Recipient

Tesco Stores Limited

First report 22 Jan 2016•Latest report 25 Jun 2024

Recipient record

Reports, concerns and published responses

Private and voluntary organisations · Private limited company. This page brings together reports naming this recipient and response statements clearly connected to concerns raised in those reports.

Reports: 2
Published responses: 200%
Concerns addressed: 7
Stated actions: 14

Reports over time

Reports naming this recipient by issue year.

Evidence profile

Report topics

Share of this recipient’s reports compared with all other recipients.

200%published responses found

14stated actions described

Topic comparisons are not available in the current evidence snapshot.

Concerns and recipient responses

Statements from Tesco Stores Limited linked to the concerns in each report. Select any concern, action or position to view the source wording.

25 Jun2024
Manchester City
Concerns raised2
1. Failure to require staff approval before petrol pump access
2. Failure to restrict petrol pump use to required motor vehicles or authorised containers
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response 2
1. Action
  Work with fire authorities to establish remotely monitored petrol-station CCTV scenarios and identify risk-mitigating improvements.
  Stated in progress
2. Action
  Operate risk-assessed intuitive monitoring systems with supporting controls for unattended petrol-station self-service.
  Stated completed
Respondent positions 1
1. Position
  Existing risk-assessed systems and controls for remotely monitored petrol stations were approved as legislatively compliant by the competent Primary Authority.
  Existing arrangements considered sufficient
AI-generated summary

Afolabi Oluwafemi OJERINDE · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Afolabi Oluwafemi Ojerinde died at Wythenshawe Hospital after attending an unmanned Tesco petrol station, using a pay-at-pump facility to obtain petrol, dousing himself in it and setting himself alight. The substantive concerns were that he could use the pump without a motor vehicle or authorised container, and that no staff member was present to approve or deny access, which was automatically permitted following payment.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to require staff approval before petrol pump access
Wider context from the report
“1. The Deceased was able to use the petrol pump without the required motor vehicle or authorised plastic or metal container; 2. There was no member of staff present at the petrol station to approve or deny the Deceased access to the petrol pump, and his approval was automatic following payment made at the pump. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to restrict petrol pump use to required motor vehicles or authorised containers
Wider context from the report
“1. The Deceased was able to use the petrol pump without the required motor vehicle or authorised plastic or metal container; 2. There was no member of staff present at the petrol station to approve or deny the Deceased access to the petrol pump, and his approval was automatic following payment made at the pump. ”
Open source report
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Work with fire authorities to establish remotely monitored petrol-station CCTV scenarios and identify risk-mitigating improvements.

Verbatim wording from the response
“15. After this incident and before the PFD Report was issued – recognising the seriousness of the tragic events, acknowledging the legitimate interest of GMFRS, and also recognising that broader industry considerations applied and broader industry knowledge and experience would be valuable – TSL had initiated and then commenced discussions with GMFRS and HFRS to set up a collaborative working group with relevant stakeholders both within TSL and externally throughout the industry and with enforcing authorities. Once established, the group will be chaired by Clare Scawthorn, in her independent capacity as Technical Manager for the Petroleum Retailers Association.”

Source location
Response from Tesco
Page 3 · response
Published 27 June 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent action was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Operate risk-assessed intuitive monitoring systems with supporting controls for unattended petrol-station self-service.

Verbatim wording from the response
“4. Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service (“HFRS”) are the Fire Primary Authority partner for TSL under the provisions of the Regulatory and Enforcement Sanctions Act 2008 (“RES Act”). On 15 December 2020, HFRS issued Primary Authority Advice pursuant to s.27 RES Act to TSL relating to: “The use of intuitive monitoring systems to allow petrol filling stations to trade without a dedicated person permanently monitoring CCTV for each individual site” (the “PA Advice”).”

Source location
Response from Tesco
Page 2 · response
Published 27 June 2024
Open published response
Source evidence

How this respondent position was interpreted

PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.

PFD Monitor interpretation
Existing risk-assessed systems and controls for remotely monitored petrol stations were approved as legislatively compliant by the competent Primary Authority.

Verbatim wording from the response
“4. Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service (“HFRS”) are the Fire Primary Authority partner for TSL under the provisions of the Regulatory and Enforcement Sanctions Act 2008 (“RES Act”). On 15 December 2020, HFRS issued Primary Authority Advice pursuant to s.27 RES Act to TSL relating to: “The use of intuitive monitoring systems to allow petrol filling stations to trade without a dedicated person permanently monitoring CCTV for each individual site” (the “PA Advice”).”

Source location
Response from Tesco
Page 2 · response
Published 27 June 2024
Open published response
22 Jan2016
Manchester West
Concerns raised5
1. Failure to provide authority for lone night security guards to leave site without loss of pay when conditions are too cold and instructions are unavailable
2. Failure to provide lone night workers with clear instructions for responding to unexpected situations
3. Failure to provide appropriate protective clothing for lone night security guards working outside in cold conditions
1. Failure to provide a prominent warning about the risk of fatal carbon monoxide poisoning from indoor use
2. Failure to establish a minimum acceptable temperature for premises occupied by lone night security guards
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.

No linked response statements
No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
AI-generated summary

Javaid Iqbal · Prevention of Future Deaths report

This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.

Report summary

Javaid Iqbal, who was working alone as a security guard at a construction site, died after lighting charcoal in a wheelbarrow inside a portacabin when the generator failed and left him without heat or light. The concerns included inadequate response to his reports, insufficient cold-weather clothing, lack of clear instructions for lone working, and the need for written instructions and training concerning welfare, safe temperatures, clothing, and leaving the site.

Read the report on judiciary.uk
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide authority for lone night security guards to leave site without loss of pay when conditions are too cold and instructions are unavailable
Wider context from the report
“(1) Javaid Iqbal was working alone on the night of the 5th - 6th December 2014. It was very cold that night. The generator supplying heat, (2) Despite reporting this situation to his employer and the relevant control room, he was left to devise a method of keeping warm by himself. (3) Mr Iqbal did not have appropriate clothing to protect him from the cold, even though he was required to make periodic checks outside during the course of the night. (4) As a lone worker at night, Mr Iqbal needed clear instruction as to how to respond to the situation that had unexpectedly arisen. (5) Clear written instructions should be provided by the employer accompanied by suitable training so as to ensure adequate provision is made for the welfare of other lone night security guards both as to i. The personal protective equipment and clothing needed on a cold night when they are expected to work outside ii. The minimum acceptable temperature of the premises they are expected to work in. iii. Their authority to leave site without loss of pay should it prove too cold to work and they are unable to obtain instructions from their employer or controller as to the remedial action to be taken. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide lone night workers with clear instructions for responding to unexpected situations
Wider context from the report
“(1) Javaid Iqbal was working alone on the night of the 5th - 6th December 2014. It was very cold that night. The generator supplying heat, (2) Despite reporting this situation to his employer and the relevant control room, he was left to devise a method of keeping warm by himself. (3) Mr Iqbal did not have appropriate clothing to protect him from the cold, even though he was required to make periodic checks outside during the course of the night. (4) As a lone worker at night, Mr Iqbal needed clear instruction as to how to respond to the situation that had unexpectedly arisen. (5) Clear written instructions should be provided by the employer accompanied by suitable training so as to ensure adequate provision is made for the welfare of other lone night security guards both as to i. The personal protective equipment and clothing needed on a cold night when they are expected to work outside ii. The minimum acceptable temperature of the premises they are expected to work in. iii. Their authority to leave site without loss of pay should it prove too cold to work and they are unable to obtain instructions from their employer or controller as to the remedial action to be taken. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide appropriate protective clothing for lone night security guards working outside in cold conditions
Wider context from the report
“(1) Javaid Iqbal was working alone on the night of the 5th - 6th December 2014. It was very cold that night. The generator supplying heat, (2) Despite reporting this situation to his employer and the relevant control room, he was left to devise a method of keeping warm by himself. (3) Mr Iqbal did not have appropriate clothing to protect him from the cold, even though he was required to make periodic checks outside during the course of the night. (4) As a lone worker at night, Mr Iqbal needed clear instruction as to how to respond to the situation that had unexpectedly arisen. (5) Clear written instructions should be provided by the employer accompanied by suitable training so as to ensure adequate provision is made for the welfare of other lone night security guards both as to i. The personal protective equipment and clothing needed on a cold night when they are expected to work outside ii. The minimum acceptable temperature of the premises they are expected to work in. iii. Their authority to leave site without loss of pay should it prove too cold to work and they are unable to obtain instructions from their employer or controller as to the remedial action to be taken. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to provide a prominent warning about the risk of fatal carbon monoxide poisoning from indoor use
Wider context from the report
“(1) The packaging of the charcoal provides instructions which indicate it should not be used indoors. The warning is not given much prominence and does not draw attention to the risk of death from carbon monoxide poisoning if used indoors. ”
Open source report
Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Tesco Stores Limited; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation
Failure to establish a minimum acceptable temperature for premises occupied by lone night security guards
Wider context from the report
“(1) Javaid Iqbal was working alone on the night of the 5th - 6th December 2014. It was very cold that night. The generator supplying heat, (2) Despite reporting this situation to his employer and the relevant control room, he was left to devise a method of keeping warm by himself. (3) Mr Iqbal did not have appropriate clothing to protect him from the cold, even though he was required to make periodic checks outside during the course of the night. (4) As a lone worker at night, Mr Iqbal needed clear instruction as to how to respond to the situation that had unexpectedly arisen. (5) Clear written instructions should be provided by the employer accompanied by suitable training so as to ensure adequate provision is made for the welfare of other lone night security guards both as to i. The personal protective equipment and clothing needed on a cold night when they are expected to work outside ii. The minimum acceptable temperature of the premises they are expected to work in. iii. Their authority to leave site without loss of pay should it prove too cold to work and they are unable to obtain instructions from their employer or controller as to the remedial action to be taken. ”
Open source report

Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations

Data last updated 7 September 2026

Reports, concerns and published responses

Reports over time

Concerns raised2

Failure to require staff approval before petrol pump access

Failure to restrict petrol pump use to required motor vehicles or authorised containers

Actions described in response An action is something this recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised.2

Respondent positions A position is what this recipient says about the concern when it does not describe a specific action.1

Concerns raised5

Failure to provide authority for lone night security guards to leave site without loss of pay when conditions are too cold and instructions are unavailable

Failure to provide lone night workers with clear instructions for responding to unexpected situations

Failure to provide appropriate protective clothing for lone night security guards working outside in cold conditions

Failure to provide a prominent warning about the risk of fatal carbon monoxide poisoning from indoor use

Failure to establish a minimum acceptable temperature for premises occupied by lone night security guards

Actions described in response 2

Respondent positions 1