Nottingham Prison

Justice · Prison or young offender institution

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First report 3 May 2016•Latest report 8 Apr 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
4

Naming this recipient

Published responses
25%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
5

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
4

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Nottingham Prison linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Jonathan Mark Thornton · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Jonathan Mark Thornton died at Queens Medical Centre in Nottingham on 12 July 2024 after sustaining a severe head injury in an attack by a fellow inmate at HMP Nottingham on 28 June 2024. The report raises concerns about inadequate information sharing between community forensic, prison healthcare and operational prison staff, and about the categorisation and visibility of risk alerts on NOMIS/DPS, creating a risk of future deaths.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unavailability of NOMIS/DPS alerts to Healthcare Staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Categorisation and visibility of alerts on NOMIS/DPS I heard that NOMIS/DPS has preset categorisation of alerts. The categories are limited and broad. This means that ‘violent’ prisoners – regardless of the particulars of that violence – will all be categorised together. This case illustrated quite clearly that there are certain categories of offender who require better particularisation of their risk. In this case, that was those prisoners with a history of assaulting fellow inmates. I was told that unless a prisoner has assaulted a cellmate, which would be subject to its own assessment, the operational prison staff would not necessarily know whether their violent behaviour was aimed at prison officers, other prisoners or simply a genera violent behaviour linked to their offending. Clearly, each of these categories gives rise to a particular risk within a prison setting. I am concerned that if more detailed categorisation and/or information is not provided to the operational prison staff within NOMIS/DPS alerts, with clear visibility, this gives rise to a risk of future death. I understand that this is controlled nationally. Moreover, I understand that the Healthcare Staff are unable to view NOMIS/DPS alerts. This gives rise to the same risk. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a formal mechanism for sharing prisoners’ mental health risks and triggers with operational prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Information sharing between Prison Healthcare and Operational Prison Staff. This case illustrated a lack of communication and information sharing between Prison Healthcare and the Operational Prison Staff which was concerning to me. I heard evidence that Prison Healthcare had in place a quasi ‘watch and wait’ plan for monitoring a potentially high-risk inmate. Not only was this plan not communicated to all of the healthcare team, but it relied upon reporting of deterioration in behaviours from operational prison staff who were completely unaware that (i) they were being tasked with this role; and (ii) what to look for. Furthermore, the operational prison staff told me that having a broad understanding (within the confines of confidentiality) of a prisoner’s mental health risks and triggers would improve the safety and security of the prison for the officers and prisoners. It would enable them to properly assess and manage risk, but that there was no effective mechanism in place by which to achieve this. I am concerned that the lack of formal information sharing between the two departments gives rise to a risk of future death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to equip operational prison staff to identify and report behavioural deterioration

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Information sharing between Prison Healthcare and Operational Prison Staff. This case illustrated a lack of communication and information sharing between Prison Healthcare and the Operational Prison Staff which was concerning to me. I heard evidence that Prison Healthcare had in place a quasi ‘watch and wait’ plan for monitoring a potentially high-risk inmate. Not only was this plan not communicated to all of the healthcare team, but it relied upon reporting of deterioration in behaviours from operational prison staff who were completely unaware that (i) they were being tasked with this role; and (ii) what to look for. Furthermore, the operational prison staff told me that having a broad understanding (within the confines of confidentiality) of a prisoner’s mental health risks and triggers would improve the safety and security of the prison for the officers and prisoners. It would enable them to properly assess and manage risk, but that there was no effective mechanism in place by which to achieve this. I am concerned that the lack of formal information sharing between the two departments gives rise to a risk of future death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to communicate monitoring plans to the healthcare team

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Information sharing between Prison Healthcare and Operational Prison Staff. This case illustrated a lack of communication and information sharing between Prison Healthcare and the Operational Prison Staff which was concerning to me. I heard evidence that Prison Healthcare had in place a quasi ‘watch and wait’ plan for monitoring a potentially high-risk inmate. Not only was this plan not communicated to all of the healthcare team, but it relied upon reporting of deterioration in behaviours from operational prison staff who were completely unaware that (i) they were being tasked with this role; and (ii) what to look for. Furthermore, the operational prison staff told me that having a broad understanding (within the confines of confidentiality) of a prisoner’s mental health risks and triggers would improve the safety and security of the prison for the officers and prisoners. It would enable them to properly assess and manage risk, but that there was no effective mechanism in place by which to achieve this. I am concerned that the lack of formal information sharing between the two departments gives rise to a risk of future death. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficiently detailed and visible NOMIS/DPS risk-alert categorisation for operational prison staff

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Categorisation and visibility of alerts on NOMIS/DPS I heard that NOMIS/DPS has preset categorisation of alerts. The categories are limited and broad. This means that ‘violent’ prisoners – regardless of the particulars of that violence – will all be categorised together. This case illustrated quite clearly that there are certain categories of offender who require better particularisation of their risk. In this case, that was those prisoners with a history of assaulting fellow inmates. I was told that unless a prisoner has assaulted a cellmate, which would be subject to its own assessment, the operational prison staff would not necessarily know whether their violent behaviour was aimed at prison officers, other prisoners or simply a genera violent behaviour linked to their offending. Clearly, each of these categories gives rise to a particular risk within a prison setting. I am concerned that if more detailed categorisation and/or information is not provided to the operational prison staff within NOMIS/DPS alerts, with clear visibility, this gives rise to a risk of future death. I understand that this is controlled nationally. Moreover, I understand that the Healthcare Staff are unable to view NOMIS/DPS alerts. This gives rise to the same risk. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of formal information sharing and reliable handover between the CFT and Prison Healthcare

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Information sharing between the CFT and Prison Healthcare. During the course of the inquest, I heard that there had been various barriers to information sharing between the community forensic team and prison healthcare. There was no formal system in place for the handover of information between these teams at the time of Jonathan’s death or at the conclusion of the inquest. Prison Healthcare staff were often unavailable or uncontactable for handover meetings. The handover of information between CFT and Prison Healthcare is vital for the risk assessment and management of prisoners who are known to the CFT (often some of the most complex and high-risk prisoners). I am concerned that the lack of formal information sharing between the two departments gives rise to a risk of future death. ”
    Open source report

  2. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Kevin John McDonnell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Kevin John McDonnell was discovered deceased in his prison cell on 29 September 2022, having died by ligature asphyxiation; the inquest concluded that he had died by suicide. The principal concerns included failures to conduct planned ACCT reviews and checks, share identified suicide-risk information, provide necessary mental-health support, and preserve accurate documentary evidence after his death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of prison staff to read and understand the July 2021 annex to PSI 64/2011

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Prison staff have not read and understood the July 2021 annex to PSI 64/2011. There was a failure to share risk pertinent information about Kevin to all staff caring for him that day. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to secure and retain accurate documentary evidence following a death in custody

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Failure to secure and retain documentary evidence following a death in custody. If post-death investigations are misled by inaccurate documentation that has been amended post-death, then the ability to learn from deaths in custody will be hampered. The preservation of accurate documentary evidence must be of paramount concern when a person dies in custody. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct meaningful and purposeful ACCT observations and conversations

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Prison staff were unfamiliar with the need for ACCT observations and conversations to be meaningful and have purpose. Witnesses repeatedly described these checks as simply “proof of life” checks. One witness gave the example of an ACCT observation being completed simply by hearing a noise from within the cell or observing the prisoner collecting his lunch from two landings above. Such cursory observations of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm is inconsistent with the aims and objectives of the ACCT PSI (64/2021). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to share risk pertinent information with all staff caring for a prisoner

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Prison staff have not read and understood the July 2021 annex to PSI 64/2011. There was a failure to share risk pertinent information about Kevin to all staff caring for him that day. ”
    Open source report

  3. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Alexander Michael BRAUND · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Alexander Michael Braund was a 25-year-old remand prisoner at HMP Nottingham who became acutely unwell with an undetected atypical pneumonia and died on 10 March 2020 after cardiac arrest and withdrawal of life support. The principal concerns included failures in NEWS2 assessment and monitoring, the absence of a joint healthcare and prison-staff care plan, delays in entering his cell and calling a medical emergency code, and potential weaknesses in the integrity of amended electronic medical records.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consistently apply NEWS2 assessment and monitoring, supported by adequate training and guidance

    Wider context from the report

    “1.(HEALTHCARE) Lack of safe system, supported by training, guidance, and compliance auditing, for the provision of physical healthcare assessment and monitoring by NEWS2 for acutely unwell patients in a secure setting. The Jury found shortcomings in the healthcare afforded to Alex at HMP Nottingham in the form of "continuous failures to provide adequate healthcare, which probably more than minimally contributed to his death". I heard evidence that staff were not consistently assessing acutely unwell patients using the NEWS2 system, despite the scoring system having been adopted across the NHS over the past decade and having been adopted by this Trust many years prior. In 2017, when relaunching the NEWS system, the Royal College of Physicians noted, "Every so often, someone comes up with an idea that is so obvious, no one can understand why it wasn’t thought of before. I am proud that the RCP’s National Early Warning Score (NEWS) is one of those initiatives – not just a chart (or iPad) at the end of the bed to record the patient’s physical signs and symptoms, but the chart at the end of the bed – a single point of truth to unify recording of symptoms across the NHS, consolidate training for doctors and nurses in the recording of symptoms, and thereby improve patient safety. When the RCP launched the NEWS in 2012, we hoped to see the score adopted across the NHS. What has been more astonishing is the adoption of the score internationally, with requests to use NEWS coming from health services across the world from Europe to India and the USA, including the US Naval Air Forces!" I heard evidence of an inconsistent application of NEWS2 by staff, an inconsistent awareness of NEWS2 across the staff body, and an absence of clear and robust training supported by guidance, ensuring staff were aware of the expectations of their employer with regards to the use of NEWS2 in monitoring acutely unwell patients. Sadly, Alex’s is not an isolated case. I have been repeatedly assured at a senior level from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust that they are seeking to embed NEWS2 across their Directorates, yet successive inquests have heard of patients failed by the lack of use of the system by the clinical staff responsible for their medical care. If this issue is not addressed across the Trust, with sufficient urgency, patients will continue to die in Trust settings due to a failure to recognise the deteriorating patient, and to arrange for timely healthcare intervention. Further, I heard evidence that the newly implemented compliance audit plans for NEWS2 are not safe or robust because the audit is limited to monitoring the emergency review template on Systmone, which staff are routinely failing to utilise, instead preferring to add free text entries to the running record, which cannot be audited with ease. If the Trust is incapable of monitoring compliance with the initiative, there will be repeated missed opportunities to provide support and guidance to Directorates, wards or individual staff who are deviating from expected practice with regards to NEWS2. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of NEWS2 compliance auditing to reliably monitor adherence

    Wider context from the report

    “1.(HEALTHCARE) Lack of safe system, supported by training, guidance, and compliance auditing, for the provision of physical healthcare assessment and monitoring by NEWS2 for acutely unwell patients in a secure setting. The Jury found shortcomings in the healthcare afforded to Alex at HMP Nottingham in the form of "continuous failures to provide adequate healthcare, which probably more than minimally contributed to his death". I heard evidence that staff were not consistently assessing acutely unwell patients using the NEWS2 system, despite the scoring system having been adopted across the NHS over the past decade and having been adopted by this Trust many years prior. In 2017, when relaunching the NEWS system, the Royal College of Physicians noted, "Every so often, someone comes up with an idea that is so obvious, no one can understand why it wasn’t thought of before. I am proud that the RCP’s National Early Warning Score (NEWS) is one of those initiatives – not just a chart (or iPad) at the end of the bed to record the patient’s physical signs and symptoms, but the chart at the end of the bed – a single point of truth to unify recording of symptoms across the NHS, consolidate training for doctors and nurses in the recording of symptoms, and thereby improve patient safety. When the RCP launched the NEWS in 2012, we hoped to see the score adopted across the NHS. What has been more astonishing is the adoption of the score internationally, with requests to use NEWS coming from health services across the world from Europe to India and the USA, including the US Naval Air Forces!" I heard evidence of an inconsistent application of NEWS2 by staff, an inconsistent awareness of NEWS2 across the staff body, and an absence of clear and robust training supported by guidance, ensuring staff were aware of the expectations of their employer with regards to the use of NEWS2 in monitoring acutely unwell patients. Sadly, Alex’s is not an isolated case. I have been repeatedly assured at a senior level from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust that they are seeking to embed NEWS2 across their Directorates, yet successive inquests have heard of patients failed by the lack of use of the system by the clinical staff responsible for their medical care. If this issue is not addressed across the Trust, with sufficient urgency, patients will continue to die in Trust settings due to a failure to recognise the deteriorating patient, and to arrange for timely healthcare intervention. Further, I heard evidence that the newly implemented compliance audit plans for NEWS2 are not safe or robust because the audit is limited to monitoring the emergency review template on Systmone, which staff are routinely failing to utilise, instead preferring to add free text entries to the running record, which cannot be audited with ease. If the Trust is incapable of monitoring compliance with the initiative, there will be repeated missed opportunities to provide support and guidance to Directorates, wards or individual staff who are deviating from expected practice with regards to NEWS2. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of an agreed joint care plan for acutely unwell prisoners remaining in prison

    Wider context from the report

    “2. (HEALTHCARE AND HMP) The absence of a safe joint system of care (between discipline and healthcare staff) for supporting and managing acutely unwell patients who remain in the prison setting, rather than being transferred to a dedicated healthcare facility. The very nature of incarceration curtails the prisoner’s free movement and ready access to healthcare. Instead, their incarceration places them wholly reliant on the communication between discipline staff on the wing, and healthcare staff available elsewhere within the setting, to obtain timely healthcare assessment and monitoring. I heard evidence that Alex had been told to "press his cell bell" if he "felt worse". Both Alex and his cell mate did so repeatedly between 9 and 10 March 2020, with varying degrees of success regarding healthcare attendance at his cell. Despite discipline and healthcare staff knowing that Alex was suffering with an acute illness, and in the knowledge that there was no plan for him to be transferred to a hospital, there was an absence of agreed joint plan between health and discipline staff as to how often Alex would be seen by each profession, what constitutes a deterioration for him, and what to do in the event of such a deterioration, to seek to detect and manage his risk of physical healthcare deterioration. In contrast, in circumstances whereby a prisoner is thought to be at risk of self-harm or suicide, there is an agreed joint care planning system (ACCT Version 6) which sets out the clear expectations placed on each profession to seek to keep the prisoner safe (enshrined in Prison Service Instruction). There is no such equivalent system in operation nationally with regards to the risk of physical healthcare deterioration, but that does not absolve each service from ensuring acutely unwell patients are kept safe by way of robust joint local care planning. If acutely unwell patients continue to be managed in the prison setting without an agreed joint plan of care between health and discipline staff, deaths will continue to occur in these circumstances. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear cell-entry criteria for prison officers during life-threatening emergencies

    Wider context from the report

    “3. (HM PRISON SERVICE) There continues to be a misunderstanding across discipline staff as to what constitutes a CODE BLUE/CODE RED situation, and in what circumstances a cell can be entered by a prison officer for the purpose of preserving life, despite this having been enshrined in Prison Service Instruction for many years. I heard evidence from the PCO that he erroneously believed it was necessary for 3 discipline staff to be present before a cell door could be opened during night state even in circumstances where Alex was collapsed and unresponsive on the floor. This is not the first-time issues of this nature have been identified at HMP Nottingham. Indeed, successive Prison and Probation Ombudsman reports have recommended that the Governor take action to address these issues since the cluster of deaths in 2017/2018, and while the prison has been subject to Urgent Notification procedures. I heard evidence from a medical expert that post-cardiac arrest, every minute which elapses without appropriate CPR and defibrillator use reduces the patient’s chances of survival. Timely life support is critical, and staff must be clear on when to call a medical emergency code, and when to enter the cell, subject to their dynamic risk assessment. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Misunderstanding among discipline staff of medical emergency code criteria

    Wider context from the report

    “3. (HM PRISON SERVICE) There continues to be a misunderstanding across discipline staff as to what constitutes a CODE BLUE/CODE RED situation, and in what circumstances a cell can be entered by a prison officer for the purpose of preserving life, despite this having been enshrined in Prison Service Instruction for many years. I heard evidence from the PCO that he erroneously believed it was necessary for 3 discipline staff to be present before a cell door could be opened during night state even in circumstances where Alex was collapsed and unresponsive on the floor. This is not the first-time issues of this nature have been identified at HMP Nottingham. Indeed, successive Prison and Probation Ombudsman reports have recommended that the Governor take action to address these issues since the cluster of deaths in 2017/2018, and while the prison has been subject to Urgent Notification procedures. I heard evidence from a medical expert that post-cardiac arrest, every minute which elapses without appropriate CPR and defibrillator use reduces the patient’s chances of survival. Timely life support is critical, and staff must be clear on when to call a medical emergency code, and when to enter the cell, subject to their dynamic risk assessment. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to clearly flag amendments to SystmOne medical records

    Wider context from the report

    “4. (TPP-UK) Amendment of Medical Records without clear evidence of such amendment on the face of the SystmOne patient summary The vast majority of primary care health services across the community and secure settings, such as prisons, utilise an electronic patient health record known as SystmOne. I heard evidence that the system automatically records the date, time, and user, shown along the left-hand side of each entry in the printed patient summary, as below. 17 Apr 2019 08:11 Surgery: ████████ Health Professional Access Role) I was assured by health staff that any retrospective entry or amendment to a previous entry in the patient record would be flagged by a new date and time stamp towards the right-hand side of the entry, as below. 24 Apr 2019 15:55 Surgery: ████████ Health Professional Access Role) Entered: 25 Apr 2019 11:55 However, in this case, I discovered from scrutinising an audit record, that an entry made in Alex’s patient record at 06.46 hours on 10 March 2020, had been amended by way of the deletion of some words, and the addition of others, at 09.30 hours on the same date, without any such time stamp being generated on the right-hand side of the entry. This made it look as if the entire text visible in the record would have been visible from around 06.46 hours that date. The Head of Healthcare was unable to explain how the health professional who made the entry had been able to amend her previous entry, without it being obvious on the face of the record, after it became apparent Alex was critically unwell This potentially raises serious safety issues about the integrity of the patient record, and at the very least, if the record is not as robust as first thought by its users, this ought to be made clear. I shall share this report with TPP-UK, the creators of SystmOne, to see if they can explain the safety features in place to ensure amended records are clearly marked as such, especially as in this case, the witness was not forthcoming about her amendment of Alex’s patient record. Accurate record keeping is integral to learning from incidents and seeking to prevent future deaths. ”
    Open source report

  4. Nottinghamshire

    AI-generated summary

    Shalan Blackwood · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Shalan Blackwood died at HMP Nottingham on 5 August 2015 as a result of bleeding from a duodenal ulcer. The report identified concerns about inadequate care and supervision for prisoners with complex physical or mental health needs, insufficient staffing for prisoners in segregation requiring a four-person unlock, unclear decision-making tools, widespread use of New Psychoactive Substances, and insufficient recognition of urgent physical symptoms obscured by mental health issues.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of proper provision for care and supervision of prisoners with complex physical and/or mental health needs

    Wider context from the report

    “1. That there is no proper provision for the care and supervision of prisoners who present with complex physical and/or mental health needs. It is understood that such a provision could be provided by means of an inpatient unit within the prison, such as for example is the case at HMP Liverpool. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient prison staffing for proper regimes and unlocking of prisoners requiring four person unlocks in the Segregation Unit

    Wider context from the report

    “2. That at present, if a prisoner is assessed as needing a four person unlock, and is within the Segregation Unit, there are insufficient prison staff to provide him with a proper regime and to unlock him after lunchtime, for example to allow ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Rife use of New Psychoactive Substances within the prison

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That the use of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) remains rife within the prison, and presentations such as Mr Blackwood’s are not diminishing, and that the Substance Misuse Team requires further staff to be effective in future. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Insufficient staffing of the Substance Misuse Team

    Wider context from the report

    “3. That the use of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) remains rife within the prison, and presentations such as Mr Blackwood’s are not diminishing, and that the Substance Misuse Team requires further staff to be effective in future. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of healthcare staff to recognise urgent physical symptoms obscured by mental health issues

    Wider context from the report

    “5. That healthcare staff are insufficiently alert to the issue that physical symptoms which require urgent medical attention may be occluded by mental health issues. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Nottingham Prison; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Unclear or unavailable documentary tool for decisions about prisoners remaining in Segregation

    Wider context from the report

    “4. That the documentary tool for decision making between prison staff and healthcare staff, as to whether a prisoner is fit to remain in Segregation and should do so, is unclear in or in use. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026