Recurring concern

Failure to maintain clear clinical responsibility for patient care

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First reported 3 Jan 2014•Latest report 8 Jun 2026

Definition

What this concern includes

Includes failures of an explicitly clinical care responsibility arrangement in which clinicians or senior clinical staff do not retain, clearly assign or actively oversee responsibility for patient care, including during private hospital stays, community care and post-discharge care.

Not included

  • Excludes generic delegation or supervision failures not tied to responsibility for the patient’s overall clinical care.
  • Excludes administrative, incident-investigation or governance responsibility failures that do not concern ongoing clinical responsibility for patient care.
  • Excludes individual delays, omissions or treatment failures unless they arise from the failure to retain or clearly assign clinical responsibility.
Reports
39

Distinct published reports

Individual concerns
42

A report can raise multiple concerns

Date range
2014–2026

First to latest report issue date

Stated actions
54

Described in published responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports about this concern issued each year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Most frequent recipients

Most frequent recipients

Reports about this concern sent to each recipient.

Department of Health and Social Care9
NHS England5
Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust4
Care Quality Commission3
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence2
NHS North East and North Cumbria Integrated Care Board2
Royal College of Surgeons of England2
South Tyneside and Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust2
the Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust2
49 Marine Avenue Surgery1
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges1
Association Of Anaesthetists (Great Britain & Ireland)1
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust1
Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust1
Barts Health NHS Trust1

Concerns and responses across reports

Only concerns grouped under this recurring concern are included. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Margaret Emily Tuck, who had multiple myeloma, fell at home on 13 October 2015 and again in hospital on 15 October 2015. The report identified concerns about the absence of a falls prevention care plan, unclear nursing responsibility, incomplete post-fall documentation, missing neurological observations, delays in recognising possible bleeding and informing the consultant, and shortcomings in incident reporting and the hospital investigation. The inquest jury determined that her death was caused by a combination of accident and illness.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clarity about primary nursing responsibility

    Wider context from the report

    “2. There was confusion about which nurse had primary responsibility for Margaret Tuck. Recourse was had to the bed diaries, but there was further discussion in court about whether the nurses had been sharing care. Such a lack of clarity seems undesirable. ”

    Source location

    Margaret Emily TUCK · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Assign every acute admissions patient a named nurse and communicate nurse responsibility to patients, carers and staff each shift.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “2. Since this incident the staff allocation has been revised, all patients admitted to the AAU now have a clearly identified, named nurse. Patients and their carers are made aware of this nurse on admission to the ward. All nurses on the unit, whether they are regular or agency nurses on staff, will be made aware of the nurse in charge at the beginning of each shift. In April 2016 we increased the number of senior sister charge nurse posts to increase the presence of senior nursing leadership across the 24 hour period. This has led to far better leadership and care.”

    Source location

    2016-0273-Response-by-Barths-Health-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 26 July 2016

    Open published response
  2. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Tamara Mills, who had longstanding asthma and repeated acute exacerbations, developed breathing difficulties during the night of 10th/11th April 2015 and died after paramedics were called. The principal concerns were fragmented care, inadequate coordination and communication, insufficient recognition of her deteriorating chronic respiratory condition, and the absence of a long-term management plan.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign overall clinical management responsibility

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Despite the presence of a significant number of health care professional involved in her care and some frequently, no single individual assumed management for her care overall 4. In the absence of no one individual assuming responsibility for her care, there was no plan directed towards her long term management and care identifying the chronic nature of her condition, seeking a sustained and balanced level of treatment, control and resolution of the recurring episodes. 5. Insofar as planning occurred it was in the last six months of her life and was in the form of an emergency plan directed towards the next and apparently accepted inevitable acute event, but not as a part of the necessary strategy to control and avoid such events. 6. Not only did those advised of such a plan fail to understand its limited objective they misinterpreted its purpose and consoled themselves in the false belief there was a purposeful strategy designed to protect this child in the long term. ”

    Source location

    Tamara Mills · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  3. County Durham and Darlington

    AI-generated summary

    James Bewick Graham · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    James Bewick Graham, who had peripheral vascular disease and recurring problems with his left foot, was admitted to hospital after his condition deteriorated, underwent an amputation, and died on 2 November 2014. The report identified concerns about delayed referral to secondary care, poor communication between healthcare professionals, unclear responsibility for making the referral, and administrative failures that meant the referral was not dispatched.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear ownership and responsibility for referrals to secondary care

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The GP who had most contact with the deceased in a 2 year period considered making a referral to secondary care on 17th October 2014 and instead of making the referral himself, passed the responsibility to make a referral to another GP (who worked one day per week) and who had previously sent a one page letter of referral to secondary care more than 2 years earlier. The GP gave evidence that he thought it appropriate for the original GP to make the referral as that GP had done the first one and was acquainted with the matter. The second GP gave evidence to say that she did not agree with this action because although, in principle, if there had been a recent referral it might have been appropriate for the original referring GP to make a second referral however after 2 years it was “stretching it a bit”. There was a lack of ownership and responsibility for the deceased’s care and making a referral to secondary care. There needs to be consideration given to the formulation of clear guidance as to which GP and in what circumstances has a responsibility for referrals to secondary care. ”

    Source location

    James Bewick Graham · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Require urgent secondary-care referrals to be discussed with the senior administrator and senior nurse.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The following steps have been taken to address your concerns surrounding the manner in which referrals to secondary care are made and monitored:-”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inform the current GP provider of requirements for secondary-care referrals under the new contract.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “• Following the commencement of the new contract arrangements relating to the provision of healthcare services at HMP Frankland on 1 April 2015, the former head of healthcare at HMP Frankland is now employed by Spectrum Community Health CIC and therefore the current provider of GP Services at HMP Frankland is aware and informed of the requirements relating to referrals to secondary care.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 2 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Introduce podiatry procedures requiring SystmOne communication and urgent tasking for necessary secondary-care referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “On reviewing this case it is felt that the podiatrist followed the protocol set at that time for the high security environment as it was not possible to speak to the GP. In order to prevent future similar situations occurring Premier Physical Healthcare have introduced the following procedures into the offender healthcare policies.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 3 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Issue referral guidance requiring the referring doctor to complete and monitor referrals, retain responsibility, and avoid delegating urgent referrals.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “A Directive has been issued by Spectrum Community Health CIC, that states;”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 5 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Circulate and discuss GMC guidance on delegation and referral through continuing professional development.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The GMC guidelines regarding delegation and referral have been circulated and discussed as part of Continuing Professional Development.”

    Source location

    James-Graham-Response
    Page 6 · response
    Published 17 December 2015

    Open published response
  4. Wiltshire and Swindon

    AI-generated summary

    Elizabeth Godwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Elizabeth Godwin died by suicide on 28 January 2013 after attaching a dog-lead ligature to a shower cubicle and hanging herself at home. The report raised concerns about how mental-health information was gathered, urgency assessed and monitored, information shared, responsibility allocated, and transfers of care communicated between agencies.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to assign responsibility for patient care, mental health assessment and resulting treatment

    Wider context from the report

    “I AM CONCERNED IN PARTICULAR AS TO THE FOLLOWING MATTERS: a) As to the way in which information is gathered from the family and others involved where there is a need for an individual to have a mental health assessment. b) As to how the urgency of carrying out that assessment, is assessed, recorded and monitored. c) As to how that information is shared with other agencies involved in the care of that patient. d) As to who has responsibility for the care of that patient including the carrying out of the mental health assessment and any treatment arising from it. e) As to how a transfer of that care between the agencies is communicated and acknowledged so that there is a clear audit trail. I would ask you to review the policy and procedures that you have in place to deal with the referral to another agency of a patient who appears to be suffering from mental health issues having regard to the above concerns. ”

    Source location

    Elizabeth Godwin · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 1 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Write a multi-agency protocol defining shared health and social care responsibility during mental health assessments, including when resources are unavailable.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An action from this section would be a clear message to health and social care that the responsibility for the service user is shared until the mental health crisis is over. A protocol has been written to this effect and needs to be rolled out across the health and social care teams. (Multi-agency protocol for working together when Mental Health Assessments are requested, including situations where resources are unavailable). This is a standing agenda item for the monthly meeting between mental health managers in Wiltshire Council and AWP managers and for them to cascade to teams. This policy also takes into account other problems such as the unavailability of doctors and beds and emphasises the joint responsibility of health and social care to manage the situation until the necessary resources have been identified.”

