Recipient

Rail Safety and Standards Board

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First report 21 Oct 2013•Latest report 25 Jul 2025

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Other public bodies · Rail safety body. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports
6

Naming this recipient

Published responses
17%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
2

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

17%published responses found
0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Rail Safety and Standards Board linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Robert Grey English · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Robert Grey English, aged 32, was electrocuted after entering a railway track at night, and was subsequently run over by a train searching the track. The report identifies concerns about failures to follow the process for switching the rail power back on and about inadequate lighting and equipment for locating a person on the railway at night.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Absence of suitable lights for locating people on or near railway lines at night

    Wider context from the report

    “The provision to protect a trespasser at night are the same as those during the day. The ability to locate a person close to or on the railway lines at night is made more difficult by the absence of suitable lights on the track or the train. In this case Mr English was not seen and run over by the train that has been asked to look for a person on the line. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide distinct night-time protection for railway trespassers

    Wider context from the report

    “The provision to protect a trespasser at night are the same as those during the day. The ability to locate a person close to or on the railway lines at night is made more difficult by the absence of suitable lights on the track or the train. In this case Mr English was not seen and run over by the train that has been asked to look for a person on the line. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Continuous lineside illumination is not reasonably practicable because mainline trains operate primarily to signals and access is normally restricted.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The mainline rules for train drivers responding to reports of trespassers require a driver to proceed ‘at caution’. This requires drivers to be able to stop within the distance that they can see to be clear. As the rule is the same irrespective of lighting conditions, this means in practice, drivers are likely to travel at a lower speed when proceeding at caution in darkness than in daylight. In darkness the above regulations mean that the headlamps are designed to illuminate the track when proceeding at caution. As trains principally drive to signals rather than on sight on national mainline infrastructure to which access is normally restricted (by fencing, for example), it is not reasonably practicable to provide continuous lineside illumination.”

    Source location

    Response from Railway Safety Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2025

    Open published response

    Source evidence

    How this respondent position was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Existing mainline rules and train headlamps, with no recorded caution-speed trespasser strikes since 2015, are considered sufficient for the identified risk.

    Verbatim wording from the response

    “The operating context of the mainline railway can be different to London Underground. The current regulation for mainline train headlamps is the Locomotives and Passenger National Technical Specification Notice, enforced by the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011 (as amended).”

    Source location

    Response from Railway Safety Board
    Page 1 · response
    Published 29 July 2025

    Open published response

  2. North London

    AI-generated summary

    George Henry Dicker · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    George Henry Dicker entered the railway tracks and electrical lines at Woodside Park Underground Station on 9 May 2016, where he likely died after contact with the live rail and being struck by a train. The substantive concern was that there was no alarm or warning to the signaller when a person passed through the gate onto the tracks.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of an alarm or warning to the signaller when a person passes through the gate to the tracks at the end of the platform

    Wider context from the report

    “That there is no alarm or warning to the signaller that a person has passed through the gate to the tracks at the end of the platform. ”
    Open source report

  3. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lauris Kodors · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Lauris Kodors was struck by a train and suffered fatal injuries in the Harrow Tunnel on 11 April 2016; he was discovered on 12 April and confirmed to have died on 13 April 2016. The report raised concern that the RSSB Rule Book allowed trains to be stopped only where a person might damage a train, not where a person might be in danger from a train.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the RSSB Rule Book to allow trains to be stopped when a person may be in danger from a train

    Wider context from the report

    “That the RSSB Rule Book allows trains to be stopped only in circumstances where that person may cause damage to a train, but does not allow for trains to be stopped where the person may be in danger form a train. ”
    Open source report

  4. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Michael Anthony Bovell · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 12 April 2014, Michael Anthony Bovell entered a railway line at Brimsdown Rail Station after reporting a suicide and was struck and run over by a train. The principal concern was that railway rules did not allow the signaller to stop the train when a person was in danger from it, and that the train, although cautioned and slowed, still struck him.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of train-stopping rules to provide for stopping trains when a person on the line may be in danger from a train

    Wider context from the report

    “That the RSSB Rule Book allows trains to be stopped only in circumstances where a person who has trespassed onto the line person may cause damage to a train, but does not allow for trains to be stopped where the person may be in danger from a train other than to stop the train to place the train on caution. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Train collision with a person despite cautioning and speed reduction

    Wider context from the report

    “That the train travelling having been cautioned and reduced its speed still struck Mr Bovell ”
    Open source report

  5. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Lewis Philip Ghessen · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    On 25 September 2011, Lewis Philip Ghessen was chased onto railway tracks at Harrow and Wealdstone Railway Station and was struck and killed by a fast train. The concern was that the RSSB Rule Book allowed trains to be stopped only where a person might damage a train, not where a person might be in danger from a train.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of the RSSB Rule Book to allow trains to be stopped when a person may be in danger from a train

    Wider context from the report

    “That the RSSB Rule Book allows trains to be stopped only in circumstances where that person may cause damage to a train, but does not allow for trains to be stopped where the person may be in danger form a train. ”
    Open source report

  6. North London

    AI-generated summary

    Daniel Maurice McMahon · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Daniel Maurice McMahon suffered severe head injuries after being hit by a train at Willesden Junction Station on 11 January 2012, following reports that he had fallen from a bridge and moved onto the railway track. The report raised concerns about the accuracy and completeness of information recorded by police about the location of a person trespassing on the railway, procedures for stopping trains when an unwell person is on the line, support during mental-health leave, and the use of lung-decompression needles without a valve.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to identify difficulties experienced by patients on Section 17 leave

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) Department of Health:- Consideration to be given to using a feedback form, where a patient is on S17 of the MHA 1983 leave, to be completed by those caring for the patient in the community and the professional staff at the hospital to ensure that any difficulties that a patient has while on leave are picked up ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to stop trains and set signals to danger when an unwell person is trespassing on the line

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) RSSB:- The Rule book be amended to require that trains stop, (signals are set to danger), when a person who is identified as being unwell or there is reason to believe might be unwell is trespassing on the line. (The current position would be to set the signals to caution). ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of clear guidance on whether lung decompression needles should be used with a valve

    Wider context from the report

    “(4) London Ambulance Service:- The LAS consider the guidance on the use of lung decompression needles and whether these should be used with a valve. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Rail Safety and Standards Board; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to gather and pass accurate trespasser and track-section location information

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) Metropolitan Police :- That steps should be taken to ensure that when report is passed to the police concerning a person who is seen to be trespassing on the railway line that correct information is gathered to locate that person and the section of the track that person is on so that this information can be passed to those responsible for contacting the network covering that section of the track. This is in addition to the attendance location and the incident location normally recorded when a 999 call is made. ”
    Open source report
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Published response patterns

Compared with other recipients in reports included in PFD Monitor

Describes published response evidence, not performance.

Published responses found

17%
17%All other recipients 58%
0%100%

How actions were described at the time

This respondent
All other recipients
47%25%27%<1%<1%
  • Completed
  • In progress
  • Planned
  • Unclear
  • Partially completed

Statuses reflect what recipients said at the time. PFD Monitor does not verify whether actions happened.

Types of action described in responses

Percentages use all actions described by each group. An action may have more than one type, so percentages do not total 100%.

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026