Recurring concern

Failure to communicate clinically important information reliably between care services

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First reported 27 Sep 2013•Latest report 10 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of the cross-service clinical information communication process, including stale or unsupported guidance for emergency clinicians, omitted care decisions, inaccurate handovers and information not reaching involved services.

Not included

  • Excludes failures confined to a single clinician's knowledge or competence where no cross-service information communication issue is identified.
  • Excludes generic training, staffing, documentation or information-system deficiencies that are not specifically tied to communicating clinically important information between care services.
  • Excludes delays or failures in treatment, referral or emergency access where the material communication failure is not part of the concern.
Reports
144

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
157

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
271

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care25
NHS England24
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust5
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board5
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust5
Care Quality Commission4
Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust4
Aneurin Bevan University LHB3
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Cheshire and Wirral Partnership NHS Foundation Trust3
Health Services Safety Investigations Body3
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust3
North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust3

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Surrey

    AI-generated summary

    Barbara Ann WOODMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Barbara Ann WOODMAN was found deceased at her residence on 31 March 2021 after police attended following concerns for her welfare. The post-mortem determined that she died from Paracetamol, Codeine and Amlodipine toxicity, having also consumed alcohol. Concerns included missed opportunities to obtain collateral information, the handling of a risk form, care planning and record-keeping, communication between inpatient and community teams, and information-sharing systems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Breakdowns in communication between inpatient staff and the CMHT

    Wider context from the report

    “d. Multiple witnesses observed that there is frequent tension between inpatient staff and the CMHT in the context of decisions relating to the discharge of inpatients. I note the explanations provided as to why such tension exists given the role of each team. However, in the context of Ms. Woodman’s care, these tensions led to gaps and breakdowns in communication between inpatient and CMHT with respect to diagnosis and formulation of both the care plan and CCMP. There is a lack of a unified record keeping system which allows the effective sharing of patient information between different components of the NHS, including primary and secondary care providers. This results in circumstances where important, relevant information for the treatment of patients is not available to treating clinicians. The use of the SCARF process during out of hours to provide timely and effective passage of information in relation to concerns for vulnerable persons in the community. ”

    Source location

    Barbara Ann WOODMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    KATHARINE ANNE FOX · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Katharine Fox died by hanging in October 2022 after being discharged from hospital, having been unable to access community psychology services during the following months. Concerns related to the lack of handover and continuity between hospital and community psychology services, substantial waiting times, and possible inability of clinicians to access notes held on different computer systems.

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    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide continuity and handover between hospital and community psychology services

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) I am concerned that the disconnection between the provision of psychology services to patients in hospital and the provision of similar psychology services to patients in the community, including the fact that the community psychology service does not receive any form of handover and that there is a substantial wait for the provision of psychology sessions which may well require continuity to be delivered effectively. ”

    Source location

    KATHARINE ANNE FOX · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide formal handovers from inpatient psychologists to community psychological practitioners and coordinate follow-on care with community mental health teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Every patient who is receiving psychological intervention on an inpatient unit and is in need of continued psychological intervention post discharge, will have a handover of care from the inpatient psychologist (verbal/in writing) to the Community Team psychological practitioner. The Community Team psychological practitioner will discuss the care and treatment with the community mental health team to ensure the patient receives appropriate care and support in the community. The care in the community can be provided by the psychological practitioner or other appropriate team member under the supervision of a qualified registered psychological practitioner.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Regularly audit handovers to verify safe transfer of psychological care to community teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The process of handover will be regularly audited to ensure that the care is safely transferred to the Community Team.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the operational model for transitions and handovers between inpatient and community psychological services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, the Unit is currently reviewing the operational model to improve the transition and handover of care between inpatient and community psychological services, with the aim of streamlining this provision.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce locality-based joint inpatient-community consultations, formal pre-discharge handovers, and electronic recording of handover information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The new process will include a joint consultation between the inpatient and community psychological services in order to aid care planning and formal handover of appropriate inpatient cases prior to discharge across each locality in Essex. Handover will be recorded on the patient’s electronic notes.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Embed a clinical information-sharing mechanism through a joint forum incorporating formal handover of required inpatient and community information.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Further, the Court is advised that it is commissioning a unified Electronic Medical Records System, in the interim Psychological Services will now have access to all of the required clinical systems and will also embed a new mechanism to ensure robust clinical information sharing between inpatient and community clinicians. This will be achieved through the aforementioned joint forum which will incorporate a formal handover of all required information. Should access to more detailed clinical information be required, this can be requested.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Patients do not always require immediate ongoing psychological therapy after discharge; treatment urgency should be determined by clinical need.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst it is noted that patients do not always require immediate on-going psychological therapy upon discharge from hospital, Psychological Services will, going forward, embed a mechanism for clinical prioritisation in order to ensure that the most urgent cases are appropriately identified and prioritised in the community, ensuring continuity of psychological treatment and minimising waiting times as much as is practicably possible. This will be monitored through the waiting time data that is collected by each service team, and which is reported through our Trust Accountability Framework process.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relevant clinical records are accessible to inpatient and community psychological staff through existing electronic systems and the Health Information Exchange.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Court is respectfully advised that EPUT (like a number of NHS Trusts) uses multiple Electronic Medical Records Systems, which includes PARIS and MOBIUS. Staff within the Inpatient Psychological Services team have access to both systems, as well as Health Information Exchange (HIE) and can therefore access all records/reports. Our IT department has recently confirmed that all clinical staff in Adult Community Psychological Services can also access both systems.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 December 2023

