Recurring concern

Unreliable safety investigation reports and disclosure

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First reported 18 Sep 2014•Latest report 6 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in formal safety-investigation report provision, disclosure, authorship, version control, correction or transparency where the report itself or its availability is unreliable, including failure to provide a completed report to families or coroners and failure to disclose or clearly attribute investigation findings.

Not included

  • Excludes the underlying conduct of the investigation, including evidence gathering or causal analysis, where the report is itself available and the concern is only that the investigation was inadequate.
  • Excludes failures to implement corrective actions or organisational learning after a complete and reliable investigation report has been produced.
  • Excludes general inquest disclosure, duty-of-candour or court-evidence failures unless they specifically concern the availability, completeness, attribution or transparency of a formal safety investigation report.
  • Excludes ordinary clinical-record or administrative-document deficiencies unrelated to a formal safety investigation report.
Reports
20

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
23

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
27

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Betsi Cadwaladr University LHB3
Department of Health and Social Care2
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust2
All Care In One Limited1
All Care In One Ltd1
Barts Health NHS Trust1
Civil Aviation Authority1
County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust1
Department for Transport1
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Essex County Council1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
European Union Aviation Safety Agency1
Hellesdon Hospital1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mansoor Zaman, a 27-year-old man with a history of suicidality, substance misuse and EUPD, absconded from a mental health ward on 8 December 2024 after displaying suicidal intent and erratic and aggressive behaviour. His body was recovered on 29 December 2024. The substantive concerns included failures to use available mental health authorisations, reassess risk and observation levels, adequately document care, and promptly report him missing to police; the inquest jury identified some of these failures as factors that probably or possibly contributed to his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate patient safety investigation findings to treating staff

    Wider context from the report

    “9. The inadequacy of the Trust patient safety framework investigation which neither sought the recollections of treating staff, nor communicated the findings of the report to the same staff. ”

    Source location

    Mansoor Zaman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigations may not obtain every clinician account or provide feedback when staff absence conflicts with timely completion.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “33. I understand it is frustrating that recollections of all staff are not always sought in PSII’s nor the findings communicated to all staff. Unfortunately, it is sometimes a balance of trying to obtain all clinician accounts (due to things such as sick leave) versus timely completion of the investigation. The same applies to feedback sessions. Though, to mitigate these issues, when staff are unable to attend feedback sessions they are routinely provided with a copy of the final report via email and asked to comment on it.”

    Source location

    2026-0072 - Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 12 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Mohamed Fekry Osman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Mohamed Fekry Osman was a passenger on flight MS804, which crashed into the Mediterranean Sea on 19 May 2016 after a fire broke out on the flight deck; there were no survivors. The inquest stated that the fire was caused by an ignition source of unknown origin, most likely associated with the first officer’s oxygen supply system. The substantive concerns included cockpit fire and smoke procedures, oxygen-system risks, fire-protection equipment and extinguishers, smoking regulations, and arrangements for participation in or transfer of aircraft accident investigations.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to produce timely final reports and interim statements on investigation progress and safety issues

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That a drafting committee be convened to consider amending Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 to provide: (a) a right for states entitled to participate in an investigation to have access to evidence to enable those participating states to release a statement in accordance with Chapter 6.6.1 in circumstances where they have been excluded from an investigation by the State of Occurrence; (b) a right of states entitled to participate in an investigation to take over conduct of an investigation in circumstances where a State of Occurrence does not produce a Final Report within a reasonable timeframe and does not produce interim statements indicating the progress of the investigation and safety issues raised within a reasonable timeframe and has not otherwise consented to the delegation of the investigation in accordance with Chapter 5.1. ”

