22 Oct 2015 Richard LACO · Prevention of Future Deaths report Inner North London
View report summary
Concerns raised 6 Failure of method statements, risk assessments and lift plans to address changed landing-fitting processes View source Insufficient process understanding among personnel responsible for planning and approving landing-fitting work View source Unavailability of an appropriate plan for basement landing fitting View source Failure to specify the correct landing orientation for tag-line tilting View source Failure to include stop instructions for unsuccessful positive fixings during landing fitting View source Failure to identify the need for a task-specific landing-fitting plan during drafting and approval View source See 3 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Richard LACO · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Richard Laco died on a building site at the Francis Crick Institute when a landing fell on him while it was being tilted into place. The fitting process used a different methodology from earlier landings, but the method statement, risk assessment and lift plan did not describe the process or provide key safety instructions. The report also raised concerns about inadequate understanding of the planning and approval requirements among some site witnesses.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of method statements, risk assessments and lift plans to address changed landing-fitting processes
Wider context from the report “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place.
However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that .
There was no description of the different process ; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines.
The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient process understanding among personnel responsible for planning and approving landing-fitting work
Wider context from the report “2. Not only was there no appropriate plan in place for the fitting of the two basement landings in core D, at inquest nearly two years after the event, some site witnesses did not appear to see the need for such a plan.
Some witnesses did not appear familiar with basic terminology, despite still holding a pivotal role in planning/approving the plans for such processes, and gave evidence that did not demonstrate clarity of understanding of the processes .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unavailability of an appropriate plan for basement landing fitting
Wider context from the report “2. Not only was there no appropriate plan in place for the fitting of the two basement landings in core D, at inquest nearly two years after the event, some site witnesses did not appear to see the need for such a plan.
Some witnesses did not appear familiar with basic terminology, despite still holding a pivotal role in planning/approving the plans for such processes, and gave evidence that did not demonstrate clarity of understanding of the processes.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to specify the correct landing orientation for tag-line tilting
Wider context from the report “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place.
However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that.
There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines .
The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to include stop instructions for unsuccessful positive fixings during landing fitting
Wider context from the report “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place.
However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that.
There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines.
The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to identify the need for a task-specific landing-fitting plan during drafting and approval
Wider context from the report “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place.
However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that.
There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines.
The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them .
” Open source report
Pin
Request correction
Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations