Recipient

Recipient name withheld

First report 5 Jun 2025•Latest report 5 Jun 2025

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports: 1
Published responses: 0%
Concerns addressed: 0
Stated actions: 0

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

0%published responses found

0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Recipient name withheld linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

5 Jun2025
Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire
Concerns raised7
1. Failure to produce timely final reports and interim statements on investigation progress and safety issues
2. Failure to recognise oxygen fires and immediately cut off the oxygen supply
3. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers for onboard fires
1. Failure to prevent cigarettes and related flammable items and materials in the cockpit
2. Unavailability of protective equipment for cockpit fires
3. Lack of evidence access for states entitled to participate in an investigation when excluded by the State of Occurrence
4. Failure of risk analyses to account for overpressure in the oxygen distribution system
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Richard Mohamed Fekry Osman · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Richard Mohamed Fekry Osman was a passenger on flight MS804, which crashed into the Mediterranean Sea on 19 May 2016 after a fire broke out on the flight deck; there were no survivors. The inquest stated that the fire was caused by an ignition source of unknown origin, most likely associated with the first officer’s oxygen supply system. The substantive concerns included cockpit fire and smoke procedures, oxygen-system risks, fire-protection equipment and extinguishers, smoking regulations, and arrangements for participation in or transfer of aircraft accident investigations.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to produce timely final reports and interim statements on investigation progress and safety issues
Wider context from the report
“(2) That a drafting committee be convened to consider amending Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 to provide: (a) a right for states entitled to participate in an investigation to have access to evidence to enable those participating states to release a statement in accordance with Chapter 6.6.1 in circumstances where they have been excluded from an investigation by the State of Occurrence; (b) a right of states entitled to participate in an investigation to take over conduct of an investigation in circumstances where a State of Occurrence does not produce a Final Report within a reasonable timeframe and does not produce interim statements indicating the progress of the investigation and safety issues raised within a reasonable timeframe and has not otherwise consented to the delegation of the investigation in accordance with Chapter 5.1. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to recognise oxygen fires and immediately cut off the oxygen supply
Wider context from the report
“(1) That a full review of cockpit fire/smoke procedures be undertaken to include, but not limited to: - the recognition of an oxygen fire (identifiable by a characteristic noise comparable to that of a blowtorch) and the immediate cutting off this oxygen supply. - the installation or carrying of protective equipment to deal with any cockpit fires. - a review of the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers to deal with onboard fires. - a review of regulations (if required) to prevent the use of cigarettes in the cockpit and related flammable items and materials. - the additional risk analyses to take into account the hypothesis of an overpressure in the oxygen distribution system. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers for onboard fires
Wider context from the report
“(1) That a full review of cockpit fire/smoke procedures be undertaken to include, but not limited to: - the recognition of an oxygen fire (identifiable by a characteristic noise comparable to that of a blowtorch) and the immediate cutting off this oxygen supply. - the installation or carrying of protective equipment to deal with any cockpit fires. - a review of the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers to deal with onboard fires. - a review of regulations (if required) to prevent the use of cigarettes in the cockpit and related flammable items and materials. - the additional risk analyses to take into account the hypothesis of an overpressure in the oxygen distribution system. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to prevent cigarettes and related flammable items and materials in the cockpit
Wider context from the report
“(1) That a full review of cockpit fire/smoke procedures be undertaken to include, but not limited to: - the recognition of an oxygen fire (identifiable by a characteristic noise comparable to that of a blowtorch) and the immediate cutting off this oxygen supply. - the installation or carrying of protective equipment to deal with any cockpit fires. - a review of the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers to deal with onboard fires. - a review of regulations (if required) to prevent the use of cigarettes in the cockpit and related flammable items and materials. - the additional risk analyses to take into account the hypothesis of an overpressure in the oxygen distribution system. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Unavailability of protective equipment for cockpit fires
Wider context from the report
“(1) That a full review of cockpit fire/smoke procedures be undertaken to include, but not limited to: - the recognition of an oxygen fire (identifiable by a characteristic noise comparable to that of a blowtorch) and the immediate cutting off this oxygen supply. - the installation or carrying of protective equipment to deal with any cockpit fires. - a review of the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers to deal with onboard fires. - a review of regulations (if required) to prevent the use of cigarettes in the cockpit and related flammable items and materials. - the additional risk analyses to take into account the hypothesis of an overpressure in the oxygen distribution system. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Lack of evidence access for states entitled to participate in an investigation when excluded by the State of Occurrence
Wider context from the report
“(2) That a drafting committee be convened to consider amending Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 to provide: (a) a right for states entitled to participate in an investigation to have access to evidence to enable those participating states to release a statement in accordance with Chapter 6.6.1 in circumstances where they have been excluded from an investigation by the State of Occurrence; (b) a right of states entitled to participate in an investigation to take over conduct of an investigation in circumstances where a State of Occurrence does not produce a Final Report within a reasonable timeframe and does not produce interim statements indicating the progress of the investigation and safety issues raised within a reasonable timeframe and has not otherwise consented to the delegation of the investigation in accordance with Chapter 5.1. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Recipient name withheld; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure of risk analyses to account for overpressure in the oxygen distribution system
Wider context from the report
“(1) That a full review of cockpit fire/smoke procedures be undertaken to include, but not limited to: - the recognition of an oxygen fire (identifiable by a characteristic noise comparable to that of a blowtorch) and the immediate cutting off this oxygen supply. - the installation or carrying of protective equipment to deal with any cockpit fires. - a review of the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers to deal with onboard fires. - a review of regulations (if required) to prevent the use of cigarettes in the cockpit and related flammable items and materials. - the additional risk analyses to take into account the hypothesis of an overpressure in the oxygen distribution system. ”
Open source report

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Concerns raised7

Failure to produce timely final reports and interim statements on investigation progress and safety issues

Failure to recognise oxygen fires and immediately cut off the oxygen supply

Uncertainty about the effectiveness of Halon fire extinguishers for onboard fires

Failure to prevent cigarettes and related flammable items and materials in the cockpit

Unavailability of protective equipment for cockpit fires

Lack of evidence access for states entitled to participate in an investigation when excluded by the State of Occurrence

Failure of risk analyses to account for overpressure in the oxygen distribution system