Concerns raised 3 Failure to keep aspirating fire detection system fault buzzers operational View source Failure to protect aspirating fire detection system control panels from deliberate tampering View source Lack of central oversight of aspirating fire detection system faults View source
Responses linked to these concerns
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AI-generated summary
Richard Charles HUNT · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Richard Charles HUNT was a serving prisoner at HMP Stocken who set fire to his cell on 11 July 2025, was taken to hospital, and died later that day from smoke inhalation. The report raises concerns that the aspirating fire detection system’s buzzer failed to sound because it had been deliberately disabled or tampered with, and that similar issues were found across the prison estate without central oversight of faults.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to keep aspirating fire detection system fault buzzers operational
Wider context from the report “On both occasions prior to setting fire to his cell, ████████ it is designed to trigger an alarm on a control panel which is housed in the Wing Office situated on each wing. The triggering of that alarm should not only display a light but also sound a buzzer to alert staff of a fault.
On the 19th March when Mr Hunt set fire to his cell on K Wing and on 11th July when he set fire to his cell on I Wing this buzzer did not sound.
On 19th March 2025, Mr Hunt himself raised the alarm by sounding his cell bell and was discovered. He required CPR and was hospitalised for 3 days. The aspirating fire alarm system did not sound an alarm in the K Wing office.
On 11th July the detection of Mr Hunt having set fire to his cell was fortuitous as an OSG was conducting an ACCT check on another prisoner in a nearby cell and smelt smoke. The alarm indication of a fault had been triggered 2 hours before this discovery and Mr Hunt’s cell had been smouldering for around this period of time undetected. Again, no buzzer was sounded.
Following the fire on the 19th March 2025, investigation revealed that the aspirating fire detection system buzzer with the Wing Office had been ‘disabled’ and it was believed to have been deliberately silenced for 12 months prior to the incident.
Following the fire and Mr Hunt’s death on the 11th July 2025, the aspirating fire detection system was inspected and reviewed across the HMP Stocken Estate by ADT alarms, who are contracted to maintain the system. That inspection revealed that the reason the alarm on I wing, which was triggered but did not sound the buzzer, was because the control panel in the Wing Office (and in which the buzzer was housed) had been deliberately tampered with, by the insertion of a rubber glove between the connectors thereby disabling the buzzer.
Further inspection of the aspirating fire detection system panels across the HMP Stocken Estate found for example the control panel on L Wing had been vandalised ████████ and that control panel units in other Wings including segregation had been deliberately forced open to gain access.
I further understand that the aspirating fire detection system panels on the Wings do not link with the main Control Room, meaning there is no central oversight of faults (whether deliberate coverd or indicating a fire) for action to be immediately taken.
Whilst HMP Stocken may have a system of maintenance of the aspirating fire detection system within the prison, that maintenance system is futile if staff are going to deliberately tamper with that system to disable the buzzer which is designed to alert them as to risk. This is not an isolated occurrence and is systemic across the HMP Stocken Estate.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to protect aspirating fire detection system control panels from deliberate tampering
Wider context from the report “On both occasions prior to setting fire to his cell, ████████ it is designed to trigger an alarm on a control panel which is housed in the Wing Office situated on each wing. The triggering of that alarm should not only display a light but also sound a buzzer to alert staff of a fault.
On the 19th March when Mr Hunt set fire to his cell on K Wing and on 11th July when he set fire to his cell on I Wing this buzzer did not sound.
On 19th March 2025, Mr Hunt himself raised the alarm by sounding his cell bell and was discovered. He required CPR and was hospitalised for 3 days. The aspirating fire alarm system did not sound an alarm in the K Wing office.
On 11th July the detection of Mr Hunt having set fire to his cell was fortuitous as an OSG was conducting an ACCT check on another prisoner in a nearby cell and smelt smoke. The alarm indication of a fault had been triggered 2 hours before this discovery and Mr Hunt’s cell had been smouldering for around this period of time undetected. Again, no buzzer was sounded.
Following the fire on the 19th March 2025, investigation revealed that the aspirating fire detection system buzzer with the Wing Office had been ‘disabled’ and it was believed to have been deliberately silenced for 12 months prior to the incident.
Following the fire and Mr Hunt’s death on the 11th July 2025, the aspirating fire detection system was inspected and reviewed across the HMP Stocken Estate by ADT alarms, who are contracted to maintain the system. That inspection revealed that the reason the alarm on I wing, which was triggered but did not sound the buzzer, was because the control panel in the Wing Office (and in which the buzzer was housed) had been deliberately tampered with, by the insertion of a rubber glove between the connectors thereby disabling the buzzer.
Further inspection of the aspirating fire detection system panels across the HMP Stocken Estate found for example the control panel on L Wing had been vandalised ████████ and that control panel units in other Wings including segregation had been deliberately forced open to gain access.
I further understand that the aspirating fire detection system panels on the Wings do not link with the main Control Room, meaning there is no central oversight of faults (whether deliberate coverd or indicating a fire) for action to be immediately taken.
