Recurring concern

Failure of organisational governance to act on escalated patient-safety concerns

Pin Get email alerts Request correction

First reported 14 Jun 2018•Latest report 8 Feb 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes governance or senior-management failures to own, investigate, escalate, monitor or act on known patient-safety signals.

Not included

  • Excludes un-escalated clinical deterioration, treatment, staffing, equipment or documentation failures unless the report explicitly identifies a clinical-governance failure to respond to the concern.
  • Excludes ordinary complaints or communications that are not framed as patient-safety concerns within a clinical governance or safety-oversight process.
  • Excludes failures confined to the delivery of a specific clinical intervention where no governance or oversight response is implicated.
  • Excludes concerns about the general quality of care or a service where no escalated safety concern and governance response are identified.
Reports
7

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
7

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2018–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
6

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care2
East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
NHS England1
NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board1
North East London NHS Foundation Trust1
Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust1
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian tied a fatal ligature in her room on Longview Ward on 17 April 2021 and died two days later in hospital. The principal concerns included inadequate and falsified observations, insufficiently trained and staffed ward personnel, poor communication about ligaturing and self-harm, medication-recording errors, failures involving Oxevision, and other care and record-keeping deficiencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to further investigate or monitor falsified observation records

    Wider context from the report

    “8. The mental health Trust were on notice that staff must have falsified the observations logs for Elise in 2021. Another inquest for a St. Aubyn’s patient who died on 12 July 2022, also found that observation logs were falsified and contained errors. Trust staff falsification of records were not further investigated or monitored after Elise’s death at St. Aubyn’s Centre. ”

    Source location

    Elise Kay Louise Sebastian · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Further develop PSIIR support and quality-check tools, including detailed investigation checklists, care-team confirmation and organisational sign-off checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Proposed Improvement in PSIIs”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 9 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concern is factually incorrect because the 2022 inquest concerned a Derwent Centre patient, not a St Aubyn’s Centre patient.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Concern 8) The mental health Trust were on notice that staff must falsify the observations logs for Elise in 2021. Another inquest for a St. Aubyn’s patient who died on 12 July 2022, also found that observation logs were falsified and contained errors. Trust staff falsification of records were not further investigated or monitored after Elise’s death at St. Aubyn’s Centre.”

    Source location

    2026-0078 - Response from Essex University Partnership Trust
    Page 11 · response
    Published 13 February 2026

    Open published response
  2. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    ████████ was detained under the Mental Health Act and admitted to psychiatric wards at the Tower Hamlets Centre for Mental Health before being found unresponsive in a patient room on 7 June 2022; her death was verified later that day. The jury identified several contributing factors, including a non-functioning door-locking system and shortcomings in patient observations. Further concerns included risk assessment, staff understanding and attitudes towards risk, auditing, and clinical oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of clinical governance to respond to escalated serious patient-safety concerns

    Wider context from the report

    “8) Effective clinical oversight at THCMH There was clear evidence at the inquest that, following an extended bank holiday weekend period, there was a lack of consultant cover on Rosebank Ward and the male PICU ward, which led to one consultant attempting to cover both wards. This, in itself, is not the concern for the purposes of this report, but it puts the matter into some context. The consultant that was providing the cover to both wards gave evidence at the inquest, as did other senior nursing staff. The consultant’s own evidence raised questions about their own professional judgment in providing that cover to the wards and assessing the risks. The evidence of a senior nurse was that specific concerns had previously been raised about the consultant in question, including that consultant not being a “very responsive consultant” and there having been “a pattern” with this consultant not reviewing patients in a timely manner. The court was told that those concerns had previously been raised with the Trust’s Clinical Director and Associate Clinical Director and, despite this, no discernible change had been noted. The Trust’s response to this during the inquest was to say that the consultant in question no longer works for the Trust and therefore the risk has been addressed. In my opinion, this is a misunderstanding of the risk. I consider that the risk is that senior nursing staff raised a serious issue with very senior (director level) clinicians about a pattern of issues creating risk to patients (some relating to other patient deaths and / or other serious untoward incidents) and little, if any, evidence was provided about how the Trust dealt with this serious issue from a clinical governance and oversight point of view. As such, the concern remains. ”

    Source location

    Name not published · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 5 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further action is considered necessary because considerable work has addressed the identified concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have addressed these in turn below. Please note that in respect of Concerns 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 the Trust entirely acknowledges the reasons for your concerns and has considered them extremely”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 2 December 2025

