Recipient

AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd

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First report 25 Feb 2014•Latest report 25 Feb 2014

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Private and voluntary organisations · Private limited company. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

0%published responses found
0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner South London

    AI-generated summary

    Rachel Ann Burke · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Rachel Ann Burke died in Dole, Nepal, after developing high altitude cerebral oedema and high altitude pulmonary oedema during a Himalayan trek. Concerns included an excessive rate of ascent, failure to use a nearby health post or satellite phone for urgent care, failure to recognise the severity of her illness, and sending her to descend under her own steam with a guide who had inadequate or no training in acute mountain sickness.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to use available urgent medical services and communications

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The HE trek leader was concerned about the costs of accessing services from the Health Centre and of making satellite phone calls, possibly mindful of the TAC manual for overseas group leaders, which states under “emergency” on page 20, that priority must be given to finding a cost effective solution. Despite having a satellite phone at Macheremo and 12 minutes from a health post, neither was used, when the trekker needed urgent medical care. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to recognise the severity and subtle signs of mountain sickness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The severity of her illness was not appreciated by the trek leader. The expert said that it was very well known in the trekking community that people were loathe to admit they were as ill as they were and that a good mountain guide was as capable of picking up the subtle signs of mountain sickness as most doctors. Nevertheless, this severely sick trekker with ataxia and cyanosis, signs of HACE and HAPE, was asked by the trek leader to descend under her own steam with a Himalayan Encounters guide who had inadequate or no training in acute mountain sickness. This should not happen, the expert said, since exercise worsens HAPE. Ideally she should descend passively or be treated at the health centre. The information about the training of each leader and guide was not passed to TAC, who assured themselves of the adequacy of training by statements of general compliance from HE. Whilst the companies report that action has been taken to address this, there may remain a similar risk for other trek organizers. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to limit high-altitude ascents to safe rates

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) The Adventure Company (TAC) Everest Gokyo Lakes Trek had advertised the ascent from Namche Bazaar at 3440m to Dole at 3780m, when in fact it was 4050m. This was an ascent of 610m in one day, whilst its preferred code of practice identified that ascents should be of a maximum of 300m per day. An expert in mountain sickness, ████████ said that the speed of ascent was the one factor that limits the incidence of altitude sickness. He said that the sleeping altitude (above 3000 metres) should never be more than about 300 or 400 metres above the previous night and that every 3 days or 1000 metres of additional ascent, an additional rest day would be needed. He described the ascent to Dole on this trek as excessive, being double the safe recommended ascent rate. It was noted that TAC hold a high altitude trek in Peru where the limits are strictly complied with, due to local legislation. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure and verify guide training in acute mountain sickness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The severity of her illness was not appreciated by the trek leader. The expert said that it was very well known in the trekking community that people were loathe to admit they were as ill as they were and that a good mountain guide was as capable of picking up the subtle signs of mountain sickness as most doctors. Nevertheless, this severely sick trekker with ataxia and cyanosis, signs of HACE and HAPE, was asked by the trek leader to descend under her own steam with a Himalayan Encounters guide who had inadequate or no training in acute mountain sickness. This should not happen, the expert said, since exercise worsens HAPE. Ideally she should descend passively or be treated at the health centre. The information about the training of each leader and guide was not passed to TAC, who assured themselves of the adequacy of training by statements of general compliance from HE. Whilst the companies report that action has been taken to address this, there may remain a similar risk for other trek organizers. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to AITO - The Specialist Travel Association Ltd; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide passive descent or health-centre treatment for severe altitude illness

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) The severity of her illness was not appreciated by the trek leader. The expert said that it was very well known in the trekking community that people were loathe to admit they were as ill as they were and that a good mountain guide was as capable of picking up the subtle signs of mountain sickness as most doctors. Nevertheless, this severely sick trekker with ataxia and cyanosis, signs of HACE and HAPE, was asked by the trek leader to descend under her own steam with a Himalayan Encounters guide who had inadequate or no training in acute mountain sickness. This should not happen, the expert said, since exercise worsens HAPE. Ideally she should descend passively or be treated at the health centre. The information about the training of each leader and guide was not passed to TAC, who assured themselves of the adequacy of training by statements of general compliance from HE. Whilst the companies report that action has been taken to address this, there may remain a similar risk for other trek organizers. ”
    Open source report
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Published response patterns

Compared with other recipients in reports included in PFD Monitor

Describes published response evidence, not performance.

Published responses found

0%
0%All other recipients 58%
0%100%

How actions were described at the time

This respondent
All other recipients
47%25%27%<1%<1%
  • Completed
  • In progress
  • Planned
  • Unclear
  • Partially completed

Statuses reflect what recipients said at the time. PFD Monitor does not verify whether actions happened.

Types of action described in responses

Percentages use all actions described by each group. An action may have more than one type, so percentages do not total 100%.

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026