9 Dec 2025 Katherine Wright, known as Sarah · Prevention of Future Deaths report Oxfordshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Lack of protocols and guidance for escalating safety concerns and requesting additional search resources View source Lack of training and operational guidance for adequate premises searches in missing person cases View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Katherine Wright, known as Sarah · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Katherine Wright, known as Sarah, was reported missing on 15 December 2023 and was found deceased in her flat on 20 December 2023 after an initial police search did not locate her. The report identified concerns about inadequate guidance and training for searches in missing-person cases, and the lack of protocols for escalating safety concerns that may prevent an adequate search.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of protocols and guidance for escalating safety concerns and requesting additional search resources
Wider context from the report “2. Absence of protocols for escalating safety concerns during searches.
The officer who undertook the search felt unsafe due to the cluttered environment but did not escalate this concern or request additional resources to enable an adequate search to be carried out . There appears to be no guidance on when and how officers should escalate such issues .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of training and operational guidance for adequate premises searches in missing person cases
Wider context from the report “1. Lack of training and guidance for frontline officers on conducting searches of premises in missing person cases.
Evidence given by the Police at the Inquest indicated that there is no structured training or clear operational guidance on what constitutes an adequate search , including checking all areas of a property where a person could reasonably be found .
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Update Missing Persons Operational Guidance with structured premises-search procedures, hazard controls, equipment guidance, and supervisory escalation requirements.
Verbatim wording from the response “To address this, we have reviewed our Missing Persons Operational Guidance and included a new section dedicated to the searching of premises for missing persons. This includes sub sections on the extent of the search; equipment and resources that may be used including the use of personal protective equipment; potential hazards and how the Specialist Search Unit may be used to advise and mitigate such hazards. The source documents used to create this section include a College of Policing e-learning package ‘Searching Premises’ and an input for all new recruits on Specialist Police Search Advisors. This new guidance has been shared with our Learning and Development department and will be integrated into Foundation Training for new recruits. It has also been shared with all officers in a force wide communication.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Communicate the premises-search guidance changes to all officers through a force-wide communication.
Verbatim wording from the response “To address this, we have reviewed our Missing Persons Operational Guidance and included a new section dedicated to the searching of premises for missing persons. This includes sub sections on the extent of the search; equipment and resources that may be used including the use of personal protective equipment; potential hazards and how the Specialist Search Unit may be used to advise and mitigate such hazards. The source documents used to create this section include a College of Policing e-learning package ‘Searching Premises’ and an input for all new recruits on Specialist Police Search Advisors. This new guidance has been shared with our Learning and Development department and will be integrated into Foundation Training for new recruits. It has also been shared with all officers in a force wide communication.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Integrate the new premises-search guidance into Foundation Training for new recruits.
Verbatim wording from the response “To address this, we have reviewed our Missing Persons Operational Guidance and included a new section dedicated to the searching of premises for missing persons. This includes sub sections on the extent of the search; equipment and resources that may be used including the use of personal protective equipment; potential hazards and how the Specialist Search Unit may be used to advise and mitigate such hazards. The source documents used to create this section include a College of Policing e-learning package ‘Searching Premises’ and an input for all new recruits on Specialist Police Search Advisors. This new guidance has been shared with our Learning and Development department and will be integrated into Foundation Training for new recruits. It has also been shared with all officers in a force wide communication.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
1 Aug 2025 Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report Milton Keynes
View report summary
Concerns raised 22 Failure to communicate before dragging a restrained person by the arms View source Failure to avoid extreme arm positioning during handcuffed restraint View source Failure to check airways and breathing rate during restraint View source Delays in mental health team assessment in the Emergency Department View source Failure to move restrained people onto their side as soon as practicable View source Discharge documentation liable to be misinterpreted as an official discharge notice View source Reliance on delayed written clinical documentation in emergency settings View source Failure to hand over critical restraint information View source Failure to seek clinical advice during restraint View source Failure to escalate concerns and arrange follow-up after incomplete mental health assessment View source Failure to listen to, interpret and respond to breathing during restraint View source Failure to provide timely final medical review before formal discharge View source Ambiguous and inadequately communicated discharge criteria View source Failure to communicate concerns that a patient is not medically fit for discharge View source Failure of officers to challenge inappropriate restraint View source Premature discharge of patients who are not medically fit View source Failure of senior clinical and nursing staff to intervene in observed restraint View source Reference in hospital policy to a non-existent police-custody discharge form View source Failure to reassess restraint actions using the National Decision Model View source Failure to limit prolonged prone restraint View source Failure to raise concerns about changing pallor during restraint View source Inappropriate recommendation for reassessment in police custody despite medical instability View source See 19 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response An action is something this recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 9
Action
Mandate and roll out Safer Restraint e-learning on prolonged restraint, welfare monitoring, situational awareness and safety-officer responsibilities, with completion actively monitored.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Review and publish mobile Snap Guides covering safety-officer duties, welfare monitoring, restraint, spit guards, acute behavioural disturbance and prone ground-pin risks.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Update trainer notes for prone handcuffing and ground-pin techniques, clarifying arm restraint and prohibiting arm elevation or lowering for compliance.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Introduce positional-asphyxia training for student officers covering risks, signs, symptoms, situational awareness, communication and response.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Introduce online Time on Tasks training covering management of subjects restrained in the prone position.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Roll out Upstander e-learning to officers and staff, teaching practical Direct, Distract, Delegate and Delay strategies for speaking up.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Expand operational guidance defining when safety officers are used, their responsibilities and officers’ duty to challenge welfare concerns.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Include communication and handover protocols in training scenarios and instruct officers to engage actively with medical staff during incidents.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source
Action
Implement scenario-based PPST Foundation and Recertification programmes assessing restraint, decision-making, communication, subject welfare and safety-officer use.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 4 August 2025. View source See 6 more actions
×
AI-generated summary
Brian Thomas RINGROSE · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Brian Thomas Ringrose died on 2 February 2021 after being taken to hospital following an overdose and then subjected to prolonged prone restraint by police. The report identifies concerns about police restraint practices and welfare monitoring, communication and handover, prioritisation of transport over welfare, and the hospital and mental health teams’ assessment, communication and discharge processes.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to communicate before dragging a restrained person by the arms
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to avoid extreme arm positioning during handcuffed restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back , causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to check airways and breathing rate during restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate , despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in mental health team assessment in the Emergency Department
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED) , despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to move restrained people onto their side as soon as practicable
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints , contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Discharge documentation liable to be misinterpreted as an official discharge notice
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on . This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Reliance on delayed written clinical documentation in emergency settings
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings , as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to hand over critical restraint information
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to seek clinical advice during restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to escalate concerns and arrange follow-up after incomplete mental health assessment
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police . They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to listen to, interpret and respond to breathing during restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide timely final medical review before formal discharge
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged , and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Ambiguous and inadequately communicated discharge criteria
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to communicate concerns that a patient is not medically fit for discharge
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of officers to challenge inappropriate restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint , despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Premature discharge of patients who are not medically fit
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of senior clinical and nursing staff to intervene in observed restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Reference in hospital policy to a non-existent police-custody discharge form
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to reassess restraint actions using the National Decision Model
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint , particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to limit prolonged prone restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to raise concerns about changing pallor during restraint
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor , which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inappropriate recommendation for reassessment in police custody despite medical instability
Wider context from the report “Thames Valley Police
Inadequate application of police restraint training
The evidence demonstrated that the officers who initially restrained Mr. Ringrose failed to follow their training in multiple critical respects:
a) Officers maintained Mr. Ringrose in a prone position for a prolonged period (over 20 minutes with only a brief interruption) despite training that warns of the dangers of positional asphyxia in a restrained prone position.
b) Officers positioned Mr. Ringrose's arms in extreme and abnormal positions (between 90-180 degrees) while handcuffed behind his back, causing severe shoulder injuries including torn ligaments, muscles, and deep internal bruising.
c) Officers failed to place Mr. Ringrose on his side as soon as practicable after handcuffing and applying leg restraints, contrary to their training. There were opportunities when this could have been done.
d) One officer inappropriately dragged Mr. Ringrose by his arms across the floor without informing the other officer or Mr. Ringrose he was about to do so despite being within a few feet only of both, causing significant pain to Brian.
Failure to apply the National Decision Model
Officers failed to apply the National Decision Model to reassess their actions during the restraint, particularly:
a) When Mr. Ringrose was briefly on his side or back at around 15:31 and had become calmer, officers returned him to the prone position without reasonable justification.
b) When hospital security staff arrived at approximately 15:35, providing an opportunity to reassess the situation, appoint a safety officer, and move Mr. Ringrose to his side, the officers failed to do so.
Ineffective welfare monitoring
The officers failed to adequately monitor Mr. Ringrose's welfare during restraint:
a) Officers did not appropriately listen to, interpret, or react to Mr. Ringrose's breathing despite their close proximity, instead attributing his deteriorating condition to purposeful actions.
b) Officers failed to check that Mr. Ringrose's airways were clear or monitor his breathing rate, despite their training to monitor the welfare of anyone in police custody without relying on medical professionals.
c) Officers failed to voice concerns about Mr. Ringrose's changing pallor, which progressed from extremely pale to blue, red, and even purple.
Failure of officers to "speak up and speak out"
The officers failed to challenge inappropriate restraint techniques:
a) None of the officers present, including those who arrived later, questioned the circumstances, duration, or manner of the restraint, despite police training requiring officers to "speak up and speak out."
b) No officer raised concerns about the extreme position of Mr. Ringrose's arms or the prolonged prone restraint, despite this clearly contravening their training on positional asphyxia risks.
c) No officer sought advice on Mr Ringrose’s clinical condition from the many clinical staff who were stood around watching the event.
Inadequate communication and handover
There were significant failures in communication between officers:
a) When additional officers arrived to transport Mr. Ringrose, the initial restraining officers did not inform them of how long Mr. Ringrose had been restrained in the prone position or that his arms had been elevated and the arriving officers were passive in not making any enquiry as to that.
b) Officers relied on the passive inaction of hospital staff who were stood about watching, rather than actively requesting them to assess Mr. Ringrose's condition.
Inappropriate prioritisation of transport over welfare
After the arrival of additional officers at approximately 15:45:
a) All officers became primarily focused on applying the Flexible Lift and Carry System (FLACS) and transporting Mr. Ringrose to police custody rather than monitoring his welfare.
b) During the ongoing restraint and application of the FLACS, none of the officers monitored Mr. Ringrose's welfare instead focussing on how to apply a device none had adequate experience of.
Central and Northwest London NHS Foundation Trust
a) Delay in Assessment: There was a significant delay in the mental health team attending to Brian in the Emergency Department (ED), despite the urgency of his condition.
b) Inadequate Assessment: When the mental health team did attend, they felt unable to assess Brian due to his unresponsiveness but did not escalate their concerns or communicate effectively with medical staff or police. They did not plan to return to follow up on Brian Ringrose.
c) Failure to Escalate Concerns: A member of the mental health team believed Brian was not medically fit for discharge but failed to voice this to medical staff or police.
d) Unsafe Communication Practices: Reliance on verbal communication and delayed written notes (within a maximum 24 hours) is inherently risky in emergency settings, as contemporaneous notes are essential for critical information to be promptly shared with other clinical and nursing staff dealing with patients.
e) Inappropriate Discharge Recommendation: The mental health team suggested reassessment in police custody, despite Brian’s ongoing medical instability. In my view this represented a very high risk to Brian’s safety.
Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
a) Non-existent Documentation Referenced in Policy: The hospital policy makes reference to a "discharge for police custody form" that does not actually exist. This suggests the policy was hastily created, possibly for the purposes of satisfying the inquest requirements, without appropriate consideration of its content or implementation.
b) Misleading Discharge Documentation: The discharge form generated by hospital staff was interpreted by police officers as a formal discharge notice, as the jury found. The current system allows for the generation of forms that may be misinterpreted by third parties as official discharge documents when they may not be.
c) Unsafe Form Design: The process of generating discharge forms and additional notes requires staff to advance through a structure that may include boxes not meant to be ticked but none the less resulting in production of a document purporting to be a “Discharge Notice” which the police then understandably but erroneously rely on. This poses a risk to patient safety through potential misunderstanding of care requirements.
d) Inadequate Discharge Review Process: The decision on whether patients should have a final review by doctors before formal medical discharge is reportedly scheduled to be made by a committee by June 2025. Given that four years had already passed since Brian's death at the time of Inquest, this timeline for implementing such a critical safety measure is unreasonably prolonged, and, in my view, cannot be supported. An immediate decision by the clinical director should have been made to institute final medical reviews before discharge.
e) Ambiguous discharge process: The ED doctor’s plan for discharge was vague (“more awake”), not aligned with ToxBase guidance, and not clearly documented and not clearly communicated. The ED doctor told the jury that he did not assess or intend that Brian was fit for discharge at the time he was removed from the ED. I note however that when Brian was being removed he did not intervene or seek to prevent it.
f) Unsafe supervision: There were a number of senior clinicians and nursing staff present and seen to be watching the restraint of Brian. None of those senior individuals asserted their authority and made enquiry or intervened.
g) Premature Discharge: Brian was not medically fit for discharge (still symptomatic, GCS still not recovered, ECG not done as required, Toxbase recommendations not followed)
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Mandate and roll out Safer Restraint e-learning on prolonged restraint, welfare monitoring, situational awareness and safety-officer responsibilities, with completion actively monitored.
Verbatim wording from the response “In mid-March 2025, ACC Bunt delivered a force wide communication to all officers and staff. This included changes to training and guidance as a consequence of the death of Mr Ringrose. All police officers and police staff detention officers were mandated to complete an online E-Learning package titled ‘Safer Restraint.’ This training covers the medical issues that can arise with prolonged restraint, welfare monitoring, situational awareness and the importance of the role of Safety Officer. The completion of this learning is being actively monitored and to date 4760 Officers and Detention Officers have completed this training (95% of the target audience).” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review and publish mobile Snap Guides covering safety-officer duties, welfare monitoring, restraint, spit guards, acute behavioural disturbance and prone ground-pin risks.
Verbatim wording from the response “TVP have also reviewed and published the following Snap Guides. These are summary documents available to officers through their mobile devices and are designed to be used whilst operationally deployed. They address identified matters such as ineffective welfare monitoring; inadequate application of police restraint training and risks associated with handcuffing to the rear and prone restraint.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Update trainer notes for prone handcuffing and ground-pin techniques, clarifying arm restraint and prohibiting arm elevation or lowering for compliance.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following review, TVP have made changes to their handcuffing from prone trainer notes and their ground pin trainer notes. This will provide further clarity on how a subject’s arms are to be restrained during and after the application of handcuffs.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce positional-asphyxia training for student officers covering risks, signs, symptoms, situational awareness, communication and response.
Verbatim wording from the response “TVP have introduced a PowerPoint presentation on positional asphyxia into our Foundation Training for student officers. This presentation covers the definition of positional asphyxia, the position it may occur in including the increased risk around prone restraint, signs and symptoms and officer response. Officer response is centred on situational awareness, communication and decision-making. These areas promote the use of a safety officer where numbers permit.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce online Time on Tasks training covering management of subjects restrained in the prone position.
Verbatim wording from the response “During this training and between the physical exposition and practice, TVP have introduced online training known as Time on Tasks. Mandated topic areas include managing a subject being restrained in the prone position.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Roll out Upstander e-learning to officers and staff, teaching practical Direct, Distract, Delegate and Delay strategies for speaking up.
Verbatim wording from the response “In addition, in June 2025, TVP rolled out the College of Policing’s ‘Upstander’ E-Learning to all officers and staff, designed to encourage people to ‘speak up and speak out’. A key part of this training is the 4Ds model, which provides practical strategies for being an effective upstander.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Expand operational guidance defining when safety officers are used, their responsibilities and officers’ duty to challenge welfare concerns.
Verbatim wording from the response “TVP have reviewed and expanded its operational guidance on the role of the safety officer. This can found within Mental Health Operational Guidance and follows a section on Acute Behavioural Disorder.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Include communication and handover protocols in training scenarios and instruct officers to engage actively with medical staff during incidents.
Verbatim wording from the response “Training scenarios now include communication and handover protocols. Officers are instructed to actively engage with medical staff during incidents.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement scenario-based PPST Foundation and Recertification programmes assessing restraint, decision-making, communication, subject welfare and safety-officer use.
Verbatim wording from the response “It is of note that there has been considerable National development of PPST by the College of Policing and NPCC, with new Recertification and Foundation programmes, introduced into TVP in November 2023 and April 2024 respectively. The introduction of these training programmes has seen the PPST portfolio evolve significantly since the time of the incident.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Training does not teach elevating or lowering the arms of a handcuffed person to achieve compliance or control.