Whilst HMP Stocken may have a system of maintenance of the aspirating fire detection system within the prison, that maintenance system is futile if staff are going to deliberately tamper with that system to disable the buzzer which is designed to alert them as to risk. This is not an isolated occurrence and is systemic across the HMP Stocken Estate.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Crown Premises Fire Safety Inspectorate; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of central oversight of aspirating fire detection system faults
Wider context from the report “On both occasions prior to setting fire to his cell, ████████ it is designed to trigger an alarm on a control panel which is housed in the Wing Office situated on each wing. The triggering of that alarm should not only display a light but also sound a buzzer to alert staff of a fault.
On the 19th March when Mr Hunt set fire to his cell on K Wing and on 11th July when he set fire to his cell on I Wing this buzzer did not sound.
On 19th March 2025, Mr Hunt himself raised the alarm by sounding his cell bell and was discovered. He required CPR and was hospitalised for 3 days. The aspirating fire alarm system did not sound an alarm in the K Wing office.
On 11th July the detection of Mr Hunt having set fire to his cell was fortuitous as an OSG was conducting an ACCT check on another prisoner in a nearby cell and smelt smoke. The alarm indication of a fault had been triggered 2 hours before this discovery and Mr Hunt’s cell had been smouldering for around this period of time undetected. Again, no buzzer was sounded.
Following the fire on the 19th March 2025, investigation revealed that the aspirating fire detection system buzzer with the Wing Office had been ‘disabled’ and it was believed to have been deliberately silenced for 12 months prior to the incident.
Following the fire and Mr Hunt’s death on the 11th July 2025, the aspirating fire detection system was inspected and reviewed across the HMP Stocken Estate by ADT alarms, who are contracted to maintain the system. That inspection revealed that the reason the alarm on I wing, which was triggered but did not sound the buzzer, was because the control panel in the Wing Office (and in which the buzzer was housed) had been deliberately tampered with, by the insertion of a rubber glove between the connectors thereby disabling the buzzer.
Further inspection of the aspirating fire detection system panels across the HMP Stocken Estate found for example the control panel on L Wing had been vandalised ████████ and that control panel units in other Wings including segregation had been deliberately forced open to gain access.
I further understand that the aspirating fire detection system panels on the Wings do not link with the main Control Room, meaning there is no central oversight of faults (whether deliberate coverd or indicating a fire) for action to be immediately taken.
Whilst HMP Stocken may have a system of maintenance of the aspirating fire detection system within the prison, that maintenance system is futile if staff are going to deliberately tamper with that system to disable the buzzer which is designed to alert them as to risk. This is not an isolated occurrence and is systemic across the HMP Stocken Estate.
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Serve enforcement action-plan notices on responsible duty holders addressing fire alarm faults, detector tampering, training, drills, maintenance, monitoring and spare components.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following the post fire inspection on 16th July 2025, CPFSI took enforcement action by serving 28-day action plan notices to each of the Governing Governor, MOJ Property Service, Amey FM and HMPPS Director General Operations.” Source location Response from The Crown Premises Fire & Safety Inspectorate
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Monitor compliance with served notices and conduct a follow-up visit to HMP Stocken in January 2026.
Verbatim wording from the response “CPFSI continues to monitor progress with the actions being taken to comply with each Notice served and intends to conduct a follow up visit to HMP Stocken during January 2026.” Source location Response from The Crown Premises Fire & Safety Inspectorate
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Conduct post-fire visits and inspections to identify fire safety and management failures at HMP Stocken.
Verbatim wording from the response “• Carry out an initial post fire visit to quickly gather vital information to establish and understand the facts of the fire event that occurred on 11th July 2025 in preparation for a post fire inspection.” Source location Response from The Crown Premises Fire & Safety Inspectorate
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Create and use a revised inspection aide memoire specifying detailed checks of fire detection, warning, maintenance and anti-tampering arrangements in prison residential wings.
Verbatim wording from the response “CPFSI has reviewed its business processes for inspecting residential wings in prisons. Specifically, by creating a revised aide memoire which provides inspectors with specific, detailed lines of enquiry to confirm that fire detection and warning systems can always provide effective detection performance. This is supported by: the provision of systems and components that are in accordance with the recommendations of relevant British Standards and expectations of MOJs own Technical Specifications; robust day-to-day management systems to deter tampering with life safety equipment and monitoring arrangements which ensure that specialist planned maintenance and remedial works are completed in a competent and timely fashion.” Source location Response from The Crown Premises Fire & Safety Inspectorate
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Crown bodies cannot be prosecuted under the Fire Safety Order, although enforcement notices remain available where continued non-compliance creates significant safety risks.
Verbatim wording from the response “Crown bodies must comply with the provisions of the Order**, but they cannot be subject to prosecution**. Non-Crown Responsible Persons and others with duties under the Order in Crown premises can be prosecuted.” Source location Response from The Crown Premises Fire & Safety Inspectorate
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations