Recurring concern

Failure to escalate significant clinical concerns to appropriately senior clinicians

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical escalation for significant patient concerns, abnormal findings, changing clinical conditions or treatment problems where escalation to an appropriately senior clinician is required, including obstetric escalation and escalation by junior staff during busy shifts.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational governance failures where no clinical concern requiring senior clinical review is identified.
  • Excludes failures of escalation in non-clinical operational, safeguarding, complaints or emergency-control-room processes.
  • Excludes delays in senior review where the failure is solely lack of consultant availability and no escalation deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes failures limited to documentation, communication or training unless they directly constitute or undermine escalation of a significant clinical concern.
Reports
72

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
81

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
103

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust6
NHS England5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Royal Sussex County Hospital3
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust3
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Milton Keynes University Hospital2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Recipient name withheld2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Tameside General Hospital2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Sefton, St Helens and Knowsley

    AI-generated summary

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Wayne Milne attended hospital with chest pain on 28 February 2022 but was discharged without required chest-pain assessments and senior review. On 2 March 2022, after reporting further symptoms to his GP practice, he was advised to attend the emergency department, but the nurse did not call 999, escalate to a doctor, or check whether he had obtained urgent care; Wayne was later found deceased at home from haemopericardium due to a dissecting aortic aneurysm. The report identifies concerns about inconsistent procedures for summoning emergency assistance, escalation and follow-up, and awareness of dissecting aortic aneurysm within the practice.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate concerning patient presentations to a doctor

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The nurse at the practice told the Inquest, the procedure for practice staff calling 999 (not leaving it to the patient) in the event of a patient with chest pain and other life threatening conditions applied only to reception staff and not to nursing staff. This led to inconsistency and in this case an avoidable delay in summoning urgent medical assistance and needs reviewing/all staff working in/working on behalf of the practice need to be aware of the procedure to be followed, consideration must be given as to whether it is appropriate to have different standards for qualified nursing and administrative/non qualified nursing staff. The awareness of Dissecting Aortic Aneurysm and the rapidity at which the condition can become catastrophic/fatal also needs raising within the practice. The nurse within the practice who spoke with Wayne on the date of his death on behalf of the practice , did not escalate to a doctor, did not call 999, she did not inform the NOK of her concerns, she did not call back to see if Wayne had called for an ambulance/attended hospital and she did not alert the hospital of her suspicions i.e. differential diagnoses including; PE, cardiac related problem or aortic aneurysm. The GP to whom this regulation 28 (Prevention of Future death) report is addressed informed the court (in a witness statement) no action had been taken within the practice since these events. ”

    Source location

    Wayne MILNE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Harry Arthur STOBIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Harry Arthur STOBIE suffered a stroke, underwent thrombectomy and later had a PEG tube inserted, which caused a large haemoperitoneum that was not recognised at the time. The concerns were that his deteriorating condition and abdominal pain were not monitored or escalated promptly after the procedure, and that PEG insertion procedures and protocols should be reviewed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate post-PEG patient concerns to a senior doctor for consideration of possible bleeding

    Wider context from the report

    “That once the PEG tube was inserted at Milton Keynes Hospital it seems that the deceased's deteriorating condition was not monitored closely even though he was complaining of abdominal pain soon after the procedure was completed . His concerns were not escalated to a senior doctor for consideration of a possible bleed. The procedures and protocols following PEG insertions should be reviewed. ”

    Source location

    Harry Arthur STOBIE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Carol Ann Hatch underwent repeat hiatus hernia surgery at a private hospital on 31 August 2022 and became unwell overnight. She was transferred to an NHS hospital, treated for septic shock and organ failure for six weeks, and died on 18 October 2022. The report identifies concerns about overnight monitoring, escalation, staffing competence, record-keeping, and delays in investigations and treatment; evidence at the Inquest indicated that the failings contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to alert senior clinicians to unexpected patient deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Mrs Hatch’s condition deteriorated markedly during the night of 31 August/1 September 2022 (some hours after surgery). Neither the surgeon nor the anaesthetist were alerted to this unexpected deterioration. The Surgeon only became aware of the position when he contacted the hospital and came in around 7 am. ”

    Source location

    Carol Ann Hatch · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide NEWS refresher training to relevant colleagues and conduct regular audits of NEWS compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition to addressing NEWS training with agency staff, the hospital have ensured a NEWS update refresher has been provided to all relevant colleagues and have conducted regular audits to provide assurance in relation to compliance.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 4 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver training to RMOs on recognising deteriorating patients and signs of gastric perforation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This matter was recognised in the RCA, has been discussed with the RMO and there is a plan in place for training to be delivered to RMOs on recognising signs of a deteriorating patient and recognising signs of gastric perforation. In addition, Spire has received confirmation that the RMO has undertaken a recent appraisal. We refer the Coroner to evidence file relating to the RMO which includes evidence of action taken in relation to this concern.”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 5 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce deteriorating-patient stickers for clinical use.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ADDITIONAL ACTIONS EVIDENCE”

    Source location

    Response from Spire Healthcare Limited
    Page 11 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response
  4. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Hilary THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Hilary THOMAS attended hospital with abdominal pain on 28 and 29 October 2022, then reattended on 30 October in a shocked and profoundly unwell state. She underwent emergency surgery for ischaemic bowel caused by adhesions but died on 31 October 2022. The principal concerns were delayed review of blood test results, failure to escalate her case for consultant review, and delay in arranging a CT scan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate eligible emergency department patients for consultant review

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Mrs Thomas reattended hospital with severe pain, was over age 70 and an unscheduled return within 72 hours. The Doctor should have considered and followed national guidance from the Royal College of Emergency medicine published in June 2016 (consultant sign off) which confirmed Mrs Thomas should have been reviewed by a consultant. Mrs Thomas was not escalated for consultant review. There was no evidence at the inquest that this guidance has been adopted by the Trust nor that staff are aware of it and have been trained on it. ”

    Source location

    Hilary THOMAS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a policy empowering any multiprofessional team member to escalate delayed assessment or transfer to the consultant on call.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver an education programme on escalation for delayed assessment or transfer from August 2023.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver direct teaching and display laminated posters in acute surgical areas at all acute sites by 31 October 2023.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust has therefore implemented a new policy developed by the Clinical Service Leads for EGS and ED, alongside a programme of education (from August 2023) in which any member of the multi-professional team are invited to escalate concerns regarding delayed assessment, or delayed transfer of patients to SAU, to the consultant on call. This will be enhanced by a communication strategy that will include direct teaching and laminated posters displayed in acute surgical areas at all acute sites (by 31 October 2023). This communication will emphasise the importance of this action for patient safety and will not be a punitive action.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for addressing emergency department patient volume rests with the Department of Health and Social Care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This area of concern is for the Department of Health and Social Care however we acknowledge that there has been a significant increase in demand for assessment by the Emergency General Surgery (EGS) Service at UHB. This was the service to which Mrs Thomas was appropriately referred by the Emergency Department. In this case failure of assessment and escalation occurred after this referral. She was seen by the EGS service at 11:30am by an experienced Specialist Registrar (SpR) who was in the 7th Year of specialist training (ST7). When that SpR returned at 20:00 Mrs Thomas, after waiting for so long, had taken her own discharge. We acknowledge that Mrs Thomas had to wait far too long and that this was a failure of the EGS service.”

    Source location

    Response University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 7 July 2023

    Open published response
  5. Milton Keynes

    AI-generated summary

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Allen, an otherwise healthy man, was admitted to Milton Keynes University Hospital with gallstone pancreatitis and died there on 11 April 2021 from acute pancreatitis and liver necrosis resulting from gallstone disease. The report identified concerns about ineffective monitoring, inadequate senior surgical supervision, failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively, and delay in calling the ITU team after his deterioration.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delay in calling the ITU team during critical emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “An FY1 doctor was effectively left to her own devices to manage Mr Allen, despite her being only 8 months or so in a post qualification position. In my mind this was a wholly unacceptable lapse on the part of her senior clinicians. She was, despite her efforts, out of her depth. This is not a criticism of the FY1 doctor, simply a reflection that she had only a few months junior surgical experience at that time. All clinicians, ████████ gave evidence that they were aware of the MKUH Sepsis protocol. However, none of them was able to describe it fully – the nearest being the most junior of the team, ████████. As a result there was a failure to initiate the sepsis protocol effectively. There was no effective senior involvement in the care of Mr Allen from the end of the 0800 am ward round to his deterioration at around 1800 or so. There was a failure to effectively or consistently monitor Mr Allen between 1059 am and his deterioration around 1800. Even at that point despite, in my mind, a critical emergency, there was a further delay of one hour before the ITU team were called. Overall, I find that the surgical team in charge of Mr Allen had no effective knowledge of the Sepsis protocol, they failed to monitor him effectively or consistently despite clear signs of deterioration, they failed to provide adequate support and supervision to ████████ and they failed to institute an effective senior review at any point on the 9th April 2021 until critical deterioration by which time his chances of death due to his rapid deterioration and multi-organ failure were 80 to 100%. ”

    Source location

    Michael ALLEN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. North East Kent

    AI-generated summary

    KEITH RUPERT DIMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Dimond died on 24 November 2021 at Queen Elizabeth Queen Mother Hospital following a catastrophic bleed from a ruptured iliac artery aneurysm, with anticoagulation contributing to the excessive bleeding. Concerns included communication failures about the known iliac artery aneurysm, lack of information about bleeding risks when anticoagulation was prescribed, delayed escalation when he deteriorated, and haematology advice on anticoagulation not being followed on two occasions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share iliac artery aneurysm information to trigger Consultant Vascular Surgeon advice

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) The Consultant Haematologist confirmed that if information of the existence of an Iliac Artery Aneurysm had been shared, they would have sought the advice of a Consultant Vascular Surgeon. ”

    Source location

    KEITH RUPERT DIMOND · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the requirement for accurate information in clinician referrals through clinical directors and regular team training.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We accept that the importance of any referral made by a clinician should contain accurate information so that it is understood and acted upon by the responsible clinician. This has been communicated with the clinical directors who have disseminated this information to their clinical teams. In addition to this, it is also being communicated through the training sessions which are delivered to the clinical teams regularly.”

    Source location

    Response from East Kent Hospitals University
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 October 2022

    Open published response
  7. Cumbria

    AI-generated summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Gordon Bernard Hendley, who had lymphoma and recent lung infection and pulmonary embolism, developed a severe rash most likely caused by Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and died in hospital on 23 January 2022 after maximal treatment. The report identified concerns about delays in medical assessment and treatment, failure to escalate significant blood-test results, lack of specialist dermatology input and prognostic scoring, and the robustness of systems for monitoring and supporting severely ill patients.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate critical A&E blood-test abnormalities to the senior clinician

    Wider context from the report

    “2) When Gordon returned to A&E late on 20th January there was an excessive delay in his assessment. His blood test revealed a significant lactic acidosis with marked anaemia and very low white blood counts. The A&E consultant who gave evidence said she would have expected this to be escalated to her -she was on call at home, but it was not. I have inputted the data in medical records to the scoring tools referred to above and mortality predictions have now risen to around 50%. ”

    Source location

    Gordon Bernard Hendley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles, who had reduced mobility and several risk factors for thrombosis, collapsed on 5 November 2019 and died in an ambulance after suffering a cardiac arrest. The cause of death was recorded as acute pulmonary embolus arising from deep vein thrombosis. Concerns included the absence of a documented VTE risk assessment, insufficient consideration of reduced mobility and past DVT, inadequate staff training, and missed opportunities to provide prophylactic heparin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of junior staff to seek senior advice about anticoagulation interactions before administration