    Source location

    Richard Mohamed Fekry Osman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Aircraft accident and serious-incident investigation is outside the CAA’s responsibility and falls to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CAA is not responsible for the investigation of aircraft accidents or serious incidents on behalf of the UK, which falls to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (‘AAIB’), a body who report directly to the Secretary of State for Transport. Procedures for these investigations are laid down in international protocols, specifically the standards and recommended practices defined in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, and published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’).”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department for Transport will respond separately to report aspects concerning aircraft accident investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CAA understands that the Department for Transport (‘DfT’) will, therefore, respond separately to those aspects of the Report which relate to aircraft accident investigation. We can confirm that we have exchanged responses with the DfT prior to filing this response with the court.”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    ICAO’s amended arrangements and public-information encouragement provide adequate assurance without further rights to take over investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to Point 2b, since the accident ICAO has amended Annex 13 via SARP 5.1.3 (Amendment 17 of Annex 13) introducing the right for another state to request that they take over investigative responsibility should no investigation be initiated within thirty days and giving states the right to do their own investigation using widely available information if no investigation is then initiated. ICAO also encourages states to release information publicly in the early days of the investigation. It is important to maintain clear roles and parameters for involvement in accident investigations to ensure they remain impartial, they are investigated thoroughly and lessons are learned to prevent future recurrence.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Transport
    Page 3 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Aircraft accident investigation is outside the CAA’s responsibility and falls to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CAA is not responsible for the investigation of aircraft accidents or serious incidents on behalf of the UK, which falls to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (‘AAIB’), a body who report directly to the Secretary of State for Transport. Procedures for these investigations are laid down in international protocols, specifically the standards and recommended practices defined in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, and published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’).”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Department for Transport will respond separately to report aspects concerning aircraft accident investigation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The CAA understands that the Department for Transport (‘DfT’) will, therefore, respond separately to those aspects of the Report which relate to aircraft accident investigation. We confirm that we have exchanged responses with the DfT prior to filing this response with the court.”

    Source location

    Response from Civil Aviation Authority
    Page 2 · response
    Published 3 July 2025

    Open published response
  3. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Etta-Lili Stockwell-Parry · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Etta-Lili Stockwell-Parry was born in poor condition on 3 July 2023 and died four days later after transfer for specialist neonatal care. The report identified missed opportunities to recognise static growth and fetal distress, inadequate monitoring and incomplete records during labour, and concerns that the neonatal investigation and sharing of learning were insufficiently thorough and contextualised.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient contextual sharing of investigation findings

    Wider context from the report

    “b. There was no sufficiently full contextual sharing of the investigation or its findings from a neonatal or maternity perspective. Some witnesses had only received and read the report several weeks prior to the Inquest. ”

    Source location

    Etta-Lili Stockwell-Parry · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement the Integrated Concerns Policy as a single approach to incident, complaint and mortality reviews and investigations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In relation to investigations, as you know this is an area of improvement I have prioritised. Last year, a new Integrated Concerns Policy was approved in June 2024 by the Board”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 22 May 2025

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    JAVED IQBAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Javed died on 1 June 2024 after deliberately igniting his room with flammable liquid and sustaining major burn injuries and smoke inhalation, followed by multi-organ failure. The report identified concerns that staff did not recognise and appropriately act on serious acute mental health issues, including not escalating worsening mood and irrational behaviour to the GP in writing. It also identified the absence of a formal internal post-death investigation and outstanding internal training that had not addressed these concerns.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of a formal internal post-death investigation report

    Wider context from the report

    “The evidence demonstrated there is a continuing risk that All Care In One Ltd staff will not recognise and take appropriate action when a service user presents with serious acute mental health issues. For example: (1) At a fundamental level staff did not understand what is in the best interests of a service user: (a) Carers did not want to embarrass Javed, therefore they felt justified in making repetitive inaccurate contemporaneous records recording behaviour and mood as well despite having serious concerns about his worsening mental health and triggering an urgent call to his GP; (b) Then, having contacted the GP two days before his death, the care co-ordinator did not action the request from the GP to send an email setting out these serious concerns in writing. (2) There was no formal internal post-death investigation report. (3) Whilst some post-death internal training has been identified it remains outstanding despite 8 months passing since the death. However, I was not satisfied this training has recognised the above concerns. ”

    Source location

    JAVED IQBAL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton

    AI-generated summary

    Craig Steadman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Craig Steadman was in custody at HMP Winchester and had diabetes, a mental health history, and previous self-harming incidents. He was found suspended by a ligature in his cell after a further self-harm incident, and CPR was unsuccessful. The principal concern was that findings and recommendations from investigations into his death were not shared with staff directly involved in his care, limiting the dissemination and implementation of learning.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share and discuss investigation findings and recommendations with relevant prison and healthcare staff

    Wider context from the report

    “There were several investigations into Craig Steadman’s death including a post incident review by HMP Winchester, the PPO,and the prison healthcare provider. Various recommendations flowed from the above. However upon questioning of various members of staff called to give evidence at the Inquest it became clear that several of them were not aware of the findings of the investigations nor the recommendations. The reports had not been shared with staff directly involved with Craig during his recent time in custody. It is not possible for learning to be fully disseminated and acted upon if there is no process for sharing the findings of those organisations tasked with investigating deaths in custody and discussing these with the relevant Prison/Healthcare staff. ”

