11 May 2021 Paul Steven Reynolds · Prevention of Future Deaths report Suffolk
View report summary
Concerns raised 13 Failure to place a person subjected to prone restraint in the recovery position View source Lack of accurate and clear guidance on information to share with police View source Failure to provide or arrange additional training for security staff View source Failure to control the scene to facilitate assessment of a person’s condition View source Lack of clarity about incident command and staff responsibilities View source Failure to closely and effectively monitor breathing during prone restraint View source Failure to restrict restraint participation to appropriately badged staff View source Physical intervention policy permitting ground restraint methods not taught in accredited courses View source Reduction in time allowed for officer training View source Officers’ misunderstanding of the circumstances in which pain or pressure testing is justifiable View source Insufficient officer skills in non-physical aspects of conflict management View source Lack of consistency in the training curriculum View source Failure to document staff induction and training View source See 10 more concerns
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AI-generated summary
Paul Steven Reynolds · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Paul Steven Reynolds died on 16 February 2017 after being restrained by the neck and placed in a prone position at Pontins Pakefield in Lowestoft. The principal concerns included inadequate monitoring of his breathing, failure to place him in the recovery position, insufficient staff training, unclear responsibilities, and poor sharing of information with police.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to place a person subjected to prone restraint in the recovery position
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of accurate and clear guidance on information to share with police
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide or arrange additional training for security staff
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to control the scene to facilitate assessment of a person’s condition
Wider context from the report “(4) Officers did not control the scene by clearing the ballroom and switching off the music which would have improved their ability to assess Mr Reynolds’ condition .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of clarity about incident command and staff responsibilities
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to closely and effectively monitor breathing during prone restraint
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to restrict restraint participation to appropriately badged staff
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Physical intervention policy permitting ground restraint methods not taught in accredited courses
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses .
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Reduction in time allowed for officer training
Wider context from the report “(2) The time allowed for training had been reduced from 12 to 4.25 hours. Positional asphyxia training had been reinforced, but there were questions about the impact of the reduction upon officers.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Officers’ misunderstanding of the circumstances in which pain or pressure testing is justifiable
Wider context from the report “(1) Officers appeared to be under the impression that pain/pressure testing to determine whether a person was unconscious or simply asleep was an assault rather than being justifiable in certain circumstances.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient officer skills in non-physical aspects of conflict management
Wider context from the report “(3) The College of Policing and NPCC Officer and Staff safety Review made two recommendations to include revising the curriculum to ensure greater consistency, and to implement guidelines to ensure officers are sufficiently skilled in non-physical aspects of conflict management . The time scales for implementation were not stated.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of consistency in the training curriculum
Wider context from the report “(3) The College of Policing and NPCC Officer and Staff safety Review made two recommendations to include revising the curriculum to ensure greater consistency , and to implement guidelines to ensure officers are sufficiently skilled in non-physical aspects of conflict management. The time scales for implementation were not stated.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Britannia Hotels Group Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to document staff induction and training
Wider context from the report “(1) The Physical Intervention Policy August 2016 places the onus on staff to seek additional training.
(2) Pontins do not undertake any internal training or employ external trainers for security staff.
(3) Unbadged staff are allowed to participate in restraint
(4) Ground restraint remains in the PI policy as an appropriate method to contain an incident even though this is not taught in SIA accredited courses.
(5) At no point during the prone restraint was Mr Reynolds placed in the recovery position. Neither did any member of staff appear to seriously consider the potential for positional asphyxia by closely or effectively monitoring Mr Reynolds breathing.
(6) There appeared to be no clarity in the Policy about who should take charge of an incident or what the responsibilities are for security staff and Managers.
(7) There appeared to be a lack accurate information and clarity around what information should be shared with the police about the incident.
(8) There was no documented evidence of the induction or any other training for staff.
” Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations