Recurring concern

Failure to provide effective senior clinical oversight of patient care

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First reported 23 Aug 2013•Latest report 10 Mar 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of senior clinical oversight of patient care, including absent or delayed senior input at presentation, early or daily senior review, review of patients referred for advice, and ongoing senior clinical direction or challenge where senior involvement is required for safe care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic organisational, corporate or regulatory oversight where senior clinical oversight of patient care is not the unsafe condition.
  • Excludes senior review of incident investigations, documentation quality, policies or safety governance unless the assertion directly concerns oversight of a patient's clinical care.
  • Excludes failures of junior staff competence, staffing capacity or clinical treatment where senior clinical oversight is not itself deficient.
  • Excludes delays or failures in specialist review where the concern is access to a named specialty rather than the broader senior clinical oversight of patient care.
Reports
59

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
64

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2013–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
63

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

University Hospitals Sussex NHS Foundation Trust7
Department of Health and Social Care4
NHS England4
Royal Sussex County Hospital4
Care Quality Commission3
Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust3
Doncaster and Bassetlaw Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Medway NHS Foundation Trust2
Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust2
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust2
Recipient name withheld2
Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
Aneurin Bevan University LHB1
Ashford and St Peter'S Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Worcestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Surendrakumar Patel · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Surendrakumar Patel died at Alexandra Hospital, Redditch, on 31 October 2024 after collapsing with a lower respiratory tract infection, with self-neglect through malnutrition contributing to his death. While on remand at HMP Hewell, he stopped eating, expressed that he no longer wished to live, lost weight, and developed acute kidney injury. The report identified concerns about healthcare staff’s failure to recognise the need for a timely mental capacity assessment, consider hospital transfer and expedited senior medical and psychiatric assessment, and consider family contact; prison staff also lacked awareness of procedures for informing or consulting next of kin about food refusal.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in full medical assessment by a senior healthcare professional

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Healthcare staff (MPFT and PPG) lacked awareness of the food refusal policy: a. Failure to recognise that a mental capacity assessment was required as soon as food refusal began b. Failure to consider hospital transfer for prisoners severely weakened by weight loss c. Failure to expedite full medical assessment by a senior healthcare professional, including psychiatric assessment where physical health posed a risk to survival d. Failure to consider and advocate for family contact 2. Prison staff lacked awareness of HMP Hewell food refusal policy, including: • Not informing Next of Kin of the prisoner’s decision to refuse food/fluids • Not asking the prisoner whether such information should be shared ”

    Source location

    Surendrakumar Patel · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Practice Plus Group is responsible for responding to concerns about healthcare delivery at HMP Hewell.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following evidence heard at the inquest you raised concerns directed to both HMPPS and Practice Plus Group (PPG). I understand PPG will respond to those issues relating to the delivery of healthcare at HMP Hewell, for which they are responsible. I am therefore responding to the issue relating to HMPPS.”

    Source location

    Response from HM Prison & Probation Service
    Page 1 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The clinical presentation did not indicate a need for more urgent psychiatric assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “At the time of assessment, his presentation was not indicative of a clear acute mental illness requiring urgent psychiatric intervention. In addition, records indicate that from 24 October onwards he was taking fluids and intermittently consuming food.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Active clinical observation through ACCT and food refusal processes was sufficient before psychiatric assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is also relevant that the period between the reported onset of food refusal (21 October 2024) and multidisciplinary review (24 October 2024) was brief, and during this time Mr Patel remained under active clinical observation, including management through ACCT and food refusal processes.”

    Source location

    Response from Midlands Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The food and fluid refusal pathway is considered robust and fit for purpose regardless of the reason for refusal.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “This does not mean that Practice Plus Group has not reflected on this case. The outcome of the Inquest follows a period whereupon the food and fluid refusal pathway has robustly been tested and, as a result, Practice Plus Group considers it to be robust and fit for purpose regardless of the”

    Source location

    Response from Practice Plus Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 12 March 2026

    Open published response
  2. Kent and Medway

    AI-generated summary

    Mark Stuart VIDLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mark Vidler had severe depression and was receiving mental health care from Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust. After serious suicide attempts on 30 April and 7 May 2025, he was discharged from the Home Treatment Team and was not reviewed by an out-of-hours clinician on the night of 7 May after a Rapid Response Team referral was declined. He was found dead at home on 8 May 2025, and the inquest concluded that his suicide was contributed to by a failure in care. Concerns included shortcomings in patient-centred care, clinical oversight and referral processes, risk recognition, discharge decision-making, continuity of care, care coordination, and the implementation and recording of suicidality management.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear senior clinical oversight and decision-making accountability for Rapid Response Team referrals

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The process in place for triaging and considering referrals to the Rapid Response Team is reliant, for the most part, on call handlers working through a script and there is a total lack of clarity regarding clinical decision making in this regard. The Trust acknowledged in its PSII report that there was "no evidence of senior clinical oversight of the decision making or clarity as to where the final clinical decision sits regarding accepting or declining referrals". A senior manger from the Trust told me, in evidence, that there is still work to be done to address this concern. ”

    Source location

    Mark Stuart VIDLER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Revise the Trust-wide Home Treatment and Rapid Response procedures to require senior clinical oversight before declining referrals and agreement of alternative care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust wide Rapid Response Standard Operating Procedure is being revised and amended to ensure referrals received are accepted by call handlers. No referral will be declined until a senior clinician has had oversight, and alternative care agreed. As such each referral will be reviewed by a Rapid Response clinician in collaboration with the referring clinician, thereby ensuring decision making is person centred.”

    Source location

    Response from Kent and Medway NHS Mental Health Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 January 2026

    Open published response
  3. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Paolino Amico, who had metastatic bladder cancer and advanced clinical frailty, was admitted with severe bilateral pneumonia and died in hospital on 12 June 2024. He received multiple overdoses of slow-release morphine following a prescription error, with concerns also raised about medication administration, delayed emergency escalation, oxygen provision after discharge, and the management of morphine reversal and pain relief.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate medication concerns to appropriately senior clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Mr Amico did not receive his prescribed medications during his second admissions when he was readmitted to hospital on 9 June. a. On 9 June a doctor in Accident & Emergency had reviewed Mr Amico’s prescribed medications and increased liquid oral morphine sulphate 10 mg in 5mL Solution 4 hourly as required with 2.5 -5 mg max 6 doses at 22:57 hours with slow released morphine sulphate (MST) continued 2 times daily. Trust staff did not administer any morphine to Mr Amico although he and his family were raising concerns about his high level of pain. b. The family was informed incorrectly that medications had not been prescribed. On the morning of 10 June, the family were given permission by a nurse to dispense from Mr Amico’s own supply of medications that he had brought to the hospital due to his level of pain. This was not accurately recorded in Mr Amico’s record. Mr Amico took his prescribed morning dose of MST. c. On 10 June the nurse in Accident & Emergency did not escalate to the nurse in charge or a senior doctor that she could not locate the doctor allocated to Mr Amico and instead approached a foundation year 1 doctor to prescribe pain relief for Mr Amico. The nurse informed the doctor who was junior and very busy that the frequency of the morphine needed to be increased for Mr Amico. The doctor did not escalate the matter and did not review Mr Amico before prescribing a controlled drug. d. Neither the nurse nor the doctor sufficiently scrutinised the medication prescribed on 9 June or on the Trust system that would have shown the correct medications. This led to a prescription error being made with MST being increased from 2 times daily to 4 times daily. Mr Amico was not referred for pain management. e. Mr Amico then moved to a ward. Multiple nurses were involved in checking and administering a controlled drug morphine sulphate slow release (MST) on 5 separate occasions between 10 and 11 June 2024 and did not raise concerns about the potential for a prescription error or note that Mr Amico had already received 1 dose of MST that morning. ”

    Source location

    Paolino AMICO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide restorative clinical supervision and professional nurse advocate learning on controlled drugs, communication, challenge and escalation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Restorative clinical supervision took place in June 2024, which was a reflective discussion with special emphasis on how to manage challenging prescribers and how to have an effective professional discussion when in doubt of management plan, and how to escalate higher if still in doubt.”

    Source location

    Response from Princess Alexandra Hospital
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The hospital trust is responsible for providing the response and addressing the reported concerns through its governance arrangements and actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust will be providing their own response to this Report, however, the Hertfordshire & West Essex ICB have advised NHS England of the Trust’s governance arrangements and actions being taken to address the concerns raised. It is understood that the Trust’s Patient Safety Group (PSG) has active oversight of several of the areas highlighted in the Report, particularly medicines safety, recognition of deterioration, and incident learning.”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 November 2025

    Open published response
  4. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    David Charles Noel Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    David Charles Noel Jones attended hospital after dizziness and was found to have low blood pressure and a low pulse rate. After developing chest pain and sweatiness while mobilising, he was discharged the following day and died later that day from the effects of an aortic dissection. Concerns included the failure to escalate his changing clinical condition to a senior doctor and possible gaps in learning, training and review processes relating to atypical aortic dissections.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to escalate significant clinical changes for review by appropriately senior clinicians

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Despite Mr Jones’ clinical picture changing whilst in the emergency department, the middle grade doctor reviewing Mr Jones did not alert a senior doctor of the change. I am concerned that training in relation to atypical aortic dissections brought to my attention in evidence at this and a previous inquest, and to my coroner colleague’s attention in inquests they conducted, may not have been ineffective. I am concerned about recurrence for other patients who present atypically, and that the patients who experience similar significant developments whilst in hospital may remain unreviewed by those with the appropriate skill and seniority, and a risk of death from undiagnosed aortic dissections may follow. ”

    Source location

    David Charles Noel Jones · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  5. West Sussex, Brighton and Hove

    AI-generated summary

    Keith James Hankin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith James Hankin was admitted for an elective optical urethrotomy on 8 September 2023, developed sepsis shortly after the procedure, was transferred to Worthing Hospital, and died there on 11 September 2023. The report identifies concerns about poor clinical governance and lack of integration, oversight and clinician assessment within the Community Urology Service, as well as multiple omissions in his pre-operative, intra-operative and post-operative care at Goring Hall Hospital, including delays in recognising and treating sepsis and transferring him for further management.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of multidisciplinary assessment and senior consultant oversight of community urology patients

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Lack of Integration of the Community Urology service with NHS Hospital Urology Services The CUS provided community-based urology services with non-consultant grade urologists without any oversight or integration with hospital-based consultant led urology services. Whilst there was an opportunity for CUS to refer more complex patients to NHS Hospital Trusts the ‘silo’ effect of these 2 services was such that they effectively worked independently of each other. The absence of a robust multidisciplinary team assessment within the CUS and the lack of senior clinical oversight of community urology patients by NHS consultant clinicians leads to a concern that the urology service is fragmented and does not effectively support urology patients within the region to confirm best practice and optimal treatment. ”

    Source location

    Keith James Hankin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of senior clinicians to retain responsibility for patients throughout private hospital care

    Wider context from the report

    “6. Management of Mr Hankin at Goring Hall Hospital There were multiple omissions in the pre-operative, intra-operative and post operative care provided by Goring Hall Hospital which individually and collectively contributed to Mr Hankin’s death. This included a failure to recognise Mr Hankin underlying medical co-morbidities rendered him unfit to have his operative procedure at the hospital. More specifically the post-operative assessment and support provided by the consultant anaesthetist and surgeon led to a delay in assessing and diagnosing sepsis and thereafter giving appropriate and timely antibiotics and facilitating an earlier transfer to the NHS Hospital for further management. This gives rise to a concern that there was a lack of understanding by the senior clinicians (in the absence of any local and national guidelines provided at the inquest) requiring them to remain responsible for the care of patients throughout their time in a private hospital rather than delegating the care to a Resident Medical Officer who is more likely than not to be insufficiently experienced in managing such critical situations. ”

    Source location

    Keith James Hankin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require consultants to retain responsibility for patients throughout their clinical pathway under the Practising Privileges policy.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that GHH, as with all CHG sites, operates a consultant-led care model which is adopted across the private sector. Consultants’ responsibilities are clearly and robustly identified in CHG’s Practising Privileges policy, which draws upon the GMC’s Good Medical Practice and associated national guidance with which all doctors are expected to comply. CHG’s policy explicitly states: “The practitioner retains responsibility for patients they have treated during the patient’s entire clinical pathway in the relevant CHG hospital”.”

    Source location

    Response from Circle Health Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a Care of the Deteriorating Patient policy defining consultant and Resident Medical Officer responsibilities and requiring escalation when consultants fail to respond appropriately.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Consultants’ responsibilities are further reiterated within the comprehensive suite of clinical policies that are implemented across the CHG estate. Of particular relevance in this case is CHG’s Care of the Deteriorating Patient policy, which plainly sets out the expectations of both consultants and RMOs when managing patient deteriorations, and is incontrovertibly clear that consultants remain responsible for clinical care throughout a patient’s stay in a CHG hospital. Further, the policy mandates that a failure by a consultant to respond in line with their responsibilities must be escalated to the senior management team within the hospital.”

    Source location

    Response from Circle Health Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing policies sufficiently establish consultants’ continuing responsibility for patients and define RMO and consultant responsibilities during deterioration.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I can confirm that GHH, as with all CHG sites, operates a consultant-led care model which is adopted across the private sector. Consultants’ responsibilities are clearly and robustly identified in CHG’s Practising Privileges policy, which draws upon the GMC’s Good Medical Practice and associated national guidance with which all doctors are expected to comply. CHG’s policy explicitly states: “The practitioner retains responsibility for patients they have treated during the patient’s entire clinical pathway in the relevant CHG hospital”.”

    Source location

    Response from Circle Health Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CHG considers its consultant-responsibility policies clear and effective, requiring no revision or further action at this time.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Consultant compliance with their responsibilities is monitored and ensured through a combination of incident reporting and monitoring, appraisal, biennial review, a wider-reaching and robust audit programme and Freedom to Speak Up escalation channels. Any concerns about consultant performance are addressed appropriately under CHG’s Responding to Concerns about Medical Practitioners policy. I can therefore confirm that CHG has given careful consideration to the concerns identified and is satisfied that its policies are clear, effective in their aim, and that no revision or further action is required at this time. As is the case with all policies, and as mentioned above, these are reviewed regularly to ensure ongoing compliance with best practice.”

    Source location

    Response from Circle Health Group
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failures by individual clinicians fall outside prosecutorial remit because prosecutorial powers extend only to registered providers or registered managers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “CQC’s prosecutorial powers only extend to registered persons. A registered person means either the provider or their registered manager. Failures by individuals are not within our remit; therefore, we cannot pursue this matter any further.”

    Source location

    Response from Care Quality Commission
    Page 10 · response
    Published 19 September 2025

    Open published response
  6. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Mr Warren James Green · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Warren James Green, who was receiving care in an acute hospital following a serious attempt on his life, died on 20 August 2024 after jumping through a gap in a four-storey stairwell and sustaining a skull fracture and traumatic subdural haemorrhage. The concerns identified included delays in securing a psychiatric bed, inadequate supervision and safeguarding for a patient at high risk of self-harm, patients being able to leave the acute ward without appropriate assessment or staff awareness, and unclear escalation to consultant psychiatric oversight.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of Consultant Psychiatrist oversight for vulnerable patients

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The evidence identified a risk of patients at high risk of self-harm being able to leave the acute ward without appropriate risk assessment (2) The evidence identified a risk of patients at high risk of self-harm being able to leave the acute ward without the knowledge of the hospital staff The above shows a lacuna in terms of patients’ safety and safeguarding. (3) The evidence showed that the Mental Health Liaison Service relies on nurses to conduct initial assessments and follow up reviews of patients suffering with mental health issues and the mechanism by which escalation to a Consultants Psychiatric is decided and the factors to be taken into account for escalation are not at all clear. This leads to lack of Consultants oversight for these vulnerable patients. ”

    Source location

    Mr Warren James Green · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review the Liaison Service Standard Operating Procedure to incorporate the described consultant-oversight provisions, completing the review by May 2026.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Trust is currently reviewing its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in order to cover the above provisions. This will be completed by May 2026 we would be happy to share a copy of the same with the Court if required.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Monitor the consultant-oversight provisions to assess whether they contribute to patient safety and therapeutic care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I hope that I have provided reassurances around the steps that we have taken to address the issues of concern contained within your report. We know there is an acute need to embed and effect change, hence we will monitor the above provisions to ensure these are contributing to our overall aim of keeping patents safe and delivering therapeutic care.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing Core 24, multidisciplinary review, referral, escalation and on-call arrangements provide sufficient Consultant oversight for liaison patients.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Response: In line with the assurance evidence presented to Court, we confirm that the ‘Core 24’ model is a nationally endorsed NHS best-practice standard for 24/7 liaison mental health services in acute hospitals. This model was applied in respect of the care afforded to Mr Green.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 January 2026

    Open published response
  7. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    LAURA-JANE KIRSTEN NICOLE SEAMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Laura-Jane Seaman died at Broomfield Hospital on 23 December 2022 following a massive intra-abdominal haemorrhage after a recent vaginal delivery, with subsequent disseminated intravascular coagulation. The principal concerns were failures to recognise and escalate maternal collapse and hypovolaemia, obtain and record vital signs and blood-test results, examine for covert bleeding, activate the major haemorrhage protocol, and provide appropriate senior review. The inquest concluded that her death was avoidable and contributed to by neglect.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to obtain consultant obstetric input, medical review and imaging before therapeutic anticoagulation

    Wider context from the report

    “(11) Therapeutic anticoagulation was administered without consultant obstetric input, further medical review or imaging where there had been hours of deranged vital signs that were inconsistent potential complications for pulmonary embolism. ”

    Source location

    LAURA-JANE KIRSTEN NICOLE SEAMAN · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide guidance on reducing venous thromboembolism risk during pregnancy and the puerperium, including anticoagulation decisions when bleeding risk exists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Reducing the Risk of Venous Thromboembolism during Pregnancy and the Puerperium⁶ (Green-top Guideline No. 37a April 2015) states that: “Low molecular weight heparin (LMWH) should be avoided, discontinued or postponed in women at risk of bleeding after careful consideration of the balance of risks of bleeding and thrombosis.””

    Source location

    Response from Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
    Page 4 · response
    Published 18 December 2024

    Open published response
  8. Gwent

    AI-generated summary

    Kay SIMMONDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kay Simmonds attended hospital with signs of sepsis arising from an infected haemodialysis central line, developed septic shock, and died on 22 July 2022. Concerns included an incorrect NEWS score calculation, failure to refer her to a senior medical practitioner, observations not being performed in line with NEWS requirements, and her transfer to a hospital without an available ITU bed.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer patients to a senior medical practitioner in line with the NEWS algorithm

    Wider context from the report

    “Kay Simmonds was admitted to the Emergency Department of the Grange University Hospital on 21/7/2022. At 14:40 a nurse performed observations and calculated her NEWS score. However this calculation was incorrect. As a result Kay was not referred to a senior medical practitioner in line with the NEWS algorithm. Additionally, the observations were not thereafter performed in line with the NEWS requirements. The miscalculation of NEWS and failure to recognise a deteriorating patient can put lives at risk. ”

    Source location

    Kay SIMMONDS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mr Gibson was found dead at home on 7 June 2023, with the death attributed to sudden cardiac death due to idiopathic myocardial fibrosis. Eleven days earlier, two ECGs were not recognised as showing complete heart block, and he was discharged from hospital. Concerns included inadequate communication and contextual review of test results, lack of senior review when findings were unexpected, insufficient auditing of ECG interpretation and discharge summaries, and the absence of authoritative national guidance on ECG use and interpretation.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of required senior review when diagnostic results are incongruous or unexpected in context

    Wider context from the report

    “4. I am also concerned that there does not currently appear to be any particular requirement in place for a senior review of the patient to take place in circumstances where diagnostic tests undertaken yield results which appear incongruous / unexpected in the context of their presentation. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Gibson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Deliver regular ECG interpretation teaching and promote second opinions from appropriately qualified clinicians or cardiologists.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “ECG training is delivered regularly as part of the Wythenshawe medical teaching programme. The training also encourages junior members of the team and other Health Care Professionals (HCPs) to have a low threshold to seek a second opinion either from a Consultant/Specialist Trainee (who are signed off as competent to interpret ECGs independently) or cardiologist.”

    Source location

    Responses from NICE and MFT
    Page 6 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Registrar review is considered an appropriately senior arrangement, so consultant oversight of every ECG is not considered reasonable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “4. Whilst no Consultant reviewed the ECG prior to Mr Gibson being discharged, the Registrars did review this. A Registrar is an appropriately senior clinician to discharge a patient; it is not anticipated or reasonable for a Consultant to oversee all ECG interpretation 24 hours a day, as the opportunity cost of this would adversely impact other activity that necessitates Consultant input.”

    Source location

    Responses from NICE and MFT
    Page 7 · response
    Published 26 June 2024

    Open published response
  10. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Tommy Jay Gillman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tommy Jay Gillman died on 8 December 2022 at Leicester Royal Infirmary after Salmonella Brandenberg meningitis caused sepsis and multi-organ failure. The report identified missed opportunities at Kings Mill Hospital, including delays in triage, escalation, monitoring, intravenous fluids and antibiotics. Concerns included insufficient paediatric nursing cover, undocumented handovers and an inadequate system for recognising and escalating the care of seriously ill babies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide joint assessment by senior Emergency Department and Paediatric staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The system for recognising an ill baby in Paediatric ED is not robust- from the point of attendance, through timely triage, timely escalation, and joint assessment by senior ED and Paediatric staff. ”

    Source location

    Tommy Jay Gillman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Establish a Children and Young People’s Working Group to review related policies and procedures, including joint working, pathways, recruitment and operations.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Children and Young People’s Working Group has been established with membership from senior medical, nursing and operational staff from the Urgent Emergency Care and Women’s and Children’s Divisions. The group is reviewing current policies and Standard Operational Procedures relating to Children and Young People to include opportunities for joint working, clinical pathways, recruitment and operational working.”

    Source location

    Response from Sherwood Forest Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 6 · response
    Published 15 April 2024

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026