    Open published response
  3. Lancashire and Blackburn with Darwen

    AI-generated summary

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ida Jean Lock died on 16 November 2019 after suffering a lack of oxygen during delivery on 9 November 2019, resulting in severe hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage. The report describes missed opportunities for enhanced care and obstetric input, delays in responding to fetal distress, and initially ineffective neonatal resuscitation. The principal concerns include the Trust’s alleged lack of candour and transparency, deficient clinical and maternity governance, inadequate investigations, gaps in mandatory and remedial training, and inappropriate grading of the harm suffered.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate senior staff roles in disputed safety-report decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “8. ████████ is now Head of Compliance and Assurance at the Trust but that there has been no investigation into her role in respect of reneging on the Trust's acceptance of the HSIB report at senior management level and with the family as was indicated by her approval of the July 2021 position statement. Similarly, ████████ is now Head of Midwifery at the Trust and there has been no investigation in respect of her disputing the HSIB findings and submission of challenge to the HSIB report in Ida’s case. ”

    Source location

    Ida Jean Lock · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 6 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Operate twice-weekly Executive Review Group oversight of validated moderate-or-above harm incidents, complaints and organisational concerns.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The ERG is chaired by the Chief Medical Officer or Chief Nursing Officer. The group is convened twice weekly to oversee all incidents reviewed by the Divisions that have been validated as causing moderate or above harm. In addition to this, the group may review other incidents that trigger organisational concern. The group also reviews all complaints and claims received in the previous week. This process enables executive oversight of any immediate issues which need addressing. The group has the power to investigate any”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 9 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    No further investigation was considered beneficial because significant time had elapsed, relevant disclosures were made, and key senior leaders had left.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our Director of Midwifery has taken HR advice and concluded that given:”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 7 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust is best placed to respond to concerns about individual staff members.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “8. Specific concerns relating to individual members of staff”

    Source location

    Response from NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board
    Page 5 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust and Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB will address specific changes arising from the report.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “My response therefore focuses on concern D and E. I note that you have also addressed this report to University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (UHMBT) and NHS Lancashire and South Cumbria Integrated Care Board (LSC ICB). These organisations will address specifics as to the changes being implemented as a result of the Report. NHS England’s response to you is also made on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), and I understand that they will not therefore be issuing a separate response to the Coroner. With DHSC input, I have also addressed in this response some of your concerns regarding A and B.”

    Source location

    Joint response from DHSC and NHSE
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 March 2025

    Open published response
  4. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Winbourne Gregory Charles was found unresponsive on 10 April 2021, suspended on a mental health ward, after being admitted under the Mental Health Act following an attempt to take his own life. The principal concerns included failures in risk assessment, observation practices, emergency response, record keeping, and governance processes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate suspension of patient observations through governance processes

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Governance process failings. a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10ᵗʰ April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not. b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. c. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021. d. The Trust SI report was not prepared to fully address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports. ”

    Source location

    Winbourne Gregory Charles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Safe and Supportive Observations Policy to clarify escalation when staffing or other constraints challenge observation provision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Risk management (lack of adherence to care plan) – the Coroner found that observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles’ death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.3. Risk management and record keeping. | 4. | The Safe and Supportive Observations Policy does not allow for this to happen. However, if this becomes an issue due to teams being short staffed then escalation needs to be clearer | 1. Review of Policy to encompass escalation process”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share the clarified observation-escalation process through leadership meetings, team meetings and individual supervision.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. Safe and Supportive Observations policy has been reviewed to make escalation of this clear, to be shared through Leadership Team meetings, team meetings and individual supervision”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 8 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Safe and Supportive Observations Policy already prohibits suspending observations; the response limits further work to clarifying escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Risk management (lack of adherence to care plan) – the Coroner found that observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles’ death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.3. Risk management and record keeping. | 4. | The Safe and Supportive Observations Policy does not allow for this to happen. However, if this becomes an issue due to teams being short staffed then escalation needs to be clearer | 1. Review of Policy to encompass escalation process”

    Source location

    NELFT NHS Foundation Trust Action Plan
    Page 4 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Concerns about care provision and coordination are mainly for the NHS Trust to address.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 5 May 2023

    Open published response
  5. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Freeda GLAUSIUSZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Freeda Glausiusz died after jumping from her home on 15 May 2021. The report describes concerns that her father’s crisis-line call the previous day was not treated seriously, that the call was not documented appropriately, and that relevant information was not provided promptly to the coroner’s office.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assure appropriate action following serious crisis-line failings