    Source location

    Craig Steadman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Identify relevant staff and share, discuss, and explain investigation findings, learning, and reports with them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have received assurances from the Governor at HMP Winchester that the investigation report into the death of Mr Steadman has now been shared and discussed with the relevant staff. Going forward, once an investigation report into the circumstances of a death in custody is received, the Head of Safety will identify the relevant members of staff and discuss the findings with them. This will include sharing the report, highlighting any areas of learning and ensuring that the member of staff understands the content. Additionally, any learning identified that concerns the prison more generally will be acted upon at an early stage, ensuring effective changes are made. This will include liaising with other agencies, such as the healthcare provider.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 August 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Consider investigation recommendations nationally and produce and share learning bulletins across the wider prison estate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At a national level, all recommendations made following an investigation into a death in custody are considered by the national learning team and are used to produce learning bulletins that are shared across the wider prison estate.”

    Source location

    Response from HMPPS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 August 2024

    Open published response
  6. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Janet Rice, aged 65, died in hospital from pulmonary and cerebral embolism after surgery for a hip fracture sustained in an accidental fall. Anti-coagulant medication was inconsistently administered, including during a period when she was experiencing acute delirium; concerns included the absence of a capacity assessment, best-interests decision, escalation, or consideration of alternative treatment. The report also raised concerns about delays and limitations in the Trust’s patient safety investigation and the limited scope of related training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in completing and providing patient safety investigation reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The final version of the patient safety investigation report carried out by the Trust was only received on the first day of the Inquest, some 16 months after the death. The concerns raised in this Inquest have been well known to the Trust for a considerable period of time and the concern is that lessons cannot be learned in a timely fashion if patient safety investigations are so significantly delayed. ”

    Source location

    Janet Rice · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Track patient safety investigations at the weekly Senior Clinical Leaders patient safety forum.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has robust processes in place in relation to the investigation of any patient safety incidents identified. When the Trust were made aware that there were patient safety concerns relating to Janet’s care, in April 2024, a review commenced of her care led by one of the Community matrons. The time taken to conclude and ensure the report had progressed through the appropriate Trust governance resulted in the report not being available to yourself until the morning of the inquest. However we recognise that this was not an acceptable timeframe to enable you to properly review the report. Whilst the progress of patient safety investigations have always been tracked by the corporate patient safety team, additional processes have now been established whereby these cases are tracked at the weekly Friday Senior Clinical Leaders patient safety forum.”

    Source location

    Response from Durham and Darlington NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 1 August 2024

    Open published response
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Morgan-Rose Hart, who was detained on a female mental health ward, died on 12 July 2022 after being found unresponsive with a ligature around her neck. The report identified concerns about missed and falsified observations, failures to complete physical welfare checks after bathroom alerts, inadequate escalation of risk, shortcomings in investigation and record keeping, and insufficient suitable placements for people with autism and mental health and self-harm risks in Essex.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays and premature sign-off in Trust investigations

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Trust investigation was materially incomplete and there was a lost an opportunity to: a. Understand concerns of the Family b. Acknowledge errors and learn lessons from the circumstances of the death. The Director of Operations and Matron informed the Trust Senior Management that the PSII Report had omissions. The Trust evidence was that it was an early adopter of the new NHS investigation process. The lead investigator did not report on material issues as to how Morgan-Rose was observed on the ward and the report was significantly delayed. Evidence was there was a pressure to sign the report off although it remained incomplete and did not contain a note about the limitations. c. d. Escalate concerns about staff observations - About 2 weeks after the death the Matron received a report that staff observations had not been appropriately conducted. This prompted a review of CCTV from the afternoon of Morgan-Rose’s death. There was insufficient scrutiny of the CCTV that showed that multiple observations entries made on 6 July 2022 after 14:06 hours could not be correct. e. Understand security issues on a locked mental health ward - It has not been possible to establish the identity of the person that reset the bathroom alert triggered for Morgan-Rose on 6 July 2022 at 15:31. The Trust does not have an accurate records of Trust staff pass allocation. The Trust investigation did not establish that staff borrowed each other's security passes. On the day of Morgan-Rose’s death a visitor pass issued had had access to the nursing office. The Trust was unable to provide the identity of this person. ”

    Source location

    MORGAN-ROSE HART · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Refine patient-safety incident processes and reporting templates.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Improvement activities include:”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update the PSIRF policy to set learning-response timescales, sign-off requirements, safety-action-plan management and organisation-wide learning dissemination.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “▪ The PSIRF Policy is being updated to reflect best practice. The policy includes time scale for completion of a learning response review and timely sign off. The policy also includes process for the management of safety action plan and cascading of learning across the trust.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  8. North Wales (East and Central)

