Recipient

St Richard's Hospital

First report 15 Jul 2016•Latest report 17 Jan 2023

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Health and care · Healthcare site. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports
3

Naming this recipient

Published responses
0%

Found for named reports

Concerns addressed
0

Across all linked responses

Stated actions
0

Described in responses

Reports over time

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

0%published responses found
0stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from St Richard's Hospital linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

  1. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Teegan Marie Barnard suffered a prolonged PEA cardiac arrest during emergence from general anaesthesia after an emergency caesarean section, following significant postpartum haemorrhage and bilateral tension pneumothoraces. She sustained a non-survivable hypoxic brain injury and died at home six weeks later. Concerns included failure to consider and promptly recognise tension pneumothoraces during resuscitation, and inadequate investigation, clinical governance and learning after her death.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to undertake anaesthetic morbidity and mortality reviews and share learning

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to disseminate institutional learning from unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Trust Clinical Governance procedures The senior management team within the Trust have not acknowledged that there was a lack of a proper and robust system in place to trigger an investigation into all the circumstances of the death of a 17-year-old patient, with no steps taken by them to do so either before or after the publication of the HSIB report or at any time prior to the Inquest hearing. This gives rise to a concern of a lack of insight within the senior management team of the importance of undertaking a comprehensive investigation into unexpected deaths within their organisation and for there to be wider dissemination of any institutional learning with the aim of preventing future deaths. The failure of the Trust to fully investigate how Teegan came by her death also gives rise to a concern regarding the Trust’s obligation to comply with the Statutory Duty of Candour and their requirement to share their findings with both the regulators and Teegan’s family as well as to indicate the steps, if any, they have taken to prevent future deaths. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to download and interrogate anaesthetic machine data after a suspected equipment-related event

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to investigate potential anaesthetic-related causes of unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to remove and assess anaesthetic equipment for faults after a suspected equipment-related event

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Investigation after Teegan’s death Following this incident, and despite Teegan being intubated and ventilated at the time, with a real possibility of this being an anaesthetic related event, no steps were taken by the anaesthetic department at St Richard’s Hospital, Chichester, either before or after the publication of the HSIB report, to explore potential iatrogenic or other anaesthetic related causes (such as exposure of Teegan’s lungs to excessive volume or pressure) as a possible or probable cause of Teegan’s death. Furthermore, the anaesthetic machine/ventilator was not taken out of service and assessed to see if there was a fault. Neither was the data from the anaesthetic machine downloaded and interrogated, which may have assisted in establishing how Teegan came to develop bilateral tension pneumothoraces during her emergence from general anaesthesia. The failure of the anaesthetic department to undertake any morbidity or mortality review/meeting following Teegan’s death led to a lost opportunity to share any possible learning opportunities both within and outside their department to prevent future deaths, and as a corollary to have been in a position to fully assist both the investigation by the HSIB and the inquest hearing. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of a robust system to trigger investigations into unexpected deaths

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Trust Clinical Governance procedures The senior management team within the Trust have not acknowledged that there was a lack of a proper and robust system in place to trigger an investigation into all the circumstances of the death of a 17-year-old patient, with no steps taken by them to do so either before or after the publication of the HSIB report or at any time prior to the Inquest hearing. This gives rise to a concern of a lack of insight within the senior management team of the importance of undertaking a comprehensive investigation into unexpected deaths within their organisation and for there to be wider dissemination of any institutional learning with the aim of preventing future deaths. The failure of the Trust to fully investigate how Teegan came by her death also gives rise to a concern regarding the Trust’s obligation to comply with the Statutory Duty of Candour and their requirement to share their findings with both the regulators and Teegan’s family as well as to indicate the steps, if any, they have taken to prevent future deaths. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Delays in recognition of surgical emphysema during cardiac arrest

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Surgical emphysema There was a delay in the recognition of surgical emphysema by clinical attendees at the cardiac arrest (medical specialist registrar, consultant obstetricians, anaesthetic core trainee, anaesthetic specialist registrar and the on call consultant anaesthetist) despite indicative clinical signs of deep cyanosis, gross whole body swelling with the need to remove the increasingly constrictive hospital wrist band and endotracheal tube tie, alongside sub-cutaneous crepitus and an abdominal drainage bag noted to be tense with air. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to comply with the Statutory Duty of Candour by sharing investigation findings and prevention steps

    Wider context from the report

    “4. Trust Clinical Governance procedures The senior management team within the Trust have not acknowledged that there was a lack of a proper and robust system in place to trigger an investigation into all the circumstances of the death of a 17-year-old patient, with no steps taken by them to do so either before or after the publication of the HSIB report or at any time prior to the Inquest hearing. This gives rise to a concern of a lack of insight within the senior management team of the importance of undertaking a comprehensive investigation into unexpected deaths within their organisation and for there to be wider dissemination of any institutional learning with the aim of preventing future deaths. The failure of the Trust to fully investigate how Teegan came by her death also gives rise to a concern regarding the Trust’s obligation to comply with the Statutory Duty of Candour and their requirement to share their findings with both the regulators and Teegan’s family as well as to indicate the steps, if any, they have taken to prevent future deaths. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to consider and exclude tension pneumothorax during PEA cardiac arrest

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Resuscitation algorithm (4 H’s & 4 T’s)* for PEA cardiac arrest I heard evidence that the 4 H’s and 4 T’s should be considered and excluded in any PEA cardiac arrest situation. Steps were taken to treat anaphylaxis, but in the absence of any improvement in Teegan’s clinical condition, and whilst it was mentioned, no steps were taken to exclude possible bilateral tension pneumothoraces. Evidence was heard at the Inquest that it is the only one of the 4 H’s and 4 T’s (see footnote) that directly results in a sudden inability to ventilate, with the HSIB report indicating that there was sufficient time to consider and exclude this possibility given the length of time of the PEA cardiac arrest. ”
    Open source report
  2. Gloucestershire

    AI-generated summary

    Richard Paul Victor Sanders · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Richard Sanders, an experienced diver aged 52, became unresponsive during a dive to 45 metres on 11 April 2019 and was pronounced deceased at the scene. The concerns included awareness of immersion pulmonary oedema risks, the need for fitness-to-dive medical certification, and methods for removing divers from the water.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Lack of awareness of immersion pulmonary oedema risks among people participating in diving

    Wider context from the report

    “1. Whether there is sufficient awareness of the risks & affects of immersion pulmonary oedema by those engaged &/ or participating in the activity of diving. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Inefficient diver removal methods and techniques at the diving centre

    Wider context from the report

    “3. Whether more efficient methods and/ techniques of diver removal from the water could be employed at the diving centre. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to give sufficient consideration to a fitness-to-dive medical certificate as a prerequisite for diving participation

    Wider context from the report

    “2. Whether sufficient consideration has been given to the requirement for a “fitness to dive” medical certificate as a prerequisite to participation in diving activities. ”
    Open source report
  3. West Sussex

    AI-generated summary

    Leilani Chute · Prevention of Future Deaths report

    This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

    Report summary

    Leilani Chute was delivered by Caesarean section after an unsuccessful trial of instrumental delivery and was in a moribund condition, with terminal bradycardia and no other signs of life. The inquest concluded that she died shortly after birth from hypoxic brain injury and umbilical cord occlusion. The principal concerns were the use of an unendorsed practice of manually pushing back the cervix and inadequate disclosure of relevant risks when obtaining consent for instrumental delivery rather than proceeding directly to Caesarean section.

    Read the report on judiciary.uk

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to perform cervical replacement in accordance with standard training

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the practice of manually pushing back the cervix was one adopted by two junior doctors. This practice was not in accordance with standard training and was conducted without the knowledge of the consultant; ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to take steps to address identified care and service delivery issues

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That neither of the above matters had been identified as a “Care and Service Delivery problem” by the Trust’s Root Cause Analysis investigation and hence no steps had been taken by the Trust to address these issues. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure of Root Cause Analysis investigations to identify care and service delivery problems

    Wider context from the report

    “(3) That neither of the above matters had been identified as a “Care and Service Delivery problem” by the Trust’s Root Cause Analysis investigation and hence no steps had been taken by the Trust to address these issues. ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to ensure consultant knowledge of manual cervical replacement

    Wider context from the report

    “(1) That the practice of manually pushing back the cervix was one adopted by two junior doctors. This practice was not in accordance with standard training and was conducted without the knowledge of the consultant; ”
    Open source report

    Source evidence

    How this individual concern was interpreted

    PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to St Richard's Hospital; that does not assign responsibility.

    PFD Monitor interpretation

    Failure to provide balanced relevant facts for informed consent

    Wider context from the report

    “(2) That the manner in which consent was sought from women in labour when there was a choice to be made between attempted instrumental delivery and going straight to a CS did not appear to provide them with the relevant facts in order to come to an informed choice, but presented those facts that favoured the doctor’s preferred approach to management. ”
    Open source report
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Published response patterns

Compared with other recipients in reports included in PFD Monitor

Describes published response evidence, not performance.

Published responses found

0%
0%All other recipients 58%
0%100%

How actions were described at the time

This respondent
All other recipients
47%25%27%<1%<1%
  • Completed
  • In progress
  • Planned
  • Unclear
  • Partially completed

Statuses reflect what recipients said at the time. PFD Monitor does not verify whether actions happened.

Types of action described in responses

Percentages use all actions described by each group. An action may have more than one type, so percentages do not total 100%.

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026