20 Aug 2024 Hannah Enola Ayamo Jacobs · Prevention of Future Deaths report East London
View report summary
Concerns raised 5 Allergy plans failing to distinguish lip swelling as a potential anaphylaxis symptom View source Insufficient education of parents and patients on safe AAI use when in doubt View source Failure to recognise inability to swallow as a sign of anaphylaxis in dental settings View source Lack of sufficiently clear distinction between anaphylactic and mild reactions View source Unavailability of AAI stock in chemists for emergencies View source See 2 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Hannah Enola Ayamo Jacobs · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Hannah Enola Ayamo Jacobs, aged 13, developed anaphylactic symptoms after being served a dairy hot chocolate despite her reported dairy allergy and later died following cardiac arrest. The concerns included dental staff not recognising excessive salivation as inability to swallow and a sign of anaphylaxis, possible misunderstanding of symptoms by her mother, and the availability and use of adrenaline auto-injectors during shortages.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Allergy plans failing to distinguish lip swelling as a potential anaphylaxis symptom
Wider context from the report “• The other symptom Hannah demonstrated was swelling of her lips which is listed on allergy plans as a mild to moderate symptom and thus provided a false sense of reassurance to her mother that cetirizine was what she needed.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient education of parents and patients on safe AAI use when in doubt
Wider context from the report “• The risk of future deaths in the context of anaphylaxis remains in the absence of further consideration of what constitutes an anaphylactic reaction as opposed to a mild reaction, and the education of parents and patients of the safety of using AAIs (adrenaline auto injectors) IF IN DOUBT .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to recognise inability to swallow as a sign of anaphylaxis in dental settings
Wider context from the report “• The evidence at the inquest referred to allergy action plans discussed in the healthcare settings and given to parents and patients. Hannah displayed what appeared to be excessive salivation at the dentist which her paediatric consultant (who gave evidence) said, with the benefit of hindsight was actually a manifestation of her inability to swallow. This is a sign of anaphylaxis This was not recognised by dental staff as an inability to swallow and thus of anaphylaxis.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of sufficiently clear distinction between anaphylactic and mild reactions
Wider context from the report “• The risk of future deaths in the context of anaphylaxis remains in the absence of further consideration of what constitutes an anaphylactic reaction as opposed to a mild reaction , and the education of parents and patients of the safety of using AAIs (adrenaline auto injectors) IF IN DOUBT.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Unavailability of AAI stock in chemists for emergencies
Wider context from the report “• I was made aware there had been a shortage of AAI at the time but a vial of adrenaline was available at the chemist. However, it takes time to draw up. I am not sure if (assuming no national shortage) all chemists have AAI in stock for emergencies .
” Open source report
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop an online allergy education platform covering anaphylaxis recognition, symptoms and management for healthcare and non-healthcare professionals.
Verbatim wording from the response “The BSACI Allergy Action Plans do state that difficulty swallowing is a manifestation of anaphylaxis. These plans were developed with allergy healthcare professionals and patient representatives. The BSACI is developing an online allergy education platform for all healthcare professionals and non-healthcare professionals which will include anaphylaxis. This will include the signs and symptoms and management approach for mild, moderate and severe allergic reactions. This will be rolled out extensively to a wide range of stakeholders. We would welcome the involvement of healthcare professionals across tertiary, secondary and primary care (e.g. Royal College of General Practitioners, Royal College of Nursing) in this activity, and healthcare leadership (e.g. NHS England, devolved nations heath boards, Integrated Care Boards).” Source location Response from BSACI
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop anaphylaxis guidelines and patient information leaflets with patient organisations, including an accessible leaflet explaining anaphylaxis signs and symptoms.
Verbatim wording from the response “BSACI has collaborated with patient organisations to develop guidelines and information leaflets. This includes an Anaphylaxis patient information leaflet which can be viewed here. This clearly states the signs and symptoms of anaphylaxis and is accessible to all patients.” Source location Response from BSACI
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Develop and maintain allergy action plans distinguishing mild or moderate reactions from anaphylaxis and advising adrenaline if in doubt.
Verbatim wording from the response “The BSACI Allergy Action Plans have two boxes that clearly list the symptoms and signs of firstly a mild or moderate reaction and secondly anaphylaxis. These were developed with a wide range of healthcare professionals and patient groups. Additionally, plans state “if in doubt, give adrenaline”.” Source location Response from BSACI
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Roll out the online allergy education platform extensively to healthcare professionals, non-healthcare professionals and other relevant stakeholders.