    Open published response
  3. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Andrew BOWLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Andrew BOWLES was found face down in a canal on 16 May 2023 after leaving Birmingham City Hospital, where he had been assessed following concerns about his mental health. The medical cause of death was drowning. The principal concern was that the mental health liaison nurse did not have direct access to City Hospital records containing information about command hallucinations and thoughts of self-harm, which may have affected the assessment and potential referral for psychiatric admission.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of access to essential patient records before mental health liaison assessment and treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The mental health liaison nurse from Birmingham and Solihull mental health NHS foundation trust did not have a log in to be able to directly access City Hospital records, but rather relied on a colleague to access any notes and provide a verbal handover. Further, she stated in evidence that her assessment may have taken place prior to the A&E notes being put onto the system, as she was unaware that Mr Bowles had been experiencing command hallucinations and had thoughts of self-harm, the same being denied when she saw him less than an hour later. Her evidence was clear, that had she been privy to this information, it would have put a different angle on the assessment and would have led down the route of psychiatric review for potential admission. 4. I am concerned that the mental health liaison nurse undertook her assessment without having access to City Hospital records, which contained essential information that would have impacted on her assessment. I am concerned that there may still be a risk to the life of some patients if the mental health liaison team and Birmingham City Hospital are not ensuring that essential patient records are being appropriately shared and read prior to diagnosis and treatment. The situation may well be the same at University Hospitals Birmingham, given that Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS foundation Trust also run a mental health liaison service in the A&E department. ”

    Source location

    Andrew BOWLES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Allocate hospital-record access to bank staff regularly working within the Psychiatric Liaison Team.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the past any “bank staff” (temporary staff) who were on shift would ask a member of the permanent team to access the records, so that they could review them prior to seeing a patient and would also ask permanent staff to update the records, following their review. Following the PFD, a joint meeting has taken place between the two trusts, and we have been able to identify that a number of the bank staff are regularly working bank shifts within the PLT. Therefore these staff will now be allocated access to hospital records. This will improve matters considerably in this area.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Advise agency staff during local induction how to access, review and update hospital records through permanent team members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There are a small number of staff who may be called in from agencies when there are no other staff available. As these staff may be new to the team and/or to both trusts and only working one shift, it is unlikely that an account is set up immediately for them with the Hospital. In these exceptional circumstance, when the local induction takes place, they will be advised of the processes in place for them to speak with other permanent team members to access the City Hospital notes. They will review them prior to speaking with the patient and also update the records with their assessment after. Now that BSMHFT bank staff also have access to the”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Generic logins for agency staff cannot be provided because they would lack traceability, accountability and lawful information processing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Please be assured, we did explore all possible options including providing a generic log on for agency only staff who may be carrying out one shift. However from an information governance perspective it would not be possible to ascertain who had inputted the information and therefore there would be no traceability or accountability in place, if any problem arose. This is contra to the lawful processing of confidential information. Therefore the only option available was to strengthen the number of PLT staff who have access to the City Hospital records to address any concerns going forward and ensure smooth working.”

