Joint GP IT Committee

Private and voluntary organisations · Health professional committee

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First report 18 Apr 2024•Latest report 18 Apr 2024

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Joint GP IT Committee linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Yorkshire Eastern

    AI-generated summary

    ALEXANDER LEE REID · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Lee Reid received the Oxford AstraZeneca Covid-19 vaccine after being invited early because an erroneous BMI in his GP records led him to be identified as vulnerable. He died on 29 June 2021, and the inquest concluded that his death was linked to the vaccination, with the medical cause recorded as cerebral venous sinus thrombosis and Covid-19 vaccine-induced immune thrombotic thrombocytopenia. The principal concern was whether general practice IT systems should validate or challenge potentially erroneous data at the point of entry to improve data reliability and patient safety.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Joint GP IT Committee; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of general practice IT systems to validate or challenge potential data input errors at the point of entry

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) The inquest heard expert evidence that the combined vaccination monitoring and recall specification designed to identify vulnerable people for the purposes of inviting them to receive their Covid vaccinations early had identified Alex as vulnerable from an incorrect BMI of 68.97 recorded in his GP records on 06/02/2004. The mistake was due to the relevant clinician recording Alex's height as 145cm and his weight as 145kg, giving a BMI of 68.97 for an 11 year old boy whose previously recorded BMI aged 9 had been 14.88. (3) The inquest heard expert evidence that to have built a system that would validate multiple data items in an individual's GP records for the purposes of ensuring that individuals were not incorrectly identified as vulnerable would not have been feasible within the constraints and context of the Covid-19 programme. (4) The inquest heard expert evidence that an easier and more appropriate option would be to embed validation rules in general practice IT systems that would check such information at the time of data entry. (5) If the obviously erroneous BMI had not been recorded or had been challenged at the point of entry by the relevant IT system, Alex would not have been classed as vulnerable, would not have been offered a vaccine before guidance was published that the under 30’s should not receive the Oxford Astra Zeneca vaccine, and would not have died when he did. (6) The consequences of the data input error in this case give rise to a concern that more might be done by way of specification design to allow for the correction of or challenge to potential data input errors at the point of entry, with consequential improvements in the reliability of such data and the safety of patients and reducing the risk of other deaths occurring in similar circumstances in the future. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026