Verbatim wording from the response “The BSACI Allergy Action Plans do state that difficulty swallowing is a manifestation of anaphylaxis. These plans were developed with allergy healthcare professionals and patient representatives. The BSACI is developing an online allergy education platform for all healthcare professionals and non-healthcare professionals which will include anaphylaxis. This will include the signs and symptoms and management approach for mild, moderate and severe allergic reactions. This will be rolled out extensively to a wide range of stakeholders. We would welcome the involvement of healthcare professionals across tertiary, secondary and primary care (e.g. Royal College of General Practitioners, Royal College of Nursing) in this activity, and healthcare leadership (e.g. NHS England, devolved nations heath boards, Integrated Care Boards).” Source location Response from BSACI
Open published response
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Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The availability of adrenaline auto-injectors in pharmacies for emergencies cannot be commented on.
Verbatim wording from the response “Concern 4
“I was made aware there had been a shortage of AAI at the time, but a vial of adrenaline was available at the chemist. However, it takes time to draw up. I am not sure if (assuming no national shortage) all chemists have AAI in stock for emergencies.”” Source location Response from BSACI
Open published response
21 Nov 2022 Celia Lindsey MARSH · Prevention of Future Deaths report Avon
View report summary
Concerns raised 12 Potentially unsafe exposure to undeclared allergens for people at significantly higher risk of fatal reactions View source Potentially misleading food-labelling wording and public understanding of allergen absence View source Lack of a robust system for capturing and recording anaphylaxis cases View source Failure to obtain and preserve stomach contents and tissue samples at post-mortem examination View source Lack of adequate education for doctors and patients in anaphylaxis risk groups View source Delays in raising suspected anaphylaxis deaths with the Senior Coroner View source Lack of robust confirmation of allergen absence in ingredients and production View source Outdated pathology guidance for suspected anaphylaxis deaths View source Lack of a standard protocol for timely and appropriate sampling in suspected anaphylaxis deaths View source Failure to retain hospital blood samples in suspected anaphylaxis cases View source Failure to prioritise post-mortem examinations in suspected anaphylaxis deaths View source Failure to obtain and store an early post-death blood sample for later analysis View source See 9 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Celia Lindsey MARSH · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Celia Lindsey Marsh died on 27 December 2017 after suffering fatal anaphylaxis caused by milk protein in a wrap she believed was safe to eat. The principal concerns included the investigation and retention of evidence in suspected anaphylaxis deaths, education for doctors and patients, systems for reporting anaphylaxis, and potentially misleading “dairy-free” and other allergen-labelling claims.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Potentially unsafe exposure to undeclared allergens for people at significantly higher risk of fatal reactions
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group .
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Potentially misleading food-labelling wording and public understanding of allergen absence
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a robust system for capturing and recording anaphylaxis cases
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis , to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to obtain and preserve stomach contents and tissue samples at post-mortem examination
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of adequate education for doctors and patients in anaphylaxis risk groups
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in raising suspected anaphylaxis deaths with the Senior Coroner
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of robust confirmation of allergen absence in ingredients and production
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim .
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Outdated pathology guidance for suspected anaphylaxis deaths
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old , the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a standard protocol for timely and appropriate sampling in suspected anaphylaxis deaths
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to retain hospital blood samples in suspected anaphylaxis cases
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to prioritise post-mortem examinations in suspected anaphylaxis deaths
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to obtain and store an early post-death blood sample for later analysis
Wider context from the report “Concerns were raised in relation to the immediate investigation into a suspected death from anaphylaxis, that the evidence obtained at this time, with the right approach, can be invaluable to preventing deaths, but that to achieve this changes are required. This would need changes in the death investigation process and the wider investigation which would need assistance from the Food Standards Agency (FSA).
I was made aware that there needs to be better education both to doctors and to patients in risk groups to prevent future deaths
I was also advised that whereas the FSA would be required to assist with the above areas it could also assist in relation to the current practices of food labelling.
Firstly in relation to Pathology, I am told that the current guidance is 10 years old, the suggestion is for this to be revisited and specifically:
• If bloods are taken at hospital that they are not destroyed in a suspected case but retained for testing
• That an early blood sample is taken after death and stored for late analysis
• That the possibility that a death is due to anaphylaxis is raised with the Senior Coroner for the area where the death occurred at the earliest opportunity
• That an early blood sample is taken after death
• The post mortem examination should be prioritised.
• At the post mortem examination: that stomach contents are taken and frozen to enable testing and that tissue samples are taken
A standard protocol should be available to ensure appropriate samples are taken at the correct time to assist later investigation.
In relation to doctors/patients:
• To highlight, through public awareness and to the medical profession, that while the majority of food-allergic individuals are at very low risk of fatal reactions, a small subset of food-allergic individuals may be at significantly higher risk. These persons must be given appropriate advice as to the dangers of inadvertent exposure, since there may be no detectable safe level of allergen that can be present in a product for this group.
