Laing O'Rourke

Private and voluntary organisations · Public limited company

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First report 22 Oct 2015•Latest report 22 Oct 2015

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Laing O'Rourke linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Richard LACO · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Laco died on a building site at the Francis Crick Institute when a landing fell on him while it was being tilted into place. The fitting process used a different methodology from earlier landings, but the method statement, risk assessment and lift plan did not describe the process or provide key safety instructions. The report also raised concerns about inadequate understanding of the planning and approval requirements among some site witnesses.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of method statements, risk assessments and lift plans to address changed landing-fitting processes

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place. However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that. There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines. The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient process understanding among personnel responsible for planning and approving landing-fitting work

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Not only was there no appropriate plan in place for the fitting of the two basement landings in core D, at inquest nearly two years after the event, some site witnesses did not appear to see the need for such a plan. Some witnesses did not appear familiar with basic terminology, despite still holding a pivotal role in planning/approving the plans for such processes, and gave evidence that did not demonstrate clarity of understanding of the processes. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of an appropriate plan for basement landing fitting

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Not only was there no appropriate plan in place for the fitting of the two basement landings in core D, at inquest nearly two years after the event, some site witnesses did not appear to see the need for such a plan. Some witnesses did not appear familiar with basic terminology, despite still holding a pivotal role in planning/approving the plans for such processes, and gave evidence that did not demonstrate clarity of understanding of the processes. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to specify the correct landing orientation for tag-line tilting

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place. However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that. There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines. The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to include stop instructions for unsuccessful positive fixings during landing fitting

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place. However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that. There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines. The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Laing O'Rourke; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify the need for a task-specific landing-fitting plan during drafting and approval

    Wider context from the report

    “1. The fitting of the two below ground landings in core D of the development at the Francis Crick Institute utilised a different methodology to the landings already fitted in cores A and F. The shape of the landings was trapezoid rather than rectangular; and they were lowered vertically to ground level and then later raised & tilted to pass the side fins; rather than simply being lowered from the top directly into place. However, no part of the method statement, risk assessment or lift plan recognised that. There was no description of the different process; there was no instruction to stop the procedure if positive fixings (i.e. feeding the slings through eye bolts) could not be achieved; and there was no indication that the wide rather than the narrow end of the landing should be tilted down with the tag lines. The need for such a plan was not identified by CMF in drafting the planning documents, nor by LOR in checking and approving them. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026