Recurring concern

Failure to escalate significant clinical concerns to appropriately senior clinicians

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 27 May 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of clinical escalation for significant patient concerns, abnormal findings, changing clinical conditions or treatment problems where escalation to an appropriately senior clinician is required, including obstetric escalation and escalation by junior staff during busy shifts.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational governance failures where no clinical concern requiring senior clinical review is identified.
  • Excludes failures of escalation in non-clinical operational, safeguarding, complaints or emergency-control-room processes.
  • Excludes delays in senior review where the failure is solely lack of consultant availability and no escalation deficiency is identified.
  • Excludes failures limited to documentation, communication or training unless they directly constitute or undermine escalation of a significant clinical concern.
Reports
72

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
81

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
103

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care6
University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust6
NHS England5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust3
Royal Sussex County Hospital3
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust3
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Milton Keynes University Hospital2
Nursing and Midwifery Council2
Recipient name withheld2
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists2
Tameside General Hospital2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Ruby Baggaley · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Ruby Baggaley, aged 90, sustained a right distal femur fracture in a fall and died in hospital on the night of 24 January 2020 after complex surgery. Her blood pressure remained abnormally low after surgery, but escalation to senior clinicians was delayed until she was critically ill. Concerns included inadequate monitoring and failure to escalate her deteriorating condition, as well as uncertainty about whether clear escalation instructions and additional staff training had been implemented.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate deteriorating postoperative patients to senior clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “In the period from 17:00 hours onwards her care was exclusively in the hands of a relatively junior doctor (CT2) and the nursing staff. No attempt was made to inform the surgeons or anaesthetist of the deterioration in her condition. 3) Between 16:00 hours and 20:45 hours Mrs Baggaley’s NEWS Score was 5 and remained at this level. No attempt was made to escalate her care to more senior clinicians. It is not clear whether junior doctors and nursing staff now have clear instructions on when to escalate care in such circumstances, nor to whom. 4) By the time the surgeon was informed of the situation and travelled into the hospital around 22:00 hrs Mrs Baggaley’s condition had become critical. It is not clear whether earlier intervention by senior clinicians would have avoided Mrs Baggaley suffering a cardiac arrest consequent upon her low blood pressure (as the Inquest was informed was the case). It is quite clear, however, that she was deprived of the opportunity to have a review by a senior clinician. 5) I am concerned that in the absence of precise information as to what, if any changes in escalation procedures have been implemented, or additional training provided to the staff involved, the potential for a comparable situation to occur again, remains. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Ruby Baggaley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear escalation procedures and training for deteriorating postoperative patients