• To be aware that avoidance of foods in adults does not improve eczema and may result in more severe allergy to the food avoided particularly to cow’s milk but tolerance can be maintained by continued regular exposure.
In relation to the FSA, the UK Health Security Agency and the Department of Health and Social Care:
• To establish a robust system of capturing and recording cases of anaphylaxis, and specifically, fatal and near-fatal anaphylaxis, to provide an early warning of the risk posed to allergic individual by products with undeclared allergen content.
• Such a system could involve mandatory reporting of anaphylaxis presenting to hospitals, analogous to the current system used for notifiable diseases (including some food-borne illnesses) whereby registered medical practitioners have a statutory duty to notify the ‘proper officer’ at their local council or local health protection team of suspected cases of certain infectious diseases. An example of such a reporting system for anaphylaxis already exists in the state of Victoria in Australia, and also allows for rapid alerts of serious cases to public health authorities to expedite investigation and evaluate the public health risk.
In relation to the FSA, the British Retail Consortium, Food and Drink Federation and British Hospitality:
• The wording used on food products, and the public’s understanding of these phrases in terms of implying the absence of a particular allergen, can be potentially misleading. Examples include: “free-from” and “vegan”. Foods labelled in this way must be free from that allergen, and there should be a robust system to confirm the absence of the relevant allergen in all ingredients and during production when making such a claim.
• With respect to those with the most severe food allergies, it may be necessary in the interim to clarify that foods labelled “free-from [X allergen]” may not be safe to consume.
In relation to the FSA:
• A hotline to the FSA to provide guidance in fatal cases due to suspected anaphylaxis, although a mandatory reporting system (suggested above) would address this need.
• Nationally recognised best practice and technical advice to assist those investigating such cases;
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Operate processes for proactively recording UK deaths from anaphylaxis through linked data sources.
Verbatim wording from the response “We have all the processes in place for this system of proactively recording deaths through our web of linkages in the UK which will benefit everyone concerned in learning lessons and attempting to reduce future deaths from anaphylaxis. Our extensive work has repeatedly highlighted the issue of incorrect food labelling resulting in fatal anaphylaxis and we support any initiative taken by the retail industry to improve and clarify these labels to ensure the safety of people with food allergies.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Establish and continue systematic information-sharing links with NHS agencies and other relevant organisations to support register data collection.
Verbatim wording from the response “- For best chances of data retrieval, we have focussed our work on the last ten years in the first instance. The data available and analysed thus far has been shared as Appendix 1 of this document
- strategic engagement to create links with allied agencies has been successfully made. These are outlined in Appendix 2 of this document.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Consider holding an educational event on food avoidance for adults with eczema and food allergy.
Verbatim wording from the response “The BSACI share all of the concerns raised in the report and acknowledge that there are significant areas of need around the current shortcomings in both education of doctors, reporting and analysis of anaphylaxis fatalities to safeguard those who suffer from food and other potentially severe allergies. This is something that the BSACI has a long track record of advocacy around through the National Allergy Strategy Group, www.nasguk.org who have been actively lobbying for improvement. The BSACI recognise the importance of improved education of doctors on food avoidance in relation to adults with eczema and will consider holding an educational event (eg: BSACI Annual Conference)” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide governance for the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Register.
Verbatim wording from the response “However BSACI have been collaborating with Manchester Foundation Trust over the past 18 months by providing governance for the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Register. This register is the only register of its kind in the UK. The aim of the register is to proactively collect data to help us understand the risks and causes of fatal anaphylaxis by analysing the data to determine what the risks of recurrence are, in order to prevent further deaths. Due to the lack of funding previously the register had not been updated since 2005, however in 2020 it was agreed that The British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology (BSACI) would provide governance for the register following a one off £100,000 grant from the FSA.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provide dedicated senior research nurse, administrative, and registry-custodian capacity to support register work.
Verbatim wording from the response “The grant has allowed investment towards time of a senior research nurse and an administrative assistant contributing 2 sessions each week, payment to ████████ from Allergy Action and to The Office of National Statistics to continue to receiving annual data.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Maintain and improve the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Register by updating backlog cases, pursuing missing information, and analysing fatal anaphylaxis data.
Verbatim wording from the response “While many coroners have called for this function to exist, mechanisms of awareness among those who work in the field has been sub-optimal. The data collection is onerous with in-built delays. Since receiving the funding from FSA, UKFAR has made a concerted effort towards the sole purpose of the grant which was to update the backlog of cases. Due to various recent regulatory changes in data retention, UKFAR has had to update permissions. This led to a re-think and the opportunity to improve liaison with allied agencies based within and outside the NHS which will help reduce existing future such backlogs. However this funding will shortly be running out and after numerous attempts to secure continuous funding from the FSA, we have been informed we have not been successful. We then contacted the DoH directly, however they have not responded to our emails.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Existing UK-wide processes and linkages are in place to record fatal anaphylaxis deaths and support learning to reduce future deaths.
Verbatim wording from the response “We have all the processes in place for this system of proactively recording deaths through our web of linkages in the UK which will benefit everyone concerned in learning lessons and attempting to reduce future deaths from anaphylaxis. Our extensive work has repeatedly highlighted the issue of incorrect food labelling resulting in fatal anaphylaxis and we support any initiative taken by the retail industry to improve and clarify these labels to ensure the safety of people with food allergies.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The register cannot continue its work without further funding after unsuccessful attempts to secure ongoing support.
Verbatim wording from the response “While many coroners have called for this function to exist, mechanisms of awareness among those who work in the field has been sub-optimal. The data collection is onerous with in-built delays. Since receiving the funding from FSA, UKFAR has made a concerted effort towards the sole purpose of the grant which was to update the backlog of cases. Due to various recent regulatory changes in data retention, UKFAR has had to update permissions. This led to a re-think and the opportunity to improve liaison with allied agencies based within and outside the NHS which will help reduce existing future such backlogs. However this funding will shortly be running out and after numerous attempts to secure continuous funding from the FSA, we have been informed we have not been successful. We then contacted the DoH directly, however they have not responded to our emails.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Ongoing funding for the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Register is considered a government responsibility because anaphylaxis prevention is a public health issue.
Verbatim wording from the response “This is a public health issue and therefore the responsibility of government. So much ground- work has been undertaken with the funding from the FSA, however in order to prevent future deaths from anaphylaxis UKFAR requires on-going funding now.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
Open published response
Concerns raised 5 Lack of statutory requirements for the appearance of restaurant allergen notices View source Lack of complete allergen information on the face of restaurant menus View source Lack of a national register of severe food anaphylactic reactions View source Inadequate allergen training for serving staff View source Insufficient prominence of allergen notices on restaurant menus View source See 2 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
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AI-generated summary
Owen Carey · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
On 22 April 2017, Owen Carey ate food at Byron restaurant at the O2 centre despite making serving staff aware of his dairy allergy. The chicken contained buttermilk, causing a severe food-induced anaphylactic reaction from which he died. Concerns included the adequacy of allergen training, the prominence and effectiveness of allergen notices and information on menus, and the absence of a national register for severe food anaphylactic reactions.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of statutory requirements for the appearance of restaurant allergen notices
Wider context from the report “(2) The effectiveness of the current placement and appearance of allergen notices on restaurant menus to trigger an allergen discussion between a customer and serving staff: I was told, and accept, that it was more important to trigger a discussion between a customer and member of serving staff about allergens than to have a menu which included complete allergen information on its face. However, the prompt for this discussion on the Byron O2 menu at the time was: (i) on the side of the menu which appeared to focus solely on a ‘special’, namely a Kim Cheese burger, (ii) at the very bottom and distant from all the main food options, (iii) in very small font and (iv) on a royal blue background in black ink. I was told that this placement and appearance was not outwith the ‘general approach of the restaurant industry as a whole and that the current Food Information Regulations did not, unlike with prepacked food, specify the location and / or font size and / or prominence of such an allergen notice. It concerns me that such little prominence appears to be given industry wide to a notice which is intended to trigger what could potentially be a lifesaving discussion between a customer and member of serving staff. It further concerns me that there are no statutory requirements regarding the appearance of such an allergy notice.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of complete allergen information on the face of restaurant menus
Wider context from the report “(3) The lack of key allergen information on the face of restaurant menus and therefore their potential to be falsely reassuring: In my findings I concluded that Owen and his brother would have been falsely reassured with the menu description of Owen's order because on its face the Byron O2 menu in place at the time did not readily identify that the chicken would have been marinated in buttermilk or at all. I was shown a more up to date menu from Byron O2 and note that where buttermilk is now used to marinate chicken it is identified. However, the prompt for this change was one of ‘food fashion’ I was told rather than a move to make the menu more allergen friendly. Although I accept that triggering a discussion between a customer and member of serving staff about allergens is of key importance (as indicated above), the absence of any simple allergen words or symbols on the face of a restaurant menu is of concern , particularly when one takes into account (i) what I was told about the latest figures demonstrating how a significant proportion of customers may be naturally shy/ reluctant about sharing their allergies with serving staff and (ii) that restaurants, like Byron O2, tend to attract younger diners dining alone (i.e. school age children without their parents). It also concerns me that at the time there were symbols on the menu depicting the use of peanuts, but not other allergen , which in my view could also have potentially falsely reassured diners that allergens were being identified on the face of the menu when in fact they were not .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of a national register of severe food anaphylactic reactions
