appendix A.”

    Source location

    Response from Sunlight Care Group
    Page 1 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement new inter-agency communication and escalation strategies for timely safeguarding escalation across teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, we attended a multi-agency discussion with the Local Authority and NHS Trust to discuss lessons learnt on 23 July 2024 and arranged a follow up on 4 September 2024. At the second meeting, the following actions were agreed to be undertaken within a twelve week time frame:”

    Source location

    Response from Sunlight Care Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce regular multidisciplinary reviews for cases involving self-neglect, incorporating physical, mental and social wellbeing in decision-making.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. We are introducing regular multidisciplinary reviews for cases involving self-neglect, allowing for a more holistic approach to care that includes input from a range of professionals. This will help ensure that all aspects of the client's well-being—physical, mental, and social—are considered in decision-making processes;”

    Source location

    Response from Sunlight Care Group
    Page 5 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Meet with Newham safeguarding teams to review current pathways and organisational interfaces for improving communication about high-risk service users.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “7. Since the receipt of the Report, two meetings have taken place between the Trust’s Director of Nursing, Community Health Service’s Medical Director and LBN’s Senior Safeguarding Adviser and Interim Service Manager for Access to Adult Social Care and hospital discharge. It was explored how to further improve escalation and communication between the services in relation to high risk service groups. The outcome of both of these meetings is that both the Trust and LBN’s teams will meet in October 2024 to review the current pathways and organisational interface to ensure better communication relating to patient care.”

    Source location

    Response from ELFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the process for responding to high-risk service-user concerns with Trust staff, reinforcing responsibilities to arrange multi-agency professionals’ meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. Communication between domiciliary care providers and Community Health Newham (the Trust) is done on an individual service user basis. The system is designed so that a General Practitioner is the gate keeper of care and manages and coordinates communication between the public bodies. That said, if a high risk service user presents as a concern to Trust staff members, they are proactive and will arrange a professionals meeting for all agencies involved. We plan to review this process with all staff over the next two months to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities and understand the importance of acting on concerns.”

    Source location

    Response from ELFT
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a dressing-clinic standard operating procedure providing 30-minute service-user appointment slots instead of 10-minute slots.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “13. On 24 July, a new standard operating procedure was put into place for dressing clinic staff. The key change is that the time slots allocated to attend to service users has increased from 10 minutes to 30 minutes. It is anticipated that the provision of additional time to complete work should improve care planning and allow more meaningful communications with other services as well as improve staff morale.”

    Source location

    Response from ELFT
    Page 4 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot comment on behalf of the local authority or domiciliary care company regarding their communication and care arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. The Trust is unable to comment on behalf of London Borough of Newham (‘LBN’) or the domiciliary care company. However, it can confirm that LBN and the Trust have systems in place which facilitate joint working to improve care for service users under both services.”

    Source location

    Response from ELFT
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response
  4. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Judith Maike OBHOLZER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Obholzer died by suicide on 12 July 2023 after jumping in front of a moving train, following a significant period of worsening depression and anxiety. Concerns included delays in NHS mental-health assessment and waiting-list placement, unclear routes for private practitioners to obtain NHS crisis support, difficulties contacting her GP, and the absence of shared medical notes between private and NHS providers.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share medical notes and information between private practitioners and NHS providers

    Wider context from the report

    “4. In the course of the evidence it was confirmed that there is no sharing of medical notes between private practitioners and NHS providers. This (along with other factors) led to delays in a treatment plan being set by Wandsworth SPA as they had to obtain further details regarding Mrs Obholzer’s CBT from Mrs Obholzer rather than being able to access the notes through a shared system. Consideration should be given to ensuring a system is in place to allow the sharing of medical information between practitioners across Trusts and also between NHS and Private providers. ”

    Source location

    Judith Maike OBHOLZER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and develop a consent process for recording and sharing information when patients receive both NHS and private care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, locally the Trust is reviewing its approach to how information can be shared in line with consent and the confidentiality policy. Naturally, the Trust is not able to share clinical information with a private practitioner (and vice versa) without the explicit consent of the patient, except in rare cases where risk considerations mean information sharing is essential.”

    Source location

    Response from SW London Mental Health Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff about the Urgent Care Pathway, checking private treatment and consent, and the Private Providers Shared Care Policy through a Monthly Learning Bulletin and local GP networks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust will remind all staff of the ‘Urgent Care Pathway’ in a Monthly Learning Bulletin article (to be published by October 2024). Staff will also be reminded to regularly check if service users are receiving private treatment and discuss consent to share information. Staff will also be signposted to the Trust’s ‘Private Providers Shared Care Policy’, so they are aware of the process if they are contacted by a private provider regarding a patient in crisis. This policy will also be shared through our local GP networks.”

    Source location

    Response from SW London Mental Health Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue trialling Summary Care Record access with private hospitals and privately funded healthcare services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SCR Team at NHS England have undertaken significant work with a number of private sector organisations, including a range of private hospitals and privately funded healthcare services trialling the use of SCRs within settings where they have previously been unavailable, and this work continues. The Team will work with an Expert Advisory Committee to seek full rollout approval within the independent/private sector and consider the scope of this approval and any specific exclusions, constraints, or caveats.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Work with an Expert Advisory Committee to seek approval for independent-sector rollout and consider its scope, exclusions, constraints, and caveats.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The SCR Team at NHS England have undertaken significant work with a number of private sector organisations, including a range of private hospitals and privately funded healthcare services trialling the use of SCRs within settings where they have previously been unavailable, and this work continues. The Team will work with an Expert Advisory Committee to seek full rollout approval within the independent/private sector and consider the scope of this approval and any specific exclusions, constraints, or caveats.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the interface between NHS and non-NHS-funded independent health providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Work is also in progress to review the interface between the NHS and non-NHS funded independent health providers. This work is in its infancy, but NHS England can provide an update to the Coroner in due course if this would assist. We understand that the Care Quality Commission (CQC) are also undertaking work regarding standards for online care and are exploring opportunities for better sharing of information both into private sector providers and receiving information back to the patient’s registered GP practice from private providers.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    National systems and guidance for information sharing between NHS and private providers are principally matters for NHS England and the Department of Health.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Systems and processes for information sharing between NHS and private providers is principally a consideration for NHSE and the DH who are best placed to provide guidance around the GDPR and confidentiality considerations.”

    Source location

    Response from SW London Mental Health Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Clinical information cannot ordinarily be shared between NHS and private practitioners without explicit patient consent, except where risk makes sharing essential.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, locally the Trust is reviewing its approach to how information can be shared in line with consent and the confidentiality policy. Naturally, the Trust is not able to share clinical information with a private practitioner (and vice versa) without the explicit consent of the patient, except in rare cases where risk considerations mean information sharing is essential.”

    Source location

    Response from SW London Mental Health Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    NHS England is responsible for improving information sharing and reviewing the interface between NHS and non-NHS-funded independent providers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I know that NHS England has outlined to you the work they are taking forward to improve sharing of information and records overall. I understand that work is also in progress at NHS England to review the interface between NHS and non-NHS funded independent health providers, and that NHS England has offered to update you on this important work as it progresses. I assure you, I have written to NHS colleagues to ensure this is driven forward and these points are addressed.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for delivering shared care records sits with local Integrated Care Boards.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Responsibility for delivering shared care records sits with local Integrated Care Boards (ICBs). Each ICB’s shared care records are developed in response to the health and care needs of the local area, existing systems, and future planning. This means some of their shared care records are available to neighbouring ICBs, while others are only supported within their own ICB. Future plans include making shared care records link together regardless of where you live or receive care in England. Further information on Integrated Care Boards and Systems can be found here: NHS England » What are integrated care systems?”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 31 July 2024