    Wider context from the report

    “In the period from 17:00 hours onwards her care was exclusively in the hands of a relatively junior doctor (CT2) and the nursing staff. No attempt was made to inform the surgeons or anaesthetist of the deterioration in her condition. 3) Between 16:00 hours and 20:45 hours Mrs Baggaley’s NEWS Score was 5 and remained at this level. No attempt was made to escalate her care to more senior clinicians. It is not clear whether junior doctors and nursing staff now have clear instructions on when to escalate care in such circumstances, nor to whom. 4) By the time the surgeon was informed of the situation and travelled into the hospital around 22:00 hrs Mrs Baggaley’s condition had become critical. It is not clear whether earlier intervention by senior clinicians would have avoided Mrs Baggaley suffering a cardiac arrest consequent upon her low blood pressure (as the Inquest was informed was the case). It is quite clear, however, that she was deprived of the opportunity to have a review by a senior clinician. 5) I am concerned that in the absence of precise information as to what, if any changes in escalation procedures have been implemented, or additional training provided to the staff involved, the potential for a comparable situation to occur again, remains. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Ruby Baggaley · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the consultant anaesthetist to define postoperative care and NEWS thresholds for escalation to critical care outreach.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On the day of surgery, the consultant anaesthetist will have the responsibility to clearly define the patient’s post-operative care, including NEWS scores that will require escalation to critical care outreach team for support out of hours.”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement defined daytime and out-of-hours escalation using consultant contacts, NEWS2 and applicable deteriorating-patient and transfer policies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During daytime working hours (08.00 -18.00) any concerns will be escalated to the consultant surgeon and anaesthetist responsible for the patient’s care. After 18.00 hours the escalation policy will be based upon clear objective assessments of the patient’s physiological status using the NEWS2 score and the Trust’s ‘Deteriorating Patient Policy’ and the ‘Transfer of Care Policy for Chapel Allerton Orthopaedic Centre’. A separate policy is being developed to specifically address the deteriorating patient being cared for in peripheral hospital sites. Plans are on-going to establish a dedicated on-call consultant rota for Chapel Allerton Hospital but in the meantime, the duty consultants at the LGI site will be available to provide advice and if necessary, review the patient.”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a dedicated policy for deteriorating patients cared for at peripheral hospital sites.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During daytime working hours (08.00 -18.00) any concerns will be escalated to the consultant surgeon and anaesthetist responsible for the patient’s care. After 18.00 hours the escalation policy will be based upon clear objective assessments of the patient’s physiological status using the NEWS2 score and the Trust’s ‘Deteriorating Patient Policy’ and the ‘Transfer of Care Policy for Chapel Allerton Orthopaedic Centre’. A separate policy is being developed to specifically address the deteriorating patient being cared for in peripheral hospital sites. Plans are on-going to establish a dedicated on-call consultant rota for Chapel Allerton Hospital but in the meantime, the duty consultants at the LGI site will be available to provide advice and if necessary, review the patient.”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a dedicated on-call consultant rota for Chapel Allerton Hospital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “During daytime working hours (08.00 -18.00) any concerns will be escalated to the consultant surgeon and anaesthetist responsible for the patient’s care. After 18.00 hours the escalation policy will be based upon clear objective assessments of the patient’s physiological status using the NEWS2 score and the Trust’s ‘Deteriorating Patient Policy’ and the ‘Transfer of Care Policy for Chapel Allerton Orthopaedic Centre’. A separate policy is being developed to specifically address the deteriorating patient being cared for in peripheral hospital sites. Plans are on-going to establish a dedicated on-call consultant rota for Chapel Allerton Hospital but in the meantime, the duty consultants at the LGI site will be available to provide advice and if necessary, review the patient.”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Extend on-site anaesthetic and recovery-unit cover until 21:00.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In addition, contact details for the operating surgeon and anaesthetist will be available to the ward staff if required. Plans are in place to extend the anaesthetic and recovery unit cover on site until 21.00. This will facilitate the post-operative reviews and management of higher risk patients. Where possible, higher risk patients will be operated on early in the day to allow an extended period of observation before the treating surgeon and anaesthetist leave the site. In addition, every effort will be made to ensure high risk patients are not operated on at the end of the working week (i.e. on Friday).”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide rolling staff education and mandatory escalation-pathway and resuscitation training, recording junior doctors’ training on Electronic Staff Records.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is recognised that a rolling programme of staff education will be required to support the implementation of these planned changes. All staff in both the operating theatres and surgical wards will have regular training on escalation pathways and resuscitation. There will be compulsory mandatory training for the junior doctors starting their post at Chapel Allerton Hospital. This will be recorded on the Electronic Staff Records.”

    Source location

    2021-0044-Response-from-St-Jamess-University-Hospital-Redacted
    Page 3 · response
    Published 22 February 2021

    Open published response
  2. Norfolk

    AI-generated summary

    Kobi David WRIGHT · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kobi David WRIGHT was delivered on 3 March 2019 after unsuccessful forceps and caesarean delivery attempts and was declared dead after showing no signs of life. The concerns included conflicting accounts of cervical dilatation and the clinical reasoning for proceeding to delivery, failure to allow further progression before intervention, aspects of the forceps and caesarean procedures, and a lack of recent emergency obstetric training.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to accept consultant assistance during the procedure

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Dr ████████ did not accept the Consultant’s offer of assistance but regarded himself as fully competent to carry out the procedure. ”

    Source location

    Kobi David WRIGHT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss more patient details with the on-call consultant and obtain advice when uncertain about management.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. On reflection of this case, I accept that it was an option to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach to manage the patient rather than to proceed to a trial of instrumental delivery. I recognise that instead of allowing an hour for the patient to be prepared for theatre, where there is no clinical urgency, it would be better practice to leave the patient in the room and examine her an hour later and again consider the options at that time. Where I am in any doubt about the best way to proceed I have learnt to involve more the consultant on call.”

    Source location

    2020-0143-Response-from-Radcliffes-Le-Brasseur_Redacted.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 1 October 2020

    Open published response
  3. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Hill was admitted with biliary sepsis and underwent a liver biopsy, after which he developed bleeding requiring surgery and later suffered bowel haemorrhage. The report identified concerns about communication between specialists, inadequate medical records, and insufficient support and scrutiny around the prescription and dispensing of micafungin.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide adequate senior specialist support to junior medical staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The junior pharmacist charged with dispensing the micafungin on the evening of 25 June recognised its toxicity to the liver and could not see from the medical record that Mr Hill’s liver function tests and hepatitis had been taken into account in the prescription. The last relevant entry in the medical record indicated that the micafungin should be held off. He sought senior guidance. However, there was no specialist hepatology pharmacist on the list of available contacts. Recognising he was outside his expertise, he contacted an intensive care specialist pharmacist, the on call microbiologist and the medical doctor looking after Mr Hill. However, no decision was made regarding the micafungin and so it was simply not given. A professor of hepatology was on call and knew Mr Hill’s situation well, but he was not contacted by the ward doctor (or by the microbiologist or a senior pharmacist). Despite improvements to the availability of senior pharmacists on call at the Royal London Hospital, concern remains about night time care and proper scrutiny of prescriptions. Junior medical staff do not appear to be sufficiently supported in this. ”

    Source location

    Keith HILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reiterate consultant support and escalation expectations to junior hepatology doctors, and update switchboard and ward whiteboard contact details.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this case, the hepatology team have reiterated to the junior doctors on the team the availability of consultant support and have ensured that the switchboard contact details and ward 'white board' is up-to-date. This will also be repeated during the induction training of new medical juniors and the consultants are stressing to their trainees the importance of escalation.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Repeat consultant-support and escalation information during induction training for new junior doctors.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following this case, the hepatology team have reiterated to the junior doctors on the team the availability of consultant support and have ensured that the switchboard contact details and ward 'white board' is up-to-date. This will also be repeated during the induction training of new medical juniors and the consultants are stressing to their trainees the importance of escalation.”

    Source location

    2019-0446-Response-from-Barts-NHS-Trust-R
    Page 2 · response
    Published 6 January 2020

    Open published response
  4. Bedfordshire and Luton

    AI-generated summary

    Pamela Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Pamela Evans, aged 87, fell and hit her head at Bedford Hospital after becoming dizzy while walking to the toilet, and died on 4 November 2018 from a large right-sided acute on chronic subdural haematoma. Concerns included inconsistent understanding among nurses about when to call the critical care outreach team, limited action that team could initially take, errors in recording her NEWS, and failures to identify these issues through the Trust’s serious incident investigation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Mismatch between critical care outreach call guidance and nurses’ understanding of the call threshold

    Wider context from the report

    “(i)        A mismatch between: (a)        on the one hand, the expressed intention of senior nursing staff as to when nurses should call the critical care outreach team if the relevant medical team is unable to attend, namely that nurses should call when they have concerns about a patient, irrespective of the patient’s NEWS score and (b)        on the other hand, the understanding of at least some nurses that they cannot or will not call the outreach team, despite having concerns, unless the NEWS score exceeds a specific number (5 or above, according to the cardiac nurse practitioner who cared for the deceased; 7 or above, according to a doctor setting out her experience of some nurses’ practice). ”

    Source location

    Pamela Evans · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver direct NEWS2 training to nursing staff, including escalation based on clinical judgement as well as numerical scoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust takes patient safety seriously and is compliant with our duties to implement national patient safety initiatives. NEWS2 was launched in September 2018 and the trust had to report compliance by April 2019 and undertook:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide tools and mechanisms for identifying deteriorating patients and clarify escalation routes using clinical experience alongside numerical scoring.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Absence of evidence that staff know the routes of escalation for deteriorating patients I apologise if at the time of the inquest Trust representatives were not able to provide you with assurance on staff knowledge regarding the routes for escalation for deteriorating patients. The trust has undertaken substantial work over the past two years on identifying and escalating deteriorating patients. Part of which has been to:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Use trust-wide clinical updates, shared-learning sessions and safety bulletins to reinforce deterioration recognition and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Absence of evidence that staff know the routes of escalation for deteriorating patients I apologise if at the time of the inquest Trust representatives were not able to provide you with assurance on staff knowledge regarding the routes for escalation for deteriorating patients. The trust has undertaken substantial work over the past two years on identifying and escalating deteriorating patients. Part of which has been to:”

    Source location

    2019-0333-Response-by-Bedford-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 November 2019

    Open published response
  5. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Lester Ridout · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Lester Ridout was involved in a single-vehicle road traffic collision on 20 January 2019 and was later readmitted with respiratory failure, where cervical fractures and pulmonary contusions were discovered. The inquest concluded that he died from Influenza A and streptococcal pneumonia causing sepsis and multiple organ failure. Concerns were raised that the assessment and escalation of treatment after the collision did not include a trauma call, trauma CT scan, or cervical spine imaging despite the reported collision circumstances, injuries, neck pain and medication use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate assessment and treatment after a serious road traffic collision

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) Whilst the undiagnosed condition did not contribute to Richard Ridouts death I am concerned that the failure to escalate the assessment and treatment of a person involved in such a road traffic collision could lead to deaths in the future. ”

    Source location

    Richard Lester Ridout · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a trauma-management protocol addressing differing collision-speed accounts, reduced clinical signs in patients using opiates or sedatives, and consideration of trauma calls.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We can confirm that a protocol is being developed for the management of patients who have sustained trauma where there are differing accounts of the speed involved as well as emphasising that patients who are on long term opiates or sedatives, whether prescribed or not, will often have reduced clinical signs so the level of clinical suspicion needs to be increased. The need to give consideration to instigating a trauma call when there is an unclear account of the collision and, in particular, potential of a high speed impact, is included as part of the protocol.”

    Source location

    2019-0331-Response-by-Western-Sussex-Hospitals
    Page 1 · response
    Published 8 November 2019

    Open published response
  6. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Kaiya Sonja Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kaiya Sonja Campbell was born at Tameside General Hospital on 28 September 2019 following her mother’s extensive bleeding and early rupture of the membranes. She lived briefly and died soon after birth, with the medical cause recorded as extreme prematurity at 19 weeks and 6 days’ gestation. Concerns included gaps in records of her mother’s anticonvulsant prescriptions, failure to seek urgent neurology guidance, and the offering of a routine rather than appropriately identified high-risk consultant appointment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of clinical staff to seek urgent neurology guidance on ongoing prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “When Kaiya's mother attended at her GP appointment and her midwifery booking-in appointment, the clinical staff involved did not appreciate the need to seek urgent guidance themselves from the neurology department regarding ongoing prescribing to reduce the risk of foetal abnormalities to the unborn child; ”

    Source location

    Kaiya Sonja Campbell · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Ioannis AVGOUSTI · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ioannis Avgousti died after an episode involving documented allergy to Co-Amoxiclav, during which the medication was prescribed and administered. The report identified concerns about failure to follow allergy guidance, inadequate communication, failure to act on elevated NEWS observations or escalate care, and staffing pressures during the relevant shift.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to act on NEWS observations and escalate deteriorating patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) On the 6th October 2018 although the hospital had noted that he was allergic to Co-Amoxiclav and although the paper medication notes noted that fact he was written up for that medication and it was administered to him. I saw evidence of a poorly documented, from the point of view of time, NEWS observation. Although at the top of the chart there were the numbers 2 0 (20) I found on the balance of probabilities that set of observations had more likely been taken at about 20:10 or 20:15 hours. The observations were added up to 9. In fact the total was 13. NEWS is a tool to ensure that the deteriorating patient is recognised and given help and escalated, if appropriate, to Intensive Care. This set of observations was not acted on in accordance with the directions and no escalation was made. There should have been a MET call then i.e., at around 20:15 hours to a specialist registrar (there was one on duty) If this call had been made and if the appropriate doctor had been called to see Mr. Avgousti it is possible that although the sepsis protocol would I believe have been implemented, it would have been realised that he had an allergy to Co-Amoxiclav and he would have been given an appropriate alternative. Whilst I cannot say categorically that this would have been the case I believe it is highly likely. NEWS is an important tool and should not be ignored as it was on Vallance Ward on the night of the 6th October 2018. ”

    Source location

    Ioannis AVGOUSTI · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Expand the Critical Care Outreach service to support immediate escalation from electronic NEWS scores.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Critical Care Outreach service, of which we are expanding, so escalation will be immediate rather than reliant on staff on the ward calculating the scores and putting out a MET call.”

    Source location

    2019-0135-Response-by-Brighton-and-Sussex-University-Hospitals
    Page 3 · response
    Published 14 June 2019

    Open published response
  8. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    ARCHIE RAY GRIEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Archie Ray Grieves was born on 24 May 2017 following a complicated delivery involving shoulder dystocia. He initially showed no signs of life, later showed signs of life, and died a short time after being taken to the special care baby unit. The report identified an avoidable neonatal death, with an eight-minute delay in delivering his body after his head and missed opportunities during antenatal care and delivery to identify risks and plan a safe birth.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer women with elevated maternal or fetal growth indicators for Consultant Obstetric care

    Wider context from the report

    “4. The mother was not referred to a Consultant lead Obstetric examination and assessment when issues and concerns would have been identified both as to her presentational weight and the potential consequential size of the baby. 5. A subsequent test apparently indicated no diabetes and a determination that the ante natal care should follow a normal pathway 6. At the 34th week fundal size continued to identify the baby’s development as outwith the 95th centile and consequently on the basis of the Trust’s own guidelines this mother should have been referred also to Consultant Obstetric care. ”

    Source location

    ARCHIE RAY GRIEVES · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Exeter and Greater Devon

    AI-generated summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Stuart Michael CLARK died shortly after being recovered from a canal on 3 October 2017, after entering the water wearing a rucksack filled with weights. During a hospital admission before his death, he disclosed that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk, but this was not escalated or followed by an assessment of his risk of self-harm or suicide. The report identified that senior clinical staff were not directly informed and that the relevant medical record entry was not available to other staff at the time.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to directly inform senior clinical staff of disclosed suicide risk

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence revealed that Mr CLARK disclosed to a member of nursing staff on Lowman (Canpere) Ward at the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital that he was a vulnerable adult and a suicide risk. This disclosure was not followed up with an assessment to determine if Mr CLARK had any intent, plan or history of self-harm or suicide. An assessment would have helped determine his risk and inform the decision on a referral to mental health services. Senior clinical staff were not directly informed of the disclosure. The SHO Dr responsible for Mr CLARK stated in her evidence that had she known about the disclosure she would have assessed his risk of self-harm and suicide, and if appropriate she would have referred him to the mental health services. The nurse made an entry in the medical records; however, the medical notes were not made up until the end of the day and therefore the information was not available to the other staff at the relevant time. ”

    Source location

    Stuart Michael CLARK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review current training and support for recognising risk, escalating concerns and safeguarding adults.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    ““review procedures and training related to the actions to be taken when a disclosure is made to ward staff giving rise to the suspicion of the risk of self-harm or suicide”.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Run a two-day professional leadership forum to reinforce individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention, with learning cascaded to teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “However, the Trust is always seeking to improve safety for its patients. We will be reinforcing individual responsibility and accountability for patient safety and suicide prevention to all staff. In June 2019, the Trust is running a two day ‘Care Matters’ professional leadership forum for Nurses, Allied Health Professionals and midwives. These sessions will be run and delivered in person by ████████ ████████ Deputy Chief Executive/Chief Nurse, and will reach over 100 leads who will then cascade to their respective teams. The focus of this forum is Professional Safety and this case will be used during this forum as an example to reiterate the importance of escalating concerns about vulnerable patients to ensure the appropriate assessments and support can be provided to them.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue a safeguarding newsletter reminder about procedures following disclosures of possible suicidal intent, including the suicide-support leaflet.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing training, policies, safeguarding support and mental health provision are considered sufficient to ensure staff recognise and escalate suicide risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “There is a mandatory training programme that is completed by all staff on induction with the Trust, whatever their role. Regular updates are required at a maximum interval of every three years. The training programme has the following objectives:”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The incident is considered isolated, and staff are considered aware of their safeguarding obligations and required actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is satisfied that this was an isolated incident and staff are aware of their safeguarding obligations. However, the Safeguarding Team is going to issue a reminder to all staff in an upcoming newsletter (which reaches all clinical staff) about safeguarding procedures when there is a disclosure about possible suicidal intent. This briefing will include information about the ‘It’s safe to talk about suicide’ leaflet, a copy of which is attached. This is available on the Trust’s safeguarding intranet page but we want to raise awareness further of this issue. The leaflet was produced by Exeter Medical School in conjunction with Suicide Charities and Devon County Council for staff to use to support people when suicidal intention is disclosed.”

    Source location

    2019-0125-Response-by-Royal-Devon-and-Exeter-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 15 July 2019

    Open published response
  10. Birmingham and Solihull

    AI-generated summary

    Ann Swoffer · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ann Swoffer died on 02/09/18 after an oesophageal perforation developed following dilatation during naso-jejunal tube insertion. The report identified concerns about the procedure being contrary to accepted practice, delayed recognition and treatment of the perforation, inadequate escalation to senior staff at the weekend, and inconsistent practices and protocols across hospital sites.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of junior staff to identify deterioration and escalate to senior staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. The deceased deteriorated as a result of a late perforation over the August Bank Holiday weekend. Junior staff did not identify the problem and did not escalate this to senior staff. I was told a “work force issue” meant senior staff were not present in the hospital at the time. Patients who become ill at the weekend need to receive the same standard of care as in the week. Consideration needs to be given to how this can be addressed. ”

    Source location

    Ann Swoffer · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase weekend consultant availability and establish gastroenterology consultant ward rounds at Good Hope Hospital.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of Ms Swoffer’s admission, there was a consultant available on call at Good Hope Hospital and an upper gastrointestinal consultant surgeon on call and on site in Birmingham Heartlands Hospital. There was however no escalation to the consultants available over the weekend. We have worked with the clinical teams to ensure there is appropriate communication with senior medical staff regarding emergent complications regardless of time of day, or day of week. We have further increased routine on site attendance by a range of consultant staff over the weekend, to facilitate access to consultant opinions and help clarify lines of communication outside the times they are present. For example, at Good Hope Hospital there were no planned gastroenterology consultant ward rounds over the weekend at the time of the deceased’s admission.”

    Source location

    2019-0026-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Improve communication with senior medical staff so emergent complications are escalated regardless of time or day.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of Ms Swoffer’s admission, there was a consultant available on call at Good Hope Hospital and an upper gastrointestinal consultant surgeon on call and on site in Birmingham Heartlands Hospital. There was however no escalation to the consultants available over the weekend. We have worked with the clinical teams to ensure there is appropriate communication with senior medical staff regarding emergent complications regardless of time of day, or day of week. We have further increased routine on site attendance by a range of consultant staff over the weekend, to facilitate access to consultant opinions and help clarify lines of communication outside the times they are present. For example, at Good Hope Hospital there were no planned gastroenterology consultant ward rounds over the weekend at the time of the deceased’s admission.”

    Source location

    2019-0026-Response-by-University-Hospitals-Birmingham-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 23 May 2019

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026