Recurring concern

Unreliable doctor-to-doctor coordination of prescribing

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First reported 21 Mar 2014•Latest report 21 Apr 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures in doctor-to-doctor prescribing coordination, including communication arrangements, transfer or receipt of specialist prescribing advice, confirmation of advice, and implementation of prescribing decisions between doctors where these can cause medication to be continued, changed or prescribed unsafely.

Not included

  • Excludes prescribing errors confined to one doctor's clinical judgement where no doctor-to-doctor coordination failure is identified.
  • Excludes general clinical communication, handover or information-sharing deficiencies that are not specifically related to prescribing.
  • Excludes medication administration, dispensing, supply or monitoring failures occurring after prescribing coordination has operated reliably.
  • Excludes failures involving patient-facing medication advice where no doctor-to-doctor prescribing interface is involved.
Reports
24

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
26

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
37

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care5
NHS England5
NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care Board3
Barts Health NHS Trust2
North East London NHS Foundation Trust2
Brook Medical Centre1
BTCM Limited1
Care Inspectorate Wales1
Care Quality Commission1
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust1
Droylsden Road Family Practice1
Edge Hill Rest Home1
Eltham Palace Surgery1
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust1
Godfrey Care1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Theresa Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Theresa Lydon had severe ulcerative colitis and was admitted to hospital on four occasions before her death following complications of surgery, including an intra-abdominal haemorrhage. The report identifies concerns about delayed prescribing, unclear communication of treatment plans, inadequate access to medical records between NHS Trusts, and the absence of repeated blood tests that contributed to her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of secondary-care specialists to issue required prescriptions at diagnosis

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Evidence was given at inquest that when a diagnosis is made by a specialist in a secondary care setting, if drugs are to be prescribed that must be undertaken by the patient's GP. It was confirmed that the current practice does not allow for a specialist to issue a prescription for the required drugs at the point of diagnosis and then instruct the patient's GP to continue the process. In Mrs Lydon's case this would have ensured she received the clinically indicated drugs immediately. ”

    Source location

    Theresa Lydon · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop the Red Tape Challenge to improve primary-secondary care communication, interface working, prescribing, records access, interoperability, and process standardisation.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An initiative called the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ was developed to improve the interface between primary and secondary care, such as how referrals are made and managed, patient discharge and how different parts of the health service communicate with each other. The Red Tape Challenge led to 10 recommendations, which were cascaded through Regional Medical Directors. The focus of the Red Tape Challenge is on reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, improving communication and understanding, strengthening culture and interface working between primary and secondary care, improving digital and estates infrastructure, streamlining healthcare delivery, enhancing patient experience, and freeing up clinical time. Those especially relating to this case include:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The concern that specialists cannot prescribe required medicines at diagnosis is based on a misunderstanding; registered secondary-care specialists may prescribe them.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “When a diagnosis is made by a specialist in secondary care, the specialist, assuming they are a registered medical practitioner, is permitted to prescribe medicines for the patient without having to ask a GP to do this on their behalf. This has been standard practice in the NHS since its inception, and was confirmed in guidance from NHS England in 2018. The North-East and North Cumbria Area Prescribing Committee formulary, lists balsalazide (the drug prescribed to Mrs Lydon to treat her ulcerative colitis) as a GREEN+ drug. The definition of a GREEN+ drug from the formulary is:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implementation of measures improving primary-secondary care communication and prescribing is driven by integrated care boards, with national oversight.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An initiative called the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ was developed to improve the interface between primary and secondary care, such as how referrals are made and managed, patient discharge and how different parts of the health service communicate with each other. The Red Tape Challenge led to 10 recommendations, which were cascaded through Regional Medical Directors. The focus of the Red Tape Challenge is on reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, improving communication and understanding, strengthening culture and interface working between primary and secondary care, improving digital and estates infrastructure, streamlining healthcare delivery, enhancing patient experience, and freeing up clinical time. Those especially relating to this case include:”

    Source location

    Response from NHS England
    Page 6 · response
    Published 19 June 2026

    Open published response
  2. East Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Louis Robert SAUNDERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Louis Robert Saunders, who had been diagnosed with ADHD and experienced suicidal ideation as a side effect of medication, travelled to the East Sussex coast on 9 October 2024 and was found dead at the base of a cliff the following morning. The principal concern was insufficient communication and continuity of care between the private ADHD clinic and NHS GP, resulting in concurrent prescribing of different ADHD medications and a risk of duplicate prescriptions or confusion about treatment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to coordinate ADHD prescribing between private providers and NHS GPs

    Wider context from the report

    “Whilst it is understood that Louis had stopped taking his medication due to a perceived increase in suicidal ideation, and no medication was found in his system following his death, the evidence identified that he was being prescribed ADHD medication by both his NHS GP and the private ADHD clinic. Neither organisation was aware of the other’s ongoing prescribing until the time of the inquest. After Louis’ ADHD treatment was transferred to his GP, the plan was for the surgery to continue issuing his medication. Accordingly, on 6 November 2023, the surgery issued a prescription for lisdexamfetamine ([REDACTED]). However, Louis had attended an appointment at the ADHD clinic the previous day, on 5 November 2023, and the clinic’s notes record that he was to continue on Dexamphetamine ([REDACTED]). Although the medications have similar names, they are distinct drugs with different dosing requirements. Effective management and titration are understood to be essential to ensure therapeutic benefit and limit adverse effects. The concern that has arisen relates to continuity of care between private providers and the NHS once a patient has been diagnosed with ADHD, commenced on medication, and subsequently transferred to GP care. In Louis’ case, communication between the private sector and the NHS was insufficiently clear, and the situation became more complex when he continued to be seen by both the ADHD clinic and his GP. This created opportunities for key information to be missed. Although medication was not directly implicated in Louis’ death, there remains a risk that a patient may inadvertently obtain duplicate prescriptions or become confused about which medication to take. Such scenarios may pose a risk of future deaths. As increasing numbers of patients are receiving ADHD diagnoses and commencing treatment in the private sector due to long NHS waiting times, I am concerned about the robustness of current processes to ensure safe and continuous care following transfer to a GP. ”

    Source location

    Louis Robert SAUNDERS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Highlight duplicate-prescription, medication-confusion, continuity-of-care and treatment-change communication risks to ADHD specialists and primary-care prescribers through ongoing programme work.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I have fed your concerns back to NHS England’s National ADHD Programme and Primary Care Teams, who will ensure that the risks you have raised of duplicate prescriptions and confusion between current and previous medication regimes, and actions you have identified, including the need for continuity of care and timely and effective communication of treatment changes, are highlighted to both specialist providers and primary care prescribers wherever possible in their ongoing work.”

    Source location

    2026-0130 - Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Publish non-mandatory ADHD assessment and treatment guide prices and commissioning guidance setting expectations for assessment, data quality, governance, shared care and follow-up.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “NHS England is committed to working with system partners, including commissioners and providers of ADHD support, to improve health-related experience and outcomes for those with ADHD. We recently published non-mandatory guide prices for ADHD assessments and treatment pathways, alongside detailed commissioning guidance, that will set clear expectations for assessment standards, data quality, clinical governance, shared care and follow-up.”

    Source location

    2026-0130 - Response from NHS England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 10 March 2026

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The private ADHD provider considered its existing systems sufficient to ensure continuity of care and safer prescribing, requiring no process changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The Region have liaised with the private ADHD clinic who have advised that they have held a formal preventing future deaths review meeting for this case. The result of the review was that they did not identify any deficiencies in their processes, nor any changes required to their current clinical practice. They highlighted their current systems ensure continuity of care and safer prescribing which included that following every clinical interaction, including titration, medication reviews, and shared care reviews, detailed written correspondence is issued to the patient’s GP to ensure continuity, transparency, and clarity of care. They clarified that they do not initiate medication without first obtaining a Summary Care Record or equivalent clinical information from the patient’s GP.”

    Source location

    2026-0130 - Response from NHS England
    Page 3 · response
    Published 10 March 2026

    Open published response
  3. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Urielle Mayila Kuyenga · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Urielle Mayila Kuyenga, a four-year-old girl with sickle-cell disease, died in hospital on 4 December 2023 from sepsis resulting from bacterial pneumonia. The report identifies failures to ensure administration of prescribed prophylactic penicillin and failures by doctors to identify her sickle-cell diagnosis during three presentations for respiratory infection as contributory factors.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Breakdown of communication about responsibility for penicillin prescription and dispensation

    Wider context from the report

    “1. As a patient with Sickle Cell Disease, Urielle was prescribed prophylactic penicillin to mitigate the risk of her developing fatal symptoms arising from typical respiratory infections. Urielle’s mother chose not to collect those prescriptions and administer penicillin to Urielle. While specialist doctors believed that her GP was monitoring the prescription and dispensation of the penicillin, whilst Urielle’s GP was misled by Urielle’s mother that the hospital were dispensing the medication directly. The breakdown of communication means that Urielle was left unprotected from opportunistic infection which caused this avoidable death. ”

    Source location

    Urielle Mayila Kuyenga · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Proactively contact patients with sickle cell disease annually for medication reviews, including Penicillin V prescribing and compliance.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Having identified these patients from the Audit, all patients with Sickle Cell Disease are proactively contacted by the practice for a medication review. This includes reviewing Penicillin V prescribing and compliance as a key factor. Completed and Continuing on an annual basis.”

    Source location

    Response from Maylands Healthcare Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Liaise directly with secondary or tertiary specialists when responsibility for Penicillin V prescribing or dispensing requires clarification.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• If there are any concerns regarding who is taking responsibility for prescribing and dispensing Penicillin V prophylaxis, the practice will directly liaise with the patient’s secondary or”

    Source location

    Response from Maylands Healthcare Surgery
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Move all patients with sickle cell disease to electronic repeat dispensing for Penicillin antibiotics.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All patients with Sickle Cell Disease have had their medications changed to electronic repeat dispensing. This ensures patients can access regular, ongoing supplies of their Penicillin antibiotics from their pharmacy without needing a new prescription from their GP each time. We have also liaised with our on-site pharmacist to ensure that any uncollected prescriptions for Sickle Cell Disease patients are actively communicated back to us at the practice to identify concerns early. Completed and Continuing.”

    Source location

    Response from Maylands Healthcare Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require the on-site pharmacist to communicate uncollected sickle cell disease prescriptions to the practice.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• All patients with Sickle Cell Disease have had their medications changed to electronic repeat dispensing. This ensures patients can access regular, ongoing supplies of their Penicillin antibiotics from their pharmacy without needing a new prescription from their GP each time. We have also liaised with our on-site pharmacist to ensure that any uncollected prescriptions for Sickle Cell Disease patients are actively communicated back to us at the practice to identify concerns early. Completed and Continuing.”

    Source location

    Response from Maylands Healthcare Surgery
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Increase access to shared care records to improve communication between primary and secondary care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of an SCP, clear lines of communication should have been established between Urielle’s specialist in the hospital and GP. The overall responsibility for her care, including monitoring and issuing the prescription, should have remained with the hospital. The government is committed to improving this communication between primary and secondary care as outlined in the 10 Year Health Plan in the section on the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ recommendations. These include work to improve information technology through initiatives such as increasing access to shared care records and developing greater interoperability of electronic patient records (EPRs), starting with the sharing of structured medication information.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop greater interoperability of electronic patient records, starting with structured medication information sharing.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of an SCP, clear lines of communication should have been established between Urielle’s specialist in the hospital and GP. The overall responsibility for her care, including monitoring and issuing the prescription, should have remained with the hospital. The government is committed to improving this communication between primary and secondary care as outlined in the 10 Year Health Plan in the section on the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ recommendations. These include work to improve information technology through initiatives such as increasing access to shared care records and developing greater interoperability of electronic patient records (EPRs), starting with the sharing of structured medication information.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Responsibility for addressing the prophylactic penicillin communication concern lies with other bodies.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. As a patient with Sickle Cell Disease, Urielle was prescribed prophylactic penicillin to mitigate the risk of her developing fatal symptoms arising from typical respiratory infections. Urielle’s mother chose not to collect those prescriptions and administer penicillin to Urielle. Urielle’s specialist doctors believed that her GP was monitoring the prescription and dispensation of the penicillin, whilst Urielle’s GP was misled by Urielle’s mother that the hospital were dispensing the medication directly. The breakdown of communication means that Urielle was left unprotected from opportunist infection which caused this avoidable death.”

