CSC Computer Sciences Limited

Private and voluntary organisations · Private limited company

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First report 8 Feb 2024•Latest report 8 Feb 2024

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from CSC Computer Sciences Limited linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. East Riding and Hull

    AI-generated summary

    Ethel Doreen Reed · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Ethel Doreen Reed fell at home, sustaining rib fractures that caused a pneumothorax and chest infection, and later developed pneumonia and Covid-19 while in hospital. She was discharged to a community rehabilitation centre while described as not medically fit for discharge and died there on 2 March 2023. The report raises concerns about staffing, continuity of care, personal care, leadership and escalation arrangements on a winter-pressure ward, as well as an electronic record system issue affecting identification of authors of discharge-letter changes.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to CSC Computer Sciences Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the electronic patient record system to identify authors of changes to finalised discharge letters

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) An issue with the Lorenzo electronic patient record keeping system has been identified in respect of the system not auto populating the identification of the author of any changes made in the immediate discharge letter (IDL) after it has been finalised. This could lead to miscommunication of critical issues and difficulties in establishing who made what decisions which could lead to delays in treatment in the next post discharge setting which in turn could lead to future deaths. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to CSC Computer Sciences Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Risk of cross infection from misallocated patients’ personal effects

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) H130 is on the 13th floor of Hull Royal Infirmary. It has an East and a West wing and spans the full floor. It was opened in response to winter pressures. At that time, in January 2023, Hull Royal Infirmary was placed under significant pressure in terms of admissions and staffing. The ward been open only a matter of some two weeks by the time Mrs Reed was transferred to that ward. Despite being medically fit for discharge upon arrival on that ward Mrs Reed’s condition worsened and family raised concerns as best they could but they reported that the ward was chaotic and that staff would tell them they had only just found out they were working on the ward before their shift started and there was no consistency of nursing staff on the ward. Mrs Reed was dehydrated and family report that there was a paucity of personal care afforded on that ward. There was a risk of cross infection as patients’ personal effects such as toiletries were not with the right patients and had to be located by family. There was no established cohort of permanent staff on the ward at that time and no signposting to the ward sister or matron and therefore no way of patients, their friends, or their families being able to have a clear escalation pathway to ventilate concerns. Although HUTH now have an established team and leadership chain on Ward H130 there is a real concern that wards opened in response to winter pressures in the future in any busy hospital may give rise to the same peripatetic staffing regime, that is to say, agency staff and no fixed team in place and a lack of visible leadership. This could lead to the deterioration of patients not being recognised if there is no continuity of care by the same team of nursing staff. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to CSC Computer Sciences Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of continuity of nursing staff on winter-pressure wards

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) H130 is on the 13th floor of Hull Royal Infirmary. It has an East and a West wing and spans the full floor. It was opened in response to winter pressures. At that time, in January 2023, Hull Royal Infirmary was placed under significant pressure in terms of admissions and staffing. The ward been open only a matter of some two weeks by the time Mrs Reed was transferred to that ward. Despite being medically fit for discharge upon arrival on that ward Mrs Reed’s condition worsened and family raised concerns as best they could but they reported that the ward was chaotic and that staff would tell them they had only just found out they were working on the ward before their shift started and there was no consistency of nursing staff on the ward. Mrs Reed was dehydrated and family report that there was a paucity of personal care afforded on that ward. There was a risk of cross infection as patients’ personal effects such as toiletries were not with the right patients and had to be located by family. There was no established cohort of permanent staff on the ward at that time and no signposting to the ward sister or matron and therefore no way of patients, their friends, or their families being able to have a clear escalation pathway to ventilate concerns. Although HUTH now have an established team and leadership chain on Ward H130 there is a real concern that wards opened in response to winter pressures in the future in any busy hospital may give rise to the same peripatetic staffing regime, that is to say, agency staff and no fixed team in place and a lack of visible leadership. This could lead to the deterioration of patients not being recognised if there is no continuity of care by the same team of nursing staff. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to CSC Computer Sciences Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of visible ward leadership and a clear escalation pathway

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) H130 is on the 13th floor of Hull Royal Infirmary. It has an East and a West wing and spans the full floor. It was opened in response to winter pressures. At that time, in January 2023, Hull Royal Infirmary was placed under significant pressure in terms of admissions and staffing. The ward been open only a matter of some two weeks by the time Mrs Reed was transferred to that ward. Despite being medically fit for discharge upon arrival on that ward Mrs Reed’s condition worsened and family raised concerns as best they could but they reported that the ward was chaotic and that staff would tell them they had only just found out they were working on the ward before their shift started and there was no consistency of nursing staff on the ward. Mrs Reed was dehydrated and family report that there was a paucity of personal care afforded on that ward. There was a risk of cross infection as patients’ personal effects such as toiletries were not with the right patients and had to be located by family. There was no established cohort of permanent staff on the ward at that time and no signposting to the ward sister or matron and therefore no way of patients, their friends, or their families being able to have a clear escalation pathway to ventilate concerns. Although HUTH now have an established team and leadership chain on Ward H130 there is a real concern that wards opened in response to winter pressures in the future in any busy hospital may give rise to the same peripatetic staffing regime, that is to say, agency staff and no fixed team in place and a lack of visible leadership. This could lead to the deterioration of patients not being recognised if there is no continuity of care by the same team of nursing staff. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to CSC Computer Sciences Limited; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Paucity of personal care on the ward

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) H130 is on the 13th floor of Hull Royal Infirmary. It has an East and a West wing and spans the full floor. It was opened in response to winter pressures. At that time, in January 2023, Hull Royal Infirmary was placed under significant pressure in terms of admissions and staffing. The ward been open only a matter of some two weeks by the time Mrs Reed was transferred to that ward. Despite being medically fit for discharge upon arrival on that ward Mrs Reed’s condition worsened and family raised concerns as best they could but they reported that the ward was chaotic and that staff would tell them they had only just found out they were working on the ward before their shift started and there was no consistency of nursing staff on the ward. Mrs Reed was dehydrated and family report that there was a paucity of personal care afforded on that ward. There was a risk of cross infection as patients’ personal effects such as toiletries were not with the right patients and had to be located by family. There was no established cohort of permanent staff on the ward at that time and no signposting to the ward sister or matron and therefore no way of patients, their friends, or their families being able to have a clear escalation pathway to ventilate concerns. Although HUTH now have an established team and leadership chain on Ward H130 there is a real concern that wards opened in response to winter pressures in the future in any busy hospital may give rise to the same peripatetic staffing regime, that is to say, agency staff and no fixed team in place and a lack of visible leadership. This could lead to the deterioration of patients not being recognised if there is no continuity of care by the same team of nursing staff. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026