Wider context from the report “(4) The lack of a national register recording severe food anaphylactic reactions: I was told in evidence that despite faster ambulance response times, a greater awareness of allergies and a greater distribution of epi-pens that the death rate for severe food anaphylaxis remains static and that this is attributed in part to the fact that little is known about these deaths because thus far there has been a failure to collect together any learning from these tragedies . It concerns me that there is therefore no national register recording the circumstances of these deaths which could then be analysed and learnt from by allergy specialists .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Inadequate allergen training for serving staff
Wider context from the report “(1) The adequacy and effectiveness of allergen training at Byron O2: My findings included that there must have been a human error by a member of Byron O2 serving staff at the point of ordering. The training provided to serving staff regarding allergens at Byron O2 was limited to a combination of staff members simply attesting to the fact that they had read the company's training on allergen information and no more, coupled with an “on the job” induction in respect of which no records or details existed. It was accepted in evidence that Byron O2 had a high turnover of serving staff. This, I was told and accept, is common for the restaurant industry overall, who often rely, for example on seasonal workers. I was not confident that the current approach to allergen training about which I heard evidence was effective and / or would engage the less diligent employee , which any organisation will have, and which are potentially in a greater proportion where there is high staff turnover.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient prominence of allergen notices on restaurant menus
Wider context from the report “(2) The effectiveness of the current placement and appearance of allergen notices on restaurant menus to trigger an allergen discussion between a customer and serving staff: I was told, and accept, that it was more important to trigger a discussion between a customer and member of serving staff about allergens than to have a menu which included complete allergen information on its face. However, the prompt for this discussion on the Byron O2 menu at the time was: (i) on the side of the menu which appeared to focus solely on a ‘special’, namely a Kim Cheese burger, (ii) at the very bottom and distant from all the main food options, (iii) in very small font and (iv) on a royal blue background in black ink. I was told that this placement and appearance was not outwith the ‘general approach of the restaurant industry as a whole and that the current Food Information Regulations did not, unlike with prepacked food, specify the location and / or font size and / or prominence of such an allergen notice. It concerns me that such little prominence appears to be given industry wide to a notice which is intended to trigger what could potentially be a lifesaving discussion between a customer and member of serving staff. It further concerns me that there are no statutory requirements regarding the appearance of such an allergy notice.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Explore a sustainable UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Registry operating model and assist in securing adequate funding.
Verbatim wording from the response “As a consequence, earlier this year, the current allergy team at Manchester University hospitals (who are the custodians of the data) entered into conversations with the BSACI to explore the possibility of closer working in order to find a solution to the sustainability of the UKFAR. Following from this, BSACI council made a commitment to explore this further including consideration of a workable operating model and assistance in raising adequate funding, thought to be around £120,000 annually. Whilst funding streams could include charitable donations or industry support, these carry significant risk and the involvement of industry may be perceived to taint the integrity of the outputs. The BSACI believe that the appropriate funding solution would be for the Foods Standards Agency to support the UKFAR, as part of their responsibility to safeguarding the public.” Source location 2019-0335-Response-by-BSACI
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Respond to the tender for a UK anaphylaxis register in partnership with Imperial College, securing provisional approval.
Verbatim wording from the response “early warning signal for new risks and highlight specific situations where risk is higher so that they can be actively mitigated. Such a registry already exists in Europe and the Food Standards Agency has recently issued a tender for a UK centre to operate a UK register for anaphylaxis, which will also feed into the wider European platform already in operation. The BSACI, in partnership with Imperial College, have responded to this call and have received provisional approval.” Source location 2019-0335-Response-by-BSACI
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Write to the Food Standards Agency chair to raise the need for funding the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Registry.
Verbatim wording from the response “This would ensure sustainability and also aid engagement with the coronary system, which UKFAR relies on to provide details of all cases of suspected fatal anaphylaxis. The BSACI directors will be writing to the chair of the FSA to raise this issue, which had been previously highlighted but not led to any offer of funding.” Source location 2019-0335-Response-by-BSACI
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation The Food Standards Agency should fund the UK Fatal Anaphylaxis Registry as part of its public-safeguarding responsibility.
Verbatim wording from the response “As a consequence, earlier this year, the current allergy team at Manchester University hospitals (who are the custodians of the data) entered into conversations with the BSACI to explore the possibility of closer working in order to find a solution to the sustainability of the UKFAR. Following from this, BSACI council made a commitment to explore this further including consideration of a workable operating model and assistance in raising adequate funding, thought to be around £120,000 annually. Whilst funding streams could include charitable donations or industry support, these carry significant risk and the involvement of industry may be perceived to taint the integrity of the outputs. The BSACI believe that the appropriate funding solution would be for the Foods Standards Agency to support the UKFAR, as part of their responsibility to safeguarding the public.” Source location 2019-0335-Response-by-BSACI
Open published response
×
Source evidence
How this respondent position was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Catering-establishment staff training falls outside the organisation’s remit.