    Source location

    Response from Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 November 2023

    Open published response
  4. Newcastle and North Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Brian David MORETON · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Brian Moreton was admitted with diarrhoea, recurring fever and a distended abdomen; a toxic megacolon present on CT was not reported to those treating him. He was treated for severe colitis, later found to have a perforated bowel, and died from infections following surgery and immunosuppression. The principal concern was poor and misleading communication between clinicians, departments and hospital trusts, including deficiencies in the information provided to radiologists and assumptions about his clinical improvement and surgical referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate accurate clinically important information between clinicians and departments

    Wider context from the report

    “- Evidence was heard that at the time of the inquest radiologists do not have access to patient' medical notes and base their reporting on a summary document submitted by the department requiring imaging. The summary document in Mr MORETON’S case was seen to be deficient in that it omitted his symptom of fever. It was heard in evidence a radiologist would need to telephone the department in question or go there to inspect the notes. Their awareness of a patient's condition is based on a telephone call referral followed by a summary document which can be at odds with each. - It is of concern that the use of telephone referral system and summary could contain errors and the radiologist must rely on this information, with no quick way to inspect a patient's notes. - The evidence also dealt with radiologists working in 2 hour triage shifts in a hectic environment where those clinicians receiving the referral seldom were the clinicians who carried out the imaging. The inference was the arrangement was susceptible to error. - Over the course of the inquest evidence was heard on a number of issues where information passed to and from clinicians involved in Mr MORETON’S care was inaccurate and misleading. - Assumptions were made that, Mr MORETON was improving clinically when a surgical opinion was sought, this was incorrect. - It was assumed Mr MORETON would be referred for a surgical opinion by ED department clinicians, when in fact none took place. - Clinicians in Newcastle Upon Tyne when asked for advice were under the impression treatment was working as it was mentioned his discharge from hospital was contemplated - this was not the case. - Overall I am concerned by the poor and misleading communications between clinicians, departments and Hospital Trusts on matters of vital importance to patient care. ”

    Source location

    Brian David MORETON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of telephone referrals and imaging summaries to provide accurate, consistent clinical information

    Wider context from the report

    “- Evidence was heard that at the time of the inquest radiologists do not have access to patient' medical notes and base their reporting on a summary document submitted by the department requiring imaging. The summary document in Mr MORETON’S case was seen to be deficient in that it omitted his symptom of fever. It was heard in evidence a radiologist would need to telephone the department in question or go there to inspect the notes. Their awareness of a patient's condition is based on a telephone call referral followed by a summary document which can be at odds with each. - It is of concern that the use of telephone referral system and summary could contain errors and the radiologist must rely on this information, with no quick way to inspect a patient's notes. - The evidence also dealt with radiologists working in 2 hour triage shifts in a hectic environment where those clinicians receiving the referral seldom were the clinicians who carried out the imaging. The inference was the arrangement was susceptible to error. - Over the course of the inquest evidence was heard on a number of issues where information passed to and from clinicians involved in Mr MORETON’S care was inaccurate and misleading. - Assumptions were made that, Mr MORETON was improving clinically when a surgical opinion was sought, this was incorrect. - It was assumed Mr MORETON would be referred for a surgical opinion by ED department clinicians, when in fact none took place. - Clinicians in Newcastle Upon Tyne when asked for advice were under the impression treatment was working as it was mentioned his discharge from hospital was contemplated - this was not the case. - Overall I am concerned by the poor and misleading communications between clinicians, departments and Hospital Trusts on matters of vital importance to patient care. ”

    Source location

    Brian David MORETON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Participate in a regular Inflammatory Bowel Disease multidisciplinary team meeting at Newcastle to improve communication and advice between the Trusts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If specialist advice is required in relation to the management of colitis and any potential complications arising from this, even when the colitis is as a result of immunotherapy for the treatment of a melanoma, advice would be sought by the treating Gastroenterology team at North Cumbria, from the Gastroenterology team at Newcastle (as the tertiary centre), as the Gastroenterologists are the specialists dealing with colitis and any complications arising from this. This is why, following Mr Moreton's death, North Cumbria now take part in a regular Inflammatory Bowel Disease MDT at Newcastle, which as you heard at the inquest, has improved communication between the two Trusts and enables clinicians to more freely pick up the phone and seek advice.”