Verbatim wording from the response “Following review, TVP have made changes to their handcuffing from prone trainer notes and their ground pin trainer notes. This will provide further clarity on how a subject’s arms are to be restrained during and after the application of handcuffs.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
13 Aug 2024 Angela · Prevention of Future Deaths report Berkshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 3 Insufficient frontline staff understanding of domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour View source Failure of the domestic abuse risk assessment form to clearly include psychological harm from coercive and controlling behaviour within serious harm View source Non-adoption of the new domestic abuse risk-assessment tool View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Angela · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Angela was murdered by her husband at their home on 26 December 2018, aged 41. Before her death, she reported assault and elements of coercive control to Thames Valley Police, but the reported crimes were not recorded or investigated, relevant information was not considered in the risk assessment, and the risk was graded as standard rather than medium. The report raises concerns about frontline understanding of domestic abuse and coercive control, the clarity of the DOM5 risk assessment form, and the non-adoption of a newer domestic abuse risk-assessment tool.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient frontline staff understanding of domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour
Wider context from the report “1. Whether sufficient steps have been taken to ensure that frontline staff have a clear understanding of domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour – to think not just about physical abuse, but also about controlling behaviour and how that may escalate .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the domestic abuse risk assessment form to clearly include psychological harm from coercive and controlling behaviour within serious harm
Wider context from the report “2. I am concerned that Thames Valley Police’s DASH risk assessment form (called a DOM5) does not make it sufficiently clear that the definition of “serious harm” can include psychological harm from coercive and controlling behaviour . It may be that other formulations of this document nationally do make this clear – I have looked only at the form used by Thames Valley Police.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Non-adoption of the new domestic abuse risk-assessment tool
Wider context from the report “3. I heard evidence about a new tool for risk assessing domestic abuse, created by the College of Policing. Both the senior Thames Valley Police officer and the College of Policing witness gave evidence that this system is likely to result in better risk assessment for domestic abuse. As I understand it, this new tool has not been adopted by Thames Valley Police at this time , because of competing financial priorities, and an issue with compatibility with the Niche system.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Explore an interim solution for incorporating DARA questions and the serious-harm definition into the current crime-recording system.
Verbatim wording from the response “There are challenges to implementing the DARA risk assessment model within our current version of the NICHE crime recording system. In the future TVP will be looking to adopt an updated NICHE safeguarding and vulnerability module when available. In the mean time I have asked Detective Superintendent ████████ to explore an interim solution. This will include the replacement of the current questions in the DOM5 with the questions contained within the DARA and include clear reference to the College of Policing definition of serious harm which can include psychological harm from coercive and controlling behaviour. This will be attached to the crime recording system in the form of a template. The DARA includes a number of questions designed to assess the level of coercive and controlling behaviour and the level of risk posed.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Deliver DA Matters training, including coercive-control content, to all frontline officers.
Verbatim wording from the response “Thames Valley Police have commissioned the Safe Lives charity to deliver its ‘DA Matters’ training to all front-line officers since January 2020. This includes sessions on coercive and controlling behaviour. This training also includes an input known as ‘Crime Data Integrity’. This is essentially training officers to identify and accurately record crime and to that end specific videos have been produced covering behavioural crimes such as harassment, stalking and coercive and controlling behaviour.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop a new Contact Management training package covering coercive control and using Angela’s death as a case study.
Verbatim wording from the response “In 2024 Contact Management leaders commissioned an external training provider to develop a new training package (including Coercive Control) and asked for the circumstances of Angela’s death to be included as a case study.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review and refresh the specialist domestic abuse officer training programme with coercive-control content throughout.
Verbatim wording from the response “The training course designed for specialist domestic abuse officers has also recently been reviewed and refreshed. Inputs on coercive and controlling behaviour run throughout the programme.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review and improve frontline training inputs on domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour.
Verbatim wording from the response “We are always seeking to improve our training. Changes to training practice and content can be brought about in a number of ways. The training of new recruits is mandated through the College of Policing and delivered through a number of courses, collectively known as Foundation Training. All our training inputs have been reviewed and in some cases improved by an independent domestic abuse training consultancy. I am satisfied” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Add the College of Policing serious-harm definition to the current domestic abuse risk assessment form.
Verbatim wording from the response “You are right to point out that the current TVP Domestic Abuse risk assessment form (Dom5) does not define the term ‘serious harm’. The College of Policing defines the risk of serious harm as follows - ‘A risk which is life threatening and/or traumatic, and from which recovery, whether physical or psychological, can be expected to be difficult or impossible.’ This definition is included in the risk assessment model known as the DARA. I have asked Detective Superintendent ████████ to include this definition on our current risk assessment form.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation DARA cannot currently be implemented because of NICHE compatibility, contractor, training and partner-agency integration challenges.
Verbatim wording from the response “It is important to note that competing financial priorities are not the issue here. The principal challenges are compatibility with our NICHE crime recording system and the delivery of training to front line police and staff. Thames Valley Police require a contractor to initiate the changes on the NICHE system. The development of Electronic Case Files was prioritised over the implementation of DARA and that project has overrun. Any solution to this must also be compatible with other processes such as our ability to refer the information captured in our domestic abuse risk assessments in a timely fashion to other agencies with responsibilities for the protection of victims/survivors and their children, such as Children’s Social Care and colleagues in the health service. A change from DASH to DARA is a significant departure from the current process which has been in place for many years.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing training and guidance sufficiently equip frontline staff to understand domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour.
Verbatim wording from the response “I am satisfied frontline staff are equipped with sufficient training to understand domestic abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour. Thames Valley Police is committed to providing ongoing and updated training in these important areas.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Competing financial priorities are not the reason DARA has not been adopted; compatibility and training challenges are the principal barriers.
Verbatim wording from the response “I heard evidence about a new tool for risk assessing domestic abuse, created by the College of Policing. Both the senior Thames Valley Police officer and the College of Policing witness gave evidence that this system is likely to result in better risk assessment for domestic abuse. As I understand it, this new tool has not been adopted by Thames Valley Police at this time, because of competing financial priorities, and an issue with compatibility with the Niche system.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
20 May 2024 James Furlong and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report Central Criminal Court
View report summary
Concerns raised 6 Failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture View source Failure to provide an adequate and integrated response to identified risk View source Failure to address consequential risks created by inadequate intelligence dissemination View source Failure to provide adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison View source Failure to provide adequate mental healthcare in the community View source Failure to avoid discounting extremist risk because of personality disorder and PTSD symptoms View source See 3 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response An action is something this recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 14
Action
Complete delivery of the CTPHQ Interventions Welfare Training to CTPSE Prevent and Nominal Management staff during 2024.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Operate the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group to review below-threshold cases, support risk decisions and escalate cases when necessary.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Incorporate supervisory learning into quarterly reporting and disseminate applicable lessons through the Counter Terrorism Policing Intelligence Capability Board.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Implement NCIA access and associated Developed Vetting for relevant CTPSE Prevent staff.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Require senior-officer authorisation before closing repeat Prevent referrals.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Use Management Logs, searchable open actions and weekly supervisory checks to track, reallocate and evidence FIMU intelligence actions.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Develop new training for local-force call handlers and FIMU staff on CTPSE capabilities, limitations and effective information-sharing questions.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Open discussions with CTPHQ about providing a dedicated database for rapid access to information on proscribed organisations.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Complete the CTPSE Fixed Intelligence Management Unit review and identify necessary changes to resourcing, training, assessment, dissemination, supervision and monitoring.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Request a CTPHQ peer review of CTPSE FIMU after the current review concludes.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Maintain the process linking FIMU intelligence with CT Nominal Management, including immediate alerts, coordinated decision-making and appropriate case-management flags.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Operate the dedicated TVP MOSOVO department with additional MAPPA officers and digitally trained constables for Category 2 and 3 offender management.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Strengthen CTPSE FIMU supervisory checking by adding qualitative assessment of intelligence completeness and decision quality, with learning fed back to staff and the national capability board.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source
Action
Require all CTP Prevent staff to complete the CTPHQ-accredited Prevent training pathway, including its specified online and face-to-face modules.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 23 May 2024. View source See 11 more actions
×
AI-generated summary
James Furlong and 2 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
James Furlong, Joseph Ritchie-Bennett and David Wails were murdered by Khairi Saadallah in a premeditated attack in Forbury Gardens, Reading, on 20 June 2020. The principal concerns were failures by multiple bodies to assess and share intelligence about Saadallah’s risks, provide an adequate integrated response, and provide adequate mental healthcare in the community and prison; the report states these failures probably or possibly contributed to the three deaths.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide an adequate and integrated response to identified risk
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to address consequential risks created by inadequate intelligence dissemination
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide adequate mental healthcare in the community
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to avoid discounting extremist risk because of personality disorder and PTSD symptoms
Wider context from the report “The critical context of this Report is that there were notable failures on the part of multiple bodies which both probably and possibly contributed to the three deaths. These have been explained in extenso in my Factual Findings. In summary form, however, there was a failure to:
a) assess the intelligence in its entirety (there was an extensive intelligence history concerning KS’s extremism and capacity for violence) and then share the intelligence appropriately; instead – certainly on occasion – limited pieces of information only were made available, which were thereby rendered potentially misleading;
b) address the substantial consequential risks created by this lack of dissemination of the overarching intelligence picture (which included KS’s extremist views and associations, military training and violent impulsivity, which were potentiated by his personality disorder);
c) provide an adequate and integrated response to the true risk posed by KS, based on a consideration of the entirety of the relevant material; and
d) offer KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and secondary mental healthcare in prison.