    Open published response
  5. Oxfordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Caroline Diane Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Caroline Diane Harris, who had a long-standing diagnosis of severe mental illness, was found deceased at home on 26 July 2023, and a medical cause of death could not be ascertained because of decomposition. Information about her declining mental health, refusal of medication and concerns raised by police was not shared with the Adult Mental Health Team, which limited its ability to supervise and follow her up. The principal concern was that important information was not shared between agencies and that appropriate interventions may consequently not have been made.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share information regarding deterioration in mental health with the appropriate team

    Wider context from the report

    “In March 2023, Thames Valley Police passed on a report about Caroline to the Mult-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) which raised concerns about her behaviour and mental state and dishevelled appearance. The report stated that it was, ‘Shared in the interests of safeguarding as may be having relapse’. MASH undertook a review of the report and concluded that Caroline was not at risk but may have needs for care and support from the local authority. The information was passed to the Council’s Adult Social Care Team who in turn passed the information onto Caroline’s GP. Evidence was given that the Adult Social Care Team were unable to directly refer to AMHT, even if they had considered it necessary. As the GP was not made aware that Caroline had declined to attend the clinic to receive her medication, she saw no need to refer the Police report to AMHT. Evidence was given AMHT took a different view regarding the Police report and would have viewed the report as evidence of Caroline relapsing. AMHT’s view was that such a report met the criteria for being shared with them, with their knowledge of Caroline’s past history of self-neglect and non-compliance with taking medication, it ought to have been shared with them; and had it been done so it would have been followed up assertively and urgently including undertaking home visits and the possible use of compulsory powers under the Mental Health Act. My concern is that important information regarding a deterioration in mental health was not shared with the appropriate Team who may have been able make appropriate interventions and to have taken steps to avoid a fatal outcome. You should consider a review of how such information is assessed and shared between the respective agencies. ”

    Source location

    Caroline Diane Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to inform the GP of declined attendance for medication

    Wider context from the report

    “In March 2023, Thames Valley Police passed on a report about Caroline to the Mult-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) which raised concerns about her behaviour and mental state and dishevelled appearance. The report stated that it was, ‘Shared in the interests of safeguarding as may be having relapse’. MASH undertook a review of the report and concluded that Caroline was not at risk but may have needs for care and support from the local authority. The information was passed to the Council’s Adult Social Care Team who in turn passed the information onto Caroline’s GP. Evidence was given that the Adult Social Care Team were unable to directly refer to AMHT, even if they had considered it necessary. As the GP was not made aware that Caroline had declined to attend the clinic to receive her medication, she saw no need to refer the Police report to AMHT. Evidence was given AMHT took a different view regarding the Police report and would have viewed the report as evidence of Caroline relapsing. AMHT’s view was that such a report met the criteria for being shared with them, with their knowledge of Caroline’s past history of self-neglect and non-compliance with taking medication, it ought to have been shared with them; and had it been done so it would have been followed up assertively and urgently including undertaking home visits and the possible use of compulsory powers under the Mental Health Act. My concern is that important information regarding a deterioration in mental health was not shared with the appropriate Team who may have been able make appropriate interventions and to have taken steps to avoid a fatal outcome. You should consider a review of how such information is assessed and shared between the respective agencies. ”

    Source location

    Caroline Diane Harris · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Email Adult Mental Health Teams when online records are unavailable, follow up until a decision is received, and escalate unsuccessful contact to team leaders.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Where access to online records like RIO for mental health, is not possible the team must immediately email AMHT to check for mental health involvement before action is taken. The Social and Health Care Team will continue to follow up with AMHT until a response and decision is reached. In the unlikely event that contact cannot be made with AMHT, this is escalated to Team Leaders who will contact their counterparts in AMHT.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire County Council
    Page 7 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share qualifying mental-health reports with GPs, explain the reasons, and request follow-up and identification of social-care needs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “10. The guidance issued to the Social and Health Care Team in August 2023, states that a report is shared with the person’s GP in the following circumstances.”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire County Council
    Page 6 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Escalate urgent concerns by contacting GPs immediately or referring cases to the Professional Support Team for evaluation and decision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “11. Where the situation appears to be urgent the team will either:”

    Source location

    Response from Oxfordshire County Council
    Page 6 · response
    Published 17 July 2026

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Lee-Ann Sarah INCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lee-Ann Sarah Ince was a victim of domestic abuse in a coercive and controlling relationship and was found unresponsive attached to a ligature on 9 May 2023. The inquest identified concerns that agencies did not fully recognise coercive control, the impact of “love bombing” on her mental health, information shared by her children, or her physical-health-related vulnerability and dependence on the perpetrator.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share information effectively between agencies supporting victims of domestic abuse

    Wider context from the report

    “Her children had expressed their concerns to their school. The school had been proactive in sharing those concerns but there was little evidence that other agencies were then listening to “the voice of the child”. This meant that agencies who had direct contact with her did not have a full grasp of the situation or her vulnerability. The inquest was told that if information is not effectively shared and the voice of the child is lost there is an increased risk to the victim. ”

    Source location

    Lee-Ann Sarah INCE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Ann PILGRIM · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Ann Pilgrim died at Princess Alexandra Hospital on 29 June 2023 from congestive cardiac failure and bronchopneumonia, against a background of frailty, after an unwitnessed fall at home caused a fractured clavicle. The fracture was reported on an X-ray during her hospital admission but was not noted on her discharge summary. Concerns included the absence of treatment, pain relief, care-package consideration and fracture-clinic follow-up, and the failure to inform the patient, her family or GP about the fracture.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate identified fractures in discharge information

    Wider context from the report

    “Mrs Pilgrim’s collapse at home was multifactorial due to natural causes however, she sustained a fractured clavicle that was reported on her X-Ray during her admission to hospital. This was not noted, and Mrs Pilgrim was discharged. (1) The Trust did not treat the patient for the fracture who was discharged with no pain relief or consideration of care package (2) The Discharge Summary omitted to inform the patient, her family or her GP of the fracture and no follow-up in the fracture clinic was booked (3) The fracture was only confirmed when the GP raised the concerns of the family with the Trust and the GP arranged analgesia, social care contact and follow-up for the fracture clinic. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Ann PILGRIM · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reviewed the emergency department's process for subsequent image review to assess its robustness and alignment with national practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- It is recognised that ED will miss a small percentage of fractures on initial reporting. Hence there is a process in place by which the reported images are subsequently reviewed by an ED consultant. Unfortunately, in this instance the report was filed without the patient or GP being informed. We have discussed this incident with the department and reviewed this process to assure ourselves that it is as robust a process as possible and in line with other EDs nationally. One contributing factor to the human error that occurred was noted to be our IT systems which requires our clinicians to work with multiple different programmes in order to review the images and patient notes. I would like to reassure that we are due to launch a comprehensive Electronic Health Record in November of this year which we are confident will resolve this issue and reduce the likelihood of recurrence.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Launch a comprehensive electronic health record to reduce risks arising from clinicians using multiple systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- It is recognised that ED will miss a small percentage of fractures on initial reporting. Hence there is a process in place by which the reported images are subsequently reviewed by an ED consultant. Unfortunately, in this instance the report was filed without the patient or GP being informed. We have discussed this incident with the department and reviewed this process to assure ourselves that it is as robust a process as possible and in line with other EDs nationally. One contributing factor to the human error that occurred was noted to be our IT systems which requires our clinicians to work with multiple different programmes in order to review the images and patient notes. I would like to reassure that we are due to launch a comprehensive Electronic Health Record in November of this year which we are confident will resolve this issue and reduce the likelihood of recurrence.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing process of subsequent emergency-department consultant image review was considered as robust as possible and consistent with national practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “- It is recognised that ED will miss a small percentage of fractures on initial reporting. Hence there is a process in place by which the reported images are subsequently reviewed by an ED consultant. Unfortunately, in this instance the report was filed without the patient or GP being informed. We have discussed this incident with the department and reviewed this process to assure ourselves that it is as robust a process as possible and in line with other EDs nationally. One contributing factor to the human error that occurred was noted to be our IT systems which requires our clinicians to work with multiple different programmes in order to review the images and patient notes. I would like to reassure that we are due to launch a comprehensive Electronic Health Record in November of this year which we are confident will resolve this issue and reduce the likelihood of recurrence.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 June 2024