    Wider context from the report

    “Junior staff should consult more senior staff if they are unsure of the effect that anti-coagulation will have on anti-psychotics or other medication and are thus concerned about administering this. ”

    Source location

    Sheila Elizabeth Steggles · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ben Buster KING was detained under the Mental Health Act at Jeesal Cawston Park and died in hospital on 29 July 2020 after becoming unwell following respiratory problems and receiving sedative medication. The inquest identified concerns including failure to diagnose obesity hypoventilation syndrome, inadequate consideration of promethazine, failure to recognise the seriousness of a life-threatening situation, and wider care, observation, record-keeping and hospital communication issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to contact the respiratory on-call consultant on repeat presentation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Guidance was sought by Emergency Department (ED) when Ben King attended on 10 July 2020 from a Respiratory Consultant, who was not made aware that Ben King had attended some 6 hours earlier with the same symptoms. 2. The Respiratory on call consultant was not contacted when Mr King returned to NNUH two days later on the 12 July 2020 with the same symptoms. 3. At the time of Ben King’s attendance at NNUH, Ben King was under the Respiratory Team and had been seen a few days earlier, on the 3 July 2020. The Respiratory Team was not made aware of Ben King’s attendances at ED on 9, 10 or 12 July 2020 with respiratory problems ”

    Source location

    Ben Buster KING · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold daily multidisciplinary morning report meetings to discuss cases and make appropriate specialty referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “That said, the importance of effective communication is clearly recognised and to promote good quality handovers the Respiratory team now hold a daily morning report meeting, attended by all the on-call specialities. At these meetings cases are discussed and referred to other specialities as appropriate.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Norfolk-and-Norwich-University-Hospitals_Published
    Page 1 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A further respiratory referral was not considered necessary because the patient had the same symptoms only two days earlier.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Our on-call respiratory physicians are available to provide advice to the Emergency Department doctors as required and the ED staff sought such advice with respect to Mr King’s case when he presented on 10 July 2020.”

    Source location

    2021-0250-Response-from-Norfolk-and-Norwich-University-Hospitals_Published
    Page 2 · response
    Published 23 July 2021

    Open published response
  10. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Juliet Saunders, a 25-year-old woman with Cornelia De Lange Syndrome and a profound learning disability, attended hospital on 7 March 2020 with abdominal pain and vomiting and died at home the following day. The report identified concerns including misinterpretation of abdominal x-rays, failure to diagnose intestinal obstruction, inadequate escalation and supervision, departures from transfer and discharge procedures, lack of safety-netting advice, and insufficient support for patients with learning disabilities at weekends.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of systems to provide supervision and escalation of complex cases involving junior doctors

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The failure of systems within the department to allow for the supervision of junior doctors to ensure that complex cases are escalated to more experienced staff. ”

    Source location

    Juliet Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use Care Flow to require consultant sign-off for specified patients and senior review before learning-disability patient discharge.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There has been reinforcement with the junior staff that there can be no handovers between FY2 level doctors and any handover should be to a Tier 2 doctor at a minimum. There is a dedicated handover Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). We have now installed a new IT system called Care Flow which requires Consultant sign off for specific patients such as patients with learning disability, cardiac chest pain and all patients that were seen by junior Doctors; i.e. FY2 and SHO.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver teaching on diagnostic overshadowing and senior escalation, and add safeguarding and diagnostic overshadowing to the induction pack.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• There has been a teaching session based on this case which highlighted the need to discuss patients with a learning disability with a senior team due to the risk of diagnostic overshadowing. This was presented in the January 2021 Mortality meeting. This included reference to escalation and consideration of CT scan and specific reference to Cornelia de Lange syndrome.”

    Source location

    2021-0157-Response-from-Queens-Hospital_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 18 May 2021

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026