Verbatim wording from the response “We consider point 1 outside of our remit but fully acknowledge that the issue of staff training at catering establishments is a significant contributor to unnecessary allergic reactions and fully support rigorous measures to address this. Points 2 and 3 relate to the need for better allergen labelling on restaurant menus and again, the BSACI fully supports the need for a review and consultation by the Food Standards Agency to ensure that customers with food allergies are given the information that they need to eat safely. The recent consultation on allergen labelling in relation to food that is prepacked for direct sale has been an excellent example of effective consultation and subsequent positive change.” Source location 2019-0335-Response-by-BSACI
Open published response
Concerns raised 12 Failure to transmit allergy action plans to schools View source Lack of standardisation of allergy action plans across hospitals and schools View source Omission of second adrenaline auto-injector guidance from the emergency call algorithm View source Failure to ensure that school medication is in date View source Lack of awareness that a second adrenaline auto-injector should be administered after deterioration or non-improvement View source Delays in time-critical asthma and allergy review appointments View source Lack of school pupil understanding of allergies and the consequences of allergen exposure View source Failure to check or audit school allergy care plans and medication boxes View source Lack of awareness that adrenaline should be administered immediately for respiratory compromise after allergen exposure View source Insufficient availability of two adrenaline auto-injectors at all times View source Failure to communicate emergency adrenaline instructions effectively in school staff training View source Absence of emergency adrenaline instructions on EpiPen packaging View source See 9 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
No linked response statements No action or position from this recipient is clearly linked to the concerns in this report.
×
AI-generated summary
Karanbir Singh CHEEMA · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Karanbir Singh CHEEMA, a pupil at William Perkin High School with multiple food allergies and asthma, went into anaphylactic shock after another pupil threw cheese at him on 28 June 2017 and died. Concerns included inadequate awareness of his allergies, insufficient checking and availability of EpiPens, an out-of-date EpiPen, failures in sharing and standardising allergy action plans, a cancelled follow-up appointment, and shortcomings in emergency response guidance and training.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to transmit allergy action plans to schools
Wider context from the report “5. The allergy action plan drafted by Karanbir’s doctors at Ealing Hospital did not find its way to his school . There is no standardised approach to this , for example always sending a copy to the school designated safeguarding lead, as well as giving parents/carers a copy for themselves and a copy for the school in case the posted version does not arrive.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of standardisation of allergy action plans across hospitals and schools
Wider context from the report “4. Allergy action plans are not standardised across hospitals and schools , so messages are not as clearly delivered as they could be . This is vital particularly when they may be read for the first time in a desperate situation where panic has set in.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Omission of second adrenaline auto-injector guidance from the emergency call algorithm
Wider context from the report “11. The London Ambulance Service 999 operator did not at any time suggest that a second EpiPen be given , because this is not contained within the algorithm . That could be remedied internationally.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to ensure that school medication is in date
Wider context from the report “3. Karanbir’s EpiPen was out of date . There must be systems in place to ensure that medication in schools is in date .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of awareness that a second adrenaline auto-injector should be administered after deterioration or non-improvement
Wider context from the report “8. There appears to be a lack of awareness nationally of the simple but vital messages that:
- if a person with an allergy has been exposed to an allergen and develops any respiratory compromise, so any breathing difficulty at all, then adrenaline (via EpiPen or other) should be administered immediately, before any asthma pump and even before calling for help;
- if there is a deterioration after giving one EpiPen, then another should be administered immediately, or in any event after five minutes if there is no improvement .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Delays in time-critical asthma and allergy review appointments
Wider context from the report “6. Karanbir’s treating doctors wanted him to re-attend for asthma and allergy review four months after his last consultation. An appointment was made but cancelled by the hospital . By the time of his death four months later he had still not been seen again . There needed to be recognition of the time critical nature of this appointment. It needed to be re-booked without delay.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of school pupil understanding of allergies and the consequences of allergen exposure
Wider context from the report “1. The pupils at Karanbir’s school had a patchy understanding of his allergies, what they were and the consequences of exposure to allergens . Targeted education about this would improve safety.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to check or audit school allergy care plans and medication boxes
Wider context from the report “2. Karanbir’s school care plan and medical box were not checked or audited to ensure, for example, that his care plan stipulated two EpiPens® (adrenaline auto-injectors), the box contained two EpiPens.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of awareness that adrenaline should be administered immediately for respiratory compromise after allergen exposure
Wider context from the report “8. There appears to be a lack of awareness nationally of the simple but vital messages that:
- if a person with an allergy has been exposed to an allergen and develops any respiratory compromise, so any breathing difficulty at all, then adrenaline (via EpiPen or other) should be administered immediately , before any asthma pump and even before calling for help;
- if there is a deterioration after giving one EpiPen, then another should be administered immediately, or in any event after five minutes if there is no improvement.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient availability of two adrenaline auto-injectors at all times
Wider context from the report “7. Karanbir had one EpiPen at home, one at school and one at his father’s home . There is clearly a need for medical teams to emphasise that two EpiPens must be available at all times .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to communicate emergency adrenaline instructions effectively in school staff training
Wider context from the report “10. These instructions were not communicated effectively as part of the school staff’s first aid and EpiPen training .
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Absence of emergency adrenaline instructions on EpiPen packaging
Wider context from the report “9. The EpiPen box does not contain these instructions on the outside .
” Open source report
Concerns raised 13 Insufficient first-aid training for staff supervising pupils View source Failure to confirm replacement medication and complete its dose in the action plan View source Provision of inappropriate emergency asthma inhalers without spacers View source Failure to verify school medication directly during medication reviews View source Failure to provide and follow immediate adrenaline auto-injector administration guidance View source Failure of school staff to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans View source Failure to identify poor asthma control and excessive inhaler prescribing for specialist review View source Failure to maintain accurate allergy action plans with medication-use instructions View source Failure to include a school representative in medication reviews View source Failure to maintain identical current care-plan copies across care settings View source Emergency-services contact procedures causing avoidable delay View source Failure to provide effective refresher training and information sharing for trained staff View source Lack of follow-up review tracking after replacement medication is requested View source See 10 more concerns
Responses linked to these concerns
Each statement is shown once, even when linked to more than one concern.
×
AI-generated summary
Nasar AHMED · Prevention of Future Deaths report
This summary was generated using AI from the published report. Please read the original report for the complete account.
Report summary
Nasar died following an anaphylactic reaction contributed to by asthma while he was in the internal exclusion room at school. The concerns included delayed or inappropriate advice about using his adrenaline auto-injector, discrepancies and gaps in asthma and allergy care planning, unsuitable emergency inhaler equipment, inadequate medication review systems, and shortcomings in staff awareness, training and emergency procedures.
Read the report on judiciary.uk
× Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Insufficient first-aid training for staff supervising pupils
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained , most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER . She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan .
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to confirm replacement medication and complete its dose in the action plan
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box . This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication .
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Provision of inappropriate emergency asthma inhalers without spacers
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler , which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this , and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to verify school medication directly during medication reviews
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist .
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide and follow immediate adrenaline auto-injector administration guidance
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure of school staff to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion . The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER . Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to identify poor asthma control and excessive inhaler prescribing for specialist review
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor ; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year , the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position . For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to maintain accurate allergy action plans with medication-use instructions
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to include a school representative in medication reviews
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy .
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to maintain identical current care-plan copies across care settings
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records .
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Emergency-services contact procedures causing avoidable delay
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay .
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Failure to provide effective refresher training and information sharing for trained staff
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided.
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training . One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump . Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan .
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report × Source evidence
How this individual concern was interpreted PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the report wording shown below. The report was sent to The British Society For Allergy & Clinical Immunology; that does not assign responsibility.
PFD Monitor interpretation Lack of follow-up review tracking after replacement medication is requested
Wider context from the report “The respiratory paediatrician who gave evidence at inquest was firmly of the view that generic adrenaline auto-injectors should be available, in much the same way as defibrillators, in public spaces.
Is this a suggestion that could be given wider consideration?
1. While staff at Nasar’s school were waiting for an ambulance, they asked for advice from the call operator about whether to administer his EpiPen. They were put through to a paramedic, who advised not to use it, I think because the classic signs of anaphylaxis were not obvious.
However, the firm view expressed to me at inquest by Nasar’s respiratory paediatrician was that, if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
He explained that any harm caused by giving intra muscular adrenaline from an auto-injector in this situation is likely to be minimal, even if it proves not to have been needed, whereas the good if it is needed is potentially lifesaving.
1. The picture presented by Nasar to his respiratory paediatrician did not accord, the consultant discovered at inquest, with that given to Nasar’s general practitioner.
Nasar reported to his consultant that he was experiencing few symptoms, and he did extremely well in his last lung function test. Yet his GP found Nasar’s asthma control score to be 14 out of 25, which is poor; and his GP was prescribing 30 inhalers a year, the necessity for which is well recognised as being a risk factor for death.
Nasar should have seen his consultant again. There must be a way of identifying a child in his position. For instance, could there be an automatic flag raised if excess medication is prescribed?
