Phoenix Futures

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First report 11 Mar 2026•Latest report 11 Mar 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

* 2026 is projected from reports observed to 7 Sep 2026.

Reports
1

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Phoenix Futures linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. Inner North London

    AI-generated summary

    Peter Asher CAMPBELL · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Peter Asher Campbell collapsed in his prison cell at Pentonville after smoking a drug and died five days later. The principal concerns were the failure to prevent drugs entering the prison and shortcomings in the prison drug service’s response, including inadequate engagement, harm-minimisation advice, staff training, supervision and auditing.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to prevent drugs from entering the prison

    Wider context from the report

    “For HMPPS and Pentonville In the narrative conclusion, the jury recorded a failure to prevent drugs from entering the prison. Every witness at inquest who expressed a view gave evidence that drugs are rife within Pentonville, as they are across the prison estate. They enter attached to drones and in throw overs; via prison officers, visitors and prisoners; and, to a lesser extent these days, in the post. ████████, a drug many times more potent and dangerous than cannabis, ████████ It has infiltrated the prison population with enormous reach and with potentially devastating consequences for the prisoners themselves and for others - there is a risk of prisoners leaving prison in a worse state than when they went in, a state that may of course be reflected in violent reoffending. Initially, I was not going to include that failure within my prevention of future deaths report, because the availability of drugs in prison seems such a huge and intractable problem. However, on reflection it seems to me that it would be complacent to view the size of the problem as prohibitive. Perhaps the size of the problem dictates only the size of the solution required. At inquest, I heard about other aspects of the prison regime that were sub optimal, but it appeared that since Mr Campbell’s death, the staff at Pentonville had taken steps to address these. However, the mass availability of drugs apparently persists without abatement. This is not in any way peculiar to Pentonville, but Pentonville is an exemplar. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to follow up when recovery-worker engagement is ineffective

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to conduct recovery-worker interactions privately

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of post-incident investigations to identify gaps in drug recovery care

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to have meaningful discussions about prisoners’ drug use

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Harm-minimisation guidance failing to address risks to cellmates

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to review medical records before recovery-worker interactions

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of routine supervision or audit to identify gaps in drug recovery care

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Phoenix Futures; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure recovery-worker practice complies with training

    Wider context from the report

    “For Phoenix and PPG Mr Campbell collapsed in prison on 18 September 2024 as he had done before following the use of ████████, and the prison and healthcare staff responded to this as an emergency code blue. The ambulance service was called and he was immediately conveyed to hospital where he was resuscitated. The jury found a failure by the prison drug service to provide a meaningful interaction with Mr Campbell between the collapse on 18 September 2024 and the fatal collapse on 3 October 2024. This was partly because a visit was not arranged promptly, a systemic issue that since seems to have been addressed. However, I also heard evidence that, when the Phoenix recovery worker did go to see Mr Campbell on 1 October 2024 in an attempt to promote harm minimisation: • She did not read any part of his medical records before she saw him, and she did not know whether she was meant to do so. She was. • She spoke to him through the hatch in the cell door, with his cellmate present. This was her normal practice, but she was not able to say why. It should not have been. • She did not have any meaningful discussion with him about his drug use, either the use that led to his collapse on 18 September 2024 or his use generally. She should have. • She gave him various pieces of harm minimisation guidance in keeping with her training, including the advice to avoid using drugs whilst alone. This advice was later confirmed as within policy by the Phoenix head of service. However, it does not seem to take account of the fact that smoking a drug in a small cell with a cellmate puts the cellmate at risk. • Mr Campbell told her that he was not under the influence at the time. The recovery worker was not wholly convinced, but she did not return later that day or the following day to see if better engagement was possible. She should have. • She did not know whether her interaction with Mr Campbell was in accordance with her training. I was told that it was not. She had not received further training or changed her practice since his death. • The drug recovery worker was the last healthcare worker to see Mr Campbell before his fatal collapse from drugs and did so just two days before that occurred. However, the gaps in her care of Mr Campbell were not identified by the investigation following his death by Phoenix and PPG (or by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman). • She had not changed her practice since Mr Campbell’s death, but any gaps in her care of other prisoners had also not been identified in the following year and a half, either by routine supervision or by audit. I heard that audits are undertaken of the medical records only. Therefore, the first time that Phoenix and PPG recognised a drug recovery worker’s failures to follow their procedures over at least a year and a half, was at the inquest. ”
    Open source report
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026