    Source location

    Response from Partnership of East London Co-operatives Ltd
    Page 1 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Without a shared care protocol, the hospital should retain responsibility for care, monitoring and issuing the prescription.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In the absence of an SCP, clear lines of communication should have been established between Urielle’s specialist in the hospital and GP. The overall responsibility for her care, including monitoring and issuing the prescription, should have remained with the hospital. The government is committed to improving this communication between primary and secondary care as outlined in the 10 Year Health Plan in the section on the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ recommendations. These include work to improve information technology through initiatives such as increasing access to shared care records and developing greater interoperability of electronic patient records (EPRs), starting with the sharing of structured medication information.”

    Source location

    Response from Department of Health and Social Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 December 2025

    Open published response
  4. Essex

    AI-generated summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Resmije Ahmetaj, also known as Merita Brahimi, died on 30 June 2024 from a traumatic head injury after falling from a height at a multi-storey car park while suffering an exacerbation of psychosis. The report identifies concerns about subtherapeutic antipsychotic medication levels not being acted on, communication and escalation within the mental health team, incomplete record-keeping, medication prescribing confusion, and safety mitigation on the car park’s penultimate floor.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in communication with the GP about antidepressant prescribing

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) There was confusion about the mental health Trust prescribing dose for Ms Ahmetaj antidepressant medication and an overreliance on discussions with her rather than checking the prescription dose and communication with the GP was delayed. ”

    Source location

    Resmije Ahmetaj · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Reinforce with medical staff the need to communicate medication-dose inconsistencies clearly and promptly.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Whilst this discrepancy was not causative of the sad outcome in this matter, reliance on the patient’s report was made in good faith as part of the therapeutic process. I can assure the Court that, moving forward, the importance of clearly communicating and communicating any inconsistencies between a patient’s reported medication dosage and the dosage prescribed by the GP will be reinforced with the medical team, in order to ensure safe and effective prescribing and to minimise the risk of confusion.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2025

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    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The maximum licensed sertraline dose meant no dose increase was possible, so no additional prescribing action was considered necessary before the planned review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In this case, during the consultation with the doctor on the 22nd May 2024 the patient reported that she was taking sertraline ████████ and this was documented in the clinical notes on the day by the doctor. A brief letter was sent to the GP on the same day requesting an increase in dose of Sertraline (████████). The GP responded on the 24th May 2024 advising that the patient was in fact prescribed and reporting use of sertraline 200 mg. This is the maximum licensed dose. This meant there was no role for recommending a further increase, and the appropriate course of action was to review the patient at her next planned appointment which would be on 1st July 2024 to consider alternative treatment options. At this time there were no indications to suggest a need to bring the appointment forward.”

    Source location

    Response from Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 14 August 2025

    Open published response
  5. Suffolk

    AI-generated summary

    Amy Jade BUTCHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Amy Jade Butcher was declared deceased on 14 May 2023 after suspending herself with a ligature around her neck during a heightened anxiety crisis. The inquest identified concerns about a confusing, fragmented system for prescribing mental health medication, and about the decision not to prescribe Lorazepam despite its previous effectiveness for Amy.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a clear prescribing decision-making and coordination system for mental health medication

    Wider context from the report

    “Evidence heard at inquest identified a muddled and unclear system for the prescription of medication to someone in Amy’s situation. The Emergency Department Consultant who saw Amy in crisis on the 10ᵗʰ May 2024 stated that for patients like Amy she had previously prescribed Lorazepam upon discharge home, but could only do this if the Mental Health Team in the ED requested her to do so, which they did not do on this occasion. The following day, Amy herself tried to obtain a prescription of Lorazepam by dialling NHS 111 Option 2 (Mental Health line). She spoke to a mental health practitioner who told her that NHS 111 Option 2 did not have the ability to prescribe medication, and she would need to call NHS 111 Option 1 and speak to an Out of Hours GP instead. Amy contacted NHS 111 Option 1 and spoke to an Out of Hours GP, who worked for a private company which had implemented a ban on the prescription of Lorazepam due to its highly addictive properties. As such, even if the GP had considered Lorazepam to be required in Amy’s case, he could not have prescribed it. The GP prescribed different PRN medications, which were subsequently found in Amy’s system after her death. Amy’s own GP gave evidence stating that the system for prescribing mental health medication was confusing. He stated that mental health medications prescribed to a patient by a GP (such as antidepressants) before a Mental Health Team became involved, remained the responsibility of the GP. However, once a Mental Health Team became involved, any changes to the medication regime could only be made by the Mental Health Team. In addition, some medication would be prescribed by the Mental Health Team directly, whilst other would be prescribed separately by the GP. The GP described the situation as one of there simply being ‘too many chiefs’. The net effect of the current system in place is that an individual in Amy’s situation finds themselves needing to make multiple telephone calls or contacts with NHS 111 Option 1, NHS 111 Option 2, their Out of Hours GP Service, their own GP and their Mental Health Team, in order to try and obtain either a new prescription or change their current prescription if their mental health suddenly deteriorates. There is evidently no single point of contact, or single decision maker regarding prescriptions in these cases. The evidence suggests that the situation is exacerbated even further if the individual’s mental health deterioration occurs Out of Hours. ”

    Source location

    Amy Jade BUTCHER · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Add prescribing responsibilities and communication instructions to standard letters sent to GPs when service users join CRHT caseloads.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “To simplify the position, we have added the following information to our standard letters which are sent to GPs when service users are taken onto CRHT caseloads:”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Remind staff to liaise directly with GPs when requesting adjustments to medications already prescribed by GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Staff have been reminded of the need to liaise directly with GPs with any requests to adjust medications already prescribed by GPs in the circumstances described above.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Undertake a joint clinical audit with primary care colleagues three months after implementing the revised CRHT wording and report results to the Trust-wide Safety Group.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “By way of assurance, the clinical audit team will undertake a joint audit with primary care colleagues 3 months post implementation of the above wording being introduced, the results of which will be reported to our Trust wide Safety Group for consideration.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS
    Page 2 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Commissioning NHS 111 Option 1 and out-of-hours GP services is outside the respondent’s responsibility.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “I recognise that Amy interacted with multiple prescribing pathways within the NHS system and whilst NSFT is not the responsible commissioner for NHS 111 Option 1, GP surgeries out of hours GP services we have raised the issue with our Integrated Commissioning Boards with a view to identifying any possible improvements that can be made as a result of the concern raised.”

    Source location

    Response from Norfolk and Suffolk NHS
    Page 1 · response
    Published 28 November 2024

    Open published response
  6. Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent

    AI-generated summary

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Joshua Ethan Burgess, who had epilepsy and Lennox-Gastaut syndrome, died at home on 19 November 2022 after vomiting and aspirating during an epileptic seizure. The report identifies concerns about communication and prescribing processes for Brivaracetam, including failures to update the prescription, medication being withheld for several days, and a subsequent increase to 10ml twice daily despite information that 4ml twice daily was appropriate.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to refer medication-change correspondence to a clinician for consideration

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to give the prescribing GP express instructions to amend Brivaracetam prescriptions after dosage changes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The Neurology department of the Royal Stoke University Hospital operated a system whereby it did not instruct the prescribing GP to amend the prescription of Brivaracetam when changes to dosage had been agreed with Mr Burgess’ mother. The evidence from the Consultant Neurologist was that an assumption was made that when changes to medication had been discussed and agreed that Mr Burgess’ mother would attend the GP surgery to discuss the changes in medication. The same witness gave evidence that it was assumed a pharmacist within the GP surgery would read the correspondence from the neurology department and make the necessary changes to prescriptions without express instructions to do so. 2. The “workflow” within the Brook Medical Centre was such that letters sent from the Neurology department discussing changes in medication (albeit not containing a request to amend the prescription) were processed by support staff and not referred to a clinician to consider and so no changes were made to the prescription. 3. The letter of 27 July 2022 from the Neurology department to Brook Medical Centre seeking clarification as to the correct dosage of Brivaracetam was processed by support staff and a summary medications sent without referral to a clinician. 4. Godfrey Care were informed by Mr Burgess’ mother and the Neurology department of Royal Stoke University that the appropriate dose of Brivaracetam was 4ml twice daily. Medication was withheld between 22-26 July 2022 due to the information not being in writing from the prescriber, however the evidence at inquest was that 10ml twice daily was commenced on 26 July 2022 following a call to the 111 service. ”

    Source location

    Joshua Ethan BURGESS · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review internal policies and procedures against the coroner’s concerns and identify necessary changes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Godfrey Care Response We intend to review our internal policies and procedures considering the coroners concerns and identify where changes need to be made. Below, we respond to the coroner’s areas of concern, setting out what we have already done, what we are doing now, and what we intend to do in the future.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a local medication policy covering medication receipt, transcription, altered labels, missed doses, written prescribing confirmation and triangulation between prescribers.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Reviewed Policies and Procedures The following actions will be implemented by 1st April 2024.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require GP review and triage of all neurology correspondence received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised Medisec clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear prescribing actions for primary care.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust setting which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Have a GP review and triage all neurology correspondence and clinic letters received by Brook Medical Centre.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 2 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Update weekly and monthly managers’ medication audits to verify written authorisation, dosage changes and timely receipt of replacement prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Run through the reviewed managers monthly medication audit to ensure expectations are clear.”

    Source location

    Response from Godfrey Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop a standardised clinic-letter template specifying medication changes and clear actions for prescribing GPs.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The Trust’s outpatient clinic letter standards describe the structure of clinic letters based on standard headings. You will recall that ████████ (GP) gave evidence at the inquest to the effect that there were areas in the acute Trust settings which already provided discharge information which he considered to be of a ‘gold standard.’ The Trust is committed to working towards improving compliance with these standards. To support this, we are working towards creation of a standardised template in our ‘Medisec’ system (system where letters are created). This will include a section for changes to medications and clear actions for those in the primary care setting, for example, instructions for the prescribing GP to amend prescriptions.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A standardised clinic-letter template cannot be created immediately because implementation across the Trust requires substantial timeframes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. We have discussed the above process with nominated individuals from the ICS. Due to the timeframes that would be required for the creation of standardised template for clinic letters within the ‘Medisec’ system across the Trust, we are reiterating the Trust standards and ████████ has agreed, with immediate effect, that all clinic letters received from neurology will be reviewed by a GP at Brook Medical Centre. This has been implemented due to the acknowledgement that neurological conditions are often complex, and it is more likely that they will require frequent medication changes, titration and/or closer monitoring.”

    Source location

    Response from University Hospitals of North Midlands
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 February 2024

    Open published response
  7. Lincolnshire

    AI-generated summary

    Lilian Margaret BOARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lilian Margaret BOARD, aged 91, died at Lincoln County Hospital on 1 February 2023 after intentionally ingesting tablets the previous day; a note of intent was left. The principal concern was that both her GP and the hospital had prescribed the same medication, raising a question about checks to prevent duplicate prescriptions.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent duplicate medication prescriptions between hospital and GP

    Wider context from the report

    “The deceased was prescribed ████████ by her GP. Following discharge from hospital on 18th January 2023 LCH also prescribed ████████. The deceased therefore had two prescriptions of the same medication that she used to end her life. Are there any checks in place to avoid duplicity of prescriptions between hospital and GP ? ”

    Source location

    Lilian Margaret BOARD · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Trust’s 14-day discharge-supply policy and associated arrangements remain appropriate despite accepted overlapping prescriptions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “It is important to point out that the policy of the Trust (Policy for Medicines Management Supply of Medicines), in agreement with Lincolnshire Primary Care colleagues including the Primary Care Networks, the Local Medical Committee and the Integrated Care Board, is that we supply patients with 14 days supply of medication as a default at the point of discharge, This is not unusual, as almost all acute provider Trusts within NHS England have similar policies to dispense medication supplies upon discharge, with these supply arrangements ranging anywhere between 7-28 days depending on policies of the specific NHS Trusts.”

    Source location

    Response from United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust
    Page 1 · response
    Published 18 October 2023

    Open published response
  8. Cambridgeshire and Peterborough

    AI-generated summary

    Ethel Ann Beaumont · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ethel Ann Beaumont died on 11 May 2020 after developing nitrofurantoin-induced liver injury and liver failure while being treated before planned surgery. The report found that a significantly raised ALT result should have been followed up promptly and raised concerns about unclear responsibility between hospital and primary care for monitoring antibiotics prescribed at the hospital’s request.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity over responsibility for monitoring GP antibiotic prescribing requested by a hospital

    Wider context from the report

    “that there is a lack of clarity between hospital and primary care as to which of them should be responsible for monitoring where a GP is prescribing an antibiotic on the request of the hospital that a patient is attending regularly for review. I am concerned that these pathways should be clarified and that there remains a risk of future death at present. ”

    Source location

    Ethel Ann Beaumont · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Manchester City

    AI-generated summary

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Darren John Lawrence had a history of suicidal thoughts, plans, previous attempts, mental ill health, disengagement from services and medication noncompliance. He was found dead at his home on 29 August 2020, and the inquest conclusion was suicide. Principal concerns included inadequate communication and follow-up between mental health services and the GP practice, failure to ensure that prescribed venlafaxine was issued and collected, insufficient escalation when direct contact with him was unsuccessful, and inadequate systems for managing correspondence and medication.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of escalation and contact process with secondary care when requested medication is not prescribed or contact fails

    Wider context from the report

    “f. The GP system for recording receipt of correspondence and ensuring that they were seen and reviewed by a GP was inadequate. As was communication with and from the Pharmacy team. Nor was there consideration of a system or process for contacting the secondary care provider GMMH in such circumstances when medication was not prescribed as requested and no contact could be made with the deceased. There was no escalation process/procedure. ”

    Source location

    Darren John Lawrence · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 4 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The GP practice is to provide the response concerning medication prescribing, correspondence handling, pharmacy communication and escalation processes.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “GP to provide response”

    Source location

    2021-0349-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Mental-Health-NHS-Foundation-Trust_Published
    Page 4 · response
    Published 21 October 2021

    Open published response
  10. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    SAM ROBSON PRINGLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sam Pringle had a long history of mental health problems and died by suicide by hanging on 3 November 2018. The report raised concern that inconsistent prescribing practices and the shared care protocol could delay or prevent access to Lithium for mentally ill patients, with potentially fatal results.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of psychiatrists to comply with the shared care protocol when requesting GP initiation of Lithium prescriptions

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The inquest heard evidence that some psychiatrists are asking GPs to instigate prescriptions of Lithium, knowing that the shared care protocol (should) prevent GPs from doing so; as a result the provision of Lithium to mentally ill patients is either not happening or is being delayed, with potentially fatal results. ”

    Source location

    SAM ROBSON PRINGLE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate the shared-care communication failure to general-practice colleagues and require similar problems to be escalated to the CCG.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Stockport CCG have a quality scheme in place, which facilitates shared care and Dr Woodworth has communicated to colleagues in General Practice to highlight this issue and ensure that any similar problems with a shared care process are highlighted to the CCG, such that there is oversight and an opportunity to ensure patients get their treatment safely and in a timely manner.”

    Source location

    2020-0101-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Medicines-Management-Group-NHS-Stockport-Clinical-Commission-Groupw.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review all Greater Manchester Shared Care Protocols using risk-based prioritisation, agreed review timescales, COVID-related practice changes and relevant stakeholder learning.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• A full review of the content of all Shared Care Protocols is required so as to ensure consistency, improve safety and prevent any delay for patients accessing their medications as occurred in Mr Pringle’s case. o Agree a risk based prioritisation of SCP review o Agree timescale for review with GMMMG and GM Directors of Commissioning”

    Source location

    2020-0101-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Medicines-Management-Group-NHS-Stockport-Clinical-Commission-Groupw.pdf
    Page 2 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Develop recommendations for a unified Greater Manchester process for implementing Shared Care Protocols, including clearly documented local arrangements where the standard is not adopted.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Make recommendations for a unified GM position on implementation of SCPs. o This will ideally be a de minimus, standardised GM process. o Where a GM standard is not adopted due to local commissioning considerations, clinicians must have access to an agreed local process, which is clearly documented and communicated. o GMMMG to assure implementation of standards.”

    Source location

    2020-0101-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Medicines-Management-Group-NHS-Stockport-Clinical-Commission-Groupw.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Provide assurance that Greater Manchester Shared Care Protocol implementation standards are followed, including assurance where local processes deviate.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Make recommendations for a unified GM position on implementation of SCPs. o This will ideally be a de minimus, standardised GM process. o Where a GM standard is not adopted due to local commissioning considerations, clinicians must have access to an agreed local process, which is clearly documented and communicated. o GMMMG to assure implementation of standards.”

    Source location

    2020-0101-Response-from-Greater-Manchester-Medicines-Management-Group-NHS-Stockport-Clinical-Commission-Groupw.pdf
    Page 3 · response
    Published 18 May 2020

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026