    Source location

    Response from DAC Beachcroft
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Relaunch SBAR across the Trust, requiring documented email confirmation and record copies for telephone advice and escalation communications.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst staff are expected to utilise SBAR within handover and referrals, and is clearly referenced within various policies and SOPs, it would appear that this system has lost momentum within the Trust. SBAR is therefore being relaunched throughout the Trust and meetings are ongoing to determine how best to achieve this. Clinicians will be expected to utilise SBAR in any escalation of a clinical problem that requires attention, or to facilitate efficient handover, both internally and externally.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold joint internal and cross-Trust IBD multidisciplinary meetings at established biweekly and triweekly frequencies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust now holds joint biweekly IBD multidisciplinary team meetings (MDTs) between the internal general surgery and gastroenterology teams. A triweekly joint specialist IBD MDT between the Trust and Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust has also been established since February 2023. An MDT, made up of a variety of specialists within an interest in IBD or gastroenterology, approach to the management of a patient’s IBD, is recommended to provide optimised and personalised care, based on available professional expertise, infrastructure and funding, and helps to prevent errors in the delivery of care and avoid related harm to patients. The timing of MDT meetings happen on the aforementioned frequencies to ensure decision-making is not delayed, however, such discussions largely relate to complex, chronic IBD patients.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate the ratified CT imaging referral protocol requiring senior review, written ICE referrals and defined Radiographer authorisation pathways.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In August 2022, the Trust ratified a protocol, which sets out a clear referral flow chart for the authorisation of CT imaging for adults. If a CT scan is indicated, the patient must be reviewed or discussed with a senior decision maker within the referring team, and the referrer must make a written referral on ICE (as is the process for all imaging), with reference to who the senior decision maker is within the referral. If the request falls within the Rapid Radiology Request Pathway (“RRRP”) criteria below, this can be discussed with a CT Radiographer without the requirement to discuss this with a Radiologist or the referrer:”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop and deliver diagnostic-referral education covering mandatory fields, clinical information and differential diagnoses for trained staff.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust recognises that if most requests for imaging are managed via written referral on ICE, there is a need to ensure that such referrals are robust. A robust referral should contain high-quality clinical information, which enables the Radiology Department to determine the most appropriate investigation or procedure to be selected, that takes into account patient safety, radiation exposure, and diagnostic value. It also provides a reason for the investigation through a clear diagnostic question that the referrer wants answering, to assist the Radiologist in the interpretation of results, minimising perceptual and interpretational diagnostic errors, and the subsequent completion of a pertinent and concise report.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require ICE referrers to record clinical details and differential diagnoses in the renamed mandatory referral field.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The purpose of diagnostic imaging is to assist in the process of identifying or determining the etiology of a disease or condition, alongside the evaluation of a patient’s history, physical examination, and review of laboratory data. Reaching a diagnosis provides a trajectory of treatment and an understanding of a patient’s prognosis, and in some cases, may be useful for preventative treatments. However, in order to justify diagnostic imaging (to provide assurance that the benefits outweigh the risks) it is necessary to provide a differential diagnosis, which the imaging seeks to evidence or rule out. A differential diagnosis of query obstruction was included within Mr Moreton’s ICE referral, but toxic megacolon was not considered as an explanation for his presentation during his admission.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind Radiology staff to document relevant justification discussions in RIS for access by subsequent reporting Radiologists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust however recognises that there may be occasions where referrers and the Radiology Department need to discuss a referral. As aforementioned, such discussions were not documented or recorded at the time of Mr Moreton’s admission. The Radiology Department utilises RIS (radiology information system) which has the ability to document any relevant information, and each Radiologist has access to the system. Following Mr Moreton’s death, Radiology staff have been reminded of situations where it might be appropriate to record information on RIS, particularly discussions during the justification process, which could be reviewed by the Reporting Radiologist, if the imaging was justified by another Radiologist.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Timetabled multidisciplinary team meetings cannot determine acute or emergency care because those decisions cannot be delayed.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Acute or emergency care decisions cannot not be delayed for timetabled MDTs, but should happen separately between relevant specialists. The introduction of the MDTs has improved working relationships and communication between the teams and Trusts, to ensure early referrals for specialist input in the management of a patient’s care is sought, for patients who are acutely unwell and/or where urgent advice is required. Had the MDTs been in place during Mr Moreton’s admission, he likely would have been listed for discussion in both MDTs and professional relationships would have been established to seek earlier input from surgical colleagues and specialists in Newcastle.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Written ICE referrals are generally sufficient to justify imaging without supplementary telephone discussion with a radiologist.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Furthermore, there is no longer the expectation or requirement for referrers to discuss referrals for any imaging with a Radiologist. Whilst the duty line is still operational for referrers, Radiographers and Radiologists to discuss any requests being made, it is process for a robust ICE written referral to be made, and it is on that basis that the majority of imaging requests are justified or rejected, either by a Radiographer or Radiologist (depending on the above criteria), without the need for further discussion.”

    Source location

    Response from North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 5 October 2023

    Open published response
  5. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Anthony John Friend · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Anthony John Friend, who was living with the effects of a brain tumour and required regular personal care, sustained a significant head injury on 17 April 2023 after slipping through a sling while being hoisted from a chair to his bed. He was discharged home for palliative care and died there on 20 April 2023. The principal concern was that an old toileting sling had previously been judged unsuitable and unsafe, but remained at his property and continued to be used, with shortcomings identified in communication, supervision and arrangements for safer alternatives.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate concerns about continued unsafe sling use in writing to care agencies

    Wider context from the report

    “In the course of the inquest, I heard evidence that: 1) As long ago as 28.11.22 (nearly 5 months before the accident which led to Mr. Friend’s death ), ████████, an Occupational Therapist employed by HWHT, had concluded that the sling being used at the time of the accident on 17.4.23 ( the “old toileting sling” ) was no longer suitable for Mr. Friend, ensured that two more suitable slings were provided instead, but did not remove the old toileting sling from Mr. Friend’s property; 2) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 2.2.23, ████████ noted that the old toileting sling was still being used, and made clear to Mr. Friend’s family and carers that it was “not safe to use”, but again did not remove it from the property; 3) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 6.3.23, ████████, another Occupational Therapist employed by HWCT, noted that the old toileting sling was still being used by family and carers, and that although the two more suitable slings provided by her colleague ████████ would be difficult to fit, they were nonetheless safer to use. ████████ told the inquest that in hindsight she “should not have allowed [ carers ] to carry on using the unsafe sling” and that she did not know why she had not taken time to show carers how to use the safer slings which had been provided; 4) During a home visit to Mr. Friend’s address on 17.4.23 (just prior to the accident ) in order to assess Mr. Friend for a new sling, ████████ noted that the old toileting sling was still being used. However, she told the inquest that despite her misgivings about it, she did not remove it from the address, and still expected carers to carry on using it for the next two weeks until a new sling arrived. She described this decision as “an oversight” on her part; 5) ████████ also told the inquest that: (a) she should have ensured that Mr. Friend’s carers were present for the home visit and sling assessment on 17.4.23 ( which they were not ); and (b) she should have contacted his new carers ( Divine Health Services Ltd. ) after that visit, to discuss their use of the sling; 6) At no time did either ████████ appear to have communicated their concerns about the continued use of the old toileting sling in writing to either of the agencies which were providing care for Mr. Friend at the relevant times. ”

    Source location

    Anthony John Friend · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement and disseminate a step-by-step focus card for identifying unsafe equipment, documenting removal warnings, and educating occupational therapy staff on its use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As a Trust we recognise that more timely action was required about removal of older slings so we have in partnership with a range of professionals designed a focus-on-card around a step by step guide for staff when they identify unsafe equipment in a patient’s home. This is a direct impact from this serious incident. This will act as a useful reminder document that staff will have access to when visiting patients in their homes and will be a vital part of new starter’s induction packs.”

    Source location

    Response from Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The existing CHC-mediated handover captured all relevant information, including sling concerns, so direct outgoing-to-incoming contact was not necessary in this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “As part of this meeting, the management team reviewed the detailed care plan that had been prepared by CHC based on information provided by ourselves and provided to Divine Health Care as part of the process of finding a new care provider. Although the handover was from CHC to Divine Health Care and not directly from Bluebird Care to Divine Health Care, all of Bluebird Care’s concerns regarding the sling were very clearly documented within this detailed 14-page document. Our identity as the outgoing care provider was also included within this document. This document was shared with Divine Health Care in advance of them carrying out their assessment and agreeing to take over Mr Friend's package of care.”

    Source location

    Response from Bluebird Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 September 2023

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Kevin Amesbury · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Kevin Amesbury had extensive cardiac disease and became increasingly unwell while awaiting assessment for severe mitral regurgitation. He died in hospital after becoming unresponsive and undergoing cardiopulmonary resuscitation; post-mortem examination identified bilateral bronchopneumonia and aspiration of gastric contents, with heart failure contributing to reduced physiological reserves. The concerns included delays and problems in referrals between secondary and tertiary services, information-sharing and transfer of clinical records and images, and delays in cardiology assessment and trans-oesophageal echocardiography due to resource and appointment constraints.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of inter-trust referral systems to provide timely electronic transfer of clinical information, images and notes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The inquest heard evidence that Mr Amesbury needed to be referred from secondary to tertiary services within Greater Manchester. The inquest heard evidence that the speed and quality of that referral was impacted by the way in which information was shared between clinicians in different trusts within Greater Manchester. The use of different systems and reliance on postal services and lack of a clear, effective electronic system of referrals including transfer of images /notes meant there were delays in assessing patients which led to a delay in formulating a treatment plan in tertiary services; ”

    Source location

    Michael Kevin Amesbury · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Explore extending referral-platform benefits to other Greater Manchester services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “exploring. Attached as appendix 1 is a briefing note which outlines how a secondary to tertiary referral platform (Patient Pass) has been used to excellent effect in Renal, Neurosurge████████ Northern Care Alliance (NCA). There are significant benefits for outcomes re safety and productivity. We are looking at how we can bring the benefits of this type of technology to other services.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with information officers and the Digital Delivery Executive how to develop the referral-platform proposal into a funded project.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Work to resolve this aligns closely with the GM digital strategy, the opportunities that the ICB brings for visibility, spread and scale. GM ICB commits to exploring and as appropriate, implementing this across other GM services. We will be progressing this with chief information officers across the integrated care system for an outline discussion to consider how this could be worked up into a funded project within the strategy delivery plan.”

    Source location

    Response from Greater Manchester Integrated Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 July 2023

    Open published response
  7. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Shone Blewitt died at Milton Keynes University Hospital on 11 July 2022 after returning to the emergency department with faecal incontinence and abdominal pain, following an earlier visit where he had been referred from an urgent care centre. A possible acute abdomen was confirmed by CT, and he suffered a cardiac arrest before surgery. Concerns included inaccurate communication of important symptoms and treatment information, inadequate clinical recording, and the absence of reliable records of intravenous fluids administered in the emergency department.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accurately transcribe communications received at emergency department triage

    Wider context from the report

    “[3] On arrival at the ED a triage nurse summarised the communication from the urgent care centre. The triage nurse missed important points during the transcription. The attending doctor did not concern himself to look at the communication himself. ”

    Source location

    Alexander Shone BLEWITT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Swansea and Neath Port Talbot

    AI-generated summary

    Samuel Alexander Morgan · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Samuel Alexander Morgan, who was suffering from alcohol addiction and had diagnoses of ADHD and social anxiety, was found deceased at his parents’ house on 9 May 2019 after tying a ligature around his neck. The principal concern was that addiction and mental health services could not electronically access each other’s records, meaning important information about suicide risk and patient safety might be lost or insufficiently understood between treating teams.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of integrated electronic access to medical and treatment records between treating teams

    Wider context from the report

    “I am concerned that in cases where an individual is receiving treatment from alcohol and drug addiction services and treatment from the primary community mental health team that neither team is able to access the other teams records electronically. The lack of integrated electronic records between treating team means that important information regarding patient safety is not easily accessible between treating teams. Treating teams are reliant on referral letters which are necessarily limited and not always sufficient to capture all the detailed information available to a referring team. This is particularly concerning where there is dual diagnosis - such as substance misuse and mental health - given these are often complex cases. This is particularly the case where complex cases have not been referred into secondary mental health services and so do not have access to a care-coordinator who can oversee and understand the views of the various professionals treating and assisting an individual. I am concerned that the lack of such an integrated electronic system of medical and treatment records inhibits the effective sharing of information regarding patient safety and so increases the risk that information of significance regarding a risk to life will be lost between agencies and not sufficiently understood between all those managing risk. ”

    Source location

    Samuel Alexander Morgan · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Enable two-way WCCIS information sharing between Swansea community mental health and drug and alcohol teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. For Swansea based teams there is opportunity to share information between community mental health teams and drug and alcohol services via WCCIS which will allow 2 way sharing of all information in the WCCIS system relating to episodes of care both within community mental health services and drug and alcohol services. The technical changes to enable this will be completed within 10 working days and it is intended that this will be implemented week commencing 7th August 2023.”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further WCCIS rollout is on hold pending Welsh Government approval of National Programme Team recommendations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The solution to this is intended to be the implementation of the Welsh Community Care Information System, (WCCIS) which is a national IT programme aimed at enabling the safe sharing of information between health and social care. This has been partially rolled out within the Health Board as part of the implementation of the solution within Swansea Local Authority. Further roll out within the Health Board is currently on hold pending the approval by Welsh Government of recommendations made within a Ministerial Advice Paper presented by the National Programme Team. The situation is complicated by the fact that only one of our Local Authority partners has chosen to implement WCCIS. The current deployment of the solution within SB UHB is managed by Swansea Local Authority who”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Local Authority must request and implement any amendments to WCCIS system functionality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The solution to this is intended to be the implementation of the Welsh Community Care Information System, (WCCIS) which is a national IT programme aimed at enabling the safe sharing of information between health and social care. This has been partially rolled out within the Health Board as part of the implementation of the solution within Swansea Local Authority. Further roll out within the Health Board is currently on hold pending the approval by Welsh Government of recommendations made within a Ministerial Advice Paper presented by the National Programme Team. The situation is complicated by the fact that only one of our Local Authority partners has chosen to implement WCCIS. The current deployment of the solution within SB UHB is managed by Swansea Local Authority who”

    Source location

    Response from Swansea Bay University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 May 2023

    Open published response
  9. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Elsie Leaver · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Elsie Leaver died on 23 August 2020, aged 89, from multiple organ failure following a mixed drug overdose. The report raised concerns about missing psychiatric history, inadequate psychiatric assessment and risk assessment, failure to access available health information, and the lack of formal psychiatric liaison cover at QMH.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Omission of pertinent psychiatric history from GP summaries

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That the GP summary did not contain pertinent psychiatric history that would have assisted the hospital clinicians to identify Mrs Leaver’s depression and specifically her suicidality. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Elsie Leaver · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. South London

    AI-generated summary

    Patrick Soames · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Patrick Soames died by suicide on 21 June 2021 after a final month involving repeated serious self-harm, including cutting, medication overdose and excessive alcohol misuse, with multiple hospital attendances. The principal concerns were that information about his risk was fragmented across NHS Trusts, police forces, local authorities and geographical areas, with no effective system to consolidate or flag his recent self-harm history nationally.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a national risk-flagging system for previous self-harm attendances

    Wider context from the report

    “1. 5 NHS Trusts and 3 police forces in different geographic areas had contact with Patrick in the final month of his life and each thereby gained some information about the risk to him. However, that information was by reason of the agencies falling into different geographic areas. There was no single effective global focus for the information being acquired piecemeal about Patrick’s pattern of serious self-harming behaviour. The various agencies were significantly impeded in forming a single clear picture of Patrick’s pattern of behaviour (which was particularly necessary in circumstances where he was not engaging and therefore not assisting in providing a complete history himself). 2. GPs act as a repository for information about contact with other clinical agencies (such as attendances at accident and emergency departments) and therefore serve as a point of contact for information about past history. However, I heard evidence at inquest from accident and emergency consultants that it is either not possible to access information held by a GP outside of GP surgery hours or where it is possible to do so that is only available if the GP is in the same geographic area as the accident and emergency department. Several of Patrick’s attendances at accident and emergency departments were out of GP surgery hours. 3. I was informed at inquest that one local authority (in whose area Patrick resided) had been made aware by police of the risk to Patrick following one of his self-harm incidents (in respect of a particularly important piece of information) and had relayed that information to a 6th NHS Trust (not one of the 5 from which I heard evidence at inquest) but Patrick did not reside in that Trust area. Those Trusts which did have direct contact with Patrick were never made aware of that piece of information nor had any means of accessing it. 4. I heard evidence that there is no national ‘risk flagging’ system: for example, when a person attends an accident and emergency department having self-harmed, the fact of a previous self-harm attendance at a different accident and emergency department is not systematically flagged up. 5. In summary, there was no single effective global focus consolidating the information which was flowing into the various agencies about Patrick; no global focus to which those agencies could in turn refer in emergency to obtain the totality of information about Patrick’s recent pattern of behaviour; no national ‘risk flagging’ system to alert those agencies to his significant recent history. ”

    Source location

    Patrick Soames · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026