The failures principally involved the Home Office, Counter Terrorism Police South-East (“CTPSE”), HMPPS, BHFT and MPFT. There were concurrent deficiencies in the approach adopted within the Prevent, Pathfinder and MAPPA schemes. A common enduring error during the relevant period was the tendency to downplay or discount KS’s extremist risk on account of his EUPD and symptoms of PTSD.
The failure to maintain and disseminate an adequate intelligence picture (the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police)
The failure to provide KS adequate mental healthcare in the community and to provide KS adequate secondary mental healthcare in prison (the Secretary of State for Justice, Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and Midlands Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust)
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete delivery of the CTPHQ Interventions Welfare Training to CTPSE Prevent and Nominal Management staff during 2024.
Verbatim wording from the response “The requirement to embed professional curiosity more consistently when dealing with potential terrorists is a theme within both Intelligence and Prevent. This is particularly relevant to the phenomenon that is often called ‘Disguised Compliance’ but is increasingly being referred to by CTP as ‘Sincerity of Change’. Training in this area forms part of the initial Prevent ‘Conversations’ module, which is delivered for Prevent staff by CTPHQ (see above). Additionally, CTPHQ ODU (Operational Development Unit) have recently released a new face-to-face training package entitled ‘Interventions Welfare Training’, which specifically focuses on Sincerity of Change.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Operate the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group to review below-threshold cases, support risk decisions and escalate cases when necessary.
Verbatim wording from the response “CTPSE have also piloted the Self-Initiated Terrorist oversight group, which is now led by a Detective Inspector. The point of it is to consider cases such as KS that fall below the threshold for coverage or intervention by MI5, to make sure they are being addressed correctly, to ensure that they sit in the right space for intervention, the cases are escalated quickly where necessary, and to provide staff with a further support in their risk assessment decision making. This approach is being rolled out in other parts of the country but it is most developed in the South East as a direct result of the Forbury Gardens attack.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Incorporate supervisory learning into quarterly reporting and disseminate applicable lessons through the Counter Terrorism Policing Intelligence Capability Board.
Verbatim wording from the response “The key points learnt from the supervisory framework will be incorporated into regular quarterly reporting cycles. This will complement the current CTP Intelligence Capability Assurance Report reporting process that looks at metrics measurable from the NCIA database and is examined at the ICB. The local review process will add qualitative learning that helps to improve decision making as well as ensuring that supervisors are compliant. This qualitative learning will then be disseminated to the ICB to ensure that any applicable lessons are learnt across the whole CTP network.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Implement NCIA access and associated Developed Vetting for relevant CTPSE Prevent staff.
Verbatim wording from the response “I acknowledge the concerns you set out regarding Prevent at §§19-21 of your regulation 28 report. The changes made or planned to the FIMU described above clearly interlock with these concerns: for example, ensuring that there is an assessment of the totality of the available evidence of sufficient quality, made available by the FIMU to Prevent staff to ensure that they can make a properly considered assessment of risk. This should ensure that Prevent staff, in future, would be aware of an individual’s links to proscribed organisations or other terrorist offenders, where this information is known by CTPSE. To support this, CTPSE has begun to implement access to NCIA (and the associated requirement for Developed Vetting) for some Prevent staff. The Prevent Gateway Team within CTPSE has also, since 2019, been co-located with the FIMU.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Require senior-officer authorisation before closing repeat Prevent referrals.
Verbatim wording from the response “You have raised a concern about how CTPSE handles repeat Prevent referrals in light of the fact that KS was referred to Prevent on four separate occasions between 2017 and 2019. CTP Prevent policy has now been amended to provide additional scrutiny to the cumulative impact of repeat referrals related to the same subject, even if the subject had been closed from Prevent previously at an early juncture without management or interventions. In such cases, Counter Terrorism Case Officers (CTCOs) and their supervisors are now required to obtain the authorisation from a senior officer (Inspector or above) before closing a ‘repeat referral’ from the case management system. This change is intended to bring added assurance that, in cases where CTP has been notified of a radicalisation risk more than once, greater scrutiny is afforded to the case circumstances and decision making within it.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Use Management Logs, searchable open actions and weekly supervisory checks to track, reallocate and evidence FIMU intelligence actions.
Verbatim wording from the response “The CTPSE FIMU review will also examine how actions are monitored and tracked within the FIMU, and how supervisory reviews take place. I am aware that the evidence heard at the Inquests indicated that actions set by or for the CTPSE FIMU were not consistently tracked or followed through. At the end of 2021, ‘Management Logs’ (MLs) were introduced to CTP FIMUs nationally to provide an easier way for FIMU assessors and supervisors to manage the intelligence development space. ‘Open actions’ on NCIA can now easily be searched for and managed accordingly. Supervisors carry out weekly checks to review and, if necessary, reallocate actions. FIMU assessors can add auditable entries to the MLs to demonstrate efforts made to complete enquiries.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop new training for local-force call handlers and FIMU staff on CTPSE capabilities, limitations and effective information-sharing questions.
Verbatim wording from the response “Second, your findings highlighted the importance of clear and timely communications between local police forces and CTPSE. I acknowledge that, as far as possible, information sharing needs to be based more consistently on an approach of ‘dare to share’, rather than ‘need to know’. This can be challenging, particularly where intelligence is sensitive, requiring ‘action on’ permissions or agreed forms of words. Nevertheless, the culture must be one that pushes the boundaries where necessary to facilitate the management of risk. CTPSE and the joint Contact Management Department of TVP and Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary have met to discuss how the passage of information between CTPSE and local forces can be enhanced.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Open discussions with CTPHQ about providing a dedicated database for rapid access to information on proscribed organisations.
Verbatim wording from the response “The CTPSE FIMU review will also consider the level of knowledge of staff in relation to proscribed groups, and how this can be enhanced. Currently, when a group is proscribed, communications are issued centrally from CTPHQ. Those staff in post at that time therefore receive an update, but this does not help individuals who join after the point of proscription. Present thinking is that having more concise guides available could help understanding in this” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Complete the CTPSE Fixed Intelligence Management Unit review and identify necessary changes to resourcing, training, assessment, dissemination, supervision and monitoring.
Verbatim wording from the response “The headline point as regards CTPSE’s management of intelligence is that a comprehensive review of CTPSE’s Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) began in March 2024, and will be completed by the end of the year. CTPSE initiated this review (the CTPSE FIMU review) in response to the issues canvassed in these Inquests. It is being carried out by CTPSE’s Head of Intelligence, an officer of Detective Superintendent rank.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Request a CTPHQ peer review of CTPSE FIMU after the current review concludes.
Verbatim wording from the response “After the CTPSE FIMU review has concluded, CTPSE will ask CTPHQ for a peer review of CTPSE FIMU to provide external scrutiny and reassurance of effective working.
As I hope is clear from the above, this CTPSE FIMU review is intended to be a wide-ranging and thorough review that covers not only the matters you have raised in the PFD report, but also builds on previous and ongoing work within both CTPSE and nationally. I can assure you that the entire chain of command within CTPSE, from myself down, is committed to implementing any necessary or desirable changes that the CTPSE FIMU review identifies.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain the process linking FIMU intelligence with CT Nominal Management, including immediate alerts, coordinated decision-making and appropriate case-management flags.
Verbatim wording from the response “I would also like to draw to your attention the increased sharing of information between CTPSE’s Intelligence function and its Nominal Management Team (NMT), which forms part of its Interventions function. Both the CT Nominal Management (CTNM) Manual of Guidance and the national Prevent process require compliance with the National Standards of Intelligence Management (NSIM) which requires submission of intelligence back into FIMUs as part of the intelligence cycle. This ensures visibility of individuals subject to Prevent or CTNM within the intelligence space.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Operate the dedicated TVP MOSOVO department with additional MAPPA officers and digitally trained constables for Category 2 and 3 offender management.
Verbatim wording from the response “In 2022, TVP created a dedicated Management of Sexual or Violent Offenders (MOSOVO) department to ensure there was structured and consistent management of Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs), as well as those being managed under Category 2 or 3 (violent offenders) of MAPPA. MOSOVO received an uplift of staff which created an additional Detective Inspector, one Detective Sergeant and four Constable posts. The sole role for these constable posts is to focus on Category 2 and 3 offenders. These staff are referred to as MAPPA officers. In addition to this uplift to TVP’s MAPPA capacity, a further four constable posts have been created for officers are specially trained in digital capability who can, for example, assist with searching for individuals who may be ‘wanted’.