    Source location

    2015-0233-Response-by-Wiltshire-Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Roll out the multi-agency protocol through monthly manager meetings and cascading it to health and social care teams.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An action from this section would be a clear message to health and social care that the responsibility for the service user is shared until the mental health crisis is over. A protocol has been written to this effect and needs to be rolled out across the health and social care teams. (Multi-agency protocol for working together when Mental Health Assessments are requested, including situations where resources are unavailable). This is a standing agenda item for the monthly meeting between mental health managers in Wiltshire Council and AWP managers and for them to cascade to teams. This policy also takes into account other problems such as the unavailability of doctors and beds and emphasises the joint responsibility of health and social care to manage the situation until the necessary resources have been identified.”

    Source location

    2015-0233-Response-by-Wiltshire-Council
    Page 4 · response
    Published 19 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Discuss with AWP how responsibility is allocated between mental health assessments and Mental Health Act assessments at each stage, using urgent telephone contact when necessary.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “An action from this should be further discussion between the two organisations (WC and AWP) – there is an established forum to do this on the third Friday in the month - about the distinction between mental health assessments and Mental Health Act assessments and where the responsibility sits at different stages throughout the assessment process. More urgent situations should be dealt with by telephone contact between the 2 organisations.”

    Source location

    2015-0233-Response-by-Wiltshire-Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Communicate and record clear responsibility statements for all inter-agency care transfers across daytime and out-of-hours services, including on RiO and CareFirst.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Any other transfer of care should be documented in the same way as a clear statement of who is doing what - across the different teams in Wiltshire Council and AWP and across daytime hours and out of hours – which has been agreed by both organisations and needs to be clearly communicated to the families and the GP and anyone else who needs to be informed. This should be clearly recorded on the health data base RiO and the social care system CareFirst and via any other correspondence that is required.”

    Source location

    2015-0233-Response-by-Wiltshire-Council
    Page 5 · response
    Published 19 June 2015

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    The local authority is responsible for arranging an Approved Mental Health Professional assessment when the referral is not made to Trust services.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “If a Mental Health Act Assessment is requested and a referral not made to the Trust services, it is the responsibility of the local authority to make arrangements for an approved mental health professional to consider the patient’s case on their behalf. Only once the assessment is completed would it be the responsibility of the Trust to provide treatment arising out of the assessment.”

    Source location

    2015-0233-Response-by-Avon-and-Wiltshire-NHS-Trust
    Page 3 · response
    Published 19 June 2015

    Open published response
  5. Cornwall

    AI-generated summary

    Shannon Kimberley Gee · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shannon Kimberley Gee, aged 16, died as the result of an Accident. The report raised concerns about gaps between mental health services, delays of weeks in resolving disputes over responsibility for treatment, and difficulties transferring medical notes and records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in resolving disputes over which organisation should treat a patient

    Wider context from the report

    “The situation now is improved from when ████████ encountered the delay in treatment to her but, on the evidence should ████████ a delay of ‘weeks’ in resolving clinical disputes as to which organisation should treat a patient is still worrying. Ideally, there should be a seamless union between the two organisations. The fact that there is not appears to be a consequence of the maximum threshold for treatment by OSW being lower than the minimum threshold for acceptance on to the CMHT workload. Put another way, it is entirely conceivable that both OSW and CMHT may be correct in applying their respective rules as to whether a patient needs to be taken on where that patient’s presenting complaints falls between the two organisations’ rules. That may require formal guidance to resolve hence directing this letter to the Secretary in addition to the Commissioners. The difficulties set out concerning the transfer of medical notes and records appear more difficult to justify. ”

    Source location

    Shannon Kimberley Gee · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  6. Manchester (North)

    AI-generated summary

    Lucasz Lewandowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lucasz Lewandowski suffered catastrophic head injuries after jumping from the roof of his employer’s building on 16 July, and died two days later. The principal concerns included delays and communication failures in emergency and mental-health responses, failures in psychiatric information-sharing and continuity of care, and issues concerning clinical decision-making and responsibility for his safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of clinicians to retain responsibility for patients’ safety and wellbeing in the community

    Wider context from the report

    “6. The view of the physician - that responsibility for maintaining a patient’s safety and wellbeing within the community rests entirely with the family and/or patient rather than the clinician. ”

    Source location

    Lucasz Lewandowski · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 3 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Implement a psychiatric protocol requiring documented risk assessments, action on identified risks, communication with relevant healthcare professionals, and periodic review.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Bearing in mind the particular circumstances and lessons from this case, a protocol is now being implemented specifically in relation to psychiatric practice so that a clear risk assessment must be recorded on the patient’s notes and such risk assessment to be acted upon and communicated to other relevant healthcare professionals.”