    Wider context from the report

    “1. I was shocked when I listened to the recording of the call that █ ████████ made to the crisis line the day before his daughter died. The East London NHS Foundation Trust (ELFT) serious incident (SI) report observed that the clinician did not elicit clear risks during the conversation; did not listen to ████████; talked over him; did not appear empathic; and dismissed his distress about his daughter, even though she was a patient known to services after a first episode of psychosis. In reaching my conclusion at inquest that the call was not treated with the seriousness it deserved, I agreed with all of those observations. ████████ was not taken seriously, he was not treated respectfully and he was not treated kindly. He was clearly desperate about his daughter’s mental health and, as we now know, he was right to be desperate. He rang the crisis line and he was belittled. The clinician then made no note of the call in the medical records, even retrospectively. I note the many recommendations of the thoughtful SI report, but I remain concerned on three counts. • This is not the first time that I have made a PFD report to ELFT about its crisis line. • Not only did the clinician in question not make a note of the call in the medical record, he told me in court that, after Freeda Glausiusz’s death his manager had told him not to make an appropriately dated retrospective note in the record. He said that he had made a note on a piece of paper, but he did not now have that piece of paper. • When I asked the lead SI reviewer if the trust is confident that it has taken all appropriate actions in respect of that clinician, she was not able to give me that assurance. ”

    Source location

    Freeda GLAUSIUSZ · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide monthly supervisory listening to sampled Crisis Line calls to assess care quality.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Now, senior staff supervisors (registered mental health nurses, social workers or occupational therapists at a Band 7 level) listen to a sample of each Crisis Line clinician’s calls (with them) on a monthly basis to assess the quality of their care.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Conduct a larger Trust-wide Crisis Line call-quality audit from January 2022.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “From January 2022, a larger Trust-wide Crisis Line call quality audit will take place. The audit tool has already been devised. Finally, there is a plan for the Crisis Line to change its crisis line provider to a service which allows staff supervisors in-call listening so that supervision can occur in real-time.”

    Source location

    Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 June 2023

    Open published response
  6. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Henry James Holcombe · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Henry James Holcombe’s death was investigated, and the inquest concluded that he died from natural causes. The report raised concerns about the ongoing failure to comply with therapeutic engagement and observation policies, including observations of patients described as asleep who were later found to have been dead for several hours.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to produce effective action following Serious Incident reports

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The ongoing failure of SPFT to require their staff to comply with the Trusts therapeutic engagement and observation policy. Especially those sections which relate to night times or when patients are believed to be sleeping (see para 4.5.5, 4.5.7 and table 1 – page 5). Since 27.12.2019 to 5.3.2021 there have been three occasions when patients described as asleep over a series of observations, have actually been found to have been dead for several hours. Serious Incident reports have promised action but nothing effective has been produced. ”

    Source location

    Henry James Holcombe · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. South Yorkshire (Eastern)

    AI-generated summary

    Alfred William Meek · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alfred William Meek, an 87-year-old man with dementia and cognitive impairment, suffered falls before and during his hospital admission and died on 13 September 2017. Concerns included missed or delayed Enhanced Care Supervision reviews, failure to provide supervision matching his assessed risk, and no evidence of further action after staff escalated concerns about insufficient resources.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on escalated concerns about insufficient supervision resources

    Wider context from the report

    “1) There was clear evidence of poor compliance with the Enhanced Care Supervision engagement policy and daily assessments. There was evidence before the Court of numerous days being missed and when the assessment was made the care was not provided in accordance with the policy or the level of risk identified leaving patient’s vulnerable to falls. 2) There was no evidence to suggest that any action was taken by the Trust following escalation by ward staff regarding concerns about the lack of resources to provide appropriate supervision in accordance with the level of risk identified. The Secretary of State for Health is asked to consider whether it is appropriate for Trust to review its systems and procedures in place in relation to Enhanced Care Supervision and its implications, as ████████ is concerned that this situation could occur again. ”

    Source location

    Alfred William Meek · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing enhanced supervision systems, staffing assessments and resource-allocation procedures are considered sufficient to manage staffing after escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The second concern described in the letter was about the action taken following escalation. The investigation report found that the staff did not escalate any staffing needs, as they had not recognised the need for Mr Meek. This aspect relates to the reliability point above and there are systems in place through the Enhanced Supervision & Engagement Policy. The following steps set out the systematic approach that is in place to manage staffing resources optimisation:”

    Source location

    2018-0190-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 9 July 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Short-notice additional staffing responses remain limited by finite resources, temporary-staff fill rates, sickness and absence.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is resourced with finite financial support, but when there is a clinical need for additional resources, additional resources will be requested from the nursing bank, provided by NHS Professionals. The fill rate for NHS Professionals is at about 80% of the demand for Heath Care Assistants, who are the staff group booked for supervision needs. Staff who already work for the Trust are asked to undertake additional duties, prioritised on part time staff, but would include overtime when other options have not been successful. If there is no-one available despite these attempts, then staff may be redeployed to spread the risk and optimise patient safety and safe staffing levels across the hospital. A limitation remains in achieving short notice responses, exacerbated when there is sickness and absence that creates additional demands for temporary staffing.”

    Source location

    2018-0190-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Teaching-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 9 July 2018

    Open published response
Back to top

Data last updated 7 September 2026