Most of TVP’s MAPPA work relates to the management of RSOs, of whom there are more than 1,000 in the TVP area.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Strengthen CTPSE FIMU supervisory checking by adding qualitative assessment of intelligence completeness and decision quality, with learning fed back to staff and the national capability board.
Verbatim wording from the response “Across CTP, supervisory reviews are now carried out on a set percentage of FIMU assessments. It is not possible to review all assessments due to the volume, so a ‘dip checking’” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Require all CTP Prevent staff to complete the CTPHQ-accredited Prevent training pathway, including its specified online and face-to-face modules.
Verbatim wording from the response “To address the weaknesses in training in Prevent, it is now a requirement that all CTP Prevent staff undergo a CTPHQ-accredited training pathway. This training aims to build on existing policing expertise, whilst providing additional knowledge, skills, and awareness for the CTP context. The National Interventions Foundation Programme (NIFP) has four online modules, one day face-to-face on the assessment framework and one day face-to-face on welfare/disguised compliance. An interactive exercise will be included in the NIFP but is still under development at the time of writing. While the NIFP and its training courses are signed off/accredited by CTPHQ, there is no official external accreditation for the content of those courses.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation All FIMU assessments cannot be reviewed because of assessment volumes, so a percentage-based dip-checking regime is used.
Verbatim wording from the response “Across CTP, supervisory reviews are now carried out on a set percentage of FIMU assessments. It is not possible to review all assessments due to the volume, so a ‘dip checking’” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
Concerns raised 3 Failure to condition firearms licensing delegation on adequate training View source Absence of a mandatory requirement for role-specific firearms licensing training View source Lack of nationally accredited training for firearms licensing staff View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Maxine Betty Davison and 4 others · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On 12 August 2021, Jake Davison used a lawfully held shotgun to kill his mother, Maxine Davison, and four other people in Keyham, Plymouth. The inquest identified serious failures in firearms licensing, including inadequate training, governance, supervision, scrutiny, information gathering and decisions to grant and return the shotgun certificate. The report expressed particular concern about the continuing lack of nationally accredited and mandatory training for firearms licensing staff and the risk of incorrect licensing decisions and future deaths.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to condition firearms licensing delegation on adequate training
Wider context from the report “I am concerned that there is an urgent need to develop a national accredited training for FELU staff that covers how to apply the relevant Home Office Guidance on firearms licencing including, in particular, training in assessing the suitability of applicants to be granted a licence. The development of such accredited training is vitally important to achieve consistency and drive up standards.
I am concerned that there is currently no requirement or guidance that FELU staff should undergo mandatory training. I am also concerned that there is currently no requirement that Chief Officers of Police may only delegate decision making authority regarding issuing firearms licences to a person who has undergone adequate training .
Whilst I acknowledged that the current NPCC lead for firearms licencing is now working with the College of Policing and others to develop the required training, I am concerned to ensure that the momentum to effect change after the horrific tragedy in Keyham should not be lost, as it has been in respect of lessons and recommendations over the past 27 years.
I am therefore reporting the matters above to:
The NPCC lead for firearms licencing and all other Chief Constables in England and Wales
So that each Chief Constable is made aware of my concern that, that despite the many recommendations made over the past 27 years, there continues to be a lack of nationally accredited training for their FELU staff.
I also report my concern that in the absence of such the training there is a risk that the Statutory Guidance is not being appropriately applied by FELU staff today, and so each Chief Constable may need to take steps to satisfy themselves that (i) adequate local training, of a satisfactory standard has been universally delivered to all their FELU staff and supervisors in applying the Home Office Guidance on Firearms Licencing Law (published in November 2022) and the revised Statutory Guidance for Chief officers of Police (published in February 2023) and (ii) they have only delegated decision making to persons who have undergone adequate training in firearms licencing and in applying that recent Guidance.
The College of Policing (CoP)
So that the College of Policing is made aware of my concern that
(1) despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, and the earlier requests made specifically to the College of Policing asking for such training to be developed, no accredited training as yet exists.
(2) neither the current CoP APP guidance on firearms nor the proposed update (which I am assured is still under consultation) includes any requirement that FELU staff are trained in firearms licencing generally or trained in conducting suitability assessments in particular.
The Home Secretary and The Minister of State for Crime, Policing and Fire
So that they may be made aware of my concern that despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, beginning with the Cullen report in 1996:
(i) successive governments appear to have failed to ensure that any guidance is produced that makes having training in firearms licencing generally (and in conducting suitability assessments in particular) mandatory for all FELU staff;
(ii) there appears to be no requirement that Chief Officers of Police should only delegate authority to issue and revoke licences to officers and staff who have completed adequate (and preferably nationally accredited) training .
I am concerned that the lack of accredited training combined with the absence of a mandatory requirement for all those making firearms licensing decisions to undertake adequate training for their role increases the risk of incorrect decision making and, consequently, increases the risk of future deaths.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Absence of a mandatory requirement for role-specific firearms licensing training
Wider context from the report “I am concerned that there is an urgent need to develop a national accredited training for FELU staff that covers how to apply the relevant Home Office Guidance on firearms licencing including, in particular, training in assessing the suitability of applicants to be granted a licence. The development of such accredited training is vitally important to achieve consistency and drive up standards.
I am concerned that there is currently no requirement or guidance that FELU staff should undergo mandatory training . I am also concerned that there is currently no requirement that Chief Officers of Police may only delegate decision making authority regarding issuing firearms licences to a person who has undergone adequate training.
Whilst I acknowledged that the current NPCC lead for firearms licencing is now working with the College of Policing and others to develop the required training, I am concerned to ensure that the momentum to effect change after the horrific tragedy in Keyham should not be lost, as it has been in respect of lessons and recommendations over the past 27 years.
I am therefore reporting the matters above to:
The NPCC lead for firearms licencing and all other Chief Constables in England and Wales
So that each Chief Constable is made aware of my concern that, that despite the many recommendations made over the past 27 years, there continues to be a lack of nationally accredited training for their FELU staff.
I also report my concern that in the absence of such the training there is a risk that the Statutory Guidance is not being appropriately applied by FELU staff today, and so each Chief Constable may need to take steps to satisfy themselves that (i) adequate local training, of a satisfactory standard has been universally delivered to all their FELU staff and supervisors in applying the Home Office Guidance on Firearms Licencing Law (published in November 2022) and the revised Statutory Guidance for Chief officers of Police (published in February 2023) and (ii) they have only delegated decision making to persons who have undergone adequate training in firearms licencing and in applying that recent Guidance.
The College of Policing (CoP)
So that the College of Policing is made aware of my concern that
(1) despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, and the earlier requests made specifically to the College of Policing asking for such training to be developed, no accredited training as yet exists.
(2) neither the current CoP APP guidance on firearms nor the proposed update (which I am assured is still under consultation) includes any requirement that FELU staff are trained in firearms licencing generally or trained in conducting suitability assessments in particular .
The Home Secretary and The Minister of State for Crime, Policing and Fire
So that they may be made aware of my concern that despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, beginning with the Cullen report in 1996:
(i) successive governments appear to have failed to ensure that any guidance is produced that makes having training in firearms licencing generally (and in conducting suitability assessments in particular) mandatory for all FELU staff ;
(ii) there appears to be no requirement that Chief Officers of Police should only delegate authority to issue and revoke licences to officers and staff who have completed adequate (and preferably nationally accredited) training.
I am concerned that the lack of accredited training combined with the absence of a mandatory requirement for all those making firearms licensing decisions to undertake adequate training for their role increases the risk of incorrect decision making and, consequently, increases the risk of future deaths.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of nationally accredited training for firearms licensing staff
Wider context from the report “I am concerned that there is an urgent need to develop a national accredited training for FELU staff that covers how to apply the relevant Home Office Guidance on firearms licencing including, in particular, training in assessing the suitability of applicants to be granted a licence. The development of such accredited training is vitally important to achieve consistency and drive up standards.
I am concerned that there is currently no requirement or guidance that FELU staff should undergo mandatory training. I am also concerned that there is currently no requirement that Chief Officers of Police may only delegate decision making authority regarding issuing firearms licences to a person who has undergone adequate training.
Whilst I acknowledged that the current NPCC lead for firearms licencing is now working with the College of Policing and others to develop the required training, I am concerned to ensure that the momentum to effect change after the horrific tragedy in Keyham should not be lost, as it has been in respect of lessons and recommendations over the past 27 years.
I am therefore reporting the matters above to:
The NPCC lead for firearms licencing and all other Chief Constables in England and Wales
So that each Chief Constable is made aware of my concern that, that despite the many recommendations made over the past 27 years, there continues to be a lack of nationally accredited training for their FELU staff .
