Recurring concern

Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services

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First reported 27 Sep 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the cross-service clinical information communication process, including stale or unsupported guidance for emergency clinicians, omitted care decisions, inaccurate handovers and information not reaching involved services.

Not included

  • Excludes failures confined to a single clinician's knowledge or competence where no cross-service information communication issue is identified.
  • Excludes generic training, staffing, documentation or information-system deficiencies that are not specifically tied to communicating clinically important information between care services.
  • Excludes delays or failures in treatment, referral or emergency access where the material communication failure is not part of the concern.
Reports
144

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
157

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
271

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care25
NHS England24
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Care Quality Commission4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Aneurin Bevan University LHB3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust3
Health Services Safety Investigations Body3
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly

    AI-generated summary

    Paul Byron Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paul Byron Holmes sustained fractured ribs and a fractured sternum in a road traffic collision on 4 April 2022, followed by hospitalisation, delirium, dehydration and declining health. He died at home on 29 May 2022 after returning for palliative care. Concerns included inadequate doctor-to-doctor handover and recording of the treatment plan during a hospital transfer, and a prescription error that delayed intravenous fluids.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly record treatment plans between transferring and receiving clinical staff

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) A treatment plan including the need to continue to treat Paul for dehydration and what to do in the event of deterioration was not agreed and recorded clearly between clinical staff of both hospitals ”

    Source location

    Paul Byron Holmes · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the inter-hospital transfer form to document escalation plans, ensure consistent handover records, and prompt sharing of relevant medical-management details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Trusts propose to review the inter-hospital transfer form used by both the discharging and receiving wards to ensure an escalation plan is documented and to ensure that the handover record in both Trusts is consistent. Any revisions to the handover documentation would need to include a prompt for the discharging and receiving nurse to share any relevant details from the medical management plan.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a task-and-finish group to review inter-hospital transfer-form design and take forward resulting developments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Both Trusts commit to establishing a task and finish group to review the design of the inter-hospital transfer forms and take forward any developments. This group will be established by the start of October 2024.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing Treatment Escalation Plan adequately specified escalation to acute hospital if deterioration occurred, despite omission from the handover form.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The patient handover form was completed by the receiving nurse at CFT, however, this did not detail the need to continue to treat the patient for dehydration and what to do in the event of a deterioration. Although specific actions in the event of a deterioration were not documented on the handover form, there was a Treatment Escalation Plan (TEP) dated 4th of April 2022 recorded in Mr Holmes’ paper notes, which did detail that Mr Holmes was for escalation back to the acute hospital in the event he deteriorated. The TEP was followed.”

    Source location

    Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 June 2024

    Open published response
  2. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew James Naylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew James Naylor was found deceased on 11 October 2022 in Durham City, the day after discharge from hospital following treatment for a drug overdose and alcohol withdrawal. The report identified concerns about inadequate warnings of the risks associated with combining the administered drug with alcohol or drugs, poor communication between services, and insufficient consideration of his homelessness, discharge safety, and available support. The inquest concluded that he died from the combined central nervous system depressant actions of alcohol and two drugs, with cumulative failures contributing more than minimally to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of acute, alcohol and drug treatment, and mental health teams to share crucial risk information appropriately

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There appears to be a lack of a joined up process between acute clinicians, alcohol and drug treatment teams, and mental health teams, to consider the safety of a discharge, and to ensure that crucial information relevant to risk is shared appropriately (which may also be, to an extent, hampered by a continuing inability to see each other's records), and whether discharge should be delayed or care stepped down, until a place of safety is identified, and to ensure that a robust safety plan is in place upon discharge. ”

    Source location

    Andrew James Naylor · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Test and roll out CDDFT electronic patient-record access on TEWV clinicians’ laptops for joined-up assessments and information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “advised, the EPR team within CDDFT attended the liaison team office on Wednesday 27 March 2024 to take steps to begin the process of putting the acute Trust's EPR on to the TEWV clinician's laptops. The EPR team have assisted, a data protection impact assessment was completed however we then experienced issues with organisational firewalls. The two IT teams have been working together to resolve this and we are now testing the platform. The testing concludes 06/08/24 and if it has been successful, it will be rolled out further from 12/08/24.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue team discussions and daily MDT reminders about documenting and verbally handing over homelessness and other risk information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Team meeting discussions: As you are aware, it was not possible to conclude Andrew's inquest in the one day initially allocated on 14 March 2024, and therefore it was adjourned and later concluded on 3 June 2024. Following the first day of Andrew's inquest, the initial learning identified during day one was picked up, and discussions took place within the team meeting, on 15 March 2024. Those discussions have continued within daily MDT meetings, to remind liaison staff of the importance of documenting, and verbally handing over if a patient reports themselves to be homeless. Conversations continue with regard to ensuring the important information relevant to a patient's risk, is handed over.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit and deep-dive liaison documentation to verify that verbal handovers to other Trusts and services are recorded, addressing issues through supervision and team meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Audits: I can reiterate that in order to provide a check that improvements are being made in respect of communicating with acute Trust staff, a further check has been added when completing the team's monthly audit to ensure it is documented that a verbal handover has been completed. This check is completed alongside the Trust Quality Assurance Schedule audit (a Trust standard) and the Advanced Nurse Practitioners (ANPs) completing the Quality Assurance Schedule have been asked to carry out a deep dive to check documentation around communication with other Trusts/services. As part of this, we now check that it is documented that a verbal handover has been given. If any issues are identified, this is picked up with the team as part of team meetings/supervision to ensure it is addressed as soon as possible.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reissue an open letter to all staff supporting appropriate information sharing while balancing patient confidentiality and safety.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Open letter to all staff: On 13 May 2024, I personally reissued a letter (initially sent in June 2021) to all Trust staff members about the support the Trust will offer when making decisions about the difficult balance between patient confidentiality and appropriate sharing of information. In particular, the letter provides “We want to emphasise however to you all, that we would rather support you for saving a person's life by breaching their confidentiality than have to explain why we held onto information that could have made a difference.” I understand that you have already received a copy of this open letter.”

    Source location

    Response from Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 30 July 2024

    Open published response
  3. Dorset

    AI-generated summary

    Frazer Charlie Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frazer Charlie Williams was found deceased on 7 March 2022 in his cell at HMP Guys Marsh, suspended by a ligature. The report identifies concerns about delays transferring prisoners requiring mental health hospital care, inadequate arrangements for managing self-neglect and healthcare handovers, shortcomings in ACCT monitoring and reviews, and other prison care and safety processes. The inquest concluded that he died by suicide in circumstances where there was inadequate assessment and monitoring of his risks of self-harm and suicide prior to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of consultation with receiving-prison healthcare teams about care capability

    Wider context from the report

    “iii. There is a lack of a national directory detailing the facilities and provision of healthcare at individual prisons across England and Wales, and associated guidance on the transfer of individuals between prison establishments when they are under the care of the healthcare teams and are not placed on medical hold. There is a lack of guidance on consultation with prison doctors where a prisoner is receiving medical care, whether that be for physical or mental health, when there is consideration by the prison to transfer the prisoner who is not placed on medical hold. Further there is a lack of consultation with the healthcare team at the proposed receiving prison to ensure they can provide the appropriate care for the person. ”

    Source location

    Frazer Charlie Williams · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Other report recipients are responsible for addressing prison healthcare guidance, ACCT operations and family engagement because these concern day-to-day prison operations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “With regard to the other concerns you have raised around a lack of national guidance relating to a range of healthcare issues in prison settings; operational issues regarding the ACCT process and engagement with prisoners’ family members, I would expect the other recipients of your report to address these in their responses, as they are responsible for matters relating to day to day operations within prison settings. I look forward to seeing their responses and working with them where appropriate, to avoid a repetition of the horrific events of this case.”

    Source location

    Response from DHSC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 June 2024

    Open published response
  4. Cheshire

    AI-generated summary

    Evie Jane DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Evie Jane Davies was found deceased at home on 2 December 2021 after taking a significant overdose of medication that had not been prescribed to her. The report states that this was likely a deliberate act intended to end her life, amid deteriorating mental health and significant personal stressors. The principal concern was insufficient real-time information sharing between the café71 crisis service, the mental health team and the GP, potentially preventing prompt follow-up of people at risk.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of access by café71 staff to mental health team information about patients’ backgrounds and risk factors

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence I heard was that the café71 service is run as a crisis line for those who are in ’lesser crisis’ than those who would call mental health team crisis line or the crisis resolution home treatment team. It appears that the cafe71 team are operating in isolation/ separately to the mental health team, and for those patients who are under the mental health team, they will be unaware of the background and the risk factors for that person. They will take an assessment of that person at face value based on how they are in the call, as they don’t have access to the information held by the mental health team. In addition, there does not appear to be any notification to the mental health team to say that the person has been in contact such that this can be followed up. It is likely that there is notification to the GP but in this case there was no detail provided which could have been passed on, and the timescales for review of correspondence by the GP, who again are operating somewhat in isolation to the mental health team, does not lend itself to the prompt action which may be required by the mental health team. I am concerned that the lack of information sharing between these organisations, and in particular in real time or as near as possible, gives rise to a risk of future deaths and consider that your organisation has the power to take action, either as provider of the service or as commissioner. ”

    Source location

    Evie Jane DAVIES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Audit referrals sent to Café 71 every six months and report findings through Acute Care and First Response governance meetings.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following learning has been undertaken by both the Trust and Café 71 to streamline how key information regarding individuals involved with mental health services can be shared with Café 71”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership
    Page 5 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Café 71 does not operate in isolation; staff can obtain relevant mental-health information from Trust crisis-line staff with the individual’s consent.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Café 71 do not have access to the Trust’s electronic Patient record system (SystmOne). However, the staff from Café 71 will contact crisis line staff to discuss any risk concerns, the teams work closely to ensure that the relevant information relating to a patient’s mental health is available to Café 71 staff. Café 71 staff can phone the crisis line to request further information, but more often the member of staff requiring the information will physically call into the office. Contacts between services are undertaken with patient knowledge and consent. The Trust would seek consent from the individual to refer them to Café 71.”

    Source location

    Response from Cheshire and Wirral Partnership
    Page 4 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  5. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Karen THOMASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Karen Thomason, aged 52, collapsed at home on 31 October 2023, was discharged from hospital without Cumbria Housing staff being notified, and was found unresponsive at home the following day. Her death was confirmed on 1 November 2023 after she had consumed a substantial amount of alcohol. The concerns included errors in safeguarding documentation, failures to notify housing staff about discharge, and the risk of conflating capacity with an absence of vulnerability or safeguarding concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to notify support services of vulnerable patients' discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There is evidence that Cumbria Housing staff had asked to be notified of the discharge of a vulnerable patient so that they could provide support to her but that they received no communications on several occasions. I am concerned that this may mean that other patients are discharged without appropriate support being alerted to their needs. ”

    Source location

    Karen THOMASON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update Symphony’s discharge screen to record discharge discussions and identify notifications or vulnerable-adult support needed before patients go home.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “RECOMMENDATION 2: Update Symphony to include discharge discussions for all patients. Include an ask “is there anything we can do or anyone we can notify before you go home?” Explore the “discharge screen” options on symphony to include a vulnerable adult question set.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Emergency Department was not informed of any request or requirement to notify the Housing Officer about discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Unfortunately, the ED Team were not made aware at any stage during Ms Thomason’s ED attendance, of any ask or requirement to notify the Housing Officer of Ms Thomason discharge or that the Housing officer had any concerns, either by the Housing Officer themselves, the Ambulance Service, or Ms Thomason. This was not conveyed verbally nor was it documented in the Ambulance records that were shared with ED on Ms Thomason’s arrival into the department.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 May 2024

    Open published response
  6. Blackpool and the Fylde

    AI-generated summary

    Sabina Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sabina Wood was admitted to hospital with abdominal pain, gallstones and possible bile duct stones, underwent an ERCP, and self-discharged against medical advice. She was found unresponsive at home on 27 January 2023 and her death was recorded as a natural death, with acute haemorrhagic pancreatitis and cholelithiasis stated as the medical cause. The principal concern was that a speculative and inaccurate draft discharge summary, prepared before the ERCP and sent to her GP practice, reflected unsafe processes and could pose a risk to future patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prepare discharge summaries only when patients are ready for discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “I heard extensive evidence on the practice of preparing hospital discharge summaries over the two days of the inquest. I heard that doctors commonly start to prepare discharge documentation before a patient is ready for discharge. I found that this occurred across disciplines and hospitals given that ████████ now works at the Royal Preston Hospital as a Consultant where I heard the practice also takes place. The rationale explained to me was that discharge summaries were created early and worked on throughout patient stays. This was to save time and to prevent lengthy summaries being written at the end of long stays for patients. I heard from ████████, Head of General Internal Medicine at the Blackpool Victoria Hospital that each doctor’s practice is different and it is for individual doctors to decide how they create and complete discharge summaries. I found that there is no process or procedure for discharge summaries to be created prior to discharge taking place at the Blackpool Victoria Hospital. In this case, ████████ created the document on 20th January 2023 before Sabina underwent the ERCP procedure. This document indicated that the patient was discharged on medical advice when in fact she self-discharged against medical advice. The section on ERCP was left blank intending to be completed after the procedure took place and set out that Sabina was well in herself upon discharge with pain settling. As the discharge summary was prepared prior to the ERCP taking place it could not be known whether Sabina was well in herself or that her pain was settling. ████████ mistakenly clicked on the completed button rather than the save button on 20th January 2023. There is no mechanism for the IT system to double check the document is completed before marking the document as complete. The draft discharge summary was sent by staff on 24th January 2023 after Sabina’s self-discharge on 23rd January 2023. Staff members believed that it was ready to be sent as it was marked complete by ████████. ████████ accepted in her evidence that a draft discharge summary was sent to Sabina’s GP Practice in error and told me that her revised practice is that she instructs her junior doctors to mark the discharge summaries as drafts. I heard evidence that Blackpool Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust are undertaking a review which hasn’t yet commenced. This will look at the development of a policy of how discharge summaries are prepared. This will also include a review of the IT system with regard to creating and completing discharge summaries. I found it very concerning to hear that speculative information in Sabrina’s case was placed on the discharge summary before her procedure took place. There is a risk that this could occur again and in the future this may be significant for a patient’s treatment and care. I found that the sending of a draft discharge summary to Sabina’s GP Practice by Blackpool Victoria Hospital didn’t contribute to Sabina’s death. I found that a correctly completed and finalised discharge summary wouldn’t have changed the steps taken by ████████ on 25th January 2023 who was told by the patient that she was improving. It is however, of vital importance that GPs receive timely and accurate discharge summaries from hospitals which may be significant in other cases. For that reason and not notwithstanding the review or audit that is about to commence at the Blackpool Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, I consider my duty to prevent future deaths is triggered and that there is a risk to of deaths in the future from this practice which is commonplace and neither medical specialist or hospital specific. I found that these matters gave rise to a risk of future deaths and engaged my duty under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. ”

    Source location

    Sabina Wood · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a safety instruction directing staff to take care when pre-populating discharge summaries and avoid prejudging investigation results.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the interim whilst system implementation is brought to completion, the Executive Medical Director will issue a safety instruction to all staff regarding the population of discharge summaries, stating that they need to take care when pre-populating and that clinicians are not to prejudge any investigation results.”

    Source location

    Response from Blackpool Teaching Hospitals
    Page 2 · response
    Published 29 April 2024

    Open published response
  7. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Anne HAWKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anne HAWKES was admitted to Rotherham Hospital after a fall and hip fracture, and later developed fluid overload associated with poorly managed cardiac failure. Her surgical wound broke down, with delayed tissue viability referral and an incohesive approach to wound management; she died on 15 July 2023 from multi-organ dysfunction due to an infected hip joint. The stated concerns were delayed cardiology referral and poor communication between surgery, cardiology and tissue viability services.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication between services for wound management

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The lack of communication between services within the Trust (surgery, cardiology and tissue viability) led to a delayed and incohesive approach to the wound management. ”

    Source location

    Anne HAWKES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate Tissue Viability Nurse referral criteria and raise awareness of the service across the Trust through collaborative Quality Governance work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On this occasion, it was recognised at the Inquest that the communication between orthopaedics, cardiology and our Tissue Viability Nurse services (TVN) could have been improved upon. However, this is not a reflection on the overall communication with the TVN service. Tracey Green, Tissue Viability Nurse, gave evidence that there exists a good working relationship between the surgical teams and the TVN service. It was acknowledged that TVN could have been contacted earlier when Mrs Hawkes was on Ward A1 when her wound started to break down and for this we reiterate our apology.”

    Source location

    Response from The Rotherham
    Page 3 · response
    Published 4 April 2024

    Open published response
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Isaac Onyeka · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Isaac Onyeka, a 3-year-old boy with Down’s Syndrome, developed chicken pox followed by painful swellings and signs of sepsis. He became unresponsive at home and died in hospital on 31 May 2023. Concerns included missed clinical information and risk factors during NHS111 and GP assessment, limited access to background diagnoses for NHS111 health advisers, gaps in awareness of the immune deficiency associated with Down Syndrome, and a lack of central resources to help families recognise sepsis in patients with darker skins.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of NHS111 health advisers to access GP electronic summaries and background diagnoses

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Health advisers with NHS111 do not have access to GP electronic summaries. They do not therefore have the background diagnoses of the patient concerned. The inquest heard that a different disposition would have been reached, had the health adviser been aware of the diagnosis of Down Syndrome. Had the health adviser been aware of the diagnosis, Isaac would have been assessed by a clinician during the evening of the 30 May 2023. Had this happened, Isaac’s death would have been avoided. ”

    Source location

    Isaac Onyeka · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GP electronic summaries cannot be presented to non-clinical NHS 111 advisers because they lack the training and mandate to interpret clinical information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GP electronic summaries contain clinical terms. Presenting such information to non-clinical Health Advisers would be outside the scope of practice for non-clinical staff. This is because they do not have the clinical training required to interpret the information held in these records, nor do they have a mandate to apply clinical judgement. It is the case, however, that Summary Care Records (SCRs) are visible to clinically trained staff in urgent and emergency care services. This is managed through local records sharing agreements.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 March 2024

    Open published response
  9. Mid Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Kerri Louise Mothersole · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kerri Louise Mothersole, a 44-year-old woman, died on 20 August 2022 after developing endometrial cancer with brain metastases. Her diagnosis was delayed, including because an earlier ultrasound report and associated images were not provided to treating clinicians or uploaded to hospital clinical notes, and community imaging was not available on the central imaging system.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide community ultrasound reports and images to treating clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The two reports from HEM Clinical Ultrasound Ltd on 28 June 2021 and 1 July 2021 and any images associated with the reports were not provided to any of the deceased's treating clinicians. Only the second report from 1 July 2021 was sent to her General Practitioner and not the first report from 28 June 2021. Neither report was uploaded to her clinical notes at Medway Maritime hospital or Maidstone hospital. Had the images and the reports been available to her treating clinicians then a more urgent referral would have been warranted by her General Practitioner and she may have been investigated and treated at a much earlier stage. (2) The court heard that most of Kent have a system whereby imaging taken can be seen at more than one Trust and is even linked to tertiary referral centres in London. The system used was referred to as the PACS system. Clinicians told the court that they could look up images for their patients taken at another hospital and this would impact on their decision making for a patient. Images taken in the community by private providers are not uploaded to the system but can be requested however this relies upon knowing that there were any images to access in the first instance. (3) The managing partner at HEM Clinical Ultrasound Ltd gave evidence that she had been requesting that the imaging they took be made available on the central system. She was unable to explain why this had not been requested or set up or commissioned by the Integrated Care Board. All gave evidence that the lack of imaging being available meant that issues could be missed and this created a risk to patients, which at its extreme would include a risk of future deaths. ”

    Source location

    Kerri Louise Mothersole · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continue transitioning providers from individual PACS systems to a central PACS system, including integration of acute provider trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To address the concerns highlighted in the Regulation 28 Report, we can confirm that Kent and Medway have been moving away from individual PACS systems resident in each of our providers to a central PACS system. Procurement commenced in 2021, with the integration of acute provider trusts in September 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the incident and diagnostic workflow, audit data-sharing systems, and produce and assess an options appraisal for process and IT integration improvements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. To provide longer term assurance, and in acknowledgment of this matter, NHS Kent and Medway will examine potential changes where appropriate relating to IT integration. To support this, we will undertake a review of how the incident occurred and determine how the risk of this re-occurring can be reduced. This will include:”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The first ultrasound report was inaccurate and should not have been sent to the patient’s GP.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “For information regarding this patient’s case, the ICB Patient Safety Team has requested that HEM Clinical Ultrasound complete a Serious Incident (SI) Investigation regarding the Coroner’s first concern. This concern notes that there were two ultrasound reports available, only one of which was initially sent to the patient’s GP. The provider has stated that that first report was inaccurate and should not have been sent to the patient’s GP.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    GPs receive community diagnostic reports, assess them clinically, and decide whether referral to secondary care is required.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Community diagnostics were introduced in the 2010s to improve access and reduce cost. However, no work was commissioned at the time to provide integration to GP or acute systems. The standard protocol is for community diagnostic providers to send reports (text-based), as opposed to the full diagnostics image, back to the GP that requested the investigation. The GP will then assess the report in the context of their holistic assessment of the patient and they make a clinical decision on whether to refer a patient to secondary care.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 March 2024

    Open published response
  10. West London

    AI-generated summary

    Tom Sweeting · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tom Sweeting experienced a sudden deterioration in his mental health in August 2021 and was assessed by liaison psychiatry after reporting suicidal thoughts. On 20 August 2021, he was found suspended by a ligature at home after locking himself in the garage, and resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful. Concerns included incomplete clinical assessment documentation, failures in discharge communication and treatment-plan communication, delegation of family collateral information gathering to a junior trainee, and a lack of evidence that new training and procedures had been effectively audited.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Ineffective communication between community teams

    Wider context from the report

    “2. No letter of discharge was sent at the time Tom was seen by the liaison psychiatry team, and a letter was only generated in response to investigations taking place after the death. The team acknowledged that there were “problems” with sending out letters at the time, and no evidence was brought before the court that this issue has now been resolved. Letters should be dispatched within 24 hours of attendance. Communication between the various community teams and setting out the treatment plan to the patient are important factors that were not effective during Tom’s care and remain a concerning omission where there may be a simple and effective remedy. ”

    Source location

    Tom Sweeting · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026