    Open published response
  8. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew James Naylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew James Naylor was found deceased on 11 October 2022 in Durham City, the day after discharge from hospital following treatment for a drug overdose and alcohol withdrawal. The report identified concerns about inadequate warnings of the risks associated with combining the administered drug with alcohol or drugs, poor communication between services, and insufficient consideration of his homelessness, discharge safety, and available support. The inquest concluded that he died from the combined central nervous system depressant actions of alcohol and two drugs, with cumulative failures contributing more than minimally to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of acute, alcohol and drug treatment, and mental health teams to share crucial risk information appropriately

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appears to be a lack of a joined up process between acute clinicians, alcohol and drug treatment teams, and mental health teams, to consider the safety of a discharge, and to ensure that crucial information relevant to risk is shared appropriately (which may also be, to an extent, hampered by a continuing inability to see each other's records), and whether discharge should be delayed or care stepped down, until a place of safety is identified, and to ensure that a robust safety plan is in place upon discharge. ”

    Source location

    Andrew James Naylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test and roll out CDDFT electronic patient-record access on TEWV clinicians’ laptops for joined-up assessments and information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “advised, the EPR team within CDDFT attended the liaison team office on Wednesday 27 March 2024 to take steps to begin the process of putting the acute Trust's EPR on to the TEWV clinician's laptops. The EPR team have assisted, a data protection impact assessment was completed however we then experienced issues with organisational firewalls. The two IT teams have been working together to resolve this and we are now testing the platform. The testing concludes 06/08/24 and if it has been successful, it will be rolled out further from 12/08/24.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue team discussions and daily MDT reminders about documenting and verbally handing over homelessness and other risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Team meeting discussions: As you are aware, it was not possible to conclude Andrew's inquest in the one day initially allocated on 14 March 2024, and therefore it was adjourned and later concluded on 3 June 2024. Following the first day of Andrew's inquest, the initial learning identified during day one was picked up, and discussions took place within the team meeting, on 15 March 2024. Those discussions have continued within daily MDT meetings, to remind liaison staff of the importance of documenting, and verbally handing over if a patient reports themselves to be homeless. Conversations continue with regard to ensuring the important information relevant to a patient's risk, is handed over.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit and deep-dive liaison documentation to verify that verbal handovers to other Trusts and services are recorded, addressing issues through supervision and team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Audits: I can reiterate that in order to provide a check that improvements are being made in respect of communicating with acute Trust staff, a further check has been added when completing the team's monthly audit to ensure it is documented that a verbal handover has been completed. This check is completed alongside the Trust Quality Assurance Schedule audit (a Trust standard) and the Advanced Nurse Practitioners (ANPs) completing the Quality Assurance Schedule have been asked to carry out a deep dive to check documentation around communication with other Trusts/services. As part of this, we now check that it is documented that a verbal handover has been given. If any issues are identified, this is picked up with the team as part of team meetings/supervision to ensure it is addressed as soon as possible.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reissue an open letter to all staff supporting appropriate information sharing while balancing patient confidentiality and safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Open letter to all staff: On 13 May 2024, I personally reissued a letter (initially sent in June 2021) to all Trust staff members about the support the Trust will offer when making decisions about the difficult balance between patient confidentiality and appropriate sharing of information. In particular, the letter provides “We want to emphasise however to you all, that we would rather support you for saving a person's life by breaching their confidentiality than have to explain why we held onto information that could have made a difference.” I understand that you have already received a copy of this open letter.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response
  9. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Tcherno Bari · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tcherno Bari, who had been detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to a psychiatric unit with psychotic depression, left the hospital grounds while assessed as at high risk of suicide. He was found deceased the following day, 26 September 2023, hanging from a tree in parkland outside the police search area. The principal concerns were significant gaps in multi-agency coordination, communication of risk information, use of risk-assessment procedures, and the handling of differing assessments between mental health staff and police.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of formal notification of police disagreement about risk category

    Wider context from the report

    “(6) RCRP does not require WMP to formally indicate to BSMHFT (i.e. via a form) when the police have taken a different view about the risk category. BSMHFT will often be unaware of the different view taken by the police rendering the ‘challenge’ process redundant and reducing the chances of the police identifying they have overlooked key information. ”

    Source location

    Tcherno Bari · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share information with health systems on establishing multi-agency governance, delivery structures, risk management, escalation and communication.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To support implementation, NHS England has shared information with health systems about setting up multi-agency governance and delivery structures to oversee delivery, manage risks and escalations and enable open communication between local”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue guidance to health systems covering multi-agency governance, delivery structures and real-time and retrospective escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “partners, including to resolve any challenges. Information has also been shared on escalation protocols, including the need for local partners to set up real-time escalation processes (in response to a situation that is currently live) and retrospective escalation processes (to review situations that have occurred, learn lessons and agree changes going forward). This information will be included in guidance that NHS England will issue to health systems shortly.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review and update the WMP Missing Person Policy to address daily appraisal attendance, clinician risk assessments, recording, and investigation-closure notifications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “BSMHFT and send an appropriate staff member, as required. The WMP missing persons policy will be updated to reflect this.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational and clinical partners are best placed to respond to relevant concerns and reassess local risk, communication and escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns about missing persons policy and Right Care, Right Person (RCRP), and I note that you have directed your report to the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) as a party to the National Partnership Agreement (NPA) on RCRP. I also note that you have raised concerns with other relevant partners, including representatives from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, West Midlands Police and NHS England. Given the operational independence of police forces and the autonomy of clinical decision making, those partners are best placed to respond to some of the concerns you raise. DHSC does have a role in setting guidance and direction to the mental health sector and I will respond on these points in particular.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The mental health trust cannot formally record differing risk opinions because it lacks access to police systems.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The PFD Report also addresses the issue of difference between the WMP and BSMHFT risk categories. BSMHFT does not have access to WMP systems or to the COMPACT log which is used to record a missing person investigation so could not use this to formally indicate a difference in opinion. However, the WMP missing persons policy will be updated to remind all officers, when attending such calls to identify the mental health trust’s risk category and to recognise the importance of clinician’s expertise in determining the risk assessment. Officers will be reminded that they must consider risk from the stakeholder/partner perspective and obtain the rationale of the treating clinician where there is a difference. This should then be recorded on COMPACT and fed back to WMP supervisors and shared with the reporting partner agency.”

    Source location

    Response from West Midlands Police
    Page 4 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Specific issues concerning police ways of working are for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, College of Policing and West Midlands Police to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As you are aware, police forces are operationally independent and so it is for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and West Midlands Police to address the specific issues raised about their ways of working as they relate to the inquest into the death of Mr Bari, and I know they have written to you separately on this matter.”

    Source location

    Response from the Home Office
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Each Chief Constable decides whether and when to implement Right Care Right Person and which elements of the national framework to adopt.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As Policing is operationally independent, each Chief Constable has to decide whether and when to implement Right Care Right Person and how much of the framework set out in the National Partnership Agreement and supporting guidance they wish to adopt.”

    Source location

    Response from the Home Office
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The APCC cannot mandate its members to undertake actions in response to the identified safety concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a membership body, the APCC cannot mandate actions upon its members. However, our role does include the provision of advice and recommendations to inform our members’ local activities, including the development of evidence-based guidance.”

    Source location

    Response from APCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operational implementation of Right Care, Right Person is assigned to Chief Constables rather than Police and Crime Commissioners.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a local policing level, PCCs are not responsible for making operational policing decisions, including the implementation of Right Care, Right Person, this is a decision for Chief Constables. Rather, PCCs are responsible for scrutinising their Chief Constables and holding them to account for the delivery of their duties. Additionally, PCCs have responsibilities to commission services, and where necessary, to bring partners together and work with them.”

    Source location

    Response from APCC
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    RCRP did not apply because the case was treated as a missing person involving immediate risk requiring police response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Missing persons framework is another distinct policy area which falls outside of RCRP when it is established that a persons whereabouts cannot be ascertained and all reasonable enquiries have been made by the informant to ascertain their whereabouts.”

    Source location

    Response from NPCC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response
  10. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Glennis CONNELLY died at home on 11 November 2022 from end-stage renal failure due to tubulo-interstitial nephritis caused by tazocin, despite a previously identified allergy to the drug. The principal concerns were that this allergy was not recorded in the hospital records at Queens Hospital Burton upon Trent and that electronic patient records across the same trust did not automatically share allergy information.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of electronic patient records to automatically share renal team entries between hospitals

    Wider context from the report

    “Although the Queens Hospital Burton Upon Trent and the the Royal Derby Hospital are governed by the same hospital trust, they have different electronic patient records. Entries made by the renal team at the Royal Derby Hospital are not automatically visible to medical staff at the Queens Hospital, "allergies" do not automatically cross populate despite entries being made on the Lorenzo system and the GP records being updated on 6th & 12th February 2020. ”

    Source location

    Glennis CONNELLY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the unified electronic patient record across Trust sites, with staged rollout underway and allergy functionality planned for the first phase.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst the incident was multifactorial, the unification of the EPR systems is something the Trust is working hard to remedy. As noted, the Trust currently has two enterprise wide systems which include all patient administrative and clinical functionality, appointments, waiting lists, test results, medications, emergency care, maternity and clinical noting.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide cross-record patient links between the two electronic patient records and links to the GP Summary Care Record through the Master Patient Index.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Pending implementation of a unified system, the Trust has created a Master Patient Index, enabling us to create a patient context link from each EPR to the other, meaning that staff would be able to click a link to be taken to a mobile version of the other EPR/eCasenote systems without needing to log in or search for the patient again. Similarly, access was created to link the GP surgery held Summary Care Record (SCR). Patients have to agree to share their information on SCR in order for the information to be accessible.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust cannot extend an existing EPR across all sites because of contractual, technical, support-life and specialist-function constraints.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Implementing an entirely new system is not a small undertaking. It is important to get this right for the five hospital sites now and into the future. These EPR systems are not created by the Trust, but rather bought under contracting arrangements with their associated contractual periods, support and shelf life. As was heard at inquest, it has not been possible to extend one of the existing systems to the whole site as they need to function effectively across all specialisms. In the case of one system it is reaching the end of its support life. Any system has to be then integrated into the wider Trust in a safe way, operating alongside our other systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Derby and Burton NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Care Quality Commission will assess the incident and determine whether further regulatory action is needed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Where there is any death or serious injury at a provider or service registered by the CQC, the CQC will consider this in line with their specific incident guidance to identify if a patient has suffered avoidable harm or they were placed at significant risk of avoidable harm. This includes when there are issues relating to digital systems, and a specific incident review would consider the role of the system, as well as the registered providers involved.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will address specific local actions in its separate response.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I understand that the University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust will be separately responding to the report and commenting on specific local action in their response.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026