I also report my concern that in the absence of such the training there is a risk that the Statutory Guidance is not being appropriately applied by FELU staff today, and so each Chief Constable may need to take steps to satisfy themselves that (i) adequate local training, of a satisfactory standard has been universally delivered to all their FELU staff and supervisors in applying the Home Office Guidance on Firearms Licencing Law (published in November 2022) and the revised Statutory Guidance for Chief officers of Police (published in February 2023) and (ii) they have only delegated decision making to persons who have undergone adequate training in firearms licencing and in applying that recent Guidance.
The College of Policing (CoP)
So that the College of Policing is made aware of my concern that
(1) despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, and the earlier requests made specifically to the College of Policing asking for such training to be developed, no accredited training as yet exists .
(2) neither the current CoP APP guidance on firearms nor the proposed update (which I am assured is still under consultation) includes any requirement that FELU staff are trained in firearms licencing generally or trained in conducting suitability assessments in particular.
The Home Secretary and The Minister of State for Crime, Policing and Fire
So that they may be made aware of my concern that despite the repeated recommendations being made over the past 27 years, beginning with the Cullen report in 1996:
(i) successive governments appear to have failed to ensure that any guidance is produced that makes having training in firearms licencing generally (and in conducting suitability assessments in particular) mandatory for all FELU staff;
(ii) there appears to be no requirement that Chief Officers of Police should only delegate authority to issue and revoke licences to officers and staff who have completed adequate (and preferably nationally accredited) training.
I am concerned that the lack of accredited training combined with the absence of a mandatory requirement for all those making firearms licensing decisions to undertake adequate training for their role increases the risk of incorrect decision making and, consequently, increases the risk of future deaths.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Operational demands and resources prevent immediate full implementation of the Coroner’s recommendations, requiring staged completion.
Verbatim wording from the response “Thames Valley Police will comply with the Coroners recommendations in the following stages due to operational demands and resources:” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
15 Dec 2022 Neal Terence Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report Berkshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 8 Inconsistent terminology for the ABD umbrella term across services View source Lack of paramedic guidance on the danger of prolonged restraint View source Lack of guidance defining prolonged restraint View source Lack of checking of infrequently used guidance View source Incorrect training about ambulance response categorisation for ABD View source Failure of classroom-based ABD training to be retained and embedded View source Unclear applicability of restraint guidance to people under arrest View source Incorrect training about chemical sedation by first responding ambulance staff View source See 5 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
Actions described in response An action is something this recipient says it has done, is doing, or plans to do in response to the concern raised. 6
Action
Introduce the College of Policing’s new two-day PPST training and assessment reaccreditation programme for TVP personnel.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source
Action
Incorporate organisational-learning content into First Aid and Medics training, with written knowledge and practical-skills assessment.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source
Action
Brief contact-management staff and deliver dedicated training on ABD recognition, medical emergencies, accurate ambulance communication, incident logging, and proactive restraint-safety prompts.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source
Action
Update ABD and restraint training materials to clarify containment, ambulance response expectations, medical emergency status, and prohibited chemical-sedation references.
Stated completedThe respondent said that this action was complete when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source
Action
Update initial PPST and First Aid training programmes with ABD and restraint material, written testing, and practical-skills assessment.
Stated in progressThe respondent said that this action was in progress when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source
Action
Deliver the interim PST Mod 1 reaccreditation package with ABD, restraint, de-escalation, medical-emergency, communication, scenario, and written-test components.
Stated plannedThe respondent said that this action was planned when they made their response on 19 December 2022. View source See 3 more actions
×
AI-generated summary
Neal Terence Saunders · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Neal Terence Saunders was restrained by police for 58 minutes, including 14 minutes in a prone position, after police attended his address following an assault report and concerns about recent cocaine use and paranoid behaviour. He suffered a cardiac arrest while being transported to hospital and died there on 4 September 2020. Concerns included inadequate guidance and training about prolonged restraint, ambulance response expectations, prone transportation, and coordination and training between police and ambulance services.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inconsistent terminology for the ABD umbrella term across services
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of paramedic guidance on the danger of prolonged restraint
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of guidance defining prolonged restraint
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint , and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of checking of infrequently used guidance
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed . The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Incorrect training about ambulance response categorisation for ABD
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of classroom-based ABD training to be retained and embedded
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received . I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively .
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded ?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unclear applicability of restraint guidance to people under arrest
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified ).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Incorrect training about chemical sedation by first responding ambulance staff
Wider context from the report “Brief summary of matters of concern
Police training
There was extensive BWV footage in this case, which both I and the jury were able to see multiple times. It appeared to me, and (presumably) to the jury, (given their conclusion), that the officers at the scene were trying to take Neal’s welfare into account. The real issue was around their training. Whilst there may not have been any realistic or practicable alternative to restraining Neal, at least initially, it was clear from the evidence that none of the officers recalled their training which had told them that “prolonged” restraint should be avoided.
The training gives no guidance as to what constitutes “prolonged” restraint, and this an issue which the jury highlighted. There are also a number of concerns regarding College of Policing training in this respect.
The key concerns around training can be summarised as follows:-
1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?
2. One of the witnesses questioned whether the guidelines applied at all if somebody is under arrest, particularly regarding “contain rather than restraint”. Given that these are police guidelines, it seems to me likely that they would apply, whether a person is arrested for public order offences or other matters (but that should be clarified).
3. The College of Policing slides regarding ABD state that a “Cat 1 call” should be made to the ambulance service. The slides go on to say that the ambulance service should respond to ABD as a “category 1” [response]. It is clear that categorisation would be a matter for the ambulance service rather than the police, and this training may result in inappropriate expectations on behalf of officers at scene, who are expecting an ambulance to arrive more quickly that it in fact does. This in turn could affect their decision making.
4. The guidelines also refer to providing “chemical sedation”. This appears to me to indicate an incorrect understanding of what is likely to be done medically by a first responding paramedic or emergency care assistant.
5. It was interesting to note that the parts of the training the officers did seem to remember were around when the training was provided in a very physical way (around positions for restraint etc.) and the final slide “ABD = A&B”. It appears that the more “classroom based” training is less well received. I understand that the College of Policing is changing its methods, and it may be that an educational consultant with policing background could assist with this in trying to achieve training which will stick with those being trained more effectively.
6. Is there a better way for the College of Policing to ensure that the training has worked and is embedded?
Training generally
I raise 2 points here:
1. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used
2. Joint training with ambulance services
Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing will be aware of my Regulation 28 report dated 9th July 2019, following the death of Leroy Medford in 2017.
I raised a number of concerns about police training, and received responses from Thames Valley Police and the College of Policing. These are publicly accessible documents on the Chief Coroner’s website.
I am concerned that the issues raised around training in that report have been insufficiently addressed. The only substantive change appears to relate to better remote access to guidance.
In both inquests, the guidance was in relation to a matter which is not commonly faced by police officers.
Whilst I consider ABD training could and should be improved, I accept that there has to be proportionality, given that officers will require training in a number of areas, some of which are far more frequently relevant than this.
In addition to achieving better training, I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police nationally), should consider a change of approach. I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with. I fully appreciate that this will need to have a “where practicable” caveat, since that will not always be operationally possible. In this case, however, there was ample time for an officer to check. One of the officers is heard saying words to the effect of “there is nothing more we can do here”, whilst waiting for the ambulance to arrive.
I consider that Thames Valley Police (and police forces nationally) should consider not only requiring officers to do this wherever possible, but also for control to remind teams to do this or assist them with that. It would be best practice for this to be recorded on the log as having been completed. This could be achieved by a phone call to a senior officer, or by checking guidance directly.
It was suggested by the Medical Director of South Central Ambulance Service that police and ambulance services should work together in reviewing their policies and perhaps train together as well. This is something I would endorse completely.
Ambulance issues
One of the reasons that I consider that joint training would be more effective is that it would appear (based on the evidence I heard at least), that police are potentially given more training on ABD than paramedics. We heard, for instance, that police training includes reference to prolonged restraint being dangerous. The paramedic evidence we heard indicated that this was not known by them, and not referred to in JRCALC guidance.
I consider that the JRCALC guidelines should be reviewed to account for this, and potentially to recommend that paramedic staff be encouraged to ask how long somebody has been restrained for when they arrive, as this may affect their management.
There should also be care taken regarding terminology, to ensure that all services refer to this umbrella term using the same terminology.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce the College of Policing’s new two-day PPST training and assessment reaccreditation programme for TVP personnel.
Verbatim wording from the response “• In April 2023, the College of Policing are introducing a new PPST 2-day training and assessment re-accreditation programme for all Forces nationally. The new programme will be based around six scenarios to aid officer’s learning and the retention of knowledge and skills. Forces have until the end of March 2024 to introduce the new programme, which is due to go live in TVP on 14th November 2023.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Incorporate organisational-learning content into First Aid and Medics training, with written knowledge and practical-skills assessment.