    AI-generated summary

    Vivienne Greener · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Vivienne Greener was taken by ambulance to Glan Clwyd Hospital after vomiting blood and died there on 20 March 2018 following a massive upper gastrointestinal haemorrhage. The report identified concerns including delayed admission and triage, delayed provision of blood products, failures to escalate and trigger haemorrhage pathways, insufficient staffing and the lack of out-of-hours emergency endoscopy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to maintain consistent investigation report content

    Wider context from the report

    “8. A part of the Health Board’s Investigation Report changed in different versions and obscured the reason why the provision of blood products was delayed meaning issues are not sufficiently identified and actioned; ”

    Source location

    Vivienne Greener · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce a report template identifying the final approved investigation version and distinguishing it from drafts.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Finally, regarding your concern that the investigation report changed in different versions and obscured the reason why the provision of blood products was delayed, I understand ████████, IHC Medical Director provided a statement regarding this. Our new incident process mentioned above will introduce a new report template making it clear which version is the final, approved version of the report avoiding any confusion between the final approved version and any draft versions.”

    Source location

    Response from Betso Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 6 · response
    Published 28 December 2023

    Open published response
  9. North West Wales

    AI-generated summary

    Lynsey Sarah Smalley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lynsey Sarah Smalley, aged 42, set fire to her bed at home during an acute psychotic episode on 8 April 2021. She suffered inhalation injuries, was admitted to intensive care, and died at Ysbyty Gwynedd, Bangor on 16 May 2021. The substantive concerns were conflicting investigation reports, disjointed patient-safety and governance processes, delays in completing actions, and risks arising from paper-based medical records that may impede continuity of care.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Investigation reports containing conflicting evidence

    Wider context from the report

    “a. The Health Board provided 3 investigation reports into the death, two of which contained conflicting evidence. One responded to Lynsey’s brother’s complaint. It is clear that there was no strategic plan or collaboration in governance processes. Furthermore, there were a number of proposed actions which took nearly two years to identify and complete. The time it took to identify and complete actions, together with governance processes are matters which I have raised previously with the Health Board in previous Prevention of future Death Reports. If there are such disjointed patient safety and governance processes learning will not be effective and deaths will continue to occur or will occur into the future. ”

    Source location

    Lynsey Sarah Smalley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise and co-design a new incident investigation and action-planning process, including governance review, staff training and planned implementation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Health Board is now fully reviewing the incident process to identify where it can be improved and strengthened. A workshop was held on the 23rd October 2023 to identify current issues and to begin the work of revising our process. The concerns you have identified in this notice, and in other notices, are being directly fed into this work. We are working in co-designing the process with staff and patient representatives, such as the independent Llais organisation, to implement a completely new and improved approach where the focus is on learning and improvement. During November 2023 we are meeting with the IHCs and Divisions for their collaboration and engagement in developing the process.”

    Source location

    Response from Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 September 2023

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jade Michelle Hart died on 9 July 2018 after giving birth, following a uterine inversion caused by inappropriate management of the third stage of labour. She suffered massive uterine haemorrhage and multiple cardiac arrests, with delayed recognition and management of the bleeding, and the inquest concluded that her death was contributed to by neglect. The report raised concerns about the Trust’s serious incident investigation and insufficient support for newly appointed obstetric consultants.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disclose a critical commissioned expert report to relevant oversight bodies

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The conduct of the Trust Serious Incident Investigation – there are outstanding concerns regarding the methodology, findings and conclusions in this case. The Investigation in my view was flawed in a number of serious ways as follows: • It was undertaken without including, nor giving due weight to, the family evidence, in the analysis and conclusions of the report • It was undertaken without any immediate written accounts taken of what had happened, and very limited and delayed interviews of key staff involved • The Trust commissioned an expert to assist with the Investigation. This was provided by a well respected Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology recommended expert, and was then ignored, simply because there were aspects of the expert report that the Trust did not accept. All of these omissions in the Investigation process, led to serious omissions in the analysis, conclusions, recommendations and actions that followed in the report, in my view. Also, the Trust, on the evidence of Dr ████████, Executive Medical Director, likely did not share with either the CCG or the CQC, the fact that they had received a detailed, but critical, expert report, that they had not included, nor referred to in the final Investigation report. At the Hearing, there was no reflection on this latter issue by senior Trust staff, no acceptance that the inadequacies of the report had caused huge distress to the family, and more importantly insufficient learning. If there is insufficient learning from a tragic and avoidable death such as this, what reassurance is there that there will be sufficient learning by the Trust in the future. In my view this poses a continuing risk of similar deaths occurring in the future if the Investigation process does not change. ”

    Source location

    Jade Michelle Hart · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026