2. The asthma pump in Nasar’s medication box at school was an Accuhaler, which I heard from his respiratory consultant is inappropriate for an emergency situation such as this, and would not have assisted him. Moreover, the appropriate inhaler should have been accompanied by a spacer for best administration.
I wonder whether there is a widespread lack of understanding of the best treatment in this situation?
3. The school nurse had updated Nasar’s care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before, the allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
There must be a way of ensuring that the care plan is accurate and up to date, and that there are identical copies stored at home, school, the GP surgery and within the hospital records.
4. Even if the correct action plan had been used, it does not give the instruction that if a person has an adrenaline auto-injector and:
- has any respiratory compromise, or
- there is a loss of consciousness, or
- if there is doubt,
then the correct and potentially lifesaving course of action, regardless of the particular constellation of signs and symptoms, is to use the EpiPen and to use it immediately.
This was the very firm view of Nasar’s respiratory consultant. Is there a way of disseminating this advice more widely?
1. Although Nasar’s mother was present for Nasar’s medication review conducted by the school nurse, there was no school representative such as the year learning manager there for the meeting, contrary to school policy.
2. The school nurse identified Nasar’s medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but there was no robust system for ensuring that he was booked in for further review when this was provided .
3. Although all staff at the Bow School were encouraged to familiarise themselves with pupils’ care plans, they often did not unless there was a school excursion. The internal exclusion room (IER) supervisor had not done this for the pupils in the IER. Even the deputy headteacher, who had in the past taught Nasar, did not know about Nasar’s food allergies or the fact that he had a care plan and allergy action plan when he placed Nasar in the IER.
4. Not everyone involved in trying to help Nasar was first aid trained, most notably not the learning assistant who was supervising the IER. She said that she would not have thought of looking for and retrieving his care plan.
5. Even those members of staff who were first aid trained it seemed might benefit from additional and/or more frequent training. One member of staff did not share with others the fact that Nasar had asked for this asthma pump. Another looked at his individual healthcare plan, but could not remember looking at the allergy action plan.
6. One member of staff forgot Nasar’s name. It is of course not possible for members of staff to remember the names of all pupils, but perhaps typed forms accompanied by a photograph might help?
7. Although not followed in this instance, I heard that the school policy dictates that the headteacher’s personal assistant should be contacted to telephone the emergency services. Such a stipulation would surely be guaranteed to add delay.
1. When the school nurse (employed by Compass Wellbeing) conducted a review of Nasar’s medication in May 2016, he did not have the medication stored in school in front of him at the time, but relied on its description by a school receptionist.
2. Although Nasar’s mother was present for the review, there was no school representative, such as the year learning manager (head of year), there for the meeting.
3. The school nurse then updated the care plan by using the allergy action plan (mild-moderate with asthma) instead of the correct one used the year before allergy action plan (severe with asthma). This meant that Nasar’s medication box contained an EpiPen without any description of when or how to use it.
4. He identified the medication as being out of date, and asked that in-date medication be provided, but did not diary forward to the following week to ensure that current medication was now in the box. This meant that he also did not complete the action plan with the dose of the relevant medication.
These points raise issues about the actions of this particular nurse and potentially of other nurses in this role in other schools.
” Open source report
×
Source evidence
How this respondent action was interpreted
PFD Monitor created a concise, searchable interpretation from the published response wording shown below.
PFD Monitor interpretation Promote personalised written emergency plans for anaphylaxis and provide adaptable templates for healthcare professionals.
Verbatim wording from the response “In addition, we have promoted the use of written personalised emergency management plans for anaphylactic reactions. We have developed templates which can be used by all healthcare professionals available on the BSACI website and these can be tailored to each individual’s personal circumstances and allergies.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
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How this respondent action was interpreted
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PFD Monitor interpretation Produce national allergy-management guidelines through a NICE-accredited process.
Verbatim wording from the response “We have produced a number of national guidelines using a process accredited by NICE (National Institute of Care Excellence) and these include the following:” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
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PFD Monitor interpretation Support a campaign securing regulatory changes allowing schools to obtain spare adrenaline auto-injectors without prescription for emergencies.
Verbatim wording from the response “BSACI have also been part of a campaign to ensure that schools can hold spare adrenaline auto-injectors without prescription for use in emergencies. This required an amendment to the Human Medicines Regulations Act 2012. We were informed last week that the amendment has been accepted (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/715). The revised regulations will come into effect on 1 October 2017 and will allow schools to buy adrenaline auto-injectors without prescription for use in emergencies from a pharmaceutical supplier in small quantities provided it is done on an occasional basis and not for profit. Furthermore a working group has been set up to develop a website which will provide online resources to support school staff with this.” Source location Response from British Society for Allergy and Clinical Immunology
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Information checked against published PFD reports and official responses · Data reviewed 7 Sep 2026 · About data quality and limitations