Verbatim wording from the response “• To reinforce the organisational learning further, TVP will also ensure that additional training material is included within all First Aid and Medics training programmes from the 1st May 2023. This will ensure that Officers and Staff who have direct contact with the public will receive key aspects of this learning within both their mandatory training inputs (PPST) and First Aid re-accreditation, i.e. twice in any year).” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Brief contact-management staff and deliver dedicated training on ABD recognition, medical emergencies, accurate ambulance communication, incident logging, and proactive restraint-safety prompts.
Verbatim wording from the response “Contact Management Training” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Update ABD and restraint training materials to clarify containment, ambulance response expectations, medical emergency status, and prohibited chemical-sedation references.
Verbatim wording from the response “material on this issue has been updated to ensure that Officers understand this point.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Update initial PPST and First Aid training programmes with ABD and restraint material, written testing, and practical-skills assessment.
Verbatim wording from the response “Initial Training (Police Officer, Police Community Support Officer, Special Constable, Detention Officer):” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Deliver the interim PST Mod 1 reaccreditation package with ABD, restraint, de-escalation, medical-emergency, communication, scenario, and written-test components.
Verbatim wording from the response “• Before the introduction of the new CoP PPST programme, TVP will be re-accrediting Officers and Staff who require re-accreditation prior to November with an updated training package. Delivery of the new 1-day package (called PST Mod 1) will start on 2nd March 2023 through to November 2023.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Joint police and ambulance training is difficult to achieve because of current recruitment pressures and operational demand volumes.
Verbatim wording from the response “8. Joint training with ambulance services” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation There is no fixed definition of prolonged restraint because physiological changes vary between individuals and situations.
Verbatim wording from the response “1. How long is “prolonged” restraint?” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Mandating periodic review of all infrequently used guidance is impracticable because of the volume of guidance materials.
Verbatim wording from the response “7. Checking of guidance which is infrequently used” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing briefing, training and guidance communication mechanisms address identified risks without requiring universal periodic guidance review.
Verbatim wording from the response “• In response to the Reg. 28 section which states ‘I consider that police officers should be mandated to review guidance (whether APP guidance or otherwise) in any scenario that they have not (or not recently) dealt with’, we have considered whether it would be practicable to mandate officers to periodically review what amounts to 282 SNAP Guides, 222 Operational Guidance notes, and APP covering a 24 areas. Given the high volume of this guidance, this has not been deemed practicable.” Source location Response from Thames Valley Police
Open published response
14 Dec 2021 Hedley Frederick ROBINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report Milton Keynes
View report summary
Concerns raised 2 Failure to discuss S. 136 Mental Health Act assessments with relevant police officers and other involved care professionals View source Failure to ensure that S. 136 Mental Health Act assessments use full information held by relevant services View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Hedley Frederick ROBINSON · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Hedley Frederick ROBINSON died on 14 April 2019 after sustaining multiple stab wounds inflicted in Newport Pagnell on 24 March 2019. The concern identified was that a Mental Health Act section 136 assessment was conducted without full information or discussion with relevant senior police officers and others involved in the assailant’s care, prompting concern about the operation of section 136 procedures in Milton Keynes.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to discuss S. 136 Mental Health Act assessments with relevant police officers and other involved care professionals
Wider context from the report “I am concerned that the S. 136 Mental Health Act assessment was conducted without full information held by CNWL or discussion with senior police officers and others who had been involved in the care of the deceased’s assailant . There needs to be an urgent review of the operation of S. 136 procedures in Milton Keynes.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure that S. 136 Mental Health Act assessments use full information held by relevant services
Wider context from the report “I am concerned that the S. 136 Mental Health Act assessment was conducted without full information held by CNWL or discussion with senior police officers and others who had been involved in the care of the deceased’s assailant. There needs to be an urgent review of the operation of S. 136 procedures in Milton Keynes.
” Open source report
9 Jul 2019 Leroy Dacosta Junior Medford · Prevention of Future Deaths report Berkshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 7 Insufficient protected training time for police officers View source Failure of officers to know the drugs SOP requirement for an officer to be within the cell with the detained person View source Failure to safely prioritise the volume and frequency of police training updates View source Lack of easy digital access to, and efficient updating and storage of, police procedures and policies View source Failure to monitor whether police training has been taken up View source Failure to encourage officers to consult infrequently used SOPs and guidance View source Failure of the police training system to disseminate training effectively and safely View source See 4 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Leroy Dacosta Junior Medford · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Leroy Dacosta Junior Medford, referred to as Junior, was arrested by Thames Valley Police on 1 April 2017 and detained under the drugs SOP after being suspected of concealing drugs. His condition deteriorated in his cell, and resuscitation was unsuccessful; the recorded cause of death was heroin (diamorphine) toxicity. The principal concerns were that officers of all ranks involved did not know that the SOP required observation from inside the cell, and broader concerns about how police training is delivered, monitored, prioritised and taken up.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient protected training time for police officers
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service. I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe.
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this . Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up, and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly.
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised. There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of officers to know the drugs SOP requirement for an officer to be within the cell with the detained person
Wider context from the report “The Drugs SOP
One of the reasons that the drugs SOP was introduced by Thames Valley Police on 1st July 2016 was to prevent exactly what happened in this case. That is (one of) the reasons that the SOP requires an officer to observe from within the cell.
We heard that the SOP was circulated to all police officers in July 2016. Custody Sergeants were asked to carry out online training on this in the same month. Clearly no officer would be expected to know any SOP word for word, but these are available to be looked at on computers within the custody suite.
A key requirement of the drugs SOP is the requirement for an officer to be within the cell with the detained person.
What has concerned me in this case is that not 1 or 2 officers were unaware of this requirement. All officers – of all ranks – who were involved with Junior on the night of 1st April 2017 were unaware of this requirement.
I was however satisfied that additional training and awareness has now taken place around this particular SOP. It is a SOP that is used more frequently now.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to safely prioritise the volume and frequency of police training updates
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service. I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe.
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this. Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up, and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly.
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised . There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of easy digital access to, and efficient updating and storage of, police procedures and policies
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service. I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe.
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this. Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up, and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly.
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised. There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to monitor whether police training has been taken up
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service. I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe.
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this. Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up , and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly.
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised. There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to encourage officers to consult infrequently used SOPs and guidance
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service. I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe.
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this. Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up, and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly .
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised. There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of the police training system to disseminate training effectively and safely
Wider context from the report “Concern Regarding Future Training
My concern is a broader one – around how training is disseminated and monitored within the police service . I am satisfied that this is an issue that does not only relate to Thames Valley Police.
We heard that the police, like many services and professions, are given regular updates and training, in various formats. It is reasonable to suggest that different people learn in different ways. What this case has illustrated however, is that the current system is not effective or safe .
That may be partly because of the pressures on the service. It may be that officers are not given sufficient protected training time to do this. Training is given in many, varied ways. Much of this is on-line.
I consider that there should be a national review and debate about the way in which training is delivered to police officers across the country. There should be consideration given to how police forces reassure themselves that training has not just been offered, but has been taken up, and that officers are encouraged to consult SOPs and other guidance that they do not use regularly.
This would of course require easy access, digitally, to these procedures and efficient updating and storage of these policies for officers to review.
It is a matter for the respondents to this letter to consider the volume of training issued to police officers, and whether this can be safely prioritised. There is perhaps a risk of lack of urgency if training updates are given too frequently.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce Local Police Area points of contact to communicate new guidance and encourage staff review.
Verbatim wording from the response “It is accepted that TVP have had challenges to communicate with all front line staff to ensure they are aware of guidance and update themselves on it, especially when they are performing an unfamiliar role. To counter this the Policing Strategy Unit have introduced Special Points of Contact or ‘SPOCs’ from within the team on each Local Police Area so they can build relationships with local staff. This will assist with communications locally when new guidance is produced so staff are aware of its existence and are encouraged to review it.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Establish governance and service-improvement units responsible for developing accessible, role-specific operational guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “In April 2017 TVP established the Governance & Service Improvement department. Headed by a Chief Superintendent, it consists of 4 separate units, Governance, Service Improvement, Policing Strategy and Change. The Policing Strategy Unit (PSU), Headed by a Detective Superintendent is responsible, amongst other things for the development of simple, up to date and easily accessible operational guidance for front line staff. The operational guidance is developed in layers so staff can access the guidance that is relevant to their particular role. This is built in a ‘Wikipedia’ style so if staff wish to understand more they can click on links to navigate to more detailed explanations of subject matter relevant to the guidance.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Introduce a video briefing demonstrating appropriate drugs-toilet use and close observation of detainees on the drugs protocol.
Verbatim wording from the response “○ Officers working on a cell watch deployment now receive a specific briefing from the custody sergeant. This is recorded once received and to improve standardisation and to avoid any essence of doubt, TVP are now creating a video clip to be played to all officers on cell watch for those on the drugs protocol providing a visible representation of how to use the drugs toilet appropriately and how best to conduct such close watch on a detained person. We believe this is the first time this methodology has been used in the country.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Update drugs-recovery standard operating procedures into simpler, role-specific operational guidance.
Verbatim wording from the response “The drugs recovery SOP was updated into the new format in July 2019. Prior to this and at the time of the death of Mr Medford this was contained in a Standard Operating Procedure which was long and difficult to both access and understand from an operational officers perspective. The new, simpler guidance is far easier to access and simplified down to the responsibilities of officers role. As an example there is a section headed “observing the detainee” which sets out the responsibilities of those conducting a cell watch.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop access to simplified operational guidance through officers’ mobile phones.
Verbatim wording from the response “TVP are also developing ways to ensure simple guidance is available on officer’s mobile phones so they can access it in methods that are aligned with modern technology and societal demand.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide recorded custody-sergeant briefings to officers deployed on cell watch.
Verbatim wording from the response “○ Officers working on a cell watch deployment now receive a specific briefing from the custody sergeant. This is recorded once received and to improve standardisation and to avoid any essence of doubt, TVP are now creating a video clip to be played to all officers on cell watch for those on the drugs protocol providing a visible representation of how to use the drugs toilet appropriately and how best to conduct such close watch on a detained person. We believe this is the first time this methodology has been used in the country.” Source location 2019-0233-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
7 Mar 2019 Simon Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report Oxfordshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 1 Inadequate partnership agreement coverage for mental health crisis situations View source
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Simon Robinson · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Simon Robinson died at home on 2 February 2018 after stabbing himself in the neck with a kitchen knife during a psychotic episode. His wife’s 999 call requesting police attendance was incorrectly graded, resulting in a delayed response. The principal concern was that the partnership agreement between police and mental health services did not adequately cover mental health crises in private places, including the expected initial police response when there is a fear for welfare or safety.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate partnership agreement coverage for mental health crisis situations
Wider context from the report “The concern that I have is mirrored in Chief Superintendent Bunt’s statement paragraph 57 where it states that the current partnership agreement does not adequately cover incidents such as this one . The problem is not uncommon situation where a person is experiencing a mental health crisis and there is an imminent need for agencies to respond. If the person is experiencing the mental health crisis is in their home or another private place, police powers are limited. I recognise there is a requirement to work in partnership with other agencies but the primary responsibility to respond when there is a fear for welfare or safety rests with the police. It should be the expectation therefore that the police will respond initially to deal with matters until other agencies are able to respond and take over if appropriate. It is concerning that there is a gap in the partnership agreement for a crisis situation such as this .
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Review the interagency partnership protocol to address crisis-response gaps.
Verbatim wording from the response “The Interagency Partnership Agreement (Protocol), between Thames Valley Police (TVP) and Social Care agencies has been carefully considered and reviewed to address the concerns which have been raised.” Source location 2019-0176-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Multi-agency Protocol changes cannot be implemented until all parties have fully agreed them.
Verbatim wording from the response “A strategic Mental Health partners meeting was held on 2nd April 2019. The recommended amendments were disseminated to all relevant Mental Health and NHS Agencies for consultation at this meeting. A response is expected from all agencies by 30th April 2019. The Protocol must be fully agreed by all parties before any changes are implemented.” Source location 2019-0176-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
15 Jul 2014 Stephen Peter Church · Prevention of Future Deaths report Berkshire
View report summary
Concerns raised 4 Lack of joint working to address high self-harm risk promptly View source Insufficient knowledge and understanding of the interagency mental health working protocol View source Breakdown of the British Transport Police chain of command for detention responsibilities View source Lack of appreciation of the need to contact an approved mental health professional promptly for a Mental Health Act assessment View source See 1 more concern
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Stephen Peter Church · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Stephen Church was found dead at the entrance to the multi-storey car park at Royal Berkshire Hospital on 13 May 2011 after absconding while detained under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The concerns included a broken chain of command resulting in only one police officer being responsible for his detention, insufficient understanding of an interagency working protocol, inadequate joint working to keep him safe, and delay in contacting an approved mental health professional to arrange a Mental Health Act assessment.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of joint working to address high self-harm risk promptly
Wider context from the report “(3) There was a lack of joint working amongst the British Transport Police, Royal Berkshire Hospital and psychiatric liaison service staff members to ensure that Stephen Church was safe and the high risk of him self-harming addressed promptly .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient knowledge and understanding of the interagency mental health working protocol
Wider context from the report “(2) There was insufficient knowledge and understanding amongst members of the psychiatric liaison service and the Royal Berkshire Hospital as regards the "Interagency joint Working Protocol for the Management of Mental Health Thames Valley Area"
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Breakdown of the British Transport Police chain of command for detention responsibilities
Wider context from the report “(1) The chain of command within the British Transport Police was broken unacceptably leading to only one police officer responsible for detaining Mr Church .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to Thames Valley Police; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of appreciation of the need to contact an approved mental health professional promptly for a Mental Health Act assessment
Wider context from the report “There was a lack of appreciation amongst the psychiatric liaison service, Royal Berkshire Hospital staff and British Transport Police as to the importance of contacting an approved mental health professional promptly to arrange a Mental Health Act assessment .
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inform police staff to promote partner organisations’ awareness of the protocol and support understanding of their respective responsibilities during incidents.
Verbatim wording from the response “The specific concern raised by Mr Sidhu that related to the protocol suggests that there was insufficient knowledge and understanding about it among staff members of the psychiatric liaison service and the Royal Berkshire Hospital. Thames Valley Police has no direct responsibility or influence for their understanding as responsibility for dissemination and training of the protocol lies with the individual organisations concerned. However, once the amended version has been agreed, Thames Valley Police is committed to work together with the other organisations named within the Regulation 28 report to assist with joint training and awareness. Our own staff will be informed of the need to ensure that other organisations are aware of its existence whenever an incident occurs and to support partner agencies in understanding the individual responsibilities.” Source location 2014-0331-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Coordinate consultation and completion of the amended interagency protocol for managing mental-health-related Section 136 detentions.
Verbatim wording from the response “Thames Valley Police were not directly involved in the original incident involving Mr Church, his detention under S136 Mental Health Act nor his subsequent care prior to his death on 13th May 2011. However, as the force lead in Mental Health for Thames Valley Police I take responsibility for co-ordinating the publication of an interagency joint working protocol for managing mental health in the Thames Valley Area. This protocol was subject to discussion during the inquest.” Source location 2014-0331-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Make every effort to ensure British Transport Police understands the Thames Valley mental-health protocol.
Verbatim wording from the response “While British Transport Police have indicated that they are unable to be signatories to individual protocols as they are a National Force, Thames Valley Police will make every effort to ensure their awareness and understanding of the Thames Valley protocol.” Source location 2014-0331-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Work with partner organisations to deliver joint training and awareness on the amended protocol after it is agreed.
Verbatim wording from the response “The specific concern raised by Mr Sidhu that related to the protocol suggests that there was insufficient knowledge and understanding about it among staff members of the psychiatric liaison service and the Royal Berkshire Hospital. Thames Valley Police has no direct responsibility or influence for their understanding as responsibility for dissemination and training of the protocol lies with the individual organisations concerned. However, once the amended version has been agreed, Thames Valley Police is committed to work together with the other organisations named within the Regulation 28 report to assist with joint training and awareness. Our own staff will be informed of the need to ensure that other organisations are aware of its existence whenever an incident occurs and to support partner agencies in understanding the individual responsibilities.” Source location 2014-0331-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Responsibility for disseminating and training staff on the protocol lies with the individual organisations, not Thames Valley Police.
Verbatim wording from the response “The specific concern raised by Mr Sidhu that related to the protocol suggests that there was insufficient knowledge and understanding about it among staff members of the psychiatric liaison service and the Royal Berkshire Hospital. Thames Valley Police has no direct responsibility or influence for their understanding as responsibility for dissemination and training of the protocol lies with the individual organisations concerned. However, once the amended version has been agreed, Thames Valley Police is committed to work together with the other organisations named within the Regulation 28 report to assist with joint training and awareness. Our own staff will be informed of the need to ensure that other organisations are aware of its existence whenever an incident occurs and to support partner agencies in understanding the individual responsibilities.” Source location 2014-0331-Response-by-Thames-Valley-Police
Open published response
Pin
Request correction
Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations