Recurring concern

Failure to maintain clear clinical responsibility for patient care

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First reported 3 Jan 2014•Latest report 8 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of an explicitly clinical care responsibility arrangement in which clinicians or senior clinical staff do not retain, clearly assign or actively oversee responsibility for patient care, including during private hospital stays, community care and post-discharge care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic delegation or supervision failures not tied to responsibility for the patient’s overall clinical care.
  • Excludes administrative, incident-investigation or governance responsibility failures that do not concern ongoing clinical responsibility for patient care.
  • Excludes individual delays, omissions or treatment failures unless they arise from the failure to retain or clearly assign clinical responsibility.
Reports
39

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
42

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
54

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care9
NHS England5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
Care Quality Commission3
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
NHS North East and North Cumbria Integrated Care Board2
Royal College of Surgeons of England2
South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust2
the Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
49 Marine Avenue Surgery1
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges1
Association Of Anaesthetists (Great Britain & Ireland)1
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barts Health NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    Serena Jane Nicholas · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Serena Jane Nicholas was born by category 1 emergency Caesarean section on 29 August 2017 after fetal bradycardia and died shortly afterwards at Leeds General Infirmary from intrauterine hypoxia, with the pregnancy also involving a diabetic mother and a fetal heart abnormality. Concerns included disjointed management and a lack of identified consultants overseeing the high-risk pregnancy, as well as inadequate continuity of care and monitoring, meaning reduced fetal activity and the potential desirability of an earlier Caesarean section were not recognised.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of identified consultant oversight of diabetic and gynaecological aspects of high-risk pregnancy care

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The antenatal surveillance was largely carried out in Hull where the mother lived. She was seen by a variety of clinicians and at a late stage by a community midwife, despite the recognition that this was a pregnancy accompanied by clear risk factors. The absence of identified consultants responsible for the oversight of mother and baby’s care in relation to diabetic and gynaecological aspects resulted in disjointed management. ”

    Source location

    Serena Jane Nicholas · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report
  2. Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire

    AI-generated summary

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Julie MORREY died in Royal Stoke University Hospital on 10 January 2019 after presenting with renal failure and bronchopneumonia. The report raised concerns about inadequate communication between hospital departments, a lack of proactive nursing management, insufficient fluids for over 24 hours, and no senior clinician review during that period.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of communication between hospital departments about responsibility for patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. There was a clear lack of communication between the hospital departments as to which department was responsible for the patient after she was assessed by a renal specialist and a plan made for her care and whilst she awaited a bed on the Renal Unit during which time she was looked after on the AMU. During this time she was without fluids for over 24 hours. ”

    Source location

    Julie MORREY · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Agree the renal admission pathway with advice clarifying the reason for referral.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The “Renal pathway for patients referred for admission from ED/AMU” has been agreed, which includes detailed advice about clarifying the reason for referral. Trust Internal Professional Standards have been amended with the support of the Medical Director to enhance fitness for purpose and to prevent recurrence of patient care failing due to misunderstanding between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Amend Trust Internal Professional Standards to reduce failures caused by misunderstanding between departments.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “1. The “Renal pathway for patients referred for admission from ED/AMU” has been agreed, which includes detailed advice about clarifying the reason for referral. Trust Internal Professional Standards have been amended with the support of the Medical Director to enhance fitness for purpose and to prevent recurrence of patient care failing due to misunderstanding between departments.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Escalate and document patients requiring specialty care through Emergency Department huddles and the Huddle Log.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “b. Any patient who requires speciality care is now escalated and discussed within ED huddles and the discussion is documented in the Huddle Log.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The absence of consultant review was not a separate error because existing senior-review mechanisms were robust; it resulted from misunderstanding responsibility for the patient.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “3. Clinical teams would like to reassure H M Coroner that both Renal and Acute medicine do have robust mechanisms for ensuring senior review of patients. In this case, if either specialty had thought the patient to be under their care, they would have had a review. On this occasion, the lack of a consultant review was not a separate or additional error; it all stems from the misunderstanding of allocation at the beginning of the patient’s care. The corrective actions outlined in 1 and 2 above will prevent such a situation from arising in the future.”

    Source location

    2019-0353-Response-by-University-Hospitals-of-North-Midlands-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 22 November 2019

    Open published response
  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kathleen McGeary died on 6 March 2018 from a head injury sustained in a fall at Tuxford Manor Care Home after her discharge from hospital. Concerns included inadequate assessment and treatment before discharge, unclear responsibility for discharge decisions, inadequate discharge documentation and communication, and her leaving hospital without prescribed antibiotics.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign clear responsibility for discharge decision making

    Wider context from the report

    “2. No clinician took clear responsibility for discharging decision making. The recording of the identity of the discharging clinician was incorrect and communication between clinicians and nursing staff was unclear. ”

    Source location

    Kathleen McGeary · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a CDU standard operating procedure defining responsibility across the patient pathway.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We have developed a new CDU (Clinical Decision Unit) standard operating procedure, which I attach, where it makes clear where responsibility lies for various aspects of”

    Source location

    2019-0081-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    A CDU consultant made the discharge decision and identified the patient as medically fit for discharge, subject to specified conditions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The decision to discharge the patient was made by ████████ CDU Consultant on the ward rounds in the morning who clearly identified that the deceased was medically fit for discharge pending the outcome of the urine dipstick but required a RAPTS assessment. I am led to understand that should the RAPTS team at this stage have had any concerns they would have raised this with staff in ED and not continued with the discharge. I am advised that the team clearly stated that they had no concerns on this occasion. I am also advised by ████████ Patient Safety Lead who attended the Inquest that while the Care Home Manager said that the deceased “looked poorly when she arrived on an ambulance trolley and not in a wheelchair” she was not immediately worried and was happy to accept Mrs McGeary for observation for 24 hours.”

    Source location

    2019-0081-Response-by-Doncaster-and-Bassetlaw-Hospital-NHS-Trust
    Page 4 · response
    Published 9 June 2019

    Open published response
  4. London (East)

    AI-generated summary

    Sophie Holman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Sophie Holman, a 10-year-old girl with chronic asthma, died on 13 December 2017 after collapsing during a severe asthma attack while being taken to hospital. The report identifies concerns about inadequate long-term management, fragmented records, failure to recognise the cumulative severity and risks of her asthma, lack of a coordinated asthma action plan and safety-netting, and missed opportunities for specialist referral.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall responsibility for asthma care

    Wider context from the report

    “3) As in the case of two recent child asthma deaths resulting in Regulation 28 statements (Michael Uriely and Tamara Mills), despite the presence of numerous health professionals involved no single individual or organisation took overall responsibility for assuming management of her care overall. ”

    Source location

    Sophie Holman · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Share examples of effective asthma-service practice through the clinical networks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We will also be working to improve access to specialist paediatric care in the community, as we know this will have a positive impact. Also through the clinical networks we will continue to share examples of best practice from areas that are”

    Source location

    2019-0035-Response-by-NHS-England
    Page 2 · response
    Published 26 May 2019

    Open published response
  5. Manchester South

    AI-generated summary

    Maria Katarina HRYNIW · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Maria Katarina HRYNIW, who was PEG fed following a stroke and had very limited mobility, developed bronchopneumonia and died at The Lakes Care centre on 14 April 2018. Concerns included the lack of assessment of the suitability and volume of continued PEG feeding near the end of life, continued administration despite reported difficulty coping with the prescribed volume, and unclear responsibilities between the SALT team and care home regarding assessment and decision-making.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish clear responsibility for PEG feeding assessment and key decisions

    Wider context from the report

    “The inquest heard evidence that Maria Katarina HRYNIW was peg fed. She was approaching the end of life but there was no assessment regarding the suitability of the use of continued peg feeding in the community or the volume given to her. The inquest heard evidence from her family that she could not cope with the volume prescribed but continued to be given it. A community MDT was not held when she was prescribed end of life medications. Maria Katarina HRYNIW lacked capacity to refuse PEG feeding and it continued as the home felt that ethically and legally they had to continue as end of life care was in place. The inquest heard that some of the difficulties arose form an lack of understanding between the SALT team and care home about who would carry out assessment and who would make the key decisions regarding the use of peg feeding. ”

    Source location

    Maria Katarina HRYNIW · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Complete an inspection addressing the reported concerns, including end-of-life care and Mental Capacity Act arrangements.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “We look at how people’s end of life needs are met under Assessment Framework key question “Is the service Responsive?” The framework has ‘Key Lines of Enquiry’ (KLOEs) for inspectors to follow when answering the key questions. One of the KLOEs for ‘Responsive’ asks: How are people supported at the end of their life to have a comfortable, dignified and pain-free death? Inspectors explore how people, and their family, friends and other carers are involved in planning, managing and making decisions about their end of life care, and how people’s pain and other symptoms are assessed and managed effectively, including having access to specialised support.”

    Source location

    2018-0398-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC does not prescribe how providers should improve; the provider or registered manager decides the appropriate actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In accordance with CQC’s regulatory remit, as with other regulators, we highlight breaches of the regulations to a Provider and where appropriate ask them what they are going to do to make improvements. We do not tell them what they should do. That is for the Provider and/or Registered Manager (‘registered person’) to decide. CQC does not publish detailed standards and expectations about specific conditions and meeting related needs. To do so would duplicate the work of more appropriate expert sources (for example NICE and SCIE) and impossible to keep safely up to date. It would also make our assessment framework far too long and detailed. We expect registered persons to keep up to date with, take on board and implement good practice standards provided by relevant authoritative organisations.”

    Source location

    2018-0398-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    CQC does not publish detailed standards for specific conditions because this would duplicate expert sources and be impractical to keep updated.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In accordance with CQC’s regulatory remit, as with other regulators, we highlight breaches of the regulations to a Provider and where appropriate ask them what they are going to do to make improvements. We do not tell them what they should do. That is for the Provider and/or Registered Manager (‘registered person’) to decide. CQC does not publish detailed standards and expectations about specific conditions and meeting related needs. To do so would duplicate the work of more appropriate expert sources (for example NICE and SCIE) and impossible to keep safely up to date. It would also make our assessment framework far too long and detailed. We expect registered persons to keep up to date with, take on board and implement good practice standards provided by relevant authoritative organisations.”

    Source location

    2018-0398-Response-by-CQC
    Page 2 · response
    Published 20 December 2018

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The Care Quality Commission, as regulator, is expected to consider and respond to concerns about the services provided in this case.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “You will appreciate that I am not in a position to comment on the quality of end of life care provided by the nursing home and others to Ms Hryniw. I expect the Care Quality Commission to respond to you as regulator of health and adult social care in England on its consideration of the matters of concern raised with regard to the provision of services in this case.”

    Source location

    2018-0398-Response-by-Department-of-Health-and-Social-Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 20 December 2018

    Open published response
  6. City of London

    AI-generated summary

    Charlotte Anne Agnew · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Charlotte Anne Agnew became psychiatrically unwell and expressed suicidal ideation. After referrals to psychiatric services, her care was not effectively transferred, her suicide risk was not sufficiently assessed or managed, and no care plan was put in place; she died on 25 March 2016 after ingesting high levels of alcohol and medication and jumping in front of a London Underground train. The report identified an ongoing risk that similar failures in timely assessment, treatment, care transfer and suicide-risk management could recur.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign clear responsibility for coordinating and delivering care before discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “It was apparent from the evidence that there were five principal failures by the Trust in relation to the treatment and care provided to the Deceased. These were: (1) The Deceased was first assessed by the Trust’s Early Intervention and Assertive Psychosis Team who recognised that she was in need of psychiatric treatment and care by another team but, despite referring her on to other psychiatric teams within the Trust, made no effective transfer of her care before discharging her back to her General Practitioner and closing her case. A significant number of clinical and managerial staff were involved in this process and none of them prevented the Deceased’s premature discharge. (2) Prior to the Deceased’s discharge no sufficient assessment was made of her risk of suicide. Despite at least two clinical staff being involved, there was insufficient evidence gathering, including from the Deceased’s family, and a wholly inadequate assessment was made despite the use of the Trust’s electronic assessment tool (which was not properly completed). Further, no plan was put in place to manage the Deceased’s recognised risk of suicide. (3) Prior to the Deceased’s discharge no care plan was put in place and no single person had responsibility for ensuring care was properly assessed, co-ordinated and delivered prior to discharge. (4) The Deceased was discharged back to the care of her General Practitioner with a recommendation for the prescription of psychiatric medication without her having been seen or assessed by the psychiatrist who made the recommendation and with no means of monitoring its subsequent effectiveness. (5) Despite the matters set out in (1) to (4), the General Practitioner’s request, made on 15 March 2016, for an urgent assessment was not granted and the Trust’s Access and Assessment Team provided an appointment for a date five weeks later on 20 April 2016. I was told by witnesses from the Trust (and in submissions made on behalf of the Trust) that the Trust had adequate relevant policies and procedures in place at the time and that the failings set out above occurred because all the staff involved failed to follow those policies and procedures. It was said that there had been no subsequent amendment of the policies and procedures but, in summary, that staff have been reminded of them and what ought to happen (by email) and there is now an increased level of monitoring of compliance. Whilst the staff directly involved, who gave oral evidence at the inquest, told me that they now understand that the above failings ought not to have happened and would not occur now, I remain concerned that one or more of the above failings could recur in the future. Although the Trust has taken steps to inform current staff of what went wrong in the Deceased’s case, it has not taken steps to ensure that the above failings could not occur again (whether by amendment or clarification of its policies and/or procedures or sufficient training of staff or otherwise). Most particularly, the evidence provided to me did not satisfy me that the Trust’s policies and procedures, and the training given upon them, now ensure that every patient who is referred to the Trust will be assessed and treated in a timely manner, even if transfer between teams is necessary. Nor did it satisfy me that every patient’s risk of suicide is now properly assessed and managed so as to ensure the risk is minimised. In all the circumstances I consider that there is an ongoing risk that any one or more of the above failings could recur. If that risk is permitted to continue, it could have an adverse impact on the assessment, treatment and care of current and future patients and upon the protection of their lives. ”

    Source location

    Charlotte Anne Agnew · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  7. Inner West London

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Uriely · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Michael Uriely had asthma from early childhood, which deteriorated and was uncontrolled in the seven months before his death. The report identified missed opportunities in the management of his asthma, including a lack of coordinated overall responsibility and long-term care planning, failure to assess and optimise treatment consistently, poor communication between services, and failure to refer him to a specialist respiratory service.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall management responsibility for care

    Wider context from the report

    “3) Despite the presence of a significant number of health care professionals involved in his care, no single individual assumed management for his care overall. ”

    Source location

    Michael Uriely · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. East London

    AI-generated summary

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker underwent a liver biopsy on 8 July 2016 and suffered a bleed caused by a tear to the hepatic artery. She died in hospital the following morning after a significant delay in detecting the bleed. The principal concerns were that required post-operative checks were not carried out, monitoring responsibilities were unclear, and the appropriate environment for post-operative monitoring was not provided.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear post-procedure clinical accountability

    Wider context from the report

    “3. The lines of clinical accountability post-procedure, was unclear. The radiologist confirmed that Mrs Walker was no longer the responsibility of the radiology team after the procedure, as she should have gone up to the ward. The ward however were concerned with her clinical parameters and considered that she should remain with the radiologist. ”

    Source location

    Mrs Anna Teresa Walker · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  9. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rohid Shergill, who had Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy and was fed through a nasogastric tube, died on 14 March 2016 after the tube was inserted into his lung and was used for feeding and medication. The principal concerns included inadequate checking of the tube position, uncertainty about parental understanding of pH testing, insufficient information-sharing between trusts, unclear care coordination, and possible contamination from repeated syringe use.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear allocation of a named keyworker or lead nurse for community care coordination

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Clear guidance on a named keyworker / lead nurse who is responsible for coordinating the care of children cared for in the community. ”

    Source location

    Rohid SHERGILL · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  10. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Dr Debatra Sircar · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Dr Debatra Sircar had longstanding alcohol dependency and depression, and died on 20 February 2016 after a fall associated with alcohol intoxication, causing subdural and intracerebral haemorrhage. He had been assessed as unsuitable for home treatment, but a Mental Health Act assessment was scheduled 11 days later, and he died before it took place. Concerns included the delay in securing hospital care and the absence of a clear interim care plan and responsibility for psychiatric monitoring.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign clinical leadership and psychiatric monitoring during interim care pending Mental Health Act assessment

    Wider context from the report

    “2. In the intervening 11 day period there was an absence of an interim care plan, identified in the SUI investigation. Although there were plans for increased contacts in future interim care for those pending MHA assessment, it was unclear who would take the lead and how a patient would be psychiatrically monitored in that period. ”

    Source location

    Dr Debatra Sircar · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Specify the Home Treatment Team’s expected risk-management role in referrals made while clients await Mental Health Act assessment.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Following our review, we have instigated the following change in practice:”

    Source location

    2016-0352.Response-by-Oxlea-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Hold thrice-weekly zoning meetings for high-risk individuals and minute agreed risk-mitigation actions.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Zoning meetings to review those individuals considered high risk (i.e. those in the red zone) take place three times per week and agreed actions to mitigate risks are minuted. In addition, regular weekly interface meetings between community and home treatment teams now take place to ensure that the clinical pathway between services is working properly.”

    Source location

    2016-0352.Response-by-Oxlea-NHS-Trust
    Page 2 · response
    Published 19 February 2017

    Open published response
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Data last updated 7 September 2026