Heaton Medical Centre

Private and voluntary organisations · Multi-service care provider

First report 12 Sep 2017•Latest report 12 Sep 2017

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Heaton Medical Centre linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Manchester West

    AI-generated summary

    Frances Elizabeth Greenhalgh · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Frances Elizabeth Greenhalgh died on 10 April 2017 after taking a substantial overdose of Mirtazapine and Dihydrocodeine, following a recent hospital admission after an overdose and discharge with a mental health care plan. The principal concern was that the GP surgery did not promptly record or act on the RAID Team’s faxed notification and treatment plan, so the plan was not available to the GP at the deceased’s appointment.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Heaton Medical Centre; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to record notifications from external healthcare professionals promptly and make them available in patient records and computer systems

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that:- i. On the 22nd March 2017 the Surgery received a letter by fax message from the RAID Team in relation to a plan of treatment for the deceased which included actions to be taken by the General Practitioner. On the 4th April 2017, 13 days following the notification, the General Practitioner had not put the RAID Team notification with the deceased’s medical records and there was no record of the notification on the computer systems at The Surgery. ii. ████████ who no longer works at The Surgery, was not aware of any systems at The Surgery in relation to the receipt of notifications from Healthcare Professionals or the systems in relation to the recording of notifications and information on a patient’s record so that the information is available to a General Practitioner on the next appointment with the patient. On the 4th April 2017 ████████ was unaware of the notification from the RAID Team and there was no evidence that the deceased had received any communication from the General Practitioner after the 22nd March 2017 in relation to the plan agreed with the RAID Team on that date. 2. I request the Senior Partner of The Surgery to conduct a review of the documented protocols and systems relating to the processing and recording of notifications received from Healthcare Professionals, particularly where the notification is received from a Healthcare Professional outside The Surgery. The review should consider the training of Healthcare Professionals, including Doctors, and check systems to ensure that any notifications are recorded on the patient notes and on any computerised system available to Healthcare Professionals within The Surgery without delay so that the notification and any plan of treatment are available to a Doctor or Healthcare Professional at the next appointment with the patient. Furthermore the notification should trigger contact with the patient, if appropriate, and in any event, if the agreed plan requires contact, to enable the patient to receive the benefit of treatment and care in accordance with the plan without delay. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Heaton Medical Centre; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure patient contact when agreed treatment plans require contact

    Wider context from the report

    “1. During the Inquest evidence was heard that:- i. On the 22nd March 2017 the Surgery received a letter by fax message from the RAID Team in relation to a plan of treatment for the deceased which included actions to be taken by the General Practitioner. On the 4th April 2017, 13 days following the notification, the General Practitioner had not put the RAID Team notification with the deceased’s medical records and there was no record of the notification on the computer systems at The Surgery. ii. ████████ who no longer works at The Surgery, was not aware of any systems at The Surgery in relation to the receipt of notifications from Healthcare Professionals or the systems in relation to the recording of notifications and information on a patient’s record so that the information is available to a General Practitioner on the next appointment with the patient. On the 4th April 2017 ████████ was unaware of the notification from the RAID Team and there was no evidence that the deceased had received any communication from the General Practitioner after the 22nd March 2017 in relation to the plan agreed with the RAID Team on that date. 2. I request the Senior Partner of The Surgery to conduct a review of the documented protocols and systems relating to the processing and recording of notifications received from Healthcare Professionals, particularly where the notification is received from a Healthcare Professional outside The Surgery. The review should consider the training of Healthcare Professionals, including Doctors, and check systems to ensure that any notifications are recorded on the patient notes and on any computerised system available to Healthcare Professionals within The Surgery without delay so that the notification and any plan of treatment are available to a Doctor or Healthcare Professional at the next appointment with the patient. Furthermore the notification should trigger contact with the patient, if appropriate, and in any event, if the agreed plan requires contact, to enable the patient to receive the benefit of treatment and care in accordance with the plan without delay. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026