    Source location

    2014-0445-Response-by-Green-Surgery-Medical-Dental-Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 October 2014

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Follow up medication non-compliance reports by inviting patients to appointments, discussing non-compliance impacts, and reassessing resulting risks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “In instances such as the present case, it is now envisaged to follow – up any report of compliance failure with an invitation to an appointment being made so as to discuss the impact of failure to follow medication as well as to perform a re-assessment of the risks that the patient may present to her / himself as a direct result of the non – compliance.”

    Source location

    2014-0445-Response-by-Green-Surgery-Medical-Dental-Care
    Page 1 · response
    Published 15 October 2014

    Open published response
  7. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Thomas Charles TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Thomas Charles Taylor, a diabetic man aged 54, died in the Royal Free Hospital after a delay in administering insulin following the loss of his medical notes and drug chart. Concerns included unclear ward leadership, the absence of a protocol for lost notes and drug charts, inadequate escalation when blood sugar checks were refused, and delayed clinical monitoring after significant hyperglycaemia.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to establish clear nursing responsibility for patient care

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The ward where Mr Taylor was being nursed seemed rudderless, operating without clarity of leadership or support. On 21 February, a bank nurse worked alone in the morning, though was joined by another agency nurse at lunch time, with only a senior nurse in the office. On 22 February, the nurse in charge appeared unclear that he had any additional responsibility by virtue of being the nurse in charge, other than to allocate nurses to patients. Despite only three nurses being on duty on 22 February, the nurse in charge took a break at the same time as another nurse. There was a conflict of views among the nurses that day about who had primary care of Mr Taylor. ”

    Source location

    Thomas Charles TAYLOR · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
  8. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Natasha Raghoo was admitted to The Dene Hospital in April 2012 for treatment related to bipolar disorder and was later detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act. She was found unresponsive in bed on 5 May 2012 and died from anaphylactic shock caused by an unknown allergen. Concerns included inconsistent physical observations, lack of ECG assessment, staff training in resuscitation and defibrillator use, and communication and handover problems.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear responsibility for stopping physical observations

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Physical observations of blood pressure, pulse and temperature were sporadic and few in number. This was cause for concern as Natasha had a raised blood pressure and had been commenced on treatment, Observations stopped two days prior to death and no member of staff was able to explain who was responsible for this action. ”

    Source location

    Natasha Raghoo · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent action was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Review, revise and reissue the observation policy, brief relevant staff, obtain responsibility acknowledgements, and audit implementation with spot checks.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “Lessons Learned and changes made”

    Source location

    2014-0100-Response-by-Partnership-in-Care
    Page 6 · response
    Published 6 March 2014

    Open published response
  9. Gateshead and South Tyneside

    AI-generated summary

    Keith Fleming · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Keith Fleming underwent elective reversal of an ileostomy in January 2013 and was discharged home on 14 January. He developed an unrecognised internal infection, was admitted as an emergency on 6 February, and died on 10 February 2013 despite urgent treatment. The substantive concerns included the absence of recorded temperature and blood pressure readings, insufficient monitoring and communication between surgical and community services, and inadequate care planning and record keeping after discharge.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of surgical teams to maintain ongoing oversight after discharge

    Wider context from the report

    “Whilst it has to be acknowledged in early correspondence to his GP from Professor████████ the surgeon in charge of the patient at the Freeman Hospital the possibility of pelvic infection was mooted as a risk factor in the proposed reversal -- no plans specifically provided on discharge for this possible contingency or appears. On discharge the care of the deceased was to be managed within the Community and the deceased was to be seen by the surgical team as “a follow up” some time in the future. ”

    Source location

    Keith Fleming · Prevention of Future Deaths report
    Page 2 · concerns

    Open source report
